

INTERNATIONAL PISSOUSI VILLAGE SYMPOSIUM

Media and Democracy

EDITOR:

Dr. Europides C. Antoniadis



PUBLICATION



C. EIPHANIYOU

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VILLAGE SYMPOSIUM**

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INTERNATIONAL PISSOURI VILLAGE SYMPOSIUM

Media and Democracy

EDITOR:
Dr. Euripides C. Antoniadis

Publication Costas Epiphaniou
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**International Symposium Papers
(Pissouri, 7-8 December 2019)**

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Speech on behalf of Pissouri Repatriated Association

Dear:

Professor Tsapatsoulis

Pissouri Council Chairman Lazaros Lazarou

Distinguished academics and participants,

Firstly, we would like to welcome you to my village and we are very happy to have academics around the world to visit for first time Pissouri Village and to present and submit academic paper. For the Pissouri Repatriate Association is a big honour and we feel very proud because we served us a small association the global academic society and knowledge.

Now about the title of the Symposium “Media and Democracy” we choose this title because we believe that nowadays Media play daily an important role in people’s life. Daily the Media broadcast the news what is happen in Cyprus and around the world, have the ability to shape human minds, mediate, discuss and sometimes give solutions in citizens social, economic, environmental, educational, health and other problems. The media give to the academic community the ability us an archive tool for academic research work.

Media plays a crucial role in shaping a healthy democracy. It is the backbone of a democracy. Media makes us aware of various social, political and economic activities happening around the world. It is like a mirror, which shows us or strives to show us the bare truth and harsh realities of life.

Historically, Media came into existence in 1900 in Cyprus with the newspaper namely “The Cyprus” – “Kipros Gazette” in Greek and English language because in that period we have a strong and hard British colonialism regime. After a fighting decade the media develop and now, we have a pluralism of media democracy in freedom Cyprus.

On the other hand, the Democracy (Greek: δημοκρατία *dēmokratía*, literally "rule by people") is a form of government in which the people have the authority to choose their governing legislation. Who people are and how authority is shared among them are core issues for democratic development and constitution. Some cornerstones of these issues are freedom of assembly and speech, inclusiveness and equality, membership, consent, voting, right to

life and minority rights. In other words, Democracy is a system of government in which all the people of a country can vote to elect their representatives’.

Dear Academics and friends

When I write this speech, I have some questions to you, questions like:

- Nowadays we have Media democracy or Media censorship?
- We have original news or fake news?
- We have media strong regulation body or loose media system?
- We have strong authentic journalism or manipulated journalism?

I wish that all my questions have an answer during the Pissouri Symposium.

Finally, thanks again for your coming to Cyprus Pissouri Village and we wish to have a good and productive discussions during the today conference.

My Best wishes to enjoy your journey in Cyprus, to see the beauties of these divide island and to go back safe in your country with a lot of new knowledge’s and Cyprus memories.

Thank you for your attention, nice to meet you, Merry Christmas and Happy New Year 2020!!!.

Niki Georgiou Perikleous
Pissouri Repatriate Association President
7.12.2019

Speech on behalf of Pissouri Council

It's a great honour to welcome you at International Pissouri Village Symposium. In the symposium you are going to discuss about Media and Democracy. This neuralgic issue is critical for the society because it depends on the level of cultivation, culture and education status of the people. Today we welcome our guest academics, researchers, PhD candidates from all over the world. I am sure that the participants will present very interesting papers in the symposium.

Lazaros Lazarou
Pissouri Council Chairman

7 December 2019

Speech on behalf of the Department of Communication and Internet Studies

Dr. Nicolas Tsapatsoulis

It is my pleasure to address this scientific symposium in one of the most historic, and not only touristic places of Cyprus.

The Cyprus University of Technology in general and the department of Communication and Internet Studies in particular consider that the scientific knowledge is important to spread out in the society and not being restricted in the areas in the academic and research institutions. We are, therefore, proud of events like this one and we are encouraging and support them in practice. In this respect we deeply appreciate initiative taken by the Pissouri Council, the repatriated association of Pissouri and my close friend and colleague Dr. Antoniadis who is the soul of this event.

Pissouri is not only a touristic place. Is a historic place where the struggle against the British colonialism started back in 1931. The topic of this symposium is obviously related October revolt of 1931. Without the physical freedom and independency we could not discuss about media and democracy.

I am not an expert in the field of the symposium, so I can only express my opinion as a participant and an academic in the general sense. I still, however, expecting to see a fruitful discussion and I hope that this effort will become an annual or biannual scientific event that will keep a space in your scientific agendas.

Nicolas Tsapatsoulis
Professor
Department of Communication and Internet Studies
Cyprus University of Technology
7 December 2019

Introduction

Media plays a critical a role today for the protection and the strengthening of peaceful democratic societies.

On the other hand, Democracy gives us freedom—'the right to free speech'. The media through television channels, the Internet, and newspapers assume the role of the moral guardian in society. More than often, we depend on the media to seek the truth. But truth is subjective. What is truth to you might not be the truth to me. Therefore, the media is expected to carefully analyze a situation from all possible angles rather than merely pass a fixed moral judgment.

This International Symposium today we discuss with the question of the role of mass media in modern democracies. Mass communication is indispensable for today's large-scale societies, and television, newspapers and the radio are the most important sources of information for citizens all around the globe. But while there seems to be great consensus about what this means for dictatorships and countries in transition, the contribution of mass media to the well-functioning of more mature and established democracies is highly debated among scholars, politicians and practitioners alike.

There is usually no doubt that mass media help maintaining the system and the power of the government in authoritarian regimes where they are – at least for the most part – tightly controlled by the state.

From Politics as a Theater to the Politics as a Firework

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Abstract

In the current work, we draw the basic lines of the democracy model transformation. In this regard we use as a starting point the media democracy concept that was developed by Thomas Meyer. Nowadays, democracy can be considered as media democracy and the kind of politics we exercise as firework politics. In the first, media democracy, the TV scene, the viewers and the polls take more or less the place that political parties had in the past. However, we support the idea that with the advent of the new, digital media on one side and the deep economic, political and cultural changes on the other, the media democracy model has been transformed. It turned from a TV model of media democracy to a digital, internet one. New pillars of democracy, along with the previous ones dominated in the TV version of media democracy as well as next to the political parties become: a) the digital media and internet, that is connected to fake news, communicative fusillade, communicative avalanche and personalized information flows, b) the new media users. A large part of them often become the “captains” of the political “wars” next to the leaders or political generals who dominated in the TV era of media democracy. In this way, the previous, theatrical model of the political stage of media democracy is transformed and led to “political carnival”. Additionally, c) the bridge between the key political actors and the public becomes a more liquid, precise, multilevel and complex mechanism consisted of various techniques. Thus, the transformation of the media democracy model leads to a new kind of politics, namely the “fireworks politics.”

Keywords: *Media democracy, Fireworks politics, Communicative fusillade, Communicative avalanche, Political carnival.*

Introduction

One of the consequences, the characteristics and the generators of mature (vs early – high/late) modernity, in our way of thinking, is analyzed by Carl Schmitt (2007) broadening the political notion both in its general forms but also in specific areas like propaganda, as one can notice in Edelstein's concept (1997) about the so called "Total propaganda" introduced by him. The widening of the political perception, on the other hand, is in line with the proliferation and evolution of the media.

