

“Other Than Mexicans”, “Islamic Fascists” and the transatlantic regulation of risky subjects

Ethnicities

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Abstract

Post-9/11 significations of “immigration threat” link the policing of the US–Mexico border to the “war on terror” geopolitically such that domestic policies and practices related to the regulation of “undocumented” Latino migrants shape and are shaped by extra-domestic considerations related to the signification of Arab and Muslim communities. In broadening migration analysis, to include a geopolitical dimension, we are able to draw out the changing patterns of racialized population regulation within a given territory of the international state complex. Consequently, extending the geopolitical reach to include US and UK post-9/11 security regimes reveals that the logic underpinning the “Other Than Mexican” immigration category in the US, ostensibly an addition to and extension of the signification of threat posed by Latinos to the US, is neither Latino nor US specific: an idiom of threat is mobilized around “special interest aliens” as perpetrators of risk to the global social order, which broadens the domestic reach of state surveillance. The “war on terror” with related discourses of “anti-fundamentalism” and “islamofascism” specifies that risk averse surveillance documents the “elusive undocumented” carrier of terror threat, guilty by association: a cipher of fear is armed and disarmed, used to legitimate and operationalize surveillance as precautionary intervention. Through an analysis of the signification of immigration threat related to the state of Arizona’s Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, SB1070 in 2010 with the judicial investigation surrounding the killing of Brazilian migrant Jean Charles de Menezes

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by Metropolitan police on the London Underground in 2005, this study reveals how the lethal logic of Other Than Mexican regulation underpins the post-9/11 transatlantic politics of racialized risk, reconfiguring state intervention related to the “browning of America” through an “anti-fundamentalist” population control measure.

Keywords

Anti-fundamentalism, Arabs, immigration, “islamofascism”, Jean Charles de Menezes, Latinos, Muslims, Other Than Mexican, post-9/11, war on terror

The U.S. Border Patrol uses choppers, ATVs and horses to patrol the 2000-mile border between the Southeastern U.S. and Mexico. Agents say most of the illegals caught crossing are from Mexico or South America. Still, they say thousands of people caught are classified as O.T.M.’s, which stands for “other than Mexican”. They report that includes hundreds of people from nations that sponsor terrorism.

...the route Middle Easterners take. They travel from Europe to South America to the tri-border region, where they learn to speak Spanish then travel to Mexico and blend in with other illegals heading to this country. (WSB-TV, 2010)

Introduction

The post-9/11 culture of fear has been well documented (Altheide, 2006; Linke and Smith, 2009; Mythen and Walklate, 2006), as has the impact of the “war on terror” on Middle Eastern migrants/minority citizens, particularly in the US (Akram and Johnson, 2002; Cankar, 2011; Khan and Ecklund, 2012; Naber, 2006; Salaita, 2006). Additionally, studies of immigration geopolitics illustrate how US–Mexico border control mechanisms and policies have increasingly come to encroach on the US domestic interior such that “undocumented migration” provides an ideological bridge linking the “war on terror” with the signification of “Latino threat” through criminality (Ackleson, 2005; Andreas, 2003; Coleman, 2007). Following from this work it is striking that the Other Than Mexican (OTM) US immigration category, which has gained media prominence in the post-9/11 era, has been the subject of very little academic attention (Kyriakides, 2012; Kyriakides and Torres, 2012). As our study shows, the OTM, including as it does the sub-designation of “special interest alien”, presents us with an opportunity to deepen our knowledge of the relationship between post-9/11 geopolitics and the domestic control of immigration.

In this paper, we broaden our geopolitical reach via comparative US–UK analysis of state responses to immigration post-9/11. In doing so we demonstrate that, the logic of OTM is not US-specific. Our study pairs two strands of analysis.

By comparing political debate around the 2010 introduction of Arizona law SB1070 with the judicial investigation surrounding the killing of Brazilian migrant Jean Charles de Menezes by Metropolitan police on the London Underground in 2005, we reveal how an OTM control logic links the “war on terror” to the politics of precaution on both sides of the Atlantic. With little objective presence, the OTM validates state intervention by operationalizing a subjective cipher of fear. Comparing the Bush administration’s targeting of “islamofascism” with the Blair administration’s move toward “faith group inclusion” puts flesh on the bones of the OTM. “Neither Muslim nor Latino”, the “special interest alien” is a security category that splits Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations’ and Fukuyama’s End of History protagonist such that state intervention attempts to harness allegiance by elevating the subjective threat posed by “authoritarian fundamentalists”.

Fear “without a Subject”

On 23 April 2010, the state of Arizona enacted the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, SB1070. The law, which aimed to strengthen the control of illegal immigration across the Mexican–Arizona border, drew unprecedented reaction and protest. The most controversial part of the law required that “a reasonable attempt . . . be made to determine the immigration status of a person during any legitimate contact made by an official or agency of the state or a county, city, town, or political subdivision if reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien who is unlawfully present in the United States” (Arizona State Senate, 2010: 1). The clause evidently paves the way to racial profiling. On what basis would a police officer reasonably suspect that a person is an immigrant whose legal status should be verified? It seems implausible that a “white” person in a southern border town would be asked to verify his or her legal status. “Reasonable suspicion” of unlawful presence is most likely to be aroused by persons of Mexican and other “nonwhite” ethnic origins. Moreover, people who are wrongly identified as belonging to such groups will also be “reasonably suspected.”

