House Prices and School Quality: The Impact of Score and Non-score Components of Contextual Value-Added
Date Issued
May 2010
Author(s)
Abstract
This paper investigates how the newly introduced Contextual Value
Added (CVA) indicator of school quality affects house prices in the
catchment area of primary and secondary schools in England. The
empirical analysis, based on data drawn from three independent and
previously unexplored UK data sources, shows that the score
component of CVA has a strong positive effect on house prices at both
primary and secondary levels of education; while the non-score
component of this school quality indicator has a significant (negative)
effect only in the analysis of secondary school data. Nevertheless, the
effect of CVA and its score and non-score components on house prices
also varies with the level of spatial aggregation at which empirical
investigation is pursued, assuming a more ‘positive’ role between
rather than within Local Authorities (LAs). This reflects the emphasis
placed by CVA on ‘public good’ aspects of school quality and suggests
that LA policies aimed at raising the average non-score quality
characteristics of schools conform to household preferences.
Added (CVA) indicator of school quality affects house prices in the
catchment area of primary and secondary schools in England. The
empirical analysis, based on data drawn from three independent and
previously unexplored UK data sources, shows that the score
component of CVA has a strong positive effect on house prices at both
primary and secondary levels of education; while the non-score
component of this school quality indicator has a significant (negative)
effect only in the analysis of secondary school data. Nevertheless, the
effect of CVA and its score and non-score components on house prices
also varies with the level of spatial aggregation at which empirical
investigation is pursued, assuming a more ‘positive’ role between
rather than within Local Authorities (LAs). This reflects the emphasis
placed by CVA on ‘public good’ aspects of school quality and suggests
that LA policies aimed at raising the average non-score quality
characteristics of schools conform to household preferences.