Nevertheless, modern society has long been described by another Schmitt, namely Siegfried Schmitt (2001) as "media society", a society of both communication abundance, according to John Kean (2008; 2010), and of media driven systems of social interaction, (Luhmann, 2007) on societal level but also within individual social systems and institutions such as economy, education, politics, religion and many more. However, this "media society" has already evolved into a new type of media society, becoming an online media society (Castells 1996; van Dijk, 1999) that brings significant consequences for the society and politics.

Politics as a theater

Even those who are not political scientists or do not study politics in any academic field are well aware that democracy has not always been a party democracy (Held, 2006). Party democracy is a relatively recent form of democracy, which varies from country to country even in the European continent. However, party democracy in the era of "media society" tends to be transformed, if it has not already been altered into media democracy as Meyer (2002) underlines. The so called "media democracy" views accept that its pillars are three-fold: a) The mass media scene where the politicians perform as real actors do - that is, to persuade the public and achieve consensus on the existed or future policies they implement, b) the citizens - viewers who consume the political spectacle in terms of television and broader viewership, and c) the polls, which form the bridge between political actors and citizens - viewers. Polls appear to be a measurement of political likes/dislikes for televisual politics and serve as a corrective action to improve the behavior of political actors. At the same time, polls can be a reflection to the public through which they can observe their own collective reaction as well as their individual beliefs on related issues. Thus, polls can also estimate their own attitudes towards political actors and the policies they support or are presented to them (Meyer, 2002).

This structure of Democracy more or less corresponds to almost all societies. For example, this kind of societies where mass media abundance (Kean, 2010) appears to play a key role in the internal structuration process and dynamics of the institutions but also in the multifaceted interaction between social institution in the frame of societal system such as this kind of societies which are called media societies in social theory and media studies (Schmidt, 2001).

Politics as a “firework”

During the last decades, at least in the west, there have been significant changes in the mode of communication¹. These changes resulted, on one hand, from the dominance of the Internet in the communication systems, and on the other hand, from the socio-cultural context that facilitates or it is facilitated by internet technologies, especially the advanced ones. The above-mentioned transformations in the mode of communication, at least in western societies are caused by the introduction of new kind of public discourse that is tightly connected to the internet or digital “logic of medium” (Alteide & Snow, 1991).


The latter will be discussed here and at the end of our analysis it will be mentioned again. Although internet seems to be linked mostly to our leisure time, communication with mates and friends, uploads and statuses, posting comments and thoughts, personal videos, sharing of articles or videos and many others, one of the most important aspects might be the economic one. Internet is, on one hand, the nervous system of the global capitalism in economic terms, especially in the operating of multinational corporations (Sennett, 2005; Garnham, 2007; Schiller, 1999). On the other hand, it is the field of colossal, unprecedented business activity that goes beyond the states and even the budgets of several states (Smyrniaios, 2018).

-
1. The term “Mode of communication” has been described by Runciman (1989) in relation to the mode of production and the mode of coercion. However, we understand the mode of communication as a set of interrelated components that includes a) the technical structure of public communication and consequently the semiotic means and structures related to this technical structure of communication, b) the related to the previous economic and social relations - above all the basic social bond that exist in traditional or in modern societies- between the producers of content and the public, between the producers as well as between the members of audience, c) the social - instructional organization of media consumption, and finally d) the cultural paradigm corresponds to the technical and semiotic structure of production and content (Pleios, 2011).

Conversely, internet can be analyzed into different viewpoints. However, in the frame of media political economy in relation to the rest or “real” economy, internet can be regarded either as factor of the circulation and consumption process (A-B) of commodity or as factor of the (re)production process of the labour force (as commodity) and the production of “real” commodity itself (C-D) (figure 1).

According to a well-known approach in the political economy of the media, the latter participates mainly in the production – consumption circle. In other words, media, especially in a commoditized communication system one way or another facilitate the consumption of commodity on one hand (e.g. advertisement or cultivation) and receive funding on the other (Curran & Gurevitch, 1991; Garnham, 2007; Fuchs, 2010). Yet, the main theoretical and methodological question here is how media consumption contributes to the productivity so that consumers (workforce) become able to get higher salaries that enlarge consumption needs and how is this politically achieved? In our view, this is possible only due to the fact that media consumption contributes to higher productivity by cultivating the desired social behavior at work place. In other words, before media becoming a circulation mechanism it is essential to operate as a mechanism that produces the required workforce as defined by the production systems (Pleios, 2012).

Figure 1: the production – consumption circle



In this regard, consumption of old media content in its natural form corresponds to the Fordist, mass production – mass consumption model where enlarged consumption of commodities (including media consumption) similarly requires enlarged funding and therefore extended salaries. Nonetheless, nowadays competitive capitalism has become globalized, where internet constitutes not only its nervous system (Sennett, 2005) but also a means of enlarged consumption in a digital form. In addition, the flexible production – consumption model replaces the mass model (Lipietz, 1994; Matsuyama, 2002) not only in industry but along with the use of internet and digital media in many other spheres including media consumption as well (Pleios, 2012). That leads to cultural – economic and social output similar to the previous mass model even though at a much lower economic cost – in financial terms. On its turn, this makes any kind of cuts in the price of workforce (salaries) possible that facilitate the concentration of capital which companies seek in order to invest and participate in the global competition for profit. In other words, internet becomes the (commoditized) communication media equivalent to neoliberalism as economic policy (Pleios, 2012; Pleios, 2014).

In contrast, global, internet and new media-based economy goes hand to hand with Internet monopolies. That is, companies such as Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft (GAFAM) (Smyrnaioi, 2018) tend to monopolize internet, or even transcend the states and responsibilities of many governments not only in the economy, but in in politics, and vice versa.

Having exclusive rights in the use of internet like the monopolization of the old media several decades ago (Wu, 2010) resulted from economic changes and the economic logic of this particular kind of media. Conversely, it is also a product of specific political decisions, taken by governments like the US government or supranational organizations such as EU institutions that are statutory to its member states. Thus, in most cases, in the globalized, disorganized capitalism (Urry, 1987), national governments have significantly reduced authorities in policymaking decisions, including the ICT, or old and news media sphere, even if they act as a collective capitalist, in Marxist terms (Engels, 2017). The same conditions restrict them heavily to manage the decisions by others and consequently the “manufacturing of consent” (Hermann & Chomsky, 1988) on policies which are more or less not in the position to formulate themselves.