Oppressive police practices toward racialized groups in the United States have been well documented, coming to light most famously in the brutalization of Rodney King by Los Angeles police (Escobar, 1999; Gooding-Williams, 1993; Moore, 2010; Nelson, 2001; Weitzer and Tuch, 2006). What sometimes goes unnoticed is that the treatment of internal minorities has a reciprocal effect on that of migrants and vice versa. Viewed in historical context, recent legislative measures like Arizona Law SB1070 can be interpreted, in effect, as an attempt to legalize common law enforcement practices that can adversely affect “nonwhite” minorities as a whole and not just in Arizona. A 2004 report by Amnesty International USA revealed that “racial profiling is so pervasive that it has impacted nearly 32 million people in the United States,” including Native Americans, Asian Americans, Hispanic Americans, African Americans, Arab Americans, Persian Americans, American Muslims, and, in some instances, white Americans. Moreover, profiling of citizens and visitors of Middle Eastern and South Asian descent, and others who

are identified as originating from these areas, has substantially increased since 9/11 (Amnesty, 2004). As Leo Chavez makes abundantly clear, the threat to national security posed by Mexican and other Latin American migration is “a powerful theme in the post-9/11 political debate over security” (2008: 133). But the idiom of threat has extended across ethnic groups such that racial profiling in police, immigration, and airport security procedures has expanded.

The very title of the Border Protection, Anti-terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005 clearly represents the process through which terror and immigration are at once paired in the signification of threat to the US public. The bill sought to address “border security vulnerabilities. . . related to the prevention of the entry of terrorists, other unlawful aliens, narcotics, and other contraband” (US Government, 2005: 95). The apparent ease with which lawmakers move between terrorism and unlawful aliens reflects to an extent that “today, the two seminal considerations regarding the Americanization of matters racial have to do with the twin towers of immigration and terrorism” (Goldberg, 2006: 22). The bill was introduced after then deputy secretary of Homeland Security Admiral James Loy testified before the 109th United States Congress:

Entrenched human smuggling networks and corruption in areas beyond our borders can be exploited by terrorist organizations . . . Emerging threat streams strongly suggest that al-Qaeda has considered using the southwest border to infiltrate the United States. Several al-Qaeda leaders believe operatives can pay their way into the country through Mexico and also believe illegal entry is more advantageous than legal entry for operational security reasons. However, there is currently no evidence that al-Qaeda operatives have made successful penetrations into the United States via this method. (US Congress Report, 2005: 40–41)

The negative representation of migrants extends the boundaries of lawful suspicion. Loy’s testimony provides a basis for viewing Mexican migrants as potential carriers of terrorist threat. However, a report published in 2005 by the Congressional Research Service (2005) clarifies that the United States Border Patrol (USBP) categorizes unauthorized aliens as “Mexican” or “Other Than Mexican” (OTM). On one level, the distinction is purely administrative. Unlike Mexicans, OTMs cannot be immediately deported back across the Mexican border because they must be returned either to their country of origin or to a willing third country; Mexico will not accept them. However, the OTM category includes a subclassification that refers to those migrants who originate from a “special interest country” considered to harbor terrorists or foment terrorism. It is the “special interest OTMs” who are thought to constitute the most significant migratory threat to US security, and it is “their” signified connection with other migrants and US citizens that underpins the state’s regulative framework. But what are the criteria by which an OTM is to be identified?

In an important sense, the tenet of the OTM category is not limited to the United States and it is this signified connection that provides the regulative

geopolitical bridge that links emerging “transatlantic” methods of migrant regulation.

He half-tripped, was half-pushed to the floor. The policeman nearest to me had the black automatic pistol in his left hand. He held it down to the guy and unloaded five shots into him.

He looked like a Pakistani, but he had a baseball cap on and quite a thickish coat. It was a coat like you would wear in winter, a sort of padded jacket. It looked out of place in the weather we’ve been having. (CNN, 2005)

On 22 July 2005, 15 days after four British Muslims took their own lives and those of 57 commuters by detonating suicide bombs on the London transport system, 27-year-old electrician Jean Charles de Menezes, a Brazilian migrant who lived and worked in London, was “cornered like a fox” and shot dead by British Metropolitan police (Met) while boarding a train at Stockwell Street underground station. Surveillance officers had misidentified de Menezes as Ethiopian-born British citizen Osman Hussain, wanted in connection with attempted bombings that had failed to detonate on the transport system the previous day. The Met’s shoot-to-kill policy, Operation Kratos, gave high-ranked officers the authority to shoot suspected suicide bombers without warning. Though de Menezes had no connection with terrorism and was completely innocent, police’ suspicions were “confirmed” by the observation that he, like Hussain, “had Mongolian eyes.” In fact, once “identified,” de Menezes’ subsequent behavior and demeanor (while objectively without irregularity) were interpreted as those of a terrorist on a mission. The Met, one of the most powerful and well-resourced police forces in the world and staffed with highly trained personnel using sophisticated intelligence and surveillance techniques, acted lethally on the basis that the physical characteristics of an innocent man were, in the eyes of the surveillance team, those of a suicide bomber. Physical characteristics easily signified suspicion such that the migrant de Menezes was associated with terror, deemed a public threat, and therefore a legitimate target for extermination. In the imagination of the police officers, an indisputable thread connected two disparate individuals. Merged with Osman Hussain in the signification of threat, de Menezes’ objective connection to the suspect (that they were both migrants) assumed a subjective meaning that obliterated logic. The decision to execute reveals that when it comes to migrants, “suspicion” is not objective. Rather, it is the objective process through which certain biological characteristics are paired with threat that provides validity to the subjective form that the policing of migration takes. The process is instrumentalized by the state, formalized through law, and practiced on both sides of the Atlantic.

