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**Bachelor's Thesis**

**Greek Cypriot Students' Attitudes toward Turkish Cypriots  
and the Open Crossing Points across the Green Line.**

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**Limassol, May 2019**



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GREEK CYPRIOT STUDENTS' ATTITUDES TOWARD  
TURKISH CYPRIOTS AND THE OPEN CROSSING POINTS  
ACROSS THE GREEN LINE

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This research is dedicated to my beloved grandparents that I see in their late 90s not giving up the hope of living in a reunited Cyprus again.

## **ABSTRACT**

This research aimed on measure the attitudes of Greek Cypriot university students towards Turkish Cypriots and towards the open crossing points and on explaining the adoption of these attitudes using sociological theory. This was achieved through the distribution of questionnaires in both digital and printed form to 244 students at the Cyprus University of Technology, which measured attitudes towards Turkish Cypriots and the open crossing points, as well as specific personality traits, as the sociological theories chosen suggest. An in-depth analysis was also pursued with ten semi-structured interviews with students. Lack of contact with Turkish Cypriots, authoritarian personality traits, tendency to scapegoat and personal interest appear to be factors that directly affect these attitudes.

**Keywords:** Contact Hypothesis, authoritarian personality, rational choice, post-conflict societies, peace-building, Cyprus Problem

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

CUT: Cyprus University of Technology

T/C: Turkish Cypriots

G/C: Greek Cypriots

## **CHAPTER 1 Introduction**

The 29-year complete geographic separation between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots was interrupted on April 23, 2003, when, as a result of both internal and external pressures, the Turkish Cypriot leadership opened a few crossing points allowing for the inward and outward movement through the Green Line. The opening of the crossing points has been a way of contact, communication and cooperation between individuals, non-governmental organizations and political parties (Psaltis, 2008).

As McKeown and Psaltis (2017) report, a conflict or dispute between groups can lead to high levels of separation and negative attitudes among their members, something that characterizes the case of Cyprus. Many societies are, therefore, implementing programs or policies to promote contact between the groups, with a view to improving relations between them and preventing new conflicts. Especially in post-conflict societies, the risk of emergence of a new conflict is high, with governments and the international community having several possible solutions to avoid it (Collier, 2000). Thus, the lifting of restrictions on crossing between the northern and southern parts of the island of Cyprus in 2003, which had been instituted in 1974, allowed contact between the two communities again, ending the almost total lack of access to each other after almost three decades (Demetriou, 2007) and is a particularly important factor in today's perceptions of the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots concerning displacement (Bryant, 2012).

However, political, social and moral stakes are posed as to whether the two communities can finally create the necessary coherent links, institutions and socio-political processes that will eventually enable the reunification of Cyprus (Τριμυκλινώτης, 2008). This concern arises from the long absence of contact between the two communities, which led to mutual negative perceptions of the "other" based on mainly negative traits (Loizos, 2006) and, therefore, to the adoption of specific attitudes. Research has shown that negative attitudes or prejudices among ethnic groups can be reduced through contact with each other (Yehuda, 1969).

The opening of the crossing points was a sociopolitical process that would potentially serve to improve relations between the two communities but also to alleviate negative attitudes or prejudices, gradually contributing to a climate of co-operation and peaceful

coexistence with positive contribution to efforts to resolve the Cyprus Problem. Still, there is an increase in the tendency towards the closure of the crossing points, as the issue has political, social and economic dimensions. In particular, citizens and political parties on the Greek-Cypriot side (ΕΛΑΜ, 2018; ΕΔΕΚ, 2018; ΚΥΠΠΕ, 2018) advocate the closing of the crossing points or oppose to the opening of new, citing reasons such as financing and indirect recognition of the non-recognized state of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”, the increase in crime and the negative effect on Cyprus economy. Indeed, on November 8, 2018, the nationalist party ELAM (People’s National Front) provided the Deputy Minister to the President a collection of 10,000 signatures demanding the closure of the crossing points across the Green Line (Philenews, 2018).

This research, in addition to examining the attitudes of Greek Cypriot students towards Turkish Cypriots, attempts to explain the attitudes of Greek Cypriot students towards the open crossing points. The relationship between the two sets of attitudes is also examined.

The following sections present the description of the problem and the significance of this research. In the chapters to follow, the relevant literature is reviewed, and the theoretical framework of the study is defined. The study's research questions and the methodology that has been followed are presented in detail. The study concludes with presentation and discussion of the findings.

## **1.1 Statement of the Problem**

Attitudes are learned as an integral part of the individual's socialization. In particular, they can be developed through experiences, interactions with others and through cognitive processes. As Ehrlich (1973) reported, national attitudes and stereotypes are part of the social heritage of a society and one finds it difficult to escape their learning when they come from the dominant ethnic group (Devine, 1989). According to Zajonc (1968), when we experience something several times, it can affect the way we evaluate it (Hogg & Vaughan, 2010).

In the case of Cyprus, it could be expected that, after the opening of the crossing points, the attitudes between the two communities would benefit as the two communities were given the opportunity to interact and reduce negative attitudes or prejudices, which are

more intense in societies with ethnic conflict where one side tends to "demonize" and blame the other for the conflict (Hadjipavlou, 2007).

In addition, feelings such as anxiety and threat are common in post-conflict societies, especially when there is lack of contact (Zezelj et al., 2017). Christie (2006 in McKeown & Psaltis, 2017) states that conflict and division make intergroup contact between the conflicting groups a crucial element in order to resolve issues as those mentioned above. Therefore, the opening of the crossing points in 2003 had been a unique rupture of the frame of non-contact between the two communities, which had been perceived as constant and given, setting the base for contact and subsequently reducing bias (Psaltis, 2011). Allport's (1954) contact hypothesis suggests that developing contact with members of the out-group would challenge negative stereotypes and reduce the anxiety of the presence of the outgroup (Hewstone, 2003 in Psaltis et.al, 2017).

However, it seems that the opening of the crossing points has not been sufficiently assessed by the Greek Cypriot community as a development that favors the improvement of relations between the two communities and the strengthening of inter-communal cooperation (Psaltis, 2008). In addition, as already mentioned, recent political and social developments indicate that the Greek Cypriot community has begun to perceive the open crossing points across the Green Line in a negative manner.

## **1.2 Significance of Study**

Research regarding the negative attitudes of Greek Cypriots towards the open crossing points and the motives for the adoption of such attitudes is lacking. This study seeks to address this void. Another contribution of this research is the explanation of the attitudes of Greek Cypriots towards both the Turkish Cypriots and the open crossing points on the basis of sociological theories (Contact Hypothesis, Authoritarian Personality, Scapegoating and Rational Choice Theory). Finally, the investigation of possible correlations between these two sets of attitudes is of great interest, as the recently growing tendency towards the closing of the crossing points raises questions as to whether and how this is related to the general attitude of Greek Cypriots towards Turkish Cypriots. Of particular interest is the case of inconsistent attitudes (i.e. negative attitude towards the Turkish Cypriots combined with a positive attitude towards the open crossing points etc.).

In this respect, the present research seeks to explain the reasons why, in a society with a past conflict and the need for re-contact between its two main ethnic groups, there are negative attitudes to a policy (opening of crossing points) that favors the improvement of bicomunal relations. As Hadjipavlou (2007: 351) mentions

*“In deeply divided societies, where barbed wires and police checkpoints prohibit freedom of movement of both ideas and goods, there exists a suitable environment for reinforcement of a culture of conflict, mistrust, and suspicion, as well as a flourishing of enemy images”.*

In this case, intergroup contact and dialogue could be socio-psychological pillars that could help individuals and groups become more open-minded and accepting of the “others”. Consequently, they would contribute to sustainable peace (Cehajic & Brown, 2010).

## **CHAPTER 2      Review of the Empirical Literature**

Much research in social psychology has concentrated on post-conflict societies and on ways to reunite them. However, there is a research void in the case of Cyprus, as there has not been enough research to analyze the attitudes of the Greek Cypriots towards the crossing points as a factor contributing to bi-communal contact and reduction of prejudice. Nevertheless, some researchers have studied the attitudes of one community towards the other, as well as related issues dealing with post-conflict societies.

First, Psaltis (2011) tried to prove the importance of the contact between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in the trust building processes on the island. He found that a significant portion of the Greek Cypriot population (37,7%) showed low levels of trust and readiness to forgive the other community. This attitude seems to correlate with low bi-communal contact. In the same survey, 33,4% of the sample, that have had contact with the Turkish Cypriot community, was very positive towards the Turkish Cypriots. The remaining 28,9% of the sample, representing a portion of the population that mostly holds negative attitudes towards the Turkish Cypriots, expressed the “Greek nationalism in Cyprus”. In addition, a significant percentage of the sample agreed to the closure of the crossing points. Indicative of this attitude is the fact that 38% of the Greek Cypriots had not yet passed through the open crossing points across the Green Line until 2008. Through this research, the importance of contact as a trust-building factor can be observed. People with high quality and quantity of contact with members of the other community recorded higher values of trust, forgiveness, more positive feelings and lower perceived threat because of the other community, as well as lower intergroup anxiety than people with low or moderate quantity and quality of contact.

Furthermore, Hadjipavlou (2007) found that the majority of Greek Cypriots (63,5%) believe that Turkish Cypriot nationalism is highly responsible for provoking and continuing the Cyprus problem, while a lower percentage of 51,8% stated that nationalism from both communities was responsible for the creation and perpetuation of the conflict. A huge percentage (95,1%) of the same sample reported the Turkish Cypriot side’s intransigence as another reason of the problem’s existence. In addition, both Greek Cypriot (62,1%) and Turkish Cypriot (64,3%) participants’ majority, stated that, the



ethnic, religious and cultural differences between the two communities are contextual factors that have affected the Cyprus Problem. However, this research found that the vast majority of Greek Cypriots (74,9%) and Turkish Cypriots (87,7%) recognize the lack of trust between the two communities as the main socio-psychological reason for the existence of the problem, while 70,5% reported the lack of communication between the two communities as a contextual cause. These findings substantiate the need to find ways to build trust between the two communities, as ethnic, religious and cultural differences were also reported. Hadjipavlou's (2007) study shows that there is a lack of mutual acknowledgement of shared responsibility between the two communities regarding different historical events and, as a result, psychological pain, fear and mistrust still occur within the members of the two communities.

Similar findings are reported in Danielidou and Horvath's (2006) research, which reports that negative attitudes and unwillingness to cohabit between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots are related to perceived differences in social identity and to victimization experiences. As negative intergroup contacts and conflicts and strong in-group identifications affects the group members attitudes towards the out-group, their study provides evidence of the relation between negative attitudes towards Turkish Cypriots and the perceived threat to the in-group's existence, beliefs and way of life. As they state, this threat is a result of a history of mostly negative contacts and conflicts with Turkish Cypriots and Turks and by the perceived cultural differences with these out-groups.

The need to strengthen trust through contact in post-conflict societies is evident, taking into consideration the McKeown and Psaltis (2017) research, which focused on the post-conflict societies of Cyprus (Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots) and Northern Ireland (Protestants and Catholics). This research has shown that high-quality contact between the conflicting groups increases future intentions for contact and that it is fully mediated through increased intergroup trust. More specifically, quality contact can be important in increasing the intergroup trust and, therefore, encourage future interactions and sustained positive contact, as it also directly affects the outgroup evaluation in a positive way.

Leonard (2013) supports that both Greek and Turkish Cypriots tend to blame the other side for the current situation, as deep-seated negative attitudes between the two communities can still be revealed through young people's discourses. Furthermore, in the absence of direct contact between members of the two communities, young people have

a strong belief that Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots are completely different, which nurtures stereotypes and an “us” vs. “them” mentality. In this research, the majority of the participants had low levels of experience with the other community and proved that negative experiences related to the other community can lead to a more pessimistic view for reunification. As the researcher states, the young people who participated in the research provide an obvious example of how young people are aware of the political processes that contribute to strong biases against Turkish Cypriots and how the political division acts against the development of frameworks necessary to promote trust between the two communities. This makes it difficult for young people to challenge the traditional discourses regarding Turkish Cypriots.

