Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14279/33106
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorAmornpaisannon, Burin-
dc.contributor.authorDiavastos, Andreas-
dc.contributor.authorPeh, Li Shiuan-
dc.contributor.authorCarlson, Trevor E.-
dc.date.accessioned2024-10-15T11:17:11Z-
dc.date.available2024-10-15T11:17:11Z-
dc.date.issued2020-12-17-
dc.identifier.citationICCAD '20: Proceedings of the 39th International Conference on Computer-Aided Design, 2020, article No.: 50, pp. 1 - 9en_US
dc.identifier.isbn9781450380263-
dc.identifier.issn10923152-
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14279/33106-
dc.description.abstractLaser fault injection in integrated circuits is a powerful information leakage technique due to its high precision, timing accuracy and repeatability. Countermeasures to these attacks have been studied extensively. However, with most current design flows, security tests against these attacks can only be realized after chip fabrication. Restarting the complete silicon design cycle in order to address these vulnerabilities is thus both time-consuming and costly. To overcome these limitations, this paper proposes an open-source benchmark suite that allows chip designers to simulate laser attacks, and evaluate the security of their designs, both hardware-based and software-based, against laser fault injection early on during design time. The proposed benchmark suite consists of a tool that automatically integrates hardware-based spatial, temporal and hybrid redundancy techniques into a target design. With the tools used in this work, we demonstrate how the attacks can be simulated on a Verilog simulator, and run on an FPGA with a design equipped with hardware-based redundancy techniques without manual modifications. This work consists of four attacks, and four hardware-based redundancy techniques. The attacks and defenses together that the benchmark suite provides will automate the entire early design evaluation flow against laser fault injection attacks.en_US
dc.formatpdfen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.subjectintegrated circuitsen_US
dc.subjectlaser fault attacken_US
dc.subjectHardware securityen_US
dc.subjectbenchmark suiteen_US
dc.titleLaser Attack Benchmark Suiteen_US
dc.typeConference Papersen_US
dc.collaborationNational University of Singaporeen_US
dc.subject.categoryComputer and Information Sciencesen_US
dc.journalsOpen Accessen_US
dc.countrySingaporeen_US
dc.subject.fieldEngineering and Technologyen_US
dc.publicationPeer Revieweden_US
dc.relation.conference39th International Conference on Computer-Aided Designen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1145/3400302.3415646en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85097963417-
dc.identifier.urlhttps://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/85097963417-
cut.common.academicyear2020-2021en_US
dc.identifier.spage1en_US
dc.identifier.epage9en_US
item.grantfulltextopen-
item.openairetypeconferenceObject-
item.openairecristypehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_c94f-
item.fulltextWith Fulltext-
item.cerifentitytypePublications-
item.languageiso639-1en-
crisitem.author.deptDepartment of Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering and Informatics-
crisitem.author.facultyFaculty of Engineering and Technology-
crisitem.author.orcid0000-0002-7139-4444-
crisitem.author.parentorgFaculty of Engineering and Technology-
Appears in Collections:Δημοσιεύσεις σε συνέδρια /Conference papers or poster or presentation
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