What is disconcerting about the OTM category is the simultaneous (in)visibility it identifies as suspicious. Although OTM includes a subcategory that refers to migrants from “special interest countries,” it can also refer to all groups. The category of people who are not Mexican includes everyone on the planet except

Mexicans. Does this then mean that Mexicans are beyond suspicion? The answer is no, but it does mean that we are all potentially under suspicion. The importance of the OTM lies in its geopolitical applicability in targeting the negative object—the common link among all OTMs—of risk. It is the degree of risk that an individual comes to represent that identifies his or her presence as a domestic threat. As a piece in the *Tucson Weekly* illustrates, there need not be any objective basis for the threat. The number of OTM “special interest aliens” apprehended in the Tucson sector and the Arizona office of the Yuma sector in 2004 was 11, including Egypt (1); Eritrea (2); Indonesia (2); Iraq (1); Lebanon (2); Pakistan (2); and the Philippines (1). In 2003, 13 were arrested, but despite the absence of objective threat, the piece concludes that the numbers are:

almost meaningless. The number caught isn’t important; the number of “gotaways”—those who weren’t caught—is, and nobody, in government or anywhere else, has any idea how many of those exist. But it’s always greater than the number arrested, sometimes much greater. That leaves a lot of illegals from high-risk countries on the loose in our country. (Banks, 2004)

There is no objective basis for the suspicion subjectively aroused other than the process through which the signification of threat is legitimized by law. Even where threat is unknown, it is presumed. In a climate of suspicion, misidentification, as was the case in the United Kingdom with Jean Charles de Menezes, can take on lethal proportions, and the person in the street is no less likely than the London Met, LAPD, or Arizona state police to misidentify. Next, we will demonstrate how the OTM designation, an idiom of threat through which the state attempts to assert its moral authority, ultimately disarms opposition.

Precautionary intervention

In terms of the contemporary domestic law and order framework through which migration is linked to internal minorities and the wider public, a key discourse, if not the dominant interpretative paradigm, is that of “safety.” The discourse of safety links Jean Charles de Menezes and Arizona Law SB1070. There can be little doubt that the police officer who shot de Menezes did so with the intention to kill, yet he could not be prosecuted for acting under orders issued by the Met’s operations commander. The Met was held liable, not for unlawful killing but under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 for “failing to provide for the health, safety, and welfare of Jean Charles de Menezes” (BBC Report, 2006). “Safety” was the key word surrounding the entire prosecution. During the case, Met Deputy Assistant Commissioner and Operations Commander Cressida Dick refuted claims that she missed the “one safe opportunity” to stop de Menezes (Naughton, 2007). But, a wider case for safety was being made: that in tracking and killing a potential suicide bomber (even if the wrong man was killed), the Met was attempting to protect the greater public to ensure public safety. Given that the

Met had shot and killed the wrong man in a city renowned for its mix of different ethnic communities who travel on the London Underground every day, few would be reassured by the Met's defense. Later, former MET Deputy Assistant Commissioner Brian Paddick attempted, unsuccessfully, to key into the London public's insecurity when he stood for the position of mayor with the campaign pitch that he "knows how to make Londoners feel safe" (Sylvester and Thomson, 2007). An appeal to "community safety", where killing is a precautionary measure, ultimately increases suspicion from which state agencies are not exempt.

Obvious parallels can be seen with Arizona's Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, SB1070. At the signing of SB1070, Governor Jan Brewer explained her rationale for doing so:

There is no higher priority than protecting the citizens of Arizona. We cannot sacrifice our safety to the murderous greed of drug cartels. We cannot stand idly by as drop houses, kidnappings, and violence compromise our quality of life.

While protecting our citizens is paramount, it cannot come at the expense of the diversity that has made Arizona so great. Nor can safety mean a compromise of freedom for some, while we, the many, turn a blind eye.

