Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14279/26593
Title: An ultimatum wage bargaining experiment on trade union efficiency
Authors: Andreou, Adamos 
Andreou, Sofia N. 
García-Gallego, Aurora 
Georgantzís, Nikolaos 
Major Field of Science: Social Sciences
Field Category: Economics and Business
Keywords: Experiments;Trade unions;Ultimatum bargaining;Wages
Issue Date: Oct-2013
Source: Bulletin of Economic Research, 2013, vol. 65, no. 4, pp. 354-361
Volume: 65
Issue: 4
Start page: 354
End page: 361
Journal: Bulletin of Economic Research 
Abstract: We present an ultimatum wage bargaining experiment showing that a trade union facilitating non-binding communication among workers, raises wages by simultaneously increasing employers' posted offers and toughening the bargaining position of employees, without reducing overall market efficiency. © 2011 John Wiley & Sons Ltd and the Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research.
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14279/26593
ISSN: 14678586
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8586.2011.00406.x
Rights: © Wiley
Type: Article
Affiliation : University of Cyprus 
Universitat Jaume I 
University of Granada 
Publication Type: Peer Reviewed
Appears in Collections:Άρθρα/Articles

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