On the other hand, it is necessary, even a little hastily, to examine what Altheide and Robert Snow (1991) called "media logic", with regard to the Internet. Internet like old media has its own language, the "language of new media" (Manovich, 1991). Most characteristics of internet discursive features, globality, simultaneity, interactivity, in multimodality and many others have already been described in details (Manovich, 1991; Widrich, 2014; Deumert, 2014). These features were not used on the internet for the first time. Likewise, other communication media make use of partial features but not all of these. Interactivity is essential in oral communication like screen in moving-image communication, or written communication in the press. On the other hand, as far as the internet is concerned, all discursive features are used equally, are interconnected and appear in a single textual organization. Internet texts are multimodal. Internet becomes the synthetic media of our times like cinema in the industrial society or television in the consumer capitalism (Pleios, 2001). In fact, internet synthesizes the discursive means of all prior technical media. From a social point of view, however, it's a horizontal type of communication media, opposed to the vertical organization of various, still dominant, social institutions and organizations including politics in the Western world. At this point, it needs to be mentioned that this the most significant internet discursive feature from a social point of view. The horizontal internet structure challenges a very basic social structure of the "iron cage" (Schaff, 1989) type of organization in modernity.

However, from a semiotic – cultural point of view, something different is more essential. In contrast to other media content (even radio and television content that consists of different genres), Internet, combines heterogeneous texts in a single flow. That flow is essentially chaotic, individualized and socially unhomogenized and its heterogeneity lies in the very basic organization of internet texts. These texts are heterogeneous not only in semiotic terms, but also in terms of content or form and type of discourse (Fairclough, XX), size and many other. Thus, heterogeneity of the internet texts strengthens the paradigmatic relationships while at the same time weakens the syntactical relationships of the flow or consumed by the user internet content. In this regard, heterogeneity enhances not only the multimodal but also the multi-topic and multi-temporal as well as the infotainment aspects of the internet texts. What is even more important however, is that these cultural – semiotic process take place in a given socio – cultural environment that is globally and socially open, contradictory and competitive in narrative and economic terms where participates

an unpresented number of users, producers and at the same time consumers (Fuchs, 2015).

Thus, internet text appears to be dissimilar on one side but fundamentally chaotic on the other. This leads to aesthetic perception of the content while the aesthetic quality of the texts seems to be primitive. The internet text appears as cohesive while at the same time an essential discontinuity connects them. Cracks in the text created by the socio- - cultural environment link the texts and this the reason for their primitive aesthetic value. From these cracks created by this complex social and cultural environment, the sketchiest forms of tragic and of comic emerge as “base” that connect the contradictory flow of the Internet texts into the realm of complex and contradictory environment of users. It can be said that on the Internet in general, technological progress is often in line with the aesthetic and cultural primitivism, associated with populism, especially with modern far-right populism, the Alt-right (Main, 2018).

In this light, we would say that media democracy as described by Meyer (2002) is being transformed. Media democracy is becoming more complex, but also varies as the Internet and new media are gradually being installed at the heart of the communications galaxy next to the old media and the television media democracy. Thus, a new, second media democracy is born. The internet or digital media democracy next to, or after television media democracy.

Digital or internet media democracy is rather an advanced form or stage of media democracy in general. This is so due to the interaction between the communicational strategy of political actors and political parties with the whole range of media in the policymaking decision which becomes stronger and more complex. However, digital/internet media democracy is more or less different compared to television media democracy. I understand this condition as a media democracy where politics is practiced not as (television) performance but rather as series of fireworks.

The “fireworks” politics: Where and how?

In digital/media democracy or internet democracy (Margolis & Moreno-Riaño, 2016), the first change to take place refers to the technical, semiotic and social characteristics of the media. One pillar of such a democracy becomes the new, digital media, along with the old ones, especially the social media and 2.0 technology. In some sense, digital democracy is a 2.0 democracy not only and mostly from a technological but from a social and a broader cultural point of view (Carr, Hoechsmann & Thésée, 2018).

In digital, 2.0 or internet democracy, the structure of political agency is transformed, due to the large number of users and the structural difficulty for the hierarchical organization of these users, on one hand and the socio-cultural changes in late modernity on the other (Baumann, 2004; Gibbins & Reimer, 1999). Political stars become now large numbers of users next to party officers and leaders. These people, already called “influencers”, serve political parties and persons either as supporters and activists or as a hired army of communicators next to the party leaders. The charisma of the leaders blurring in the same degree the star of the influencers growing.

If, referring to the old media, the “generals” such as the party leaders or presidents/prime ministers play the leading role in the political process, now the “captains” like low rank political actors frequently play a primary role in the everyday politics or in electoral periods. These communication armies create an extreme number of stories that are formally disconnected to each other. However, they altogether construct a set, or a flow having the discursive features of the internet discourse, and mostly the above – mentioned textual organization of “primitive heterogeneity”.

- I) The dissemination of “fake news” becomes a serious problem in the news media everyday operation. Along with trustful news stories or commentary journalism, news media, especially the online news media and more often the commercial ones, tend to produce or reproduce fake news stories or at least that is the public perception about the issue. As a relevant “Statista” report underlines “As of March of 2018, around 52 percent of Americans felt that online news websites regularly present fake news stories in the United States. Another 34 percent of respondents stated that they believed that online news websites occasionally report fake news stories. Just nine percent of adults said that they did not believe that fake news stories were being reported online” (Statista, 2019). The fake news phenomenon raises especially in conditions of political or other polarization (Spohr ; Pleios, 2018; Lee, 2019).

This can be noticed both in the everyday political communication and especially during election campaigns, and before important decision-making situation. It is very interesting to study some examples of fake news in conditions of such a polarization. During the electoral campaign 2016 large quantities of fake news, were circulated (produced or reproduced and consumed) largely through the media (Persily, 2017;

Fourney et al. 2016). More recent research data shows that “social media was an important although not dominant source of election news (Hunt & Gentzkow, 2017).

Another important example comes from Greece. Since 2020, the Greek society experienced a severe debt crisis which shortly turned to general economic crisis (Katsimi & Moutos, 2010) and in few months later was transformed to a political crisis (Lapavitsas, 2010). The established two-party system collapsed and a new political party started growing, namely the leftist SYRIZA party. In 2012, double elections took place in May and June and the SYRIZA party raised wed from about 4% to almost 27%. The electoral period for the June 17 2012 repeat elections was marked by an extreme polarized political campaign. Psychological processes like techniques, including fake news were implemented in this situation².

Fake news is doctored news containing a fluctuating mix of credible and invented news stories or aspects of them, aiming to reproduce and maintain stereotypes and prejudices for the opponent (in terms of Carl Schmitt) (Pleios, 2018; Fourney et al. 2016).

Fake news can take many forms, but in fireworks politics we can observe certain relatively stable layers or issue areas. As the mediatised politics or in Lance Bennett terminology “journalism-centered politics” (Bennett, 2016) is personalized, the political actors, the party leaders or the party “generals” become such a preferred point or topic of the relevant fake news. As Humprecht (2018) underlines, in English speaking Western democracies fake news usually attack political actors. Yet, the same is valid for other EU countries as well. More specifically, as one could notice when analyzing the case of June 2012 Greek general elections, fake news targets the political knowledge, competence and effectiveness of these persons (Pleios, 2013). A similar strategy could

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2. One of the arguments was that in case SYRIZA win the election a Grexit will take place and therefore the country will run out of fuel, or pharmaceuticals, money or even food. In consequence chaos, turmoil and clashes will spread across the country. In the other side the media adopting such a strategy insisted that the SYRIZA party leader A. Tsipras will be the one responsible for this, as he was illiterate, a professional revolutionary etc. (Pleios, 2013). Thus, a series of fake news (although the terms was not yet in use) was spreading in order to terrify the citizens willing to vote for the SYRIZA party.

be observed regarding the position of political opponents of Barack Obama before or even after the presidential election 2008. Fake news coming from “playing” with the words “Obama” and “Osama” (Shore, 2010), accusations that Obama implements a “communist” healthcare policy in the US, not singing the national anthem or even ordering the spread of Ebola virus and many others were frequently used by his opponents. (Turner, 2018). b) As fake news industry seeks for more and more information it also needs more and more issue areas or topic. Such a topic becomes the overall knowledge, studies, skills or the career history of political leaders and officers (Turner, 2018) c) Fake news related to sexual and family life is repeatedly used in politics and the public sphere (Stabile et al., 2019). d) Additionally, it refers to their religious beliefs, or aesthetics and other preferences (Pleios, 2018).