A survey carried out by Georghiadis (2007) shows that four out of five Greek Cypriots do not mistrust Turkish Cypriots and believe they can peacefully coexist with them. However, a significant percentage (13%) does not trust them, and another 43% of Greek Cypriots supports that they are not ready to reunify with the Turkish Cypriot community. Another important finding is that Greek Cypriots who had visited the North part of the island, tend to trust Turkish Cypriots more and show more readiness for a peaceful coexistence. In addition, the survey proved that more interactions with Turkish Cypriots could enhance the trust towards them and the possibility for the development of bicultural trust and friendships.

The importance of contact and crossing to the “other” side, as factors that can lead to more positive attitudes towards the Turkish Cypriots, have been supported by Yildizian and Ehteshami (2004). This research was conducted in order to record the attitudes of Greek and Turkish Cypriots before and after the opening of the crossing points in 2003. The findings indicate that the contact between the two communities after the opening of the crossing points reduced hostility and mistrust between the two communities and that it also acted positively on the attitudes of Greek and Turkish Cypriots towards the possibility of reconciliation. Attitudes towards coexistence also play a crucial role in conditioning Greek Cypriots’ perceptions of the best solution to the Cyprus Problem (Webster, 2006).

Similar attitudes among conflicting ethnic groups were also found in Korea (Kim and Oh, 2001), a country that has been separated for more than 50 years with the North and the South strongly biased against each other. Despite the strong will between the two

countries for reunification, there is a remarkable division of the North Koreans' attitudes toward the South and the South Koreans' attitudes towards the North, indicating the separation of the two groups at a socio-psychological level. Related to that, Kim et al. (2015) report a form of mistrust by the Koreans towards the possibility of reunification, mainly due to the widening of their cultural differences and the "demonization" of North Korea and its leader by the media.

Contact is also proven as an effective way of mistrust and prejudice reduction in the cases of Northern Ireland, Israel, Liberia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Al Ramiah & Hewstone, 2013). Researches who investigate post-conflict societies indicate that contact can increase intergroup trust and the willingness to forgive as well as that it can reduce the anger of one group toward the other (Tausch et al., 2007 in Al Ramiah & Hewstone, 2013). This was achieved through institutional support with the application of specific policies, such as the integrated education system in Northern Ireland that promoted cross-community contact (McGlynn et al., 2004). In addition, structured contact interventions between Israelis and Israeli Palestinians lead to increased outgroup trust and an increase of the will to support compromise between the two groups (Maoz & Ellis, 2008 in Al Ramiah & Hewstone, 2013). The lack of contact and trust between post-conflict groups leads to the maintaining of perceptions that keep members of the groups in a socio-psychological distance and to the adoption of more pessimistic attitudes towards peace and reconciliation (Vinck, Pham & Kreutzer, 2011). Even experiences of positive contact prior to conflict contribute to readiness for reconciliation after the conflict (Biro et al., 2004 in Al Ramiah & Hewstone, 2013).

Apart from physical forms of intergroup contact, researches support that virtual or online contact can also help the improvement of the relationships between the members of post-conflict societies. Husnu and Crisp (2010) concluded that trends for future contact between the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot community are strengthened, even through virtual contact. Something similar is also deduced from the research by Zezelj et al. (2017) who showed that in the post-conflict societies of Serbia, Cyprus and Croatia, online contact and friendship between people belonging to the groups in conflict led to more positive attitudes towards the "rival" group.

## **CHAPTER 3      Theoretical Framework**

In order to explain the Greek Cypriots' attitudes towards the Turkish Cypriots and the open crossing points, certain sociological theories were used. These are presented in this chapter. Each theory offers an explanation for the emergence and maintenance of prejudice, a negative attitude toward individuals or groups which is not rationally justified.

An attitude is a set of beliefs, emotions and behavioral tendencies towards significant social objects, groups, events or symbols. Attitudes can be considered as the general feeling or evaluation of a person, an object or an issue. Attitudes consist of three basic components: the cognitive (beliefs), the emotional (positive or negative emotions) and the behavioral (the will to act). The process of an attitude formation can be affected by personal experiences, sources of learning and the self-perception of each individual (Hogg & Vaughan, 2010).

### **3.1 Contact Hypothesis**

According to Stephan and Stephan (1985, in Hogg & Vaughan, 2010), groups are kept apart by educational, occupational, cultural or material differences and a major concern is anxiety about possible negative outcomes of contact between them. This form of anxiety arises from several sources such as the sense of threat from other groups, problems posed by an outgroup for one's norms, values and morals, concern experienced during intergroup interactions and negative stereotypes that lead to negative emotions and beliefs.

Contact, according to the contact hypothesis, is one of the best ways to improve relationships between conflicting social groups (Brown & Hewstone, 2005). It is the view that bringing together members that belong to opposing social groups will contribute to the improvement of intergroup relations and prejudice and discrimination reduction (Hogg & Vaughan, 2010).

The contact hypothesis was developed by Gordon Allport (1954) and states that under ideal circumstances, interpersonal contact is one of the most effective methods to reduce prejudice among members of different groups. According to him, in order to ease the

conflict, contact must be lasting to the extent that it reduces concern so that one group is sufficiently comfortable with the other. In order to bring positive results, the contact itself must have a positive sign. To achieve this, according to Allport (1954), the following criteria must be met (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2005; Hogg & Vaughan, 2010):

a) *Equal status of team members*: Members brought together should be of equal social status. Contact between members of unequal status would most likely confirm stereotypes and fuel prejudice.

b) *Common goals between the team members*: An active effort toward a shared goal is essential in order to reach effective contact. Members of different groups must work together and rely on each other so that their shared goals can be achieved.

c) *Intergroup cooperation*: Contact should involve cooperation rather than casual and pointless interaction between members of the groups. Intergroup cooperation can encourage the development of positive relations between the groups.

d) *Social and institutional support*: Contact should occur within the framework of official and institutional support in order to reach integration. That requires the support of authorities and legislation against discrimination and prejudice could provide a social climate beneficial to the emergence of more tolerant practices.

### **3.2 Authoritarian Personality**

The idea of the authoritarian personality was originally formulated by Adorno et al. (1950) through an investigation in which they attempted to examine the psychological bases of anti-Semitism. Through their research, it turned out that anti-Semitism was part of a broader ethnocentric pattern that included a general loathing of out-groups and other ethnic and religious minorities, as well as excessive nationalism. These concepts were also closely linked to political and economic conservatism. In addition, the authoritarian personality consists of the beliefs of a pessimistic and cynical view of human nature, conservative political and economic attitudes and a suspicion of democracy (Hogg & Vaughan, 2010).

These attitudes and beliefs together form a pattern of nine characteristics that define the authoritarian personality (Duckitt, 2015), which Adorno et al. (1950) measured on a F-

Scale through questionnaires (Hogg & Vaughan, 2010) consisting of the following components:

- a) *Conventionalism* (rigid adherence to conventional middle-class values)
- b) *Authoritarian submission* (submissive, uncritical attitude towards authorities)
- c) *Authoritarian aggression* (tendency to condemn, reject and punish people who violate conventional values)
- d) *Anti-intraception* (opposition to emotions, imagination and subjection)
- e) *Superstition and stereotypy* (belief in mystical determinative factors of human's fate and disposition to think in rigid categories)
- f) *Power and toughness* (preoccupation with the dominance submission and the identification with power, strength and toughness)
- g) *Destructiveness and cynicism* (generalization of hostility and vilification of individuals)
- h) *Projectivity* (perception of the world as dangerous and tendency to display unconscious impulses)
- i) *Sex* (excessive concern for sexual issues)

### **3.3 Scapegoat Theory**

Dollard et al. (1939) developed this theory to explain the act of blaming or often punishing a person or group for an issue that is mainly due to another factor. This form of behavior is observed in every society because of the tendency of individuals to charge responsibility to "others" in order to justify negative developments that surround them (Rothschild et al., 2012). According to this theory, when people are frustrated with problems, they tend to engage in this practice, particularly against racial, ethnic or religious groups. These groups are termed "scapegoats". Several studies in psychology have shown that the increase in prejudice is proportional to the increase in frustration among members of a group (Barkan, 2015).

Rothschild et al. (2012) created a bipolar pattern (“Dual Motive”) through which they seek to provide a comprehensive empirical framework for understanding when individuals are more likely to resort to scapegoating, as well as what psychological incentives underline this behavior. In summary, they report that scapegoating is served by two different motives:

- a) Maintaining perceived personal moral values by minimizing guilt feelings over one’s responsibility for a negative outcome
- b) Maintaining perceived personal control by providing a clear explanation for a seemingly unexplained negative result that would otherwise be difficult to explain or to control

### **3.4 Rational Choice Theory**

Rational Choice Theory rests on the assumption of the rational self-interested profit maximizer: people care about their interests and aim at maximizing them through rational decisions and practices (Ostrom, 1997). Based on this theory, individuals are thought to be motivated by the desires or goals determined by their preferences. They act within specific and given constraints and on the basis of available information regarding the circumstances in which they must make a decision. However, since achieving all goals is not feasible, one needs to make choices based on the available means (Scott, 2000). Through this theory, an explanation is given about how individuals decide how to act in the light of a rational choice that will maximize benefits and minimize costs (Hogg & Vaughan, 2010) or simply, the choice that will bring the largest satisfaction (Scott, 2000).

In addition, Fishbein’s and Ajzen’s (1974) “Theory of Reasoned Action” supports that beliefs and intentions are critically involved in the way individuals act. An action is most likely if the individual’s attitude is positive and if it is supported by the social norm. This theory’s model consists of the following components (Hogg & Vaughan, 2010):

- a) Subjective norm (what the individual thinks that others believe)
- b) Attitude towards behavior (the individuals' beliefs about a specific behavior and their attitude towards an act)
- c) Behavioral intention (an internal declaration to act)

d) Behavior (the action itself)



## **CHAPTER 4      Research Questions and Methodology**

### **4.1 Research Questions**

Taking into consideration what has been stated thus far, the present study seeks to answer the following research questions:

RQ1 (a) What is the attitude of Greek Cypriots towards Turkish Cypriots?

(b) How can this attitude be explained sociologically?

RQ2 (a) What is the attitude of Greek Cypriots towards the open crossing points?

(b) How can this attitude be explained sociologically?

RQ3 What is the relationship between these two attitudes?

To answer these questions, a mixed research methodology was implemented. Specifically, data were collected through a survey and through semi-structured interviews. The design of the measurement methodology is presented next, beginning with conceptualization and operationalization

### **4.2 Conceptualization**


The present research follows Rosenberg and Hovland's (1960) three-component attitude model, according to which an attitude consists of:

- i. A cognitive component – thoughts and beliefs about the object of an attitude
- ii. An emotional component – feelings that are associated with the object of an attitude
- iii. A behavioral component – the state of readiness to take action

The cognitive component consists of the participants' thoughts and beliefs about the Turkish Cypriots and the open crossing points across the Green Line. The emotional component includes feelings regarding Turkish Cypriots and the open crossing points across the Green Line and the behavioral component examines the readiness of the participants to take actions associated with the two objects.

In addition, taking into consideration the empirical literature review and the theoretical framework, a causal model has been constructed linking the attitude towards Turkish Cypriots to the attitude towards the open crossing points across the Green Line (Y4). Through variable construction, the attitude towards Turkish Cypriots is represented in three latent variables (Y1, Y2, Y3). Based on this model, the attitude towards Turkish Cypriots is directly affected by the following variables: (X1) contact (how each participant's contact with Turkish Cypriots is valued), (X2) authoritarianism (to what extent the individual carries the aspects of the authoritarian personality) and (X3) scapegoating tendency (to what extent the individual tends to scapegoat). Consequently, the attitude towards Turkish Cypriots is expected to directly affect the attitude towards the open crossing points and, as a result, contact, authoritarianism and scapegoating are also expected to affect the attitude towards the open crossing points. Interest (X4) is also expected to directly affect the attitude towards the open crossing points. The model is presented in Figure 1.

**Figure 1.** The hypothetical causal model linking the attitude towards Turkish Cypriots and the attitude towards the open crossing points.