We must use this new tool wisely, and fight for our safety with the honor Arizona deserves. (Brewer, 2010)

Safety is put forward as a justification for increasing police border protection powers and simultaneously as a protection of diversity, of minorities. Brewer is mindful that state repression has often been justified at the expense of some groups in society, and she seeks to reassure that this will not be the case with SB1070 because the primary goal is that of protecting an ethnically diverse community from the effects of border harms. Immigration regulation is justified through an appeal to the equal right to be safe. This precautionary legitimization logic creates an irresolvable paradigm of threat that disarms those who work within the safety framework. Dan Pochoda, legal director of Arizona ACLU, had on the previous day issued a statement that "forcing local police to demand people's papers and arrest those who can't immediately prove their status will do nothing to make us safer," but rather, "what it will do is divert scarce police resources to address false threats and force officers to prioritize immigration enforcement over all other public safety responsibilities" (ACLU, 2010). The Act will heighten sensitivity to immigration; misplaced hypervigilance will drain police resources and result in neglect of other community safety threats. Pochoda is mindful that law can legitimize anti-immigrant sentiment with the effect that nonimmigrant minorities will be targeted, ultimately undermining the equal right to be safe. Both Brewer and Pochoda are advocates for community safety; for Brewer, uncontrolled immigration makes communities unsafe, and for Pochoda, immigrants and communities are made unsafe by Arizona Law SB1070. For President Barack Obama, however,

both uncontrolled immigration and SB1070 threatened safety. The law, he argued, would, “undermine basic notions of fairness that we cherish as Americans, as well as the trust between police and our communities that is so crucial to keeping us safe” (Archibold, 2010). At a meeting with Brewer at the White House on 4 June 2010, Obama pledged to assuage safety fears by sending 1,200 National Guard troops to the United States–Mexico border, most of which were to be positioned on the Arizona–Mexico border (Superville and Gamboa, 2010). Increased militarization proposed as a safety measure simultaneously validates the idiom of threat.

Obama’s inclusion of community-police “trust” within the paradigm of safety is telling in that it situates immigration within a wider concern to uphold the legitimacy of state institutions, and the legitimacy deficit has a history that predates the current administration. It is an observation reinforced by Amitai Etzioni: “Trust is a key element of ends-based relationships; while general social trust among the general public has been diminishing, trust in public leaders and institutions is particularly vulnerable” (2000: 30). Indeed, the idea of mistrust played a key role in the defeat of George W. Bush’s Immigration Reform Act in 2007. Touted as one of the biggest shake-ups of immigration law since Reagan’s 1986 Immigration Act, the Bush proposals were slammed for not going far enough to instill trust. “The general consensus,” charged Republican Senator Bob Corker, “is that at the end of the day, the American people do not trust Congress and do not trust the administration to carry out the things that are in the bill.” Speaking of their alternative bill for what they saw as a stronger border security enforcement proposal, Republican Senators Saxby Chambliss and Johnny Isakson added, “We believe the way to build greater support for immigration reform in the United States Senate and among the American public is to regain the trust in the ability of the federal government to responsibly administer immigration programs and enforce immigration laws” (Mittelstadt, 2007). The debate about and crushing of the bill reveal deeper issues about Republican unity, but what is clear is that there was no disunity on the need to instill trust. In short, the Bush proposals were rejected because, it was argued, they did not make Americans feel safe enough. Speaking toward the end of his tenure as president, Bush reflected on the impact of the defeated bill:

No question the American people expect us to enforce our borders. And I understand it and agree with that. But there’s a humane way to do it, and the approach I laid out was logical, humane, and upheld our values. And has there been a political consequence to the Republican Party? Evidently. But that doesn’t mean we can’t regain the trust of the Latino vote. It’s just that I’m not going to be out there regaining the trust of the Latino vote because I’m retired—in 12 days. (Dunham, 2009)

The complexity of gaining trust by making people feel safe is, for the political classes, intensified by the presence of what is presented in the United States as substantial ethnic minority populations—in this case, “Latinos”—but the need for an “interethnic safety-trust” compact runs deeper than an opportunist bid to enlist

voting constituencies, although that is certainly part of it. What contemporary immigration debate in the United States reveals is that the state attempts to bestow “victim” recognition. The so-called “immigration threat” is one medium (“terrorist threat” is another) through which some “whites” perceive themselves to be victims, and they want this recognized. This takes the form of demanding that the “state keep us safe, as is our right.” White recognition, if it is granted, then becomes the medium through which some “minorities”—in this case, anyone who can be mistaken for constituting an immigration or terrorist “threat”—protest in the name of victimization. Again, the demand is that the “state keep us safe, as is our right.” The state responds to its “victim constituencies” by conferring recognition, but it is a balancing act that in itself threatens to victimize, for recognizing one group’s victimization requires that a high-risk perpetrator be identified who cannot claim that the label is itself evidence of victimization. As the killing of Jean Charles de Menezes reveals, such identification is fraught with difficulties. Without a “credible” perpetrator, the process of justice must collapse into authoritarian remedy and it is not unique to the United States.

In 2002, New Labour’s Home Secretary David Blunkett laid out the United Kingdom Home Office’s rationale underpinning British migration and asylum policy:

Confidence, security, and trust make all the difference in enabling a safe haven to be offered to those coming to the UK. To enable integration to take place, and to value the diversity it brings, we need to be secure within our sense of belonging and identity and therefore to be able to reach out to and to embrace those who come to the UK.