The political ideology and value system of a political actor or/and of a political party is usually not a target of a fake news campaign. However, ideology seems to be related to fake news in another way. Recent research shows that populist conservatives are more likely to spread fake news stories or attack media using fake news discourse (Farhall et al., 2019). For instance, they tend to weaponize fake news discourse (McNair, 2018) more often compared to liberals.

Consequently, the use of topics or targets of fake news activity although it takes place mostly during electoral campaigns or similar condition of political polarizations, it varies from country to country, from period to period and given circumstances, such as election campaigns or parliamentary debates on key issues in domestic or foreign policy and any more. Nevertheless, every fake news “battle” is tightly connected on one hand to the issues at stake in these conditions and to the structure of stereotypes and prejudices over them on the other.

- II) Within the frame of digital media democracy, a second major communications activity form of the high ranked party members or affiliated members and supporters becomes the “communicative *fusillade*” or “*communicative avalanche*”. Communicative fusillade is this kind of news or other kind of information/content spreading where the same is posted or uploaded by many users at the same or almost at the same time. The roots of communicative fusillade can be tracked in the political campaigns on the media. The repeated political ads on many

television channels, for example aiming at the domination of their message over other (Bennett, 2016; Sussman, 1997). The “bots’ phenomenon” especially the use by political advertisement companies of bots or/and other professional accounts on social media during political campaigns is mainly connected to the construction of a communicative fusillade (Prier, 2107; Bradshaw & Howard, 2017; Paavola et al., 2016). This kind of information strategy gives users/public the idea that something “big”, something really important took or is taking place. In other words, communication fusillade facilitates certain news stories or views about them to prevail in quantity or/and quality terms over others for a period of time.

Communicative avalanche is a similar but more or less a different type of communication where a group of similar stories (for instance, over a meeting of two political actors, or over a negative/positive for the citizens upcoming or even already taken political decision, or a negative/positive event) have been posted successively in terms of time by the same or different users (Prier, 2017;). In contrast to communicative fusillade, communication avalanche helps not so much a certain news story but rather a giver social institution/area/system changing/threatening to prevail in the eye of public or a certain political actor acting towards a certain policy direction. Both digital democracy communication techniques were used extensively to manipulate public opinion in 2016 electoral campaign for the US Presidential elections (Howard, Woolley & Calo, 2018).

- III) A third aspect of political communication activity in digital media democracy is the personalized targeting/addressing of a certain communication flow either communicative fusillade or communication avalanche. Thanks to technological achievements (e.g. algorithms), a certain political actor, political person or political part) can systematically deliver a certain type of information (real or fake news stories, analyses, public speeches, information on specific public policies) or information that has been framed in a specific way to users and members of the audience that are more likely to pay attention or even believe in these units of information. What happened during the electoral period of 2016 US Presidential elections can also serve as an example for this.

Similar to the first media democracy, the second pillar of the new media democracy/ digital democracy refers to citizens – new media users. An essential change is taking place also in this second pillar. If “generals” and “captains” (such as leaders) of political parties or other political institutions are engaged in production or co-production of content (like for example, true or fake news or other kind of information), the users’ main role is to “struggle for the meaning” as it has been analyzed in Cultural Studies’ terms (Hall, 1980; Eliasoph, 1997; Fiske, 1992).

Nevertheless, it should be taken into consideration that if not all, a large number of new media users is also part of the old media audience. Thus, they have or can, among others, interpret, produce the old media content’s meaning in a new, creative way which the new media provides them with. The new media users are more or less involved remotely but actively, in forms of social and political activity, in a different way than on television. The citizen - viewer becomes also a “slacktivist” (Kristofferson, White, & Pelozza, 2013), a “remote activist”, a new role of his/her position as user and as a part of the audience but at the same time as a member of a given political community. It is a role that is played with Facebook activism, Twitter activism, Instagram activism, Avaaz activism and many others or even just posting political commentaries on the online media at, low cost and low risk. This is the main reason that such an activism in combination with the internet freedom of expression the user gains, becomes rather a carnival type of participation in Bakhtin’s terms (Bakhtin, 1984) comparing to the theater type of participation in Mayer’s (2002) understanding of (first) media democracy. Without the (carnival type of) participation of the citizens – new media users, the communication fire-works politics would be rather a technical test.

In this respect, though in some social media analysis the key role of some political changes, such as of the Arab Spring (Allagui & Kuebler, 2011), Gezi Park (Gökay & Xypolia, 2013) or the Indignandos and Aganaktismeni (Tsaliki, 2012) is considered as an internet effect, for the most part of the political use of the Internet, it seems to contribute to the opposite direction, namely the harmless incorporation of protest and challenging action in the system (Pleios, 2014).

Similar to the television form of media democracy, the third pole in digital media democracy serves as a “bridge” between the “army” of political actors and the “army” of users. Yet, unlike the television form, in the digital, carnival form of media democracy, the boundaries between political actors and the

citizens – new media users become less clear. To be more precise, there is an intermediate area, not homogeneous, consisting of amateurs, not professional political actors, or internet activists. In fact, they play a crucial regulatory role between the two poles of digital media democracy and the fireworks politics.

One more difference between the television and digital forms of media democracy is that the third pillar contains far more than one mechanism, referring to the polls on television media democracy. The third pole in digital democracy becomes richer. It does contain polls but all kind of internet and social media statistics. Thus, a second element of the third pillar is statistics (like for example, in form of flow histograms in social media, number of clicks) or most used names and terms.

Third is the reflexivity of the journalistic discourse, and in particular electronic/digital feedback, the 'coverage of the coverage' and to some extent the news aggregators.

Conclusion

New media society is becoming much more complex compared to the old media society, and so is politics and democracy. The horizontal structure of online communication is at odds with the hierarchical organization of most social institutions, including parties and other political institutions as they have been structured in the course of modernity. For a number of reasons, political actors become the users, and vice versa. The main objective becomes or remains regarding the way to manage this digital public opinion, to contract digitally consensus, while politics is often simulated at the carnival.

The need to create consensus in the digital media democracy often leads to the production of fake news, as a tool of the communication fireworks strategy next to the old television political theater.

As a result, politics – such as political parties, - in some cases tends to become accustomed to its own structure and features, to the structure and features of the horizontal online communication. However, this might cause unexpected consequences, namely revolving of the online communication to a political process in terms of Carl Schmitt. To the extent that it goes beyond the carnival model, it can only be intercepted by surveillance and repression practices. In other words, expanding freedom of expression stemming from the internet and social media and broadening political freedom might lead to being seriously questioned by old and new forms of political control.