According to the model, individuals who (a) have less or negative contact with Turkish Cypriots, (b) carry traits of the authoritarian personality and (c) tend to scapegoat, will more likely have a negative attitude towards Turkish Cypriots. The more negative the attitude towards Turkish Cypriots will be, the more negative the attitude towards the open crossing points will be. In addition, each individual's personal interest will affect her/his attitude towards the open crossing points, as Rational Choice Theory predicts.

### **4.3 Operationalization**

The concepts presented above were measured through a specifically constructed questionnaire that included indicators related to the variables that were taken into consideration. The questionnaire (print version) is presented in Appendix I. For such purpose, attitudes have been measured using specific scales. Attitude scales allow the creation of general indicators of individual questions concerning the same theoretical concept, as they are integrated into the general scale by which the social phenomenon under investigation is measured (Κυριαζή, 2009). In this way, the respondents receive a score on a general scale as a summary of the answers given to the individual questions and, thus, a score of their general attitude towards the subject under investigation.

In addition, the questionnaires attempted to measure the attributes of authoritarian personality on each participant, the degree to which they tend to scapegoat and other factors such as their personal interest and personal attitude towards the open crossing points and their contact with Turkish Cypriots.

For the measurement of the contact with T/C, each participant was asked whether s/he has any professional, social or institutional/organizational relationship with T/C. In addition, each participant was asked if any of their family members had any contact with T/C in the past. If the answer was affirmative, the participant had to state through a 1-5 scale to what extent these contacts were negative or positive. Participants were also asked to what extent they socialize with T/C and whether they participate in organizations/institutions in which T/C also participate or in bicomunal groups or activities. They also had to answer to what extent they were active and if they developed any form of relationship with T/C within these contexts.

For the measurement of authoritarianism, a set of statements related to the T/C and the Cyprus Problem, reflecting authoritarian personality traits (Adorno et al. 1950) was

presented. Each participant was asked to state on a 1-5 scale to what extent s/he agrees or disagrees with each of the statements mentioned. The authoritarianism components taken into consideration were:

1. Authoritarian aggression
2. Anti-intraception
3. Power and toughness
4. Destructiveness and cynicism

Scapegoating was measured on a 4-point scale about the extent to which participants believed that specific factors related to the two communities influenced the Cyprus Problem. In addition, they had to state on a 1-5 scale the extent to which they agree or disagree with specific statements that had to do with the role of T/C and G/C in the Cyprus Problem.

The measurement of the attitude of G/C towards T/C was achieved through the construction of specific questions reflecting each of the three basic attitudes' components (cognitive, emotional, behavioral). For each the cognitive component, a special set of statements was constructed, to which each participant had to state whether they agree or disagree on a 1-5 scale. For the emotional component, each participant had to answer to what extent (1-5) the they felt threat, anger, shame and comfort, regarding specific statements or scenarios involving T/C. Finally, for the behavioral component, participants were asked to report the possibility (1-5) that they do specific actions that had to do with T/C.

As to the measurement of the participants' attitudes towards the open crossing points, a 1-7 scale was constructed, and each participant had to state to what extent they are against or in favor of the open crossing points across the Green Line. Finally, each participant's personal interest was measured with respect to financial, political and social dimensions, relevant to the open crossing points policy. For each of those dimensions, specific statements were constructed, and each participant had to report on a 1-5 scale to what extend they agree or disagree.

## 4.4 Sampling

The questionnaires were distributed within the Cyprus University of Technology student population through convenience sampling, with an attempt to include as many different profiles of participants as possible. The university's time schedule was firstly used in order to target specific classes that would serve the demands of the survey. Specifically, one class was selected from each of the university's departments. It was attempted to find large audiences, but, also, to include classes from all years (1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup>).

After the selection of classes, the instructors were contacted via email and short visits during the lectures were arranged. Only one class could not be reached from the Department of Civil Engineering and Geomatics, as no response was received from the instructor. During the short visit, after a short briefing on the research and its purposes, a form was distributed to the students asking them to provide their contact details (Facebook/Messenger, Viber, WhatsApp, SMS or email) if they wished to participate, so that the questionnaire be sent to them in electronic form. Through this technique, consent was also obtained.

Out of approximately 450 students that were invited to participate, 244 students provided their contact details, and a final number of 186 eventually participated in the survey (participation rate:  $= 186 / 450 = \text{approx. } 41,33\%$ ). An additional 28 students participated in the survey by completing a printed version of the questionnaire and were all students from the Faculty of Communication and Media Studies. The demographic characteristics of the sample are presented in Table 1. With the exception of gender (females were slightly overrepresented), the sample is balanced with respect to basic demographic characteristics (faculty of study, year of study and refugee status). It is estimated that the sample also resembles the whole university student population in Cyprus and thus the results can be roughly and indicatively generalized to university students in Cyprus.

**Table 1.** Demographic characteristics of the sample

<i>Gender</i>	
Female	64.50%
Male	35.50%

<i>Faculty of Studies</i>	
Geotechnical Sciences and Environmental Management	12.10%
Management and Economics	21.50%
Health Sciences	22.40%
Fine and Applied Arts	7.90%
Communication and Media Studies	22.90%
Engineering and Technology	13.10%

<i>Year of Studies</i>	
1st	25.70%
2nd	33.60%
3rd	30.40%
4th, 5th, 6th	10.30%

<i>Refugee Family</i>	
No	57.50%
Yes	42.50%

#### **4.5 Semi Structured Interviews**

One of the objectives of this research is to explain specific attitudes through the sociological theories that have been chosen. For this reason, in-depth information on attitudes was needed and this was achieved through semi-structured interviews. This type of interview offers the researcher flexibility in ordering questions, modifying their content and adding or removing questions or topics to be discussed. Additionally, it allows raising of issues that were not predetermined while it also serves to investigate complex attitudes and perceptions through the experience of the respondents (Ιωσηφίδης, 2008).

A sample of 10 Cyprus University of Technology students, selected based on purpose and convenience, participated in the interviews. Theoretical sampling was also applied: the selection of some participants took place during the analysis of the data in order to enrich the theoretical breadth of the investigation. Interviews were held at the same time with the questionnaire's distribution process. The data collected were analyzed through thematic analysis (Ιωσηφίδης, 2008).

## CHAPTER 5 Analysis and Results

### 5.1 Quantitative Analysis

#### 5.1.1 Descriptive Findings

Beginning with attitudes towards Turkish Cypriots, participants, in their majority hold mostly negative beliefs towards Turkish Cypriots (Table 2). Most of them consider Turkish Cypriots not trustworthy (38.8%), culturally inferior (52.4%) and dangerous as persons (61.7%). A slight majority also perceives mixed marriages between Greek and Turkish Cypriots as a danger for the G/C national identity (52.8%). The participants were less negative with respect to the belief that that T/C are more Asians or Middle Easterners than Europeans (19.6%).

**Table 2.** Negative beliefs towards T/C

	<i>Q16a. T/C are not trustworthy</i>	
Absolutely agree		10.30%
Agree		28.50%
Neither agree or disagree		40.20%
Disagree		11.70%
Absolutely disagree		9.30%
	<i>Q16b. T/C are culturally inferior to G/C</i>	
Absolutely agree		20.60%
Agree		31.80%
Neither agree or disagree		29.00%
Disagree		11.20%
Absolutely disagree		7.50%
	<i>Q16c. T/C are dangerous as persons</i>	
Absolutely agree		24.80%
Agree		36.90%
Neither agree or disagree		27.10%
Disagree		8.40%
Absolutely disagree		2.80%
	<i>Q16d. T/C are more Asians or Middle Easterners than Europeans</i>	
Absolutely agree		9.80%
Agree		9.80%
Neither agree or disagree		44.90%
Disagree		24.80%
Absolutely disagree		10.70%
	<i>Q16e. Marriages between G/C and T/C are a danger for the national identity of G/C</i>	
Absolutely agree		22.90%
Agree		29.90%
Neither agree or disagree		22.00%
Disagree		15.00%
Absolutely disagree		10.30%

As to the behavioral tendency of the participants, it is obvious that they maintain a protective attitude towards specific hypothetical positive behaviors that have to do with Turkish Cypriots (Table 3). More specifically, significant percentages are not willing to buy any product or service from Turkish Cypriots, to vote for a Turkish Cypriot, to develop a romantic relationship with a Turkish Cypriot and to co-habit with a Turkish Cypriot during their studies. The negative tendencies towards the participation in a mixed team representing Cyprus abroad and development of a friendly relationship with a Turkish Cypriot (37.1%) were somehow lower.

**Table 3.** Behavioral tendency towards T/C

<i>Q18a. Chances of buying any product or service from T/C</i>	
1. No way	21.00%
2	20.60%
3	18.20%
4	8.90%
5	8.90%
6. Why not	22.40%
<i>Q18b. Chances of participating in a mixed team (G/C &amp; T/C) representing Cyprus abroad</i>	
1. No way	20.60%
2	16.40%
3	18.20%
4	9.80%
5	10.70%
6. Why not	24.30%
<i>Q18c. Chances of voting a T/C at any elections</i>	
1. No way	47.70%
2	16.40%
3	15.90%
4	5.10%
5	5.60%
6. Why not	9.30%
<i>Q18d. Chances of developing a friendly relationship with a T/C</i>	
1. No way	15.40%
2	11.70%
3	17.80%
4	12.10%
5	10.70%
6. Why not	32.20%
<i>Q18e. Chances of developing a romantic relationship with a T/C</i>	
1. No way	40.70%
2	15.90%
3	11.20%
4	7.90%
5	4.70%
6. Why not	19.60%
<i>Q18f. Chances of co-habiting with a T/C at the university</i>	
1. No way	31.80%
2	19.60%
3	11.70%
4	7.90%
5	8.40%
6. Why not	20.60%



Furthermore, participants also showed that they mostly hold negative emotions towards the Turkish Cypriots (Table 4). The main emotion recorded as a "strong" or "very strong" feeling was anger (52.3%) against Turkish Cypriots because of the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Participants also showed that they would not feel comfortable living with Turkish Cypriots (26.7%) but stated that they feel threat because of them (35.9%). Finally, a significant percentage of 26.6% stated that they would feel ashamed if a close relative of friend would marry a Turkish Cypriot.

**Table 4.** Emotions towards T/C

<i>Q17a. To which extent do you feel threat because of the T/C?</i>		
Very weak feeling		11.70%
Weak feeling		14.50%
Neither strong or weak feeling		37.90%
Strong feeling		28.00%
Very strong feeling		7.90%
<i>Q17b. To which extent do you feel anger for the T/C after the 1974 incidents?</i>		
Very weak feeling		9.80%
Weak feeling		12.10%
Neither strong or weak feeling		25.70%
Strong feeling		32.70%
Very strong feeling		19.60%
<i>Q17c. To which extent would you feel ashamed if a close relative or friend of you would marry with a T/C?</i>		
Very weak feeling		27.10%
Weak feeling		17.30%
Neither strong or weak feeling		29.00%
Strong feeling		15.90%
Very strong feeling		10.70%
<i>Q17d. To which extent would you feel comfortable living with T/C?</i>		
Very weak feeling		20.10%
Weak feeling		17.30%
Neither strong or weak feeling		36.00%
Strong feeling		17.80%
Very strong feeling		8.90%

Regarding contact (Table 5), the results show that Greek Cypriot students do not have a high contact tendency with Turkish Cypriots, but when contact happens, it is mostly evaluated in a positive way. More specifically, a very big portion of the sample stated that it has no social relationship with Turkish Cypriots (82.7%). In addition, another 68.2% stated that none of their close relatives has any social relationship with Turkish Cypriots. But, when social relationships do exist, they are mostly valued positively. In addition, most of the participants stated that they neither participate in organizations or institutions

in which Turkish Cypriots also participate (86.4%) or take part in bicomunal groups or activities (53.3%), which is considered a more informal way of socializing than organizations or institutions. Participants also reported very low socializing with Turkish Cypriots during the last 12 months. Only 10.3% of the sample had socialized with Turkish Cypriots through physical presence at the same place and only 4.7% through distance communication.