Britain needs to be made safe for migrants. There is lack of confidence, and there is insecurity and a sense of distrust among the British population, an identity crisis that cannot cope with the demand that the integration of diverse identities brings vis-à-vis migration. The safety of migrants is tied to the safety of the host population. This is extended as follows:

Having a clear, workable, and robust nationality and asylum system is the prerequisite to building the security and trust that is needed. Without it, we cannot defeat those who would seek to stir up hate, intolerance, and prejudice. The Government, and those agencies and organisations delivering nationality, immigration, and asylum services, need to demonstrate that they know what they are doing, and that they are doing it well. (Home Office, 2002: 3)

As we will go on to demonstrate, the perpetrator that makes both migrant and host populations unsafe is identified via policy as “hate.” If the population does not trust the government agencies that are responsible for immigration, “hate” intervenes, a dangerous emotion, is stirred, and safety is threatened. Government intervention is legitimized as a means of circumventing “interethnic hate,” the fear of which is appealed to as a means of fostering social stability and interethnic

harmony. Identifying with government on the basis of its ability to pacify “hate” makes us feel safe. What is the cause of “hate”?

“The hate that hate produced”

The recent arrests that our fellow citizens are now learning about are a stark reminder that this nation is at war with Islamic fascists who will use any means to destroy those of us who love freedom, to hurt our nation . . . This country is safer than it was prior to 9/11. We’ve taken a lot of measures to protect the American people. But obviously we’re still not completely safe, because there are people that still plot and people who want to harm us for what we believe in. It is a mistake to believe there is no threat to the United States of America. (George W Bush cited in Orlando Sentinel, 2006)

Writing in 1981, Palestinian author Edward Said argued that American political culture presents caricatures of the Arab and Muslim worlds to the American public. Such caricatures legitimize American and Western interventions in the Middle East, providing ideological cover for imperialist expansion. What passes for objective knowledge about Arabs and Islam is in fact the West’s understanding of itself cast through the lens of “the Muslim” or “the Arab” (used interchangeably) as representation. Jack Shaheen, a professor of mass communication at Southern Illinois University and world authority on media images of Arabs and Muslims concurs:

For more than a century, Hollywood . . . has used repetition as a teaching tool. Tutoring movie audiences by repeating over and over, in film after film, insidious images of the Arab people, . . . these slanderous stereotypes have affected honest discourse and public policy. (Shaheen, 2003: 172)

At the level of a purely discursive analysis, President George W. Bush’s appraisal of events repeated a familiar theme drawn from the demonizing rhetorical orbit of post-World War II American racial iconography. Yet, it is a mistake to draw too brisk a line of continuity. What is most intriguing about the term “Islamic fascist” is the reaction that followed Bush’s use of it. Validating Said and Shaheen, Stephen J. Wayne, a professor of government at Georgetown University, characterized the Republican’s approach as follows: “Most people are against fascists of whatever form. By definition, fascists are bad. If you’re going to demonize, you might as well use the toughest words you can”. The *Washington Post* responded, “Conservative commentators have long talked about “Islamofascism,” and Bush’s phrase was a slightly toned-down variation on that theme” (Raum, 2006). Nihad Awad, executive director of the Council on American–Islamic Relations, cautioned, “It is counterproductive to associate Islam or Muslims with fascism,” while Muslim activist Mohamed Elibiary thought it likely that “the president’s use of language is going to ratchet up the hate meter” (Beck, 2006). Columnist for *The Nation*, Katha Pollitt

(2006) agreed: “Islamofascism” looks like an analytic term, but really it’s an emotional one, intended to get us to think less and fear more. It presents the bewildering politics of the Muslim world as a simple matter of Us versus Them, with war to the end the only answer, as with Hitler.” Concern emerged around the possibility that Islam and terror are paired as moral equivalents and that the measure of that equivalence is provided by totalitarianism and its effect: the Holocaust. Implicit in this interpretation is the belief that negatively stereotyping an ethnic or religious group as fascist provides a spurious moral legitimacy for acts of racist exclusion or, more specifically, “racial hate”—a dangerous ethnic emotion.

Pollitt is right, but what goes unrecognized is that the “Islamofascist” epithet carries with it an attempt at demarcation and incorporation. As stated earlier, juggling appeals to victimization is a precarious balance to strike, and when it is seen not to work, as in the case of the foiled bomb plot to which the Bush quotation at the beginning of this section responds, the feelings of victimization escalate on all sides—thus Bush’s recognition of “safety fears.” When we scrutinize Bush’s use of “Islamic fascist”, it denotes an implicit demarcation between “false authoritarian hateful” dogma and “genuine, tolerant, non-acrimonious” conviction—a distinction between “faith” and “fundamentalism” that provides insight into the “Other Than Mexican” category.

According to Third Way theorist Amitai Etzioni, genuine religious conviction can provide an important post social democratic source of meaning through which communities are established and social ills tackled:

Communities, data shows, can play a major role in providing preventive and acute care, reducing the need for publicly funded social services as divergent as child care, grief counseling, and professional drug and alcohol abuse treatment, as well as assisting in curtailing juvenile delinquency.