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Post-Truth and Fake News as Public Diplomacy Tools: The Case of Neo-Ottoman Turkey

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Abstract

The fragile balance within Turkey has ended in the 2016 failed coup attempt against the Erdogan government. As a result, President Erdogan by utilizing Turkey's religion network successfully mobilized a significant part of the population, to support his government. But how did Turkey from a European course and a developing economy, end up in a coup? The present study seeks to shed light on this question by investigating President Erdogan's rhetoric through the Europeanisation theory of Radaelli (Radaelli, 2004: 3,4) that led to the formation of a European culture. To this end, Erdogan's rhetoric is also examined in terms of using / adopting / constructing post-truth and "false news" in an attempt to construct a Neo-Ottoman Identity. That is to say, the methodology used is qualitative content analysis (a) in line with the theoretical framework of Europeanisation as formulated by Professor Claudio Radaelli, and (b) discourse analysis methodology and discourse analysis for the use of "fake news" tools. It is examined whether the "fake news" phenomenon is accidentally or strategically employed to create an anti-Western rhetoric and to establish a new national identity with a primary focus on religion. In order to answer the research questions, the causal attributes of the "false news" are systematically studied in the cases of (i) the Muslims of Myanmar (Burma), (ii) the Egyptian elections, (ii) the Bangladesh hanging of an Islamic leader, (iv) the surrender of alleged guerrillas from Malaysia to Turkey, and (iv) the protection of China's Uighurs Muslims.

Keywords: *Fake news, Public diplomacy, Neo-Ottoman Turkey*

The fragile balance within Turkey has ended up to the 2016 failed coup attempt against the Erdogan government. Hence, following the failed coup attempt on July 15, 2016, President Erdogan became, in many ways, the “winner” of the coup, as he succeeded in mobilizing a significant part of the population. This was better understood by the calls from official religious authorities, in mosques, and by the 80,000 Imams (Khan, 2016; Karvounopoulos, 2016; EuroNews, 2016) who called on believers in the name of the Koran to support the Erdogan government. The existence of these alternative structures is linked to the polarization rhetoric and to President Erdogan's reforms that are not in the European / Western direction. Erdogan’s rhetoric includes “fake news” and “post-truth” creation as a means to realise revisionist tendencies both within his own country and in terms of Turkey's pursuit for an international-political role. Thus, "fake news" are used both as a means of communication and as a rhetorical-offensive character, in a combination that forms “the otherness” and in a way that reinforces the desired dimension of identity. As a result, “Fake News” and “Post-Truth” are used as "educational experiences" at the level of population perceptions through phobic-thymic anti-Western polarization strategies (such as: attacks on Muslims and / or justification of state policies) " in an attempt to construct a Neo-Ottoman Identity. The present study seeks to shed light on this question by investigating President Erdogan's governmental rhetoric through the Europeanisation theory of Radaelli (Radaelli, 2004: 3,4) that leads to the formation of a European culture, as well as “fake news” and “post truth” theoretical framework. Such rhetoric examples are presented in this research article.

Europeanisation Theory

Radaelli's theoretical framework, on Europeanisation, is considered more appropriate and complete than other because although it contains elements of European Integration, it differs from European Integration theories. Europeanisation follows a different path compared to the European integration: European integration is related to the political and policy development at the supranational level, while Europeanisation is related to the results of this process (Bulmer and Lequesne, 2005: 12). Thus, the success of Europeanisation is based on the fact that it reintroduces domestic politics into the process of European integration, “without assuming that the balance of power between the state and European institutions is being tilted in one direction or another” (Radaelli, 2004: 3,4). According to Radaelli, “Europeanisation consists of processes of

construction, diffusion and institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ways of doing things and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse” (Radaelli, 2004: 3,4). Simplifying Radaelli’s approach, there are five key steps necessary for Europeanisation to take place: (i) decision making at the EU level; (ii) incorporation of domestic political rhetoric; (iii) creation of legal framework/laws; (iv) creation of infrastructures; and (v) incorporation into domestic discourse (Violakis, 2019: 65). Especially, steps two to five (ii, iii, iv and v), may be viewed as a means to formulate an identity related to learning.

Saurugger, based on the work of Knill, Lehmkuhl and Caparaso, recognizes learning as "one of the main mechanisms of Europeanisation" (Saurugger, 2005: 297). Sabatier and Smith emphasize that learning can be significantly enhanced by external events (Sabatier, 1988). Levy argues that 'Simple' learning of new information leads to a change in means but not to goals, while complex learning leads to conflict of values and a modification of goals and means' (Levy, 1994: 286). These arguments and Radaelli's definition explain why a simple European-related learning is weak, compared to a complex learning, based on sudden change, fear, anger and hate speech (migration influx, fear / anger about the lives of Muslim brothers everywhere, cultivating an anti-Western climate - emotions). Bennet and Howlett link the need for change and its associated policies with learning, by identifying governments as the driving force (Bennet and Howlett, 1992: 277). In this light, learning is linked to understanding and perception, while understanding enables further learning. Hall associates the learning process with external changes coming from society (social learning) and the political arena (ideas in politics) (Hall, 1993: 288,289). Accordingly, external changes and ideas in politics constitute a learning process that is linked to understanding and perception. Hence, posting / creating Fake News related to external changes and / or ideas contribute to a learning process associated with changes in understanding and perception.

Fake News - Theoretical background

Oxford English Dictionary defines Fake News as "news that conveys or incorporates false, fabricated, or deliberately misleading information, or that is characterized as or accused of doing so" (Oxford English Dictionary, 2019). Allcott and Gentzkow argue that Fake news are "news articles that are deliberate and verifiable lies and could mislead readers" and that the production of

fake news aims to promote specific ideas or people they favor, often by defaming others (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017: 213). Tandoc et al. note that the main incentives for producing fake news are twofold: financial and ideological (Tandoc, Lim and Ling, 2017: 2).

Wardle believes that Fake News fall into the general category of misinformation and disinformation. For Wardle, misinformation refers to the inadvertent exchange of false news or information, while disinformation refers to the intentional creation and exchange of information that is known to be false (Wardle, 2017). False news is considered a threat to democracy as it distorts public opinion and increases the level of populism and xenophobia (Monsees, 2018). As Pereira and Van Bavel argue, "identity interacts with values in order to be credible in the news" (Pereira and Bavel, 2018: 35). Therefore, "people are more likely to believe in news if their ethical goals are fulfilled/satisfied, because their (political) group is portrayed as morally superior, or the group of "others, as morally inferior" (Pereira and Bavel, 2018: 36).