**Table 5.** Contact with T/C

<i>Q5-6. Do you have any social relationship with T/C and to which extent is it positive or negative?</i>	
Very negative	1.40%
Negative	0.00%
Neutral	3.70%
Positive	6.10%
Very positive	6.10%
No relationship	82.70%
<i>Q7-8. Does any close relative of you have any social relationship with T/C and to which extent is it positive or negative?</i>	
Very negative	0.90%
Negative	0.50%
Neutral	8.40%
Positive	13.60%
Very positive	8.40%
No relationship	68.20%
<i>Q9-10. Do you participate in organizations or institutions that T/C also participate and how much active are you within them?</i>	
Very little	2.30%
A little	5.10%
A lot	5.60%
Very much	0.50%
No participation	86.40%
<i>Q11. Do you participate in bicomunal groups or activities?</i>	
Not at all	53.30%
Rarely	19.20%
Not that much	17.80%
Frequently	8.40%
Very frequently	1.40%
<i>Q12a. During the last 12 months you have socialized with T/C with a physical presence at the same place</i>	
Not at all	58.90%
1-2 times	30.80%
3-10 times	7.50%
More than 10 times	2.80%
<i>Q12b. During the last 12 months you have socialized with T/C through distance communication</i>	
Not at all	86.40%
1-2 times	8.40%
3-10 times	1.90%
More than 10 times	2.80%

The authoritarian personality traits in the sample are presented in Table 6. Although participants do not agree with most of the authoritarian statements included in the questionnaire, they did state that the Greek Cypriot community must maintain its superior status in Cyprus (62.7%) and that Turkish Cypriots must understand that Greek Cypriots

are the superior ethnic group in Cyprus (58.4%). Participants are almost equally divided into those who are willing to reconcile with Turkish Cypriots in order to build a peaceful relationship with them (37.4%) and those who do not support to leave behind what happened in the past (35%).

**Table 6. Authoritarianism**

	<i>Q13a. T/C must be punished for the declaration of the TRNC de facto state</i>	
Absolutely disagree		23.80%
Disagree		24.30%
Neither agree or disagree		36.00%
Agree		11.70%
Absolutely agree		4.20%
	<i>Q13b. Socializing and having good relationships with T/C is an act against the G/C community</i>	
Absolutely disagree		29.00%
Disagree		31.80%
Neither agree or disagree		20.60%
Agree		13.60%
Absolutely agree		5.10%
	<i>Q13c. G/C who wish for reconciliation with T/C should be isolated from the rest</i>	
Absolutely disagree		40.20%
Disagree		34.60%
Neither agree or disagree		19.20%
Agree		3.70%
Absolutely agree		2.30%
	<i>Q13d. G/C should feel sorry for the T/C who died during the bicomunal conflicts</i>	
Absolutely disagree		11.20%
Disagree		17.80%
Neither agree or disagree		44.40%
Agree		16.40%
Absolutely agree		10.30%
	<i>Q13e. The two communities should forget of what happened in the past and should try to build a peaceful relationship between them</i>	
Absolutely disagree		15.90%
Disagree		21.50%
Neither agree or disagree		27.60%
Agree		19.60%
Absolutely agree		15.40%
	<i>Q13f. T/C must understand that G/C is the superior ethnic group in Cyprus</i>	
Absolutely disagree		8.90%
Disagree		13.10%
Neither agree or disagree		19.60%
Agree		36.40%
Absolutely agree		22.00%
	<i>Q13g. G/C must maintain their superior status within the Cyprus society</i>	
Absolutely disagree		6.10%
Disagree		8.90%
Neither agree or disagree		22.40%
Agree		37.90%
Absolutely agree		24.80%
	<i>Q13h. G/C and T/C are reasonably enemies as they have many differences between them</i>	
Absolutely disagree		15.00%
Disagree		24.30%
Neither agree or disagree		30.40%
Agree		22.00%
Absolutely agree		8.40%

A tendency of scapegoating the Turkish Cypriot community for the Cyprus problem is also evident in the data (Table 7). Turkish Cypriot nationalism, intransigence and demands attracted higher agreement rate as factors that have affected the Cyprus Problem than Greek Cypriot nationalism and demands. In addition, a significant percentage


(34.1%) supports that Turkish Cypriots carry more responsibilities than Greek Cypriots regarding the Cyprus Problem and 38.8% that Turkish Cypriots did not protect Cyprus' interests as Greek Cypriots did. Finally, more than one out of four participants supported that Turkish Cypriots are responsible for the Cyprus Problem's continuation up to date.

**Table 7. Scapegoating**

	<i>Q14a. To which extent do you believe that the T/C nationalism affected the Cyprus Problem?</i>	
Very little		3.30%
A little		17.80%
A lot		47.70%
Very much		31.30%
	<i>Q14b. To which extent do you believe that the G/C nationalism affected the Cyprus Problem?</i>	
Very little		5.60%
A little		22.90%
A lot		48.10%
Very much		23.40%
	<i>Q14c. To which extent do you believe that the T/C intransigence affected the Cyprus Problem?</i>	
Very little		1.90%
A little		22.40%
A lot		44.90%
Very much		30.80%
	<i>Q14d. To which extent do you believe that the demands of the T/C community affected the Cyprus Problem?</i>	
Very little		2.30%
A little		15.40%
A lot		43.50%
Very much		38.80%
	<i>Q14e. To which extent do you believe that the demands of the G/C community affected the Cyprus Problem?</i>	
Very little		9.30%
A little		37.40%
A lot		43.00%
Very much		10.30%
	<i>Q15a. To which extent do you agree or disagree that T/C are more responsible than G/C regarding the Cyprus Problem?</i>	
Absolutely disagree		7.00%
Disagree		15.90%
Neither agree or disagree		43.00%
Agree		22.90%
Absolutely agree		11.20%
	<i>Q15b. To which extent do you agree or disagree that T/C are responsible regarding the Cyprus Problem continuation?</i>	
Absolutely disagree		8.90%
Disagree		20.10%
Neither agree or disagree		42.50%
Agree		17.80%
Absolutely agree		10.70%
	<i>Q15c. To which extent do you agree or disagree that T/C did not protected Cyprus interests as G/C did?</i>	
Absolutely disagree		7.00%
Disagree		8.90%
Neither agree or disagree		45.30%
Agree		29.90%
Absolutely agree		8.90%

With respect to attitudes towards the open crossing points (Figure 2), participants are in controversy, as 39.3% of the sample is against the open crossing points and 35% that in favor. The rest 25.7% of the sample expressed a neutral attitude. Of great significance is the fact that 21% of the participants is absolutely against the open crossing points.

**Figure 2.** Attitude towards the open crossing points



With respect to personal interest (Table 8), the majority of the participants considers that it does not benefit from the open crossing points. For example, 43.9% believes that the open crossing points do not benefit Cyprus economy and another 59.8% stated that open crossing points support "TRNC" financially. However, a big portion of the sample (41.1%) supports that Greek Cypriots, as individuals, benefit financially because of the open crossing points. Regarding the political aspect, 43% of participants supported that the open crossing points mostly serve the political interests of the Turkish Cypriot community; yet, just 23.9% supported that a possible closure of the crossing points would benefit the Greek Cypriot side in political terms. A large percentage believes that the open crossing points contribute to the increase of criminality (38.8%) and to the compromise of Greek Cypriots to the existing status-quo (35%). Another 35.5% believes that the mixing of populations because of the open crossing points poses a risk to the Greek Cypriots' national identity. Finally, a significant percentage (40.1%) recognizes the crossing points as an important factor in the peace-building efforts.

**Table 8. Interest in open crossing points**

	<i>Q20a. The open crossing points affect the Cyprus economy in a positive way</i>	
Absolutely disagree		18.70%
Disagree		25.20%
Neither agree or disagree		34.60%
Agree		17.80%
Absolutely agree		3.70%
	<i>Q20b. The open crossing points contribute to the financial support of the TRNC de-facto state</i>	
Absolutely disagree		2.80%
Disagree		8.40%
Neither agree or disagree		29.00%
Agree		36.00%
Absolutely agree		23.80%
	<i>Q20c. G/C benefit financially as individuals because of the open crossing points</i>	
Absolutely disagree		9.30%
Disagree		12.10%
Neither agree or disagree		37.40%
Agree		32.70%
Absolutely agree		8.40%
	<i>Q20d. A possible closure of the crossing points would politicaly benefit the G/C community</i>	
Absolutely disagree		7.50%
Disagree		14.00%
Neither agree or disagree		54.70%
Agree		16.40%
Absolutely agree		7.50%
	<i>Q20e. The open crossing points mostly serve the political interests of the T/C community</i>	
Absolutely disagree		3.30%
Disagree		8.40%
Neither agree or disagree		45.30%
Agree		27.10%
Absolutely agree		15.90%
	<i>Q20f. The open crossing points contribute to the compromise of the G/C with the existing status-quo</i>	
Absolutely disagree		7.00%
Disagree		10.70%
Neither agree or disagree		47.20%
Agree		27.10%
Absolutely agree		7.90%
	<i>Q20g. The open crossing points are important in the peace-building efforts</i>	
Absolutely disagree		11.20%
Disagree		14.50%
Neither agree or disagree		34.10%
Agree		29.40%
Absolutely agree		10.70%
	<i>Q20h. The open crossing points contribute to the increase of criminality</i>	
Absolutely disagree		7.50%
Disagree		17.30%
Neither agree or disagree		36.40%
Agree		22.00%
Absolutely agree		16.80%
	<i>Q20i. The mixing of the populations, as it happens with the transit from the crossing points, poses a risk to the national identity of the G/C</i>	
Absolutely disagree		11.70%
Disagree		14.50%
Neither agree or disagree		38.30%
Agree		22.90%
Absolutely agree		12.60%


### 5.1.2 Variables Construction

For a proper correlation analysis, specific latent variables were constructed. Firstly, for the measurement of the participant’s attitudes towards the Turkish Cypriots, latent variables were formed in order to include three sets of variables as follows: negative beliefs towards Turkish Cypriots (Y1), behavioral tendency towards Turkish Cypriots (Y2) and emotions towards Turkish Cypriots (Y3). Each set of variables consists of several questions that were included in the questionnaire as follows:

Y1 = Q16a (*T/C are not trustworthy*) + Q16b (*T/C are culturally inferior to G/C*) + Q16c (*T/C are dangerous as persons*) + Q16d (*T/C are more Asians or Middle Easterners than Europeans*) + Q16e (*Marriages between G/C and T/C are a danger for the national identity of G/C*)

(Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.886)


**Figure 3. Negative beliefs towards T/C (Y1)**



Negative beliefs towards Turkish Cypriots (Figure 3) produced a quite high score. With a minimum value of 5.00 and a maximum of 25.00 the mean of the participants’ answers was 13.38. Despite the fact that many answers are in the “neutrality zone”, the mean itself proves that the beliefs towards the Turkish Cypriots are mostly negative.

Y2 = - Q18a (*Chances of buying any product or service from T/C*) - Q18b (*Chances of participating in a mixed team [G/C & T/C] representing Cyprus abroad*) - Q18c (*Chances of voting a T/C at any elections*) - Q18d (*Chances of developing a friendly relationship with a T/C*) - Q18e (*Chances of developing a romantic relationship with a T/C*) - Q18f (*Chances of co-habiting with a T/C at the university*) + 36  
 (Cronbach's Alpha = 0.917)

**Figure 4.** Behavioral tendency towards T/C (Y2)




Negative behavioral tendency (Figure 4) was even more intense. The mean was 17.19 on a 0-30 scale. It is also notable that a significant percentage (8.4%) scored the maximum negative value on the behavioral tendency scale.

Y3 = Q17a (*To what extent do you feel threat because of the T/C?*) + Q17b (*To what extent do you feel anger for the T/C after the 1974 incidents?*) + Q17c (*To what extent would you feel ashamed if a close relative or friend would marry with a T/C?*) - Q17d (*To what extent would you feel comfortable living with T/C?*) +2  
 (Cronbach's Alpha 0.743)



**Figure 5.** Emotions towards T/C



Finally, emotions towards Turkish Cypriots also proved to be mostly negative. The 8.34 mean with a minimum value of 0 and a maximum of 16, shows this. Still, a big portion of the sample is placed in the “neutrality zone”.