The strongest evidence for these statements is found in religious communities that meet my definition of shared affective bonds and a moral culture. Practically all kinds of antisocial behavior are relatively low among Mormon communities in Utah, Orthodox Jewish communities in New York, and Black Muslim groups. They are also lower, on average, in villages and small-town America as compared to large cities, where communities are less prevalent. (2000: 17)

The virtue of religion lies in the “preventive” nature of “affective bonds” that help to foster social cohesion by containing antisocial impulses. And how do we guarantee the latter? Former advisor to the Blair administration, sociologist Anthony Giddens, proposes what is essentially a politics of affect where dialogue expressed within a unity of moral purpose ensures that “difference” will not beget “a degenerate spiral of communication. . . where antipathy feeds on antipathy, hate upon hate” (1995: 245). This helps to partially contextualize the Clinton administration’s thinking behind the Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act of 1994 and the Church Arson Prevention Act of 1996, especially when we consider the flesh that

Giddens puts on the bones. Hate producing hate is most likely to occur “wherever fundamentalism takes hold, whether it be religious, ethnic, nationalist, or gender fundamentalism” (1995: 245).

The crucial step in Giddens’s theory, the concept of fundamentalism, is not tagged to any specific group because its etiology is, to a large extent, affective. Anxiety is an essential state of humanness requiring the acquisition and maintenance of a protective cocoon that develops through relationships of basic trust in early parent–child interaction. But, anxiety does have a sociocultural form. In “post-traditional” societies such as those in the West, where submission to a given authority is replaced by radical doubt and the proliferation of authorities, “the dilemma of authority versus doubt”—that is, the source of anxiety—“is ordinarily resolved through a mixture of routine and commitment to a certain form of lifestyle, plus the vesting of trust in a given series of abstract systems” (2001: 196). What Giddens means is that the contemporary worldview of an individual needs to be flexible enough to accommodate and integrate other belief systems that will increasingly be brought into an individual’s proximity as a consequence of globalizing tendencies such as migration from putatively more “traditional cultures.” The valued “post-traditional” individual, whether migrant or host, minority or majority, needs a regulative governing framework that he or she can trust to deliver security. The threat to this harmonious picture is rigidity of belief. “Compromise” can “disintegrate under pressure,” especially where “individuals find it psychologically difficult or impossible to accept the existence of diverse, mutually conflicting authorities” (2001: 196). Such individuals have a predilection for dogmatic authoritarianism, which Giddens distinguishes from faith, because where the latter “rests on trust,” the former represents an abrogation of trust through the “slavish adherence” to “overarching systems of authority” (2001: 196). The propensity for intolerance of “conflicting” abstract systems is the character trait of the dogmatic authoritarian, not of those who have faith.

The distinction between “slavish adherence” and “trust” fits with the Blair administration’s establishment of the United Kingdom Home Office Faith Communities Unit, whose goal was to “assist faith communities to develop their individuals and organizations in order to reach their full potential. The positive effects of this work will include an increased ability for faith community members to motivate and improve their own community as well as strengthening their links with the wider community” (Home Office, 2004: 5). It is the “dogmatic, fundamentalist individual” not the subject of faith, that is the signified source of concern to be regulated (see Kyriakides, 2008). For George W Bush, “faith communities” were a key pre-9/11 constituency:

Latinos enrich our country with faith in God, a strong ethic of work, community & responsibility. We can all learn from the strength, solidarity, & values of Latinos. Immigration is not a problem to be solved, it is the sign of a successful nation. New Americans are to be welcomed as neighbors and not to be feared as strangers. (Bush, 2000)

The aims of the theorist and those of the politician and state are not equivalent. We are not here arguing that Giddens's or Etzioni's social theory was or is adopted by politicians and implemented as policy. There are key differences between the way in which communitarian theory was developed in the United States and in the United Kingdom—Etzioni and Giddens are not identical. But lest we assume that Giddens' or Etzioni's analysis is only applicable to grasping the philosophical underpinnings of Tony Blair's New Labour and Clinton's New Democrats, salience of the distinction they advocate becomes apparent when we consider post-9/11 debates around "islamofascism" and the distinction between faith and fundamentalism that took off under what is usually hailed as a right-wing Republican Bush administration.

Marking a distinction between Islam as faith (a trust concept) and Islamism as fascism (rigid authoritarian adherence) has become, for many commentators, key to the deployment of the latter. American historian and Middle East analyst Daniel Pipes, who has been at the forefront of popularizing the association between Islamic terrorism and fascism, is "careful" to cite "Islamism" rather than Islam as the threat. Asked in an interview, if he equated "Islam with fascism," his response was "No. I equate Islamism with fascism.... Islamism is a totalitarian ideology. An Islamist is a danger in the same way a fascist is a danger" (Boehlert, 2001). A distinction is made between the practice of Islam as faith and rigid ideology—a distinction echoed by George W. Bush:

Islamic terrorist attacks serve a clear and focused ideology, a set of beliefs and goals that are evil, but not insane. Some call this evil Islamic radicalism; others, militant Jihadism; still others, Islamo-fascism. Whatever it's called, this ideology is very different from the religion of Islam. This form of radicalism exploits Islam to serve a violent, political vision: the establishment, by terrorism and subversion and insurgency, of a totalitarian empire that denies all political and religious freedom. (Whitehouse Press Release, 2005)

The term "Islamofascist" is used to designate a form of intolerance—the dogmatic imposition inherent to totalitarian projects—a disrespect for conflicting beliefs or worldviews. Fascism as authoritarian imposition is to be carefully disentangled from the Muslim religion. Islamofascism threatens safety, whereas Islam does not. For Bush, faith was distinguishable from totalitarianism, and it is the latter that comes to designate OTM "special interest aliens". But why make such a distinction?