In this process, the regularity and high flow of false news is important. The (initially) false news, despite the low level of general credibility and even when stories have been labeled as controversial or incompatible with the political ideology of the reader, has a significant impact (Pennycook, Cannon and Rand, 2017). Tandoc, Lim, and Ling presented a fake news typology based on an analysis of academic articles between 2003 and 2017. They identified six modes of Fake News operation: satire, parody, fabrication, manipulation, propaganda and advertising (Tandoc, Lim and Ling, 2017: 6):

*“**Satire** - The most common operationalization of fake news in the articles reviewed is satire, referring to mock news programs, which typically use humor or exaggeration to present audiences with news updates. **News Parody**- Instead of providing direct commentary on current affairs through humor, parody plays on the ludicrousness of issues and highlights them by making up entirely fictitious news stories. **News Fabrication**- Fake articles which have no factual basis but are published in the style of news articles to create legitimacy. **Fake news** has also been used to refer to the manipulation of real images or videos to create a false narrative. **Propaganda** refers to news stories which are created by a political entity to influence public perceptions. **Advertising and Public Relations** – fake news was defined as “when public relations practitioners adopt the practices and/or appearance of journalists in order to insert marketing or other persuasive messages into news media”” (Tandoc,*

Lim and Ling, 2017: 6). Considering the abovementioned information, and according to Reuters Institute digital news report 2018, – Turkey supplementary report, Turkey is one of the countries at the centre of misinformation and fake news (Yanatma, 2018: 20).

Post Truth – Theoretical background

Oxford English Dictionary defines Post-Truth as: An adjective ‘relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief’ (Flood, 2016; Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries, 2020). Collective memory and post-truth: History shapes how we think about the future and collective memory shapes how we think about history. Collective memory in its turn is shaped by patterns of communication. Unreliable communication repeated over time will produce false or distorted collective memories (Law, 2017). Berg links the assault on truth, including (but not limited) fake news, alternative facts, and post-truth with the creation of moral panic and threat to democratic life (Berg, 2017). Grech argues that Post-Truth and Fake-News are closely related. According to Grech, “Post-truth is aided and abetted by the peddling of fake news, journalism (or outright propaganda) that is comprised of deliberate misinformation or hoaxes” (Grech, 2017). Corner views ‘Post-truth’ as a “self-consciously grand term of epochal shift (trading heavily on assumptions about an ‘era of truth’ we apparently once enjoyed)” (Corner, 2017). Corner highlights Schlesinger’s argument, according to which, post-truth “has signaled a perception of change both in how the public domain is constituted and in the conduct of major protagonists in the media-political sphere” (Corner, 2017). Tas claims that Post-Truth “refers to the brazen disregard for facts while representing ‘a reliance on assertions that “feel true” but have no basis in fact” (Taş, 2018: 2). Furthermore, he notes that post-truth politics “alters both the grammar and vocabulary of politics” due to the fact that ideological premises are “being replaced by a commonsense politics that is mastered to perfection by new populisms” (Taş, 2018: 3). Considering these, one can conclude that the use of Fake News aims to construct a new identity, based on manipulated facts and on epochal shift (Ottoman Empire).

Public Diplomacy

The term, “Public Diplomacy”, was (re)defined in the Freedom Promotion Act of 2002 (Congress, 2002). The changes re-introduce Public Diplomacy as the “systematic efforts to communicate not with foreign governments but with

the people themselves” (Kennedy and Lucas, 2005: 310). Von Eschen argues that “Fake news” incorporates elements of “Public diplomacy” (Eschen, 2005), while Kennedy and Lucas describe Public Diplomacy as an emerging “crucial theater of strategic operations for the renewal of American hegemony within a transformed global order” (Kennedy and Lucas, 2005). Ragies associates Public Diplomacy with Strategic Communication and considers civilization, language, history, national culture and democracy as the most powerful weapons (Ragies, 2014). As Kalin notes, “Turkey’s soft power capacity comes from its history, culture and geography. Rather than seeing them as obstacles or burdens, the Turks are now turning them into strategic assets in both domestic and foreign policy” (Kalin, 2011: 5). Therefore, public institutions and non-governmental organizations, have an important role, in the establishment of a new “geographic imagination” where Turkey should distance from the Enlightenment and the French revolution narrative and shape new “dynamic relationships between history and geography, time and place, individual and society, reason and faith, self and other, and centre and periphery” (Kalin, 2011: 6,21). As Ozkan mentions, “Turkish public diplomacy is an activity of telling its “new story” effectively and comprehensively to the public opinion of the world” (Özkan, 2014: 4).

Considering these, it can be concluded that the use of Public Diplomacy, for Turkey, focuses on the construction of a new (hegemonic) identity, based on manipulated facts and on epochal shift (Ottoman Empire) for the Turkish and Muslim audience all over the world. But how did Turkey from a European course and a developing economy, end up in a coup which signalled the (official) end of the country’s Westernisation?

A country which voluntarily sought candidate status is expected to acknowledge and accept the EU idea set, the “EU way of doing things” and gradually (during the candidacy period) comply with the EU values and policies. President Tayyip Erdogan’s statement (Oxford in May 2004), reflected this approach: “the Greek-Turkish rapprochement was based on common ground on which common perceptions are generated more accurately. This common ground is the EU” (University of Oxford, 2004). The good climate between the EU and Turkey was verified by the Time magazine in its 2004 celebratory edition (Purvis, 2004), by the Eurobarometer (Eurobarometer, 2004) and by the Commission’s 2003 report which recorded significant progress (Commission of the European Communities, 2003). These facts indicate the beginnings

of institutional reform as well as political support for and civilian acceptance of such reform. This propitious climate, as mentioned by Radaelli (Radaelli, 2004: 3,4), provided the foundation for learning, change and Europeanisation.

Turkey's bid for the EU membership constitutes "the most critical challenge in the 200-year history of Ottoman and Turkish efforts to adopt the European political, economic and cultural paradigm" (Grigoriadis, 2006: 148; Camyar and Tagma, 2010). **Since Turkey was declared a candidate country (1999), it should have adopted the EU's scientific and regulatory principles. Turkey's attempts for Westernisation are not new.**

The first signs of Turkey's Westernisation were observed after the defeat of the Ottoman army by the Russian's in 1792, with the introduction of a series of transformations known as Nizam-I Cedid (new order) (Shaw, 1965: 292; Camyar and Tagma, 2010: 37) as a means "to restore the purity of old institutions and practices and make them operate in the manner which had brought greatness to the empire" in the past (Shaw, 1965: 292). The second wave of significant reforms came with the Tanzimat movement (1839- 76) aiming to "bring the Ottoman Empire fully into the modern world for the first time" (Shaw, 1965: 292). These changes were a means for salvaging the Ottoman Empire either through gaining foreign support or through averting foreign intervention (Zurcher, 2004: 56). Kemal Ataturk (3rd wave) reforms derived from his belief that "the formation of a solid Turkish nation and state were prerequisites of Westernization" (Grigoriadis, 2006: 148). Ataturk viewed the West as the appropriate model for Turkey's transformation (Aybey, 2004: 20). Hence, Turkey's application for the EU membership in 1987 reflected a "conscious political decision which goes back even before the foundation of the Republic of Turkey" (Çakar, 1998).