With respect to contact (X1), because of the low rate of positive responses as to whether the participants or their relatives have any social relationship with Turkish Cypriots, whether they participate in bicomunal groups or activities or in organizations and institutions in which Turkish Cypriots also participate, as well as due to the low rate of socialization with Turkish Cypriots (physically or through distance communication), binary variables were formed as follows:

X1a = Q5. *Do you have any social relationship with T/C?* (Answers from participants who reported a social relationship with Turkish Cypriots but then rated it as very negative, negative or neutral were omitted because of the very low frequency they recorded. Only answers that were either non-affirmative or affirmative and positive or very positive were included).

X1b = Q8. *Does any close relative of yours have any social relationship with T/C?* (Answers from participants who reported a social relationship of a relative with Turkish Cypriots but then rated it as very negative, negative or neutral were omitted due to low rate of response. Only answers that were either non-affirmative or affirmative and positive or very positive were included).

X1c = Q9. *Do you participate in organizations or institutions in which T/C also participate?* (Due to low rate of affirmative responses as to whether the participants participate in organizations or institutions in which Turkish Cypriots also participate, it was decided to omit the participation activity rate. It was only taken into consideration whether the participants participate or not in such organizations or institutions)

X1d = Q12a. *During the last 12 months you have socialized with T/C through physical presence at the same place* (Due to not enough answers stating that participants have had any socialization with Turkish Cypriots through physical presence during the last 12 months, it was chosen to form a binary variable stating just whether they have had or not any socialization in that way)

X1e = Q12b. *During the last 12 months you have socialized with T/C through distance communication* (Due to not enough answers stating that participants have had any distant socialization with Turkish Cypriots during the last 12 months, it was chosen to form a binary variable stating just whether they have had or not any socialization in that way).

**Table 9.** Contact with T/C (X1a, X1b, X1c, X1d, X1e)

	<i>Q6. Do you have any social relationship with T/C?</i>	
No		87.20%
Yes (positive or very positive)		12.80%
	<i>Q8. Does any close relative of you have any social relationship with T/C?</i>	
No		75.60%
Yes (positive or very positive)		24.40%
	<i>Q9. Do you participate in organizations or institutions that T/C also participate?</i>	
No		86.40%
Yes		13.60%
	<i>Q12a. During the last 12 months you have socialized with T/C with a physical presence at the same place</i>	
No		58.90%
Yes		41.10%
	<i>Q12b. During the last 12 months you have socialized with T/C through distance communication</i>	
No		86.90%
Yes		13.10%


It can be clearly observed that participants do not have enough contact with Turkish Cypriots (Table 9), neither direct or indirect. The vast majority of the sample (87.20%) has no social relationship with Turkish Cypriots, while 86.40% does not participate in any organizations or institutions in which Turkish Cypriots also participate. The socializing rate recorded is also very low.

The authoritarianism (X2) of each participant was measured through specific questions that were combining the authoritarian personality traits with statements regarding Turkish Cypriots and the Cyprus Problem. This variable was constructed as follows:

$X2 = Q13a$  (*T/C must be punished for the declaration of the TRNC de facto state*) +  $Q13b$  (*Socializing and having good relationships with T/C is an act against the G/C community*) +  $Q13c$  (*G/C who wish for reconciliation with T/C should be isolated from the rest*) -  $Q13d$  (*G/C should feel sorry for the T/C who died during the bicomunal conflicts*) -  $Q13e$  (*The two communities should forget of what happened in the past and should try to build a peaceful relationship between them*) +  $Q13f$  (*T/C must understand that G/C is the superior ethnic group in Cyprus*) +  $Q13g$  (*G/C must maintain their superior status within the Cyprus society*) +  $Q13h$  (*G/C and T/C are reasonably enemies as they have many differences between them*)

(Cronbach's Alpha 0.864)

**Figure 6.** Authoritarianism (X2)



The authoritarianism value in the sample was also significantly high (Figure 6). The mean of 20.82 on a 6-38 scale shows that participants reached high levels of authoritarianism when asked about Turkish Cypriots and the Cyprus Problem.

Scapegoating (X3) was represented in two variables that were chosen through a dimension reduction factor analysis each one consisting of different questions:

X3a = Q14a (*To which extent do you believe that the T/C nationalism affected the Cyprus Problem?*) + Q14c (*To which extent do you believe that the T/C intransigence affected the Cyprus Problem?*) + Q14d (*To which extent do you believe that the demands of the T/C community affected the Cyprus Problem?*)

(Cronbach's Alpha 0.814)


These were items that had to do exclusively with blaming the Turkish Cypriot community for the Cyprus Problem formation and continuation.

X3b = Q15a (*To which extent do you agree or disagree that T/C are more responsible than G/C regarding the Cyprus Problem?*) + Q15b (*To which extent do you agree or disagree that T/C are responsible regarding the Cyprus Problem continuation?*) + Q15c (*To which extent do you agree or disagree that T/C did not protected Cyprus interests as G/C did?*)


(Cronbach's Alpha 0.799)

These items were statements regarding T/C responsibility.

**Figure 7.** T/C's blaming as a factor into the Cyprus Problem's formation and continuation (X3a)



**Figure 8.** T/C responsibilities regarding the Cyprus Problem (X3b)




As Figures 7 and 8 show, participants mostly blamed the Turkish Cypriot community for the Cyprus Problem formation and continuation.

Finally, interest (X4) was measured through the combination of a set of variables that consisted of each participant's agreement or disagreement to statements regarding their personal interest in the open crossing points. This variable was formed as follows:

$X4 = - Q20a$  (*The open crossing points affect the Cyprus economy in a positive way*) +  $Q20b$  (*The open crossing points contribute to the financial support of the TRNC de-facto state*) -  $Q20c$  (*G/C benefit financially as individuals because of the open crossing points*) +  $Q20d$  (*A possible closure of the crossing points would politically benefit the G/C community*) +  $Q20e$  (*The open crossing points mostly serve the political interests of the T/C community*) +  $Q20f$  (*The open crossing points contribute to the compromise of the G/C with the existing status-quo*) -  $Q20g$  (*The open crossing points are important in the peace-building efforts*) +  $Q20h$  (*The open crossing points contribute to the increase of criminality*) +  $Q20$  (*The mixing of the populations, as it happens with the transit from the crossing points, poses a risk to the national identity of the G/C*)

(Cronbach's Alpha 0.788)

**Figure 9.** Interest in open crossing points (X4)



Participants' answers prove that the majority of Greek Cypriots does not perceive the open points as a factor that is of benefit to them personally (Figure 9). Participants showed that the open crossing points mostly affect them in a negative way, which is represented by the mean of 28.72 (11 = positive interest in open crossing points, 43 = negative interest in open crossing points).

### 5.1.3 Correlations

First, the relation between the attitude towards the Turkish Cypriots and the attitude towards the open crossing points is examined with Pearson's correlation coefficients. As seen in Table 10, the attitude towards Turkish Cypriots is negatively correlated with the attitude towards the open crossing points. What this means is that the more negative beliefs, the more negative behavioral tendency and the more negative emotions someone has towards Turkish Cypriots, the less positive his/her attitude will be towards the open crossing points. In addition, it is clearly observed that behavioral tendency exerts the greater influence on the attitude towards the open crossing points ( $r = -.519$ ). All coefficients are statistically significant.

**Table 10.** Correlation between the attitude towards T/C and the attitude towards the open crossing points

	Attitude towards the open crossing points (Y4) Pearson Correlation
Negative beliefs towards T/C (Y1)	-.390**
Behavioral tendency towards T/C (Y2)	-.519**
Emotions towards T/C (Y3)	-.438**

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Then, the correlations between authoritarianism, scapegoating, interest and attitudes towards the Turkish Cypriots and the open crossing points are examined (Table 11). The more authoritarian someone is and the more scapegoating tendency towards Turkish Cypriots one has, the more negative their beliefs, behavioral tendency and emotions towards Turkish Cypriots are. The statistical significance of those correlations proves that authoritarianism and scapegoating affect the attitude towards Turkish Cypriots.

In addition, the less the interest towards the open crossing points is, the less positive the attitude towards them is, so, interest can clearly affect the attitude towards the open crossing points. Authoritarianism and scapegoating affect the attitude towards the open crossing points in a negative way as well: the more authoritarian someone is and the more s/he tends to scapegoat Turkish Cypriots, the more negative her/his attitude towards the open crossing points is. However, the correlation between scapegoating and attitude towards the open crossing points was not as strong as the one between authoritarianism and attitude towards the open crossing points. All of the correlations were statistically significant.

The correlation between contact and attitude towards Turkish Cypriots and between contact and the and attitude toward open crossing points was assessed through means comparison (independent samples t-test). Five t-tests for equality of means were ran, each one comparing the mean of each form of contact with the means of the negative beliefs, behavioral tendency and emotions towards Turkish Cypriots, as well as the attitude towards the open crossing points.

**Table 11.** Correlation between authoritarianism, scapegoating, interest and attitudes towards T/C and the open crossing points

	Negative beliefs towards T/C (Y1) Pearson Correlation	Behavioral tendency towards T/C (Y2) Pearson Correlation	Emotions towards T/C (Y3) Pearson Correlation	Attitude towards the open crossing points (Y4) Pearson Correlation
Authoritarianism (X2)	.727**	.713**	.692**	-.524**
T/C's blaming as a factor into the Cyprus Problem's formation and continuation (X3a)	.290**	.281**	.406**	-.230**
T/C responsibilities regarding the Cyprus Problem (X3b)	.631**	.492**	.562**	-.332**
Interest in open crossing points (X4)		-		-.547**

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

**Table 12.** Independent Samples Test (t-test for equality of means) between social relationship with T/C (X1a) and attitudes towards T/C and the open crossing points

	Value range	Positive contact	No contact	Mean difference	p. value
Negative beliefs towards T/C (Y1)	0...16	9.9	13.7	11.45	.000
Behavioral tendency towards T/C (Y2)	0...30	6.96	18.41	3.79	.000
Emotions towards T/C (Y3)	0...16	5	8.74	3.74	.000
Attitude towards the open crossing points (Y4)	1...7	5.57	3.62	- 1.95	.000

**Table 13.** Independent Samples Test (t-test for equality of means) between relatives' social relationship with T/C (X1b) and attitudes towards T/C and the open crossing points

	Value range	Positive contact	No contact	Mean difference	p. value
Negative beliefs towards T/C (Y1)	0...16	14.12	10.53	3.59	.000
Behavioral tendency towards T/C (Y2)	0...30	10.57	18.73	8.15	.000
Emotions towards T/C (Y3)	0...16	5.87	9.02	3.15	.000
Attitude towards the open crossing points (Y4)	1...7	5.34	3.48	-1.85	.000

Participants who reported having a social relationship with Turkish Cypriots tend to have more positive beliefs, behavioral tendency and emotions towards Turkish Cypriots than those with no social relationship. In addition, who reported having a social relationship with Turkish Cypriots hold a more positive attitude towards the open crossing points than those with no social relationship (Table 12). The same holds for those who reported a social relationship between their close relatives and Turkish Cypriots (Table 13).



In addition, the means of participation to organizations or institutions in which Turkish Cypriots also participate and the components of the attitude toward T/C were also compared (Table 14). Participants who reportedly do not participate in organizations or institutions in which Turkish Cypriots also participate, have had more negative beliefs (3.91), behavioral tendency (9.65) and emotions (2.7) towards Turkish Cypriots and more negative attitude towards the open crossing points (-0.923) than the participants who participate in such organizations or institutions.

**Table 14.** Independent Samples Test (t-test for equality of means) between participation's in organizations or institutions that T/C also participate and attitude towards the open crossing points

	Value range	Participation	No participation	Mean difference	p. value
Negative beliefs towards T/C (Y1)	0...16	10	13.91	3.91	.000
Behavioral tendency towards T/C (Y2)	0...30	18.37	9.65	8.71	.000
Emotions towards T/C (Y3)	0...16	8.7	6	2.7	.000
Attitude towards the open crossing points (Y4)	1...7	4.62	3.69	-0.923	.000

Finally, the last 12 months socialization between participants and Turkish Cypriots was compared to their attitudes towards Turkish Cypriots and the open crossing points. Participants who had not socialized with Turkish Cypriots through physical presence reported more negative beliefs, behavioral tendency and emotions towards Turkish Cypriots and more negative attitude towards the open crossing points (Table 15). Even more negative are the means of those who have not had socialized with Turkish Cypriots through distance communication (Table 16).