When George H. W. Bush made his 1990 pre-Gulf War proclamation of a new world order with America at the helm, this coupled Francis Fukuyama's end of history thesis, and it seemed to signal that an era of unstoppable American capitalism was on the cards amid continuing military conflicts between, in Fukuyama's words, the pre-Historical (third) and post-Historical (first) worlds (1989, 1992). This was in step with Samuel Huntington's (1993) prediction of civilizational clash—sino-Islamic connection versus the West—and appeared to some

commentators to expose a hidden ethno-imperialist rationale behind US foreign policy: no longer a cold, but a hot, war on the make, a new right on the take. Both pros and antis assumed that the state could be self-sufficient—that, in the words of Noam Chomsky (2001), “The pretext is gone, [but] the policies remain the same” (see also Said, 2001). But neither Fukuyama nor Huntington foresaw that the end of the cold war would destabilize the geopolitical determinates of the domestic context in the way it did.

Just a few years prior to George W. Bush’s faith/fundamentalism distinction, Hishaam Aidi made the point that “commentators are advancing theories warning of a dangerous epidemic spreading through our inner cities today, infecting misguided, disaffected minority youth and turning them into anti-American terrorists.” Aidi notes, “The pathogen is Islam, more specifically, an insidious mix of radical Islam and black militancy.” (2002: 36) Certainly, the prospect of alienated minority American youth turning to radical Islam and black militancy is a problem for the state, but a deeper more profound problem arises if minority American youth believe they are being unjustly labeled as evil perpetrators of terror and nonminority Americans actually believe that minority youth are evil perpetrators of terror. By appealing to the faith/fundamentalism distinction, state officials think they offer alienated minority youth a way out of “hate,” a means of circumventing any identification with what is interpreted as authoritarian currents. Islamic faith is presented as a victim of rigid fundamentalism that attempts to key into and move dangerous affect. The faith/fundamentalism distinction attempts to give nonminority Americans a point of contact and commonality with the potentially alienated. The state bestows affective welfare on the American public. If the United States was that invincible at “History’s End”, it would not need to placate angry minority youth through the fostering of faith networks and appeals to fear. Bush’s pronouncements were symptomatic.

Although rhetorically oriented toward the US context, Bush’s various pronouncements on Islamic terrorism share key underpinnings with Tony Blair’s “beyond left or right” prescription. In the West, the archetypal iconic demons of left/right conservatism are Stalin and Hitler and Bush characteristically interprets “Islamic fascism” as a descendant of totalitarian ideologies of the past:

you have seen this kind of enemy before. They’re successors to Fascists, to Nazis, to Communists, and other totalitarians of the 20th century. And history shows what the outcome will be: This war will be difficult; this war will be long; and this war will end in the defeat of the terrorists and totalitarians. (Bush, 2006)

Again, the designation disarms through precautionary legitimization. The potential for public disorientation is particularly stark when groups see themselves as the victims of the conservatism of either the Left or the Right.

The potential chaos precipitated by conflicting victimization claims surfaced in October 2007, when the David Horowitz Freedom Centre launched “Islamofascism Awareness Week” across 114 US college and university campuses,

with the stated aim of “highlighting the threat from the Islamic Jihad and the oppression of Muslim women”. Criticism of the campaign was denounced by Horowitz:

Anti-American leftists and organizations supporting the Islamic jihad organized a national campaign of vitriol and hate . . . Speakers for the events and students organizing them were attacked as religious bigots and anti-Muslim “racists” and “fascists.” Attacks were spear-headed by the misnamed American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee . . . Under the Orwellian banner of defending tolerance, Abourezk’s group sent letters to the presidents of all the colleges hosting events, in an attempt to get administrators to shut them down and silence their speakers in advance . . . Cliopatria blogger Ralph Luker described our events as “Hate Your Neighbor Week,” which was accurate only if your neighbor were Osama bin Laden, Ayman Zawahiri, or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. (Horowitz, 2007)

Horowitz doth protest too much. But there is a wider point to be taken from this exchange. Today, “anti fascist hate” boomerangs. There can be little doubt that the image of fascism carries an implicit accusation of “racist” and that it has popular salience; no semiotic analysis need be conducted to prove the self-evident. For those opposed to the term “islamofascist,” distinguishing between Muslims and Islamists does not overcome its inherent flaw. Vilifying Islamists promotes suspicion in toto of Muslims. A climate of intolerant totalitarianism that those who deploy the term wish to counter is seen by those who oppose the term as inherent to its very deployment. On the other hand, opposition to the term is portrayed as Orwellian double-think; their cultural pluralism is seemingly “uncovered” as fake—a mystifying carrier of totalitarian thought-control that aids and abets terror.