However, Turkey's major historical reforms have been introduced with a view to strengthening the country's international position and/or preserving the status quo. Taking this into consideration, the Turkish bid for membership may be viewed as a strategic move to counter Greece's accession to the EU in **1981** (Cerami, 2011: 19; Camyar and Tagma, 2010). This project was perceived as "an integral part of the modernisation process" of Turkey (Camyar and Tagma, 2010). Therefore, for Turkey, the country's compatibility with the EU values and the EU institutions appears to be a secondary goal rather than a strategic choice (Aybey, 2004). Kalin underlines this diversification and argues that Turkey may successfully "fuse traditional Islamic-Ottoman culture

with socio-economic modernization” (Kalin, 2011: 19). Nevertheless, the milestone for this change was the War in Syria.

The war in Syria and the strong migration flows to Turkey have altered the situation. As noted by “Asian Times”, the war with Syria had a negative impact on Turkey as well as on the image of the EU concerning Turkey, especially in 2015. This resulted (among other) in making Turkey's European identity a priority for only 24.4% of the public (Atlı, 2016), while only a small percentage of Turkish (15.3%) believe that the EU treats Turkey's candidacy fairly (Atlı, 2016). Earlier Erdogan's statements indicated the possibility of an alternative plan (since Erdogan was the mayor of Istanbul in 1994-1998). As President Erdogan highlighted, "the majority of Turks are Muslims and being Muslim is incompatible with being secular" (MEMRI, 2007). Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (founded in 2001 by himself) has launched a series of reforms aimed at creating a Neo-Ottoman state based on the Islamic religion. Since 2012, when Erdogan stressed that the separation of powers is an obstacle (Hayatsever, 2012), the implementation of the change plan has begun.

The process of creating this new political identity, based on Islam, has certain common elements with the process of Europeanisation. Drawing on Ladrech and Radaelli's definition of Europeanisation, especially the “construction” part, we have: Construction referring to the “ways of doing things” in terms of shared beliefs linked to Islam. The construction of an Islam-based shared-belief framework precedes or “opens the way” for the subsequent development of informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms and styles. This creates a bottom-up approach to Neo-Ottomanism which is facilitated and enhanced by the pursuit of national objectives. The driving force is to be found in Turkish foreign policy and memories of the Ottoman Empire. Cambridge dictionary defines *anachronism* as “a person, thing, or idea that exists out of its time in history, especially one that happened or existed later than the period being shown [or] discussed” (Cambridge Dictionary, 2017). Erdogan initiated building his Neo-Ottoman anachronism, during the early 2000s, through the rhetoric of hate and significant structural state reforms. This approach constitutes an Islam-Neo-Ottoman learning process for Turkish population which also addresses non-Turkish, Islam believers as well (Idiz, 2016).

The restoration of Turkey's former glory was implied in the words of Davutoğlu, who in his capacity as Turkey's foreign minister referred to present-day Turks as the new Ottomans (Zalewski, 2014). Such political rhetoric is linked

to the learning process and linguistic symbolism and the (re)shaping of public view.

Furthermore, it is part of an effort to construct a legal foundation that would support a Neo-Ottoman identity in the domestic political sphere along with the introduction of new cooperative schemes based on Islam both domestically and internationally. Erdogan's planning (as early as 1996) aimed at being elected as a president from religious schools (Imam-Hatip schools) (MEMRI, 2007) (1.447 general high schools were converted into Imam-Hatip schools). Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP), beginning in 2002, utilised the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) as a means for imposing an Islam-oriented educational system and abolishing Kemalist secularism reforms (Papadopoulos-Geronikolos, 2015: 27). As Stathakopoulos argues, such practices would (eventually) lead to a prior-Tanzimat situation where the legal system is based completely on Sharia (Violakis and Stathakopoulos, 2020). The pursuit of the indicated objectives was intensified in early 2012 (a few months after AKP's victory in the 2011 elections) and ended a few months after the 2016 failed coup d'état. The objectives were associated with an Islamic-belief framework enhanced through the solution of day-to-day problems which contributed to the learning process of all citizens: New Ottoman, Islam-based identity, Islam structures (mosques at universities, Islamic education at all school grades), concentration of powers, control of press/media, control of Judicial system, Muslim-Polarisation rhetoric, re-introduction of Ottoman language in high schools and others. Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) (founded by Erdogan in 2001), utilised the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) as a means for imposing an Islam-oriented educational system (elementary and university) and abolishing Kemalist secularism reforms (Papadopoulos-Geronikolos, 2015: 27). Erdogan's political rhetoric and reforms are linked to the learning process and linguistic symbolism and the (re)shaping of public opinion. Hence, drawing on Ladrech's theoretical framework (Ladrech, 1994: 69). Erdogan's Re-Ottomanization of Turkey may be identified as an incremental process of re-orientation of the direction and shape of politics to the degree that Islam's political and economic dynamics become part of Turkey's organisational logic.

Fake News & Post-Truth related changes

Amongst the significant elements of Erdogan's rhetoric and changes, during that time, was his self-designation as the natural heir of Ottoman rulers (The

Conservative Tree House, 2014). Gradually, references to Islam increase, with reports that Muslims first discovered America (BBC, 2014) while at the same time Erdogan accuses 'Westerners' of hating Muslims but loving their money (Times of Israel, 2014). Such rhetoric was also noticed after the 2016 coup, where along with his Western sentiments, Erdogan put “religious flesh onto this concept and described the post-coup process as a clash between the cross and the crescent” (Taş, 2018: 8). Furthermore, foreign institutions (UN) were strongly criticized for not making objective decisions (Hurriyet Daily News, 2014). This criticism (UN/West/EU) verifies Tas’ argument that post-truth politics tends to “generate significant levels of doubt, neutralize the facts of others and ultimately to make ‘available information unusable” (Taş, 2018: 4).

In another speech, president Erdogan argued that (his) new Turkey requires all students to study the Qur’an (AsiaNews, 2014). Therefore, the new reform plan Erdogan introduced a year earlier comes into force by extending Islamic religion education to all school grades (AsiaNews, 2014). Erdogan responds to the criticism (about the statement that Muslims discovered America) by stressing that Muslim critics have no confidence and that a Muslim should not accept western historiography without investigating the facts (18/11/2014) (The Guardian, 2014). Erdogan has stated that women are not equal to men (24/11/2014) (The Guardian, 2014). He “accused the Western world of hating Muslims but loving their money, and want to see people of the Muslim faith dead” (Times of Israel, 2014). Erdogan expressed his complains for Turkish students not being aware (primarily) of Turkish musicians, Muslim scientists and scholars. (The Gulf Today, 2014).

Additionally, Erdogan Launches Sunni Islamist Revival in Turkish Schools (16/12/2014) (Christie-Miller, 2014). In a speech delivered in Istanbul on May 30,2015 Erdogan identified as a means for conquest the emigration or “Hijrah” (Observer, 2016). Hijrah refers to the expansion of Islam through emigration, following the example of Muhammad the founder of Islam (Observer, 2016). Erdogan has expressed his intention to "change the definition of terrorism to include journalists and politicians" (16/4/2016) (Eleftheriou-Smith, 2016). As he highlights “Freedom and democracy have no value in Turkey” (Dearden, 2016) while during the same year he argues that "Lausanne is not a treaty that cannot be discussed. It is by no means a sacred text. And of course we will discuss it” (NOVINITE, 2016; ekathimerini, 2016).

