Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14279/26593| Title: | An ultimatum wage bargaining experiment on trade union efficiency |
| Authors: | Andreou, Adamos Andreou, Sofia N. García-Gallego, Aurora Georgantzís, Nikolaos |
| Major Field of Science: | Social Sciences |
| Field Category: | Economics and Business |
| Keywords: | Experiments;Trade unions;Ultimatum bargaining;Wages |
| Issue Date: | Oct-2013 |
| Source: | Bulletin of Economic Research, 2013, vol. 65, no. 4, pp. 354-361 |
| Volume: | 65 |
| Issue: | 4 |
| Start page: | 354 |
| End page: | 361 |
| Journal: | Bulletin of Economic Research |
| Abstract: | We present an ultimatum wage bargaining experiment showing that a trade union facilitating non-binding communication among workers, raises wages by simultaneously increasing employers' posted offers and toughening the bargaining position of employees, without reducing overall market efficiency. © 2011 John Wiley & Sons Ltd and the Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research. |
| URI: | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14279/26593 |
| ISSN: | 14678586 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/j.1467-8586.2011.00406.x |
| Rights: | © Wiley |
| Type: | Article |
| Affiliation : | University of Cyprus Universitat Jaume I University of Granada |
| Publication Type: | Peer Reviewed |
| Appears in Collections: | Άρθρα/Articles |
CORE Recommender
This item is licensed under a Creative Commons License