**Table 15.** Independent Samples Test (t-test for equality of means) between socialization with T/C (physical presence at the same place) and attitudes towards T/C and the open crossing points

	Value range	Socialization	No socialization	Mean difference	p. value
Negative beliefs towards T/C (Y1)	0...16	12.48	14.01	1.52	.000
Behavioral tendency towards T/C (Y2)	0...30	14.26	19.23	4.97	.000
Emotions towards T/C (Y3)	0...16	7.51	8.92	1.40	.000
Attitude towards the open crossing points (Y4)	1...7	4.45	3.38	-1.07	.000

**Table 16.** Independent Samples Test (t-test for equality of means) between socialization with T/C (distance communication) and attitude towards T/C and the open crossing points

	Value range	Socialization	No socialization	Mean difference	p. value
Negative beliefs towards T/C (Y1)	0...16	10.8	13.79	3	.000
Behavioral tendency towards T/C (Y2)	0...30	9.64	18.34	8.7	.000
Emotions towards T/C (Y3)	0...16	5.75	8.73	2.98	.000
Attitude towards the open crossing points (Y4)	1...7	2.16	1.94	-1.23	.000

## 5.2 Qualitative Analysis

### 5.2.1 The two parts of Cyprus

Interviewees paid a lot of attention to the separation of Cyprus. In their majority they somehow blamed Turkey for the existing situation in Cyprus. Some of them also blamed Turkish Cypriots for allowing this to happen or for not taking actions in order to solve the problem. Except for four occasions Greek Cypriots nationalism was not even mentioned and the Cyprus situation was mostly presented as a Turkish case. In addition, the separation of the island is perceived as a situation that is more negative for Greek Cypriots than for Turkish Cypriots. Participants seemed to feel victimized by the events of 1974 which led to the separation of the two communities.

“In Cyprus there is the de-facto state of TRNC which is not recognized by Greek Cypriots. Many people abroad know about North Cyprus and the regular Cyprus. We are two parts now... Cyprus has been divided in two because of the Turkish invasion and some other circumstances”, Male, 23.

“They [the Turks] took the lands that belong to us with the 1974 invasion”, Male, 23.

The occupied part of Cyprus (de-facto state of TRNC) was also presented in a negative way by most interviewees. There is a dominant opinion that the north part of Cyprus is an underdeveloped place which is a protectorate of Turkey and does not offer safety or sufficient quality of life to its residents. It was also noted that Turkish Cypriots who live there, can be different from Turkish Cypriots who live in the South part.

“The Turkish Cypriot side is not as developed as the Greek Cypriot one... Because of the invasion and the current situation there, they stayed at the same status as before [1974]”, Male, 24.

“...to be honest, when I was going to the other side for the first time, I was a little bit of afraid, I did not feel secure there... I don't know, everything looked suspicious”, Female, 22.

“Turkish Cypriots who live on the Greek part are more similar to us... Turkish Cypriots who live on the occupied part, I believe that their ideology and their opinions are adjusted to the other part's ones”, Female, 21.

### **5.2.2 Turkish Cypriots as Turkey's pawn**

A tendency was noticed that Turkish Cypriots are not an independent community that protect the interests of Cyprus. Instead, Turkish Cypriots are mainly perceived as individuals that mostly serve their personal interest and tend to take Turkey's part as to the Cyprus Problem. Scapegoating toward Turkish Cypriot through these statements was noticed during most interviews.

“... they are Turks, the term Turkish Cypriot does not exist for me... They are Turkey's pawns...”, Male, 23.

“Turkish Cypriots are just Turks. There is not any Turkish Cypriot anymore... Turkish Cypriot community does not exist. Only Turks...”, Male, 24.

“Everybody wants to serve their own interests. Especially Turkish Cypriots... They clearly want to serve their interests, in order to avoid an inferior position after a possible Cyprus Problem's solution”, Male, 23.

“... they are responsible for what happened in the past as I said before [Turkish Cypriot rebellion and bicomunal conflicts], but it is reasonable because they are Turks... They are with Turkey's part and they won't contribute into the Cyprus Problem's solution”, Male, 23.

“... with their attitude, Turkish Cypriots prove that they are subservient to Turkey. The political decisions of the TRNC do not help the situation”, Male, 26.

“If they really wanted, they would have contributed into the problem’s solution... there is a lack of will and they mostly promote their interests”, Male, 26.

“... Turkish Cypriots are Erdogan’s pawns and Turkey is the driving force behind them”, Male, 23.

It is obvious that Greek Cypriots are traumatized by the past of the Cyprus Problem. Some memories seem to be impossible to fade and trust seems to be difficult to establish between the two communities.

“... I may be biased against them because of what happened in the past... I cannot trust them anymore and I do not want to live with them again...”, Male, 24.

“I expect more things from them (Turkish Cypriots) in order to resolve the problem... They are the reason the problem occurred, I wait for a series of good acts from them so, that the problem can be eventually solved”, Male, 22.

### **5.2.3 Greece Vs Turkey**

Among interviewees it was repeatedly reported that the two communities identify with different “mother countries”. On the one side, Greek Cypriots were considered as Greeks and on the other side Turkish Cypriots as Turks. Interviewees reported several reasons to support such opinion and most of those reasons had to do with the cultural characteristics, such as language, religion and ancestry narratives. These differences reflect dominant attitudes and stereotypes in the Greek Cypriot community.

“First of all, we belong to a different nation. We belong to the Greek nation and they belong to the Turkish... the Ottoman nation. And our language is different... how can we be considered to be the same when we speak a different language? How can we communicate like this? Third, I consider as my mother country Greece, and a Turkish Cypriot considers Turkey. This is a huge difference.”, Male, 22.

“I personally don’t believe that we are the same with Turkish Cypriots. They don’t speak Greek, they have different customs... and this makes me anxious because I don’t know how to manage any possible contact with them”, Female, 23.

“They have a whole different perception of reality because of their ancestry... Their mother country is Turkey... Our mother country is Greece... They are Muslims,

and everything is totally in contrast between us... Greece and Turkey had always been in conflict. There are very big differences between us.”, Male, 23.

“Cyprus is one, and it is Greek Cypriot”, Male, 22.

“... we are actually in a cultural conflict let’s say... we have a different mentality, a different way of living”, Female, 23.

Still, some interviewees supported that Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots are the same. They are people who were born in the same country and they have no reason to be hostile against each other. A shared country, a common lifestyle, customs and values are the characteristics that link Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Another important statement is that both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots tend to identify themselves as being Cypriots and not as Greek or Turkish Cypriots.

“I believe that the most similar person to me would firstly be a Greek Cypriot and then a Turkish Cypriot... I understand that we have many similarities, many things in common... We share the same country, we have the same customs and values...”, Male, 24.

“...we are like two twin babies from the same womb... we are almost the same, but not exactly the same...”, Male, 23.

“They [Turkish Cypriots] were just born a few kilometers away from us. There are not any major differences, as we are both Cypriots and share a common goal, to live peacefully together again”, Female, 22.

“When we are abroad, we say we are Cypriots, not Greek Cypriots... the same happens with Turkish Cypriots as well...”, Male, 24.

#### **5.2.4 Contact with Turkish Cypriots**

Most of the interviewees did not have any interpersonal contact with Turkish Cypriots. The opinions they formed about them were mostly a result of indirect experiences and information from their relatives. There was also a case that the interviewee had only experience with Turkish Cypriots during his military service on the Green Line. However, this contact was under the specific circumstances (opposite guard points) which naturally promote a negative attitude towards the “enemy”.

“When I was serving in the army, I was at the Green Line, I never even tried to talk with anybody from the other side, we just kept on shouting and swearing at each other... you know, we are in the army, we were oversensitive about this issue because of the system inside the army. Army creates in you an impulsive tendency and behavior that is negative...”, Male, 22.

“My experience with Turkish Cypriots when I was in the army was completely different than my experience when I faced them while visiting the north side”, Male, 22.

“I did not have any contact with Turkish Cypriots, I just have been told about them from my parents and grandparents. I know that Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots were living together in peace, despite all the differences”, Female, 23.

In the cases that contact with Turkish Cypriots did happen, interviewees supported that it only had positive effects on their perceptions of Turkish Cypriots. Contact reduced prejudice between members of the two communities and increased comfort with Turkish Cypriots. In addition, it contributed to the realization of an equal status, common goals and the need for cooperation in order to ease the in-conflict relationship that by default characterized Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

“I once visited the occupied lands, when I was younger and as I remember Turkish Cypriots did not face us in a bad way, or with hate...A Turkish Cypriot told us his issues regarding the invasion, he even told us that he is also a refugee, from Paphos...”, Male, 22.

“Once I met Turkish Cypriots I realized that what the nationalist cycles in the South support is stupid and that we have the same worries and the same hope for our land. Just these are enough to connect you with them in order to achieve something greater”, Male, 24.

“I met a guy from Lefka, through Facebook. We even met in person, we had coffee and we dined... We became good friends now and I have even met more Turkish Cypriots... With those people we share common beliefs... I realized that we have the same worries, we share the same goals...”, Male, 24.

“I met some Turkish Cypriots during a history conference in 2015. I heard about things happened that I had no idea. Through this direct contact with them, I found

out about cruel acts, facts and events that are not presented by the Greek Cypriot side... I realized that the one side tends to demonize the other.”, Female, 21.

In addition, contact between the two communities was characterized as essential to the efforts to reconcile and reach a solution.

“[if] we come closer, I would finally understand the way they were perceiving us as the other side after so many years... and if we as Greek Cypriots have had an incorrect understanding of them”, Female, 21.

“Coming closer can contribute into trust building between the two communities...”, Male, 24.

“In our community, hate is being instilled in us from our early ages... the information regarding Cyprus Problem is incomplete and biased, very important elements are missing and an integrated view of the issue is not reachable... we have to exchange opinions, ideas and knowledge with them [Turkish Cypriots]”, Female, 21.

### **5.2.5 The non-existent contact**

The non-contact status from 1974 - 2003 seems to have directly affected the opinions within the Greek Cypriot community. It is obviously perceived as a factor that contributed to the further psychological separation between the two communities. Students that participated in the interviews described the non-contact situation as a mostly negative aspect of the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots relationship. The open crossing points were recognized by almost all the interviewees as the most important contact factor.

“There is no communication at all... except the passing through the crossing points, there is nothing else...”, Male, 23.

“The distance between the two communities is getting bigger and bigger. The differences are getting more and more and the hate towards each other is getting more intense [because of the lack of contact]”, Male, 26.

“Before opening the crossing points, the relationship between the two communities was intense... clashes, stereotypes, nationalism...”, Female, 23.

“During the last years, there was not any serious form of contact... With the lack of contact the division between Greek and Turkish Cypriots is getting wide, the South is being 'Greek-ized' and the North is being 'Turkish-ized’”, Male, 26.

“From 1974 until 2003, because of the lack of contact, as the crossing points were closed, the situation was bad. But after 2003 and the opening of the crossing points, the distance between the two communities became shorter. But as the Cyprus Problem continues to occur, the distances between us will still exist”, Male, 22.

Still, some interviewees stated that they would not desire any form of contact and some suggested that closer contact is a threat to “our way of living”. In addition, some opinions were against any institutionalized form of contact.

“I don’t want to come closer with them [the Turkish Cypriots] because we are convenient just like this. They can stay on their part and do whatever they want, as they already do, like we do on our part... our everyday lives will change for sure... We are safer in the Greek Cypriot part, generally in your everyday life, you know what is going on... If they come, a different religion, a different mentality, a different way of living... for sure they will change our lives”, Male, 24.

“I am against any institutionalized form of contact... Any contact under such circumstances would be hypocritical as it does not affect the current situation in a positive way”, Male, 26.

