Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14279/26593| Title: | An ultimatum wage bargaining experiment on trade union efficiency | Authors: | Andreou, Adamos Andreou, Sofia N. García-Gallego, Aurora Georgantzís, Nikolaos |
Major Field of Science: | Social Sciences | Field Category: | Economics and Business | Keywords: | Experiments;Trade unions;Ultimatum bargaining;Wages | Issue Date: | Oct-2013 | Source: | Bulletin of Economic Research, 2013, vol. 65, no. 4, pp. 354-361 | Volume: | 65 | Issue: | 4 | Start page: | 354 | End page: | 361 | Journal: | Bulletin of Economic Research | Abstract: | We present an ultimatum wage bargaining experiment showing that a trade union facilitating non-binding communication among workers, raises wages by simultaneously increasing employers' posted offers and toughening the bargaining position of employees, without reducing overall market efficiency. © 2011 John Wiley & Sons Ltd and the Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research. | URI: | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14279/26593 | ISSN: | 14678586 | DOI: | 10.1111/j.1467-8586.2011.00406.x | Rights: | © Wiley | Type: | Article | Affiliation : | University of Cyprus Universitat Jaume I University of Granada |
Publication Type: | Peer Reviewed |
| Appears in Collections: | Άρθρα/Articles |
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