Turkey’s different conceptualisation of border security and management in

relation to the country's moderate levels of institutional Europeanisation indicate the existence of institutional incompatibility in security and defense amongst EU and Turkey. The existence of this inconsistency is related to President Erdogan's unwillingness to accept institutional control over his powers implicit in the political autonomy of EU institutions (March and Olsen, 1984: 734). Kramer argues that this incompatibility is attributable (at least in part) to the general philosophy of Turkish foreign policy, "according to which the territorial boundaries of the republic have been established once and for all by the Treaty of Lausanne" (Kramer, 1991: 64). This argument accounts for Erdogan's attempt to dispute many clauses of the Lausanne Treaty (NOVINITE, 2016; ekathimerini, 2016). Erdogan's argument is twofold: (a) it confirms the general philosophy of Turkey's foreign policy (Kramer's argument) and (b) it maintains that all non-holy texts are subject to challenge. Both parts are very significant, though the latter raises questions regarding Turkey's credibility when it comes to international agreements and institutions. This includes NATO and Turkey's EU candidacy. At this point a question may be posed, if Turkey's EU candidacy was in the end a means for extracting economic benefits rather than and a voluntary commitment to Europeanisation/ westernisation. The abovementioned reforms (related to the re-establishment of the Ottoman glory) and presidential rhetoric of hate to the west, may be viewed as the means for Turkey to become "a great nation, a great power" that dominates the Middle East (Fradkin and Libby, 2013). **Considering the abovementioned rhetoric and** Erdogan's post-coup policy shift, toward a bazaar-type negotiation concerning the handling of regular flows in conjunction with his quest for a new political identity based on Islam, also implies the existence of an alternative plan which utilises post-truth and fake news in public policy, and does not necessarily include EU values.

Fake News & Post-Truth: Construction of News

The Daily Aksam, a government-run Turkish newspaper, published on January 18, 2016 a curious story entitled "America does not forgive its academics". The article explained that about 75 academics from US universities who claimed that 9/11 was an internal job "were arrested by the FBI at the request of the US Senate". The photo accompanying the story showed the famous American Cornel West to be handcuffed by two police officers. The news was "made" while West was arrested during the Ferguson protests in October 2014 (Akyol, 2016). The aim was to justify the 19 arrests made on the report-

complaint entitled "We will not be a partner to this crime", which brought 1100 signatures from international scholars (such as Noam Chomsky) (Gardner, 2016).

Another case of Fake News refers to Turkey and Myanmar: Faced with attacks by Rohingya separatist rebels against Myanmar's regime forces (which in turn respond militarily), Erdogan appears as a self-proclaimed protector of Muslims everywhere. In this context, Turkish Vice President Mehmet Simsek, tweeted in early September (2017) a related photo in which he wrote: "Stop turning a blind eye to ethnic cleansing in Myanmar. The international community must act now" (only that, photos were from 1990 Rwanda!) (Skafidas, 2017; Ratcliffe, 2017) – Then he changed and apologized.

Furthermore, in Myanmar in 2015, false rumors were spread that Turkey was going to send military forces / warships in cooperation with Rouhani in defense of the Rohingya Muslim community (Head, 2017; Skafidas, 2017; Bozkurt, 2017; News, 2015; The News Casters, 2017). Aung San Suu Kyi has blamed Fake News and identified a misinformation campaign, aiming to provoke a crisis, which the UN says has now pushed more than 125,000 Rohingya minority Muslims into Bangladesh (with stories of savagery in the hands of security forces) (Das, 2017; Naqvi, 2017). The photo, supposedly showing the training of Rohingya fighters with rifles, proved to be a photo of Bangladeshi volunteers fighting in the 1971 war of independence (Head, 2017; Ratcliffe, 2017).

Regarding the Turkey and Egypt Fake News case: The Turkish president was looking for ways to bolster his diplomatic-leadership displacement as the global patron of the Muslim world, targeting not only overseas but also his own domestic Muslim audience in the wake of the massive 2019 elections. Thus, he supported the ousted former President Mohamed Morsi through a Fake Campaign against the Sisi regime (Skafidas, 2017; Bekdil, 2015). As Bektir notes: "As always, the protests were an Islamic demonstration rather than a liberal, pro-democracy rally, in which crowds of different ideologies together would condemn the death penalty to any elected leader, Islamist or not." (Bekdil, 2015).

As far as the Turkey and Bangladesh Fake News case is concerned: In 2016, he accused the Bangladeshi government of hanging an Islamist leader to death. It should be noted that Jamaat-e-Islami, leader Muhammad Kamaruzzaman,

was convicted and executed for the war crimes of 1971 (Reuters, 2016; Reuters/AFP, 2015). In Turkey, several anti-execution protests have taken place while Turkey's ambassador was recalled after the execution (SAMAA, 2016; Reuters, 2016).

In Malaysia, Erdogan persuaded authorities to extradite a number of alleged guerrillas to Turkey following the failed July 2016 coup (Channel News Asia, 2017). The Turkish government did not provide any direct evidence linking Gulen or his movement to the failed coup (it was accused of being behind the failed coup) (Stockholm Center for Freedom, 2017).

Concerning the Turkey and China Fake News case: Similarly, Erdogan emerges as a self-proclaimed patron of Muslims in China. On the occasion of China's repression in Xinjiang, Erdogan accused China of committing "a kind of genocide" (Canwest News Service, 2009). In 2015, Ankara offered asylum to 170 Uighurs held in Thailand, triggering the Chinese government's demise (Skafidas, 2017). Justifying Turkey citizens' concerns over the "brotherly" Uighurs, in a shocking move, he revealed the Turkish government's intention to make the necessary efforts to raise the issue for discussion at the UN Security Council and Islamic Conference (Asia News, 2009; Villelabeitia, 2009).

Conclusions

Learning and Europeanisation are linked to "change" and are interconnected issues that are evolving together. Learning, despite its long-term effects, is an important instrument of Europeanisation. Therefore, the theoretical framework of Europeanisation is an important reference point for Turkey's progress towards its European / Western course. President Erdogan's rhetoric on the one hand, seems to be moving away from Europe / West, while on the other hand seems to be linked to the process of learning or otherwise (re) educating the public (in Turkey and globally) in a new ideological and structural / organizational framework based on Islam, which is reinforced through the use of Fake News and creation of Post Truth. The aim is to create a collective, post-truth memory/ perception which is based on the (old) New Ottoman identity. This perception is NOT bound to geographical constraints of states (Pax-Ottomanica), meaning that wherever there are Muslims, Turkey may intervene to "protect" them. This argument is verified by Ünver, who notes that "Turkish diasporic diplomacy is being integrated into and entangled with Turkey's public diplomacy framework" (Ünver, 2013: 189).

Hence, for Turkey, it is confirmed that the "Fake News" and Post-Truth are used strategically to: (a) the construction of anti-Western rhetoric, (b) the constitution of a heterogeneity - a new national identity with a major focus on religion, based on the perception related to the Ottoman Empire (different from Western/European perception) and (c) the enhancement of Turkey's self-determination as the global Muslim protector. To be more specific, three modes of Fake News operation were identified: (i) News Making – (ii) Erasing / Falsifying actual images or videos to create an incorrect narrative- (