### **5.2.6 Trade between the two communities**

A large part of the interviews, during talking about the open crossing points, was dedicated to discussions about the trade relationships between the members of the two communities. As expected, interviewees' opinions were in controversy. Some of them supported that any transaction between Greek Cypriots and the north part of Cyprus is an immoral and that it burdens the Greek Cypriot community and directly benefits the de facto state in financial terms.

“...any transaction between Turkish and Greek Cypriots is incorrect and dangerous... we actually finance the pseudo-state ... mostly through our visits to their casinos, but many of us take advantage over their low standard of living...”, Male, 24.



“...the Republic of Cyprus loses income and the pseudo-state is being financed by us...”, Male, 23.

“... it [visiting the north part and spending money there] is incorrect, illegal and disrespectful to our nation, our country, our heroes... It does not make sense, it is motivated by personal interests and it is like a betrayal.”, Male, 23.

Some other interviewees were in favor of any trade relationship with the north side as they supported that any transaction would either benefit the relationship between the two communities, or individually benefit each Greek Cypriot.

“I am in favor of the development of any trade relationship between the two communities... Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots must co-operate in order to both affect their economies in a positive way...”, Male, 24.

“I visit the North side to serve my own interest, because there the products are cheaper than here”, Female, 22.

“I benefit because of the crossing points... As I am a smoker, I usually visit the North part in order to buy tobacco... even medicines are cheaper there and the Greek Cypriots who do this (buying products from the North side) are absolutely justified, everybody’s personal interest is logical.”, Male, 22.

### **5.2.7 Greek Cypriots as visitors to their “own places”**

Some participants considered the open crossing points as a policy that mostly serves the psychological and emotional needs of Greek Cypriots. Having the opportunity to visit an occupied village and see the occupied lands was only possible after the opening of the crossing points in 2003. Some interviewees however, did not seem to be in favor of visiting the occupied part of Cyprus. The main reasons were that it serves the maintenance of the existing status quo, a compromise of Greek Cypriots and the increase of disappointment because of the continuation of the Cyprus Problem.

“... how many times can anybody visit this place? What do you want to see? That they are possessive? Last week my parents visited their occupied village and my mother came back home crying... This contributes to an emotional overload because of the situation there and what you see, because of your nostalgia of wanting those places back, but you cannot have them back...”, Female, 21.

“... many people cannot deal with the psychological reaction as a result to their visit there. They just keep on filling themselves with sadness, disappointment and anger...”, Female, 21.

“... the open crossing points eventually maintain the existing status quo. The situation is still the same, either with or without the open crossing points”, Male, 23.

“...they [the open crossing points] do not serve any important need in the end and they somehow maintain the discord between the two communities. It is like a drug addict. Instead of stopping providing him with their dose, you just keep on giving them the drug in smaller doses”, Male, 26.

“If I was asked about a negative aspect of the fact that the crossing points are open, I would say that, the status quo is being established as we are getting used to a limited contact with Turkish Cypriots”, Male, 24.

“I have bad experiences with that [visiting the north part]. That was my one and only visit to the other side... Parents and grandparents crying, disappointment, you know...”, Male, 26.

In some cases, it was stated that visiting the occupied part of Cyprus only increases people’s anger and bad emotions against Turkey and Turkish Cypriots and that it does not serve any other important need or interest.

“I once visited the occupied Ammochostos. I just went there to realize what we lost to them. What they took from us. What they stole from us. I do not have any other experience and I do not want to have any again in my life”, Male, 23.

“I never visited the north part. Visiting this part means you also provide your personal details to the country that occupies your country... I will not do it, it feels like I am entering a jail inside my own country with my consent [...] as something legal. Like I am recognizing your jail...”, Female, 21.

“I believe I am against visiting the occupied part. First of all, you have to provide identification documents to a pseudo-state to pass the Green Line. Then, you are just visiting those lands. So, what? What happens next? Let’s say you visited this place once, then? Then you just complicate things in your mind, such as hope that

one day those lands will be ours again... The opportunity of visiting the occupied lands just provides us with false hopes...”, Male, 24.

### **5.2.8 The fear of bicomunal violence’s repetition**

What was very interesting during the interviews was the fear of the interviewees that a negative aspect of a possible solution of the Cyprus Problem and the island’s reunification would be the repetition of bicomunal violence. This opinion was mainly based on the perceived differences between the two communities due to the lack of contact between them during the last decades. Each community has specific sets of ethnic attitudes, deeply rooted in their members' consciousness and this enhances feelings of fear and uncertainty.

“... they have to accept that they are just a minority... but I believe that many of them will not accept it, more conflicts [will likely] happen”, Male, 22.

“... a possible reunification might provide ground to nationalist offshoots to increase their influence and political power as they will be constantly looking for incentives to create hostility and rivalries between the two communities...”, Male, 24.

“... in the case of reunification, I believe that peace will not last in time... we will face violence and conflict again, because we have so many differences between us after all these years”, Male, 23.

“... after so many years living this way [divided], I am afraid that, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots will face new conflicts between them. I don’t feel ready to imagine my everyday life with Turkish Cypriots. We live so close to each other, but our way of living and how we understand the situation might be different enough so that we will not be ready to co-exist in the same society”, Male, 24.

## **CHAPTER 6 Conclusion and Discussion**

This research has measured the attitudes towards Turkish Cypriots and the open crossing points in a sample of Cyprus University of Technology students. In addition, those attitudes were explained through the use of specific sociological theories.

The first research question was about the overall attitude of the Greek Cypriot students of Cyprus University of Technology towards the Turkish Cypriots. Based on the findings, as presented in the previous chapter, both from questionnaires and interviews, it can be said that the attitude towards Turkish Cypriots is mostly negative. Beliefs, behavioral tendency and emotions towards Turkish Cypriots represent a conservative attitude towards Turkish Cypriots, which is not extreme, but mainly negative. Still, a significant portion of the sample represents a more positive way of approaching Turkish Cypriots with respect to beliefs, behavior and emotions.

In addition, some interviewees reported their negative attitude towards Turkish Cypriots invoking specific cultural differences that do not allow them to communicate or perceive them as Cypriots and even expressed extremely negative opinions about them regarding their mentality and way of living. Furthermore, some of them also described de facto pseudo-state where T/C mostly live, as an underdeveloped place that has nothing to do with the way of living of the Greek Cypriot community and stated that this is an important factor of their doubts regarding any possible co-existence.

The next research question was, how can this attitude be explained sociologically. For this purpose, the attitude measured was correlated with contact, authoritarianism and scapegoating which were also measured, in order to identify the relation between them. As stated in the previous chapters, a statistically significant correlation between those variables has been found. Specifically, it has been found that people who do not have enough contact with Turkish Cypriots or not at all, who carry traits of authoritarian personalities as stated by Adorno et al. (1950) and who tend to scapegoat the Turkish Cypriot community for the formation and continuation of the Cyprus Problem, are more likely to maintain a negative attitude towards Turkish Cypriots. It should be noted, however, that responses on negative contact with Turkish Cypriots were omitted due to their extremely low frequency.

Lack of contact is reasonably a factor that affects attitudes towards Turkish Cypriots. As stated before, Contact Hypothesis suggests that under ideal circumstances, contact can be very effective in order to reduce prejudice among members of conflicting groups (Brown & Hewstone, 2005). In addition, the “fear for bicomunal violence repetition” among interviewees might be considered a result of not enough contact with Turkish Cypriots, as through contact it is possible to reduce the concern in conflict groups and to eventually create comfort between them (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2005). Some interviewees also expressed negative opinions towards the Turkish Cypriots without having any interpersonal form of contact with them, which proves the dominance of specific national stereotypes within the Greek Cypriot community.

Authoritarian personality traits might result in the adoption of specific ethnocentric patterns and lead to excessive nationalism. They might enhance negative attitudes and beliefs towards other groups (Adorno et al., 1950). The same applies to scapegoating. Scapegoating is an act of prejudice particularly against racial, ethnic or religious groups (Barkan, 2015). Therefore, the positive correlation between negative attitudes towards Turkish Cypriots and high tendency of scapegoating is reasonable.

In addition, the present study measured the attitude of Greek Cypriot students towards the open crossing points. The responses on a one simple question show that the corresponding attitudes are in controversy. The mean score of this attitude is close to neutrality, but closer to negative rather than positive attitude towards the open crossing points. The same tendencies were observed in the interviews.

The next part of this research question was to explain the attitude towards the open crossing points. The attitude towards the open crossing points was found to be affected by each participant’s personal interest. This means that the less personal interest each participant has in the open crossing points, the more negative their attitude towards them is. This is exactly what the rational choice theory suggests. Each individual perceives the open crossing points based on their interest and is motivated by his/her tendency to maximize it (Ostrom, 1997). Based on this theory, it can also be suggested that participants formed their attitude through a rational process in order to gain the most benefits and suffer the least costs (Scott, 2000).

This theory is also supported by the findings from the interviews. Interviewees explained their negative opinion about the open crossing points in terms of financial, political,

emotional and psychological burdens. Even those who expressed a positive attitude towards the open crossing points, reported reasons such as buying products or meeting people living there. It was also found that contact, authoritarianism and scapegoating also affect the attitude of each individual towards the open crossing points in a negative way. Finally, another objective of this research was to examine the relationship between the attitude towards Turkish Cypriots and the attitude towards the open crossing points. It was found that, the attitude towards Turkish Cypriots is positively related to the attitude towards the open crossing points. Participants who recorded negative beliefs, behavioral tendency and emotions towards Turkish Cypriots are more likely to have negative attitudes towards the open crossing points.

In addition to answering the three research questions, this research aimed at establishing a typology in the sample, regarding attitudes (positive vs negative) toward T/C and toward the open crossing points. This was achieved through the construction of attitude clusters, each representing a specific group of individuals. These types are presented below.

*Type 1: Positive attitude towards Turkish Cypriots and positive attitude towards the open crossing points:* People who have contact with Turkish Cypriots (mainly positive) also report low levels of authoritarian personality traits and do not tend to scapegoat the Turkish Cypriot community for the formation and the continuation of the Cyprus Problem. They also perceive the open crossing points as a factor that is personally beneficial to them as it serves emotional and financial interests and also contributes in a positive way in the peace-building efforts between the two communities.

*Type 2: Positive attitude towards Turkish Cypriots and negative attitude towards the open crossing points:* These are the people who have mainly positive contact with Turkish Cypriots, have authoritarian personality traits at a low extent and do not tend to scapegoat the Turkish Cypriots, but perceive the open crossing points as a factor that is not beneficial to the Greek Cypriot community in political, financial, emotional and psychological terms.

*Type 3: Negative attitude towards Turkish Cypriots and positive attitude towards the open crossing points:* These are individuals who do not have any contact with Turkish Cypriots, report high levels of authoritarian personality traits and tend to scapegoat the

Turkish Cypriot community regarding the Cyprus Problem, but have a positive attitude toward the open crossing points, as they serve them mainly financially.

*Type 4: Negative attitude towards Turkish Cypriots and negative attitude towards the open crossing points:* These are people who do not have any contact with Turkish Cypriots, seem to be authoritarian and tend to scapegoat the Turkish Cypriot community for the Cyprus Problem's formation and continuation, while they also maintain a negative attitude towards the open crossing points as they believe that the open crossing points do not serve any political, financial, psychological or emotional needs of the Greek Cypriot community.

The results of this research have limitations regarding generalizability. The sample was drawn from the population of Cyprus University of Technology undergraduate students. The sampling methodology was effective in producing a representative sample with respect to the demographic characteristics of the population (with the exception of gender); thus, it allows generalization to the sampled population (with due caution). Generalizing the findings to the population of Greek Cypriot university students in Cyprus is technically not supported; yet, the findings may be considered as indicative. In addition, social-desirability bias may have influenced the participants' responses, who could have pretendedly expressed more positive attitudes towards Turkish Cypriots and the open crossing points as a peacebuilding action. Finally, the fact that the vast majority of the participants do not have any social relationship or serious form of contact with Turkish Cypriot, reduces the purity of their responses regarding beliefs, emotions and behaviors towards Turkish Cypriots.