Somewhat mind-boggling to the casual observer is that the act of pairing Islam with fascism can be portrayed as racist, while defending Islam can also be “exposed” as an act of defending fascism and, thus, racism. The “Islamofascist debate” triggers wider disengagement threatening to escalate suspicion and fear across the social spectrum. On this, Politt is correct. But the point of Bush’s usage of the term is that the attempt to key into the “fear-safety” couplet reveals a need on the part of the state to connect emotionally with the private fears of the public such that the state is seen as the only legitimate solution. Today, no matter how vigorously one launches the “antifascist” boomerang, its forward trajectory is but a momentary eclipse of its inevitable return, which may disorientate when it smacks the unsuspecting, laying the field open to a myriad of eager and more skilled players, but neither pitcher nor catcher moves outside the park. Government operationalizes its politics of affect through tapping into fear in order to legitimize its authority. In the policy field of “race”, migration geopolitics splits the racialized referent into an anti-fundamentalist logic that allows the state to intervene as “neutral arbiter” in the name of security. It is the subject of faith that the state currently seeks to connect with. For “faith” read non-ideological, flexible but vulnerable to indoctrination and compliant with the security needs of the state.

The OTM category should now fit into place. The dual (in)visibility of the threat it poses lies in its quality as a cipher of fear that can potentially infect us all through hate. The elusive OTM, we are told, carries hate in the neighborhood, shopping malls, movie houses, restaurants, and cafes; across borders; on foot; and on airplanes, buses, trains, ships, and the subway. The Brazilian migrant Jean Charles de Menezes was killed for it, Arizona governor Brewer introduced SB1070 to stop it and President George W. Bush sent terror suspects to Guantanamo to torture it. It is also the reason President Obama stood against Arizona SB1070 while pledging 1,200 extra National Guard to monitor the United States–Mexico border.

But the set piece of the Obama administration's race intervention was the signing into law of the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act (Public Law No. 111-84) in 2009. The law, which prohibits acts of violence perpetrated against an individual because of his or her actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability, was included in the \$680 billion National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. Coming more than two decades after President George H. W. Bush signed the Hate Crime Statistics Act into law, and following in the footsteps of President Clinton's Campus Hate Crimes Right to Know Act of 1997, PL111-84 represents a move in the definition of equality, which is highly, but more than, symbolic. Critics argued that there was no relationship between hate crime and military defense and that the law created a special class of victim. The OTM category alerts us to why both criticisms are misplaced. Justification for the law is laid out in the "findings" section of the written document. The first and second findings are as follows:

1. The incidence of violence motivated by the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability of the victim poses a serious national problem.
2. Such violence disrupts the tranquility and safety of communities and is deeply divisive.

Section 4712 of the Act also includes a "prohibition on attacks on United States Servicemen on Account of Service." The policing of, and military defense against hate rests on a blurred distinction between victim and perpetrator, especially when military spending aids, as it does, overseas actions and domestic defense against the suspects of terror. The explicit inclusion of hate as the driving force behind intent provides an escape clause. The perpetrator who admits to hating automatically summons the deeper question as to the etiology of the dangerous emotion; hence, the OTM category collapses the attainment of "safety" into a demand for state measures which by-pass the rational individual. OTM is not a rational-legal concept. The most readily available answer—that he is himself a carrier of authoritarianism—not only provides an explanation for "evil" and undermines the enforcement of civil rights, it also provides a domestic entry point for the state.

The state requests our trust in its endeavor to keep us safe from the possibility that our discontent may lead us astray like “Little Eichmanns” driven by factors that lie beyond our will to the post-racial disorder.¹ The central character in this drama is the OTM.

Conclusion

In this paper, we have identified the “special interest alien” as a policy target that unites the OTM category in US immigration regulation with the designation of “Islamic fascism” as security threat. Our comparative US–UK analysis demonstrates that despite the specificities of the US–Mexico border and the absence of an OTM category in the UK, policy translates geopolitical considerations that affect the racialized domestic spheres of the transatlantic coalition. Immigration policy reproduces and regulates a cipher of fear, which frames “our need for safety” on both sides of the Atlantic. The fear-safety couplet serves the changing legitimacy requirements of state in that a “high risk” security profile must not alienate previously racialized and stigmatized minority populations such as Mexican Americans and Latinos. However, “victim recognition” carries an implicit presumption of faith versus fundamentalism that authorizes a subjective orientation premised on the sovereignty of affect. In the multiethnic domestic context, “fundamentalism” translates into an identity of “hate”; “anti-hate” is a countermeasure, which signifies a trust-identity for those who have “faith”. But it is trust without solid foundation. The absence of objective threat is reconciled within an affective politics of precaution that can raise the level of fear and suspicion with deadly consequences.

Note

1. The controversy that erupted in 2005 following University of Colorado Professor of Ethnic Studies Ward Churchill’s reference to the victims of 9/11 as “Little Eichmanns” reveals two salient points. First, there is a basic misconception of how contemporary state orientates itself around victimization and fear, not particularly in relation to 9/11, but around the more salient need to legitimize itself through safety and trust. Churchill’s “antifascist” comment placed him in the position of the victimizer. Second, it revealed how Hannah Arendt’s original analysis of Nazi atrocity has been taken out of its historical context and rendered banal but problematic either as a feature of Left or of Right critique.

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