Moral disgust and imaginative resistance
Journal
Proceedings of the European Society for Aesthetics
Date Issued
February 2023
Author(s)
Abstract
Unlike the emotional responses of fear, horror or anger, the role of moral
disgust in our engagement with fiction has not been adequately studied. The main aim
of this paper is to examine the role of disgust in moral reasoning in order to establish
a basis for tackling some key problems in our engagement with fiction, such as
imaginative resistance. Drawing insights from phenomenological accounts, moral
disgust is seen as a potentially rational response to our engagement with morally
deviant perspectives and narratives. In the first part of the essay, it is argued that moral
disgust is caused by the narrative under which an agent organizes, colours, and
presents their actions - and, consequently, the value-laden load they attach to those
actions. The second part of the essay examines the hypothesis that moral disgust
functions as a psychological boundary that limits our ability to imaginatively engage
with fiction. The paper concludes by showing how moral disgust relates to certain
versions of imaginative resistance that involve first-personal imaginative engagement
with the perspective of evil characters in morally deviant fictional worlds.
disgust in our engagement with fiction has not been adequately studied. The main aim
of this paper is to examine the role of disgust in moral reasoning in order to establish
a basis for tackling some key problems in our engagement with fiction, such as
imaginative resistance. Drawing insights from phenomenological accounts, moral
disgust is seen as a potentially rational response to our engagement with morally
deviant perspectives and narratives. In the first part of the essay, it is argued that moral
disgust is caused by the narrative under which an agent organizes, colours, and
presents their actions - and, consequently, the value-laden load they attach to those
actions. The second part of the essay examines the hypothesis that moral disgust
functions as a psychological boundary that limits our ability to imaginatively engage
with fiction. The paper concludes by showing how moral disgust relates to certain
versions of imaginative resistance that involve first-personal imaginative engagement
with the perspective of evil characters in morally deviant fictional worlds.
File(s)![Thumbnail Image]()
Name
2023-ESA-Kyprianidou.pdf
Size
760.67 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
4c89cf9774cd10847ac4d369fdbc929c