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Τίτλος: Agency Cost of Debt and Inside Debt: The Role of CEO Overconfidence
Συγγραφείς: Galariotis, Emilios 
Louca, Christodoulos 
Petmezas, Dimitris 
Wang, Shuhui 
Major Field of Science: Social Sciences
Field Category: Economics and Business
Λέξεις-κλειδιά: Agency Cost;Debt;CEO Overconfidence
Ημερομηνία Έκδοσης: 1-Ιαν-2023
Πηγή: British Journal of Management, 2023, vol. 34, iss.3, pp. 1606–1631
Volume: 34
Issue: 3
Περίληψη: This study extends our understanding of CEO inside debt compensation under an agency problem perspective by considering the impact of a behavioural trait, namely CEO overconfidence. Using a sample of US firms in Standard & Poor's ExecuComp for the period 2006–2019, we find that overconfident CEOs exhibit greater inside debt incentives (i.e. incentives arising from defined-benefit pensions and deferred compensation). This relationship is more pronounced among firms with higher CEO overconfidence-induced agency cost of debt (e.g. financially unconstrained firms) managed by CEOs who are less able to align compensation with their own preferences (e.g. less powerful CEOs). The results are robust to endogeneity, self-selection concerns and alternative explanations. We contribute to the inside compensation literature that deals with agency problems under overconfident CEOs, and optimal contracting and managerial power theories.
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14279/29699
ISSN: 10453172
DOI: 10.1111/1467-8551.12661
Rights: © The Authors
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Type: Article
Affiliation: Audencia Business School 
Cyprus University of Technology 
Durham University 
University of Surrey 
Publication Type: Peer Reviewed
Εμφανίζεται στις συλλογές:Άρθρα/Articles

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