It is recommended for future researches to study both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Exposing the dominant stereotypes and attitudes within the Turkish Cypriot community in contrast to those of the Greek Cypriots, would be of great importance in order to realize the need for contact. In addition, it is highly recommended to examine the contact between the two communities more thoroughly and in combination with the examination of the circumstances under which that contact takes place, so that the contact hypothesis will have a more proper application. More specifically, aspects such as the status of the members of the two communities, the goals of each community and the cooperation between these two groups, as well as the social and institutional support in order to achieve positive results should be measured and examined more analytically. In addition,

Rothschild's et al. (2012) bipolar pattern of scapegoating should be tested in the members of the two communities. In the present research, it was found that Greek Cypriots tend to minimize their community's guilt feelings over Turkish Cypriot responsibility for the Cyprus Problem. Therefore, the hypotheses that scapegoating is the result of an attempt to maintain perceived personal moral values and personal control by providing a clear explanation for the Cyprus Problem's negative outcomes through scapegoating, should be tested.

This research aim was to record the attitude towards Turkish Cypriots and the open crossing points. The findings suggest that both attitudes are mostly negative and are directly affected by lack of contact with Turkish Cypriots, authoritarianism, tendency to scapegoat and personal interest. What is essential to underline, is the obvious lack of contact with Turkish Cypriots within the student population. This, in combination with the negative attitudes a big portion of the sample expresses, is evidence to the domination of specific nationalist attitudes, stereotypes and prejudice within the Greek Cypriot community. Lack of trust between post-conflict groups leads to negative feelings toward each other and contact as proven through the findings, can heal those issues and contribute to peace-building.



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## **APPENDIX I**

Questionnaire distributed to CUT students (print version)

### ΜΕΡΟΣ Α΄:

1. Φύλο:

Άρρεν

Θήλυ

2. Σχολή:

Γεωτεχνικών Επιστημών και Διαχείρισης Περιβάλλοντος

Διοίκησης και Οικονομίας

Επιστημών Υγείας

Καλών και Εφαρμοσμένων Τεχνών

Μέσων Επικοινωνίας και Ενημέρωσης

Μηχανικής και Τεχνολογίας

3. Έτος σπουδών:

1ο

2ο

3ο

4ο, 5ο, 6ο

4. Ανήκεις σε προσφυγική οικογένεια;

Ναι

Όχι

### ΜΕΡΟΣ Β΄:

5. Έχεις οποιαδήποτε κοινωνική σχέση με Τουρκοκύπριους (όπως φιλική ή επαγγελματική);

Ναι

Όχι

*\*Εάν απάντησες "Ναι", απάντησε και στην ερώτηση 6 - Εάν απάντησες "Όχι", προχώρησε στην ερώτηση 7.*

6. Σε ποιο βαθμό αυτή είναι θετική ή αρνητική;

Πολύ αρνητική

Αρνητική

Ουδέτερη

Θετική

Πολύ θετική

7. Έχει κάποιος στενός σου συγγενής (π.χ. γονιός, αδελφός, αδελφή, παππούς, γιαγιά, θείος, θεία, εξάδελφος, εξάδελφη) οποιαδήποτε κοινωνική σχέση με Τουρκοκύπριους (όπως φιλική ή επαγγελματική);

Ναι

Όχι

*\*Εάν απάντησες "Ναι", απάντησε και στην ερώτηση 8 - Εάν απάντησες "Όχι", προχώρησε στην ερώτηση 9.*

8. Σε ποιο βαθμό αυτή είναι θετική ή αρνητική;

Πολύ αρνητική

Αρνητική

Ουδέτερη

Θετική

Πολύ θετική

9. Συμμετέχεις σε οργανισμούς ή θεσμούς στους οποίους συμμετέχουν επίσης Τουρκοκύπριοι;

Ναι

Όχι

*\*Εάν απάντησες "Ναι", απάντησε και στην ερώτηση 10 - Εάν απάντησες "Όχι", προχώρησε στην ερώτηση 11.*

10. Πόσο ενεργός είσαι εντός αυτών;

Πάρα πολύ

Πολύ

Λίγο

Πολύ λίγο

11. Συμμετέχεις σε δικινοτικές ομάδες ή δραστηριότητες;

Πολύ συχνά

Συχνά

Όχι πολύ

Σπάνια

Καθόλου

12. Κατά τη διάρκεια των τελευταίων 12 μηνών, έχεις συναναστραφεί με Τουρκοκύπριους:

Καθόλου

1-2 φορές

3-10 φορές

Πάνω από 10 φορές

(α) Με φυσική παρουσία στον ίδιο χώρο

(β) Μέσω εξ αποστάσεως επικοινωνίας (π.χ., τηλέφωνο, email, μέσα κοινωνικής δικτύωσης);

ΜΕΡΟΣ Γ΄:

13. Σε ποιο βαθμό συμφωνείς ή διαφωνείς με τις πιο κάτω δηλώσεις:

Διαφωνώ απόλυτα

Διαφωνώ

Ούτε συμφωνώ/ Ούτε διαφωνώ

Συμφωνώ

Συμφωνώ απόλυτα

(α) Οι Τ/Κ πρέπει να τιμωρηθούν για την ανακήρυξη του ψευδοκράτους

(β) Η συναναστροφή και η ύπαρξη καλών σχέσεων με τους Τ/Κ είναι μια πράξη εις βάρος της Ελληνοκυπριακής κοινότητας

(γ) Οι Ε/Κ που επιθυμούν επαναπροσέγγιση με τους Τ/Κ πρέπει να απομονωθούν από τους υπόλοιπους

(δ) Οι Ε/Κ πρέπει να λυπούνται για τους Τ/Κ που πέθαναν κατά τη διάρκεια δικαιοδικών συγκρούσεων

(ε) Οι δύο κοινότητες πρέπει να ξεχάσουν τι έγινε στο παρελθόν και να προσπαθήσουν να κτίσουν μια ειρηνική σχέση μεταξύ τους

(στ) Οι Τ/Κ πρέπει να καταλάβουν ότι οι Ε/Κ είναι η κυρίαρχη εθνοτική κοινότητα στην Κύπρο

(ζ) Οι Ε/Κ πρέπει να διατηρήσουν την κυρίαρχη θέση τους εντός της κυπριακής κοινωνίας

(η) Οι Ε/Κ και οι Τ/Κ είναι δικαιολογημένα εχθροί, καθώς τους διαχωρίζουν πολλές διαφορές μεταξύ τους



ΜΕΡΟΣ Δ΄:

14. Σε ποιο βαθμό θεωρείς ότι τα παρακάτω επηρέασαν το Κυπριακό Πρόβλημα;

Πάρα πολύ

Πολύ

Λίγο

Πολύ λίγο

- (α) Ο Τουρκοκυπριακός εθνικισμός
- (β) Ο Ελληνοκυπριακός εθνικισμός
- (γ) Η αδιαλλαξία της Τ/Κ κοινότητας
- (δ) Οι απαιτήσεις της Τ/Κ κοινότητας
- (ε) Οι απαιτήσεις της Ε/Κ κοινότητας

15. Σε ποιο βαθμό συμφωνείς ή διαφωνείς με τα παρακάτω:

Διαφωνώ απόλυτα

Διαφωνώ

Ούτε συμφωνώ/ Ούτε διαφωνώ

Συμφωνώ

Συμφωνώ απόλυτα

- (α) Οι Τ/Κ φέρουν μεγαλύτερες ευθύνες για το Κυπριακό Πρόβλημα σε σχέση με τους Ε/Κ
- (β) Οι Τ/Κ ευθύνονται για τη συνέχιση του προβλήματος
- (γ) Οι Τ/Κ δεν διαφύλαξαν τα συμφέροντα της Κύπρου στο βαθμό που έκαναν οι Ε/Κ

ΜΕΡΟΣ Ε΄:

16. Σε ποιο βαθμό συμφωνείς/διαφωνείς με τα παρακάτω:

Διαφωνώ απόλυτα

Διαφωνώ

Ούτε συμφωνώ/ Ούτε διαφωνώ

Συμφωνώ

Συμφωνώ απόλυτα

(α) Οι Τ/Κ είναι αναξιόπιστοι

(β) Οι Τ/Κ είναι υποδεέστεροι πολιτισμικά σε σχέση με τους Ε/Κ

(γ) Οι Τ/Κ είναι επικίνδυνοι ως άτομα

(δ) Οι Τ/Κ είναι περισσότερο Ασιάτες/ Μεσανατολίτες παρά Ευρωπαίοι

(ε) Οι μεικτοί γάμοι αποτελούν κίνδυνο για την εθνική ταυτότητα των Ε/Κ

17. Πώς νιώθεις ή θα ένιωθες σχετικά με τις πιο κάτω δηλώσεις/ενδεχόμενα; (τα συναισθήματα βρίσκονται εντός των αγκυλών)

Πολύ δυνατό συναίσθημα

Δυνατό συναίσθημα

Ουδέτερο συναίσθημα

Αδύνατο συναίσθημα

Πολύ αδύνατο συναίσθημα

(α) Οι Τ/Κ αποτελούν απειλή για τους Ε/Κ [απειλή]

(β) Θυμός για τους Τ/Κ μετά τα γεγονότα του 1974 [θυμός]

(γ) Ένας πολύ στενός συγγενής ή φίλος σου παντρεύεται με Τ/Κ [ντροπή]

(δ) Άνεση να ζεις μαζί με Τ/Κ [άνεση]

18. Σε κλίμακα 1-6 (1=Θα το απέφευγα πάση θυσία και 6 = Γιατί όχι) ποιες είναι οι πιθανότητες για σένα να:

- (α) Αγοράσεις οποιοδήποτε προϊόν ή υπηρεσία από Τ/Κ
- (β) Συμμετάσχεις σε μεικτή ομάδα (Ε/Κ και Τ/Κ) εκπροσώπησης της Κύπρου στο εξωτερικό
- (γ) Συμμετάσχεις σε πόλεμο ή ένοπλη σύγκρουση εναντίον των Τ/Κ
- (δ) Ψηφίζεις Τ/Κ σε οποιοδήποτε εκλογές
- (ε) Αναπτύξεις φιλική σχέση με Τ/Κ
- (στ) Αναπτύξεις μια ερωτική σχέση με Τ/Κ
- (ζ) Συγκατοικήσεις με Τ/Κ στο πανεπιστήμιο

ΜΕΡΟΣ ΣΤ΄:

19. Σε κλίμακα 1-7 (1=Πλήρως εναντίον και 7=Πλήρως υπέρ), σε ποιο βαθμό είσαι υπέρ ή κατά των ανοικτών οδοφραγμάτων;

ΜΕΡΟΣ Ζ΄:

20. Σε ποιο βαθμό συμφωνείς ή διαφωνείς με τις πιο κάτω δηλώσεις:

Διαφωνώ απόλυτα

Διαφωνώ

Ούτε συμφωνώ/ Ούτε διαφωνώ

Συμφωνώ

Συμφωνώ απόλυτα

- (α) Τα ανοιχτά οδοφράγματα επηρεάζουν την κυπριακή οικονομία με θετικό τρόπο
- (β) Τα ανοικτά οδοφράγματα συμβάλλουν στην οικονομική ενίσχυση του ψευδοκράτους
- (γ) Οι Ε/Κ ως άτομα επωφελούνται οικονομικά από τα ανοικτά οδοφράγματα

- (δ) Το πιθανό κλείσιμο των οδοφραγμάτων θα ευνοούσε πολιτικά την Ε/Κ κοινότητα
- (ε) Τα ανοικτά οδοφράγματα εξυπηρετούν κυρίως πολιτικά συμφέροντα της Τ/Κ κοινότητας
- (στ) Τα ανοικτά οδοφράγματα συμβάλλουν στον συμβιβασμό των Ε/Κ με το υφιστάμενο status quo (δηλ. να παραμείνει η κατάσταση ως έχει)
- (ζ) Τα ανοικτά οδοφράγματα είναι σημαντικά στην προσπάθεια οικοδόμησης ειρήνης
- (η) Τα ανοικτά οδοφράγματα συμβάλλουν στην αύξηση της εγκληματικότητας
- (θ) Η ανάμειξη των πληθυσμών, όπως συμβαίνει με τη διέλευση από τα οδοφράγματα, αποτελεί κίνδυνο για την εθνική ταυτότητα των Ε/Κ