Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14279/35365
Title: Implicit Promises and the Timing of Defined-Benefit Pension Plan Freezes
Authors: Petrou, Zacharias 
Vlittis, Adamos 
Major Field of Science: Social Sciences
Field Category: Economics and Business
Keywords: CEO turnover;Implicit contracts;Defined-benefit pension plans;Pension freezes
Issue Date: 23-Apr-2025
Source: Financial Management, 2025
Journal: Financial Management 
Abstract: Firms time defined-benefit (DB) plan freezes after CEO turnovers to protect CEO retirement benefits from cost cuts affecting the wider workforce. We document a significant increase in voluntary CEO turnovers just before the freeze, without notable post-freeze changes. Our results suggest that firms prioritize retaining their CEOs and avoiding reputational costs over cost-cutting measures that could negatively impact their top talent. Overall, the study uncovers the timing of the freeze as a strategy that firms use to honor pension promises to their CEOs and informs the academic debate on the relation between DB plans and employee mobility.
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14279/35365
ISSN: 00463892
DOI: 10.1111/fima.12501
Type: Article
Affiliation : University of Liverpool 
University of Cyprus 
Publication Type: Peer Reviewed
Appears in Collections:Άρθρα/Articles

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