Παρακαλώ χρησιμοποιήστε αυτό το αναγνωριστικό για να παραπέμψετε ή να δημιουργήσετε σύνδεσμο προς αυτό το τεκμήριο: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14279/19140
Τίτλος: When Does the Board Blame the CEO for Poor Firm Performance? Extreme Resource Reallocation and the Board's Industry and CEO Experience
Συγγραφείς: Louca, Christodoulos 
Petrou, Andreas 
Procopiou, Andreas 
Major Field of Science: Social Sciences
Field Category: Economics and Business
Λέξεις-κλειδιά: Dismiss;CEO;Extreme resource reallocation
Ημερομηνία Έκδοσης: Ιου-2020
Πηγή: British Journal of Management, 2020, vol. 31, no. 3, pp. 505-524
Volume: 31
Issue: 3
Start page: 505
End page: 524
Περιοδικό: British Journal of Management 
Περίληψη: This study sheds light on our understanding of when boards dismiss the CEO by considering the inherent conflict created by the board's advisory role when the firm underperforms. Using a sample of US firms listed in Standard & Poor's ExecuComp for the period 2000–2012 we find that, when a firm underperforms, extreme resource reallocation increases the likelihood of CEO dismissal. This relationship is positively moderated by the board's industry and CEO experience. The study contributes to the literature on corporate governance by identifying the conditions that trigger dismissal of the CEO in light of boards’ motive to protect their reputation.
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14279/19140
ISSN: 14678551
DOI: 10.1111/1467-8551.12384
Rights: © Wiley
Type: Article
Affiliation: Cyprus University of Technology 
University of Liverpool 
Publication Type: Peer Reviewed
Εμφανίζεται στις συλλογές:Άρθρα/Articles

CORE Recommender
Δείξε την πλήρη περιγραφή του τεκμηρίου

SCOPUSTM   
Citations

9
checked on 6 Νοε 2023

WEB OF SCIENCETM
Citations

10
Last Week
0
Last month
0
checked on 29 Οκτ 2023

Page view(s) 50

364
Last Week
0
Last month
3
checked on 22 Δεκ 2024

Google ScholarTM

Check

Altmetric


Αυτό το τεκμήριο προστατεύεται από άδεια Άδεια Creative Commons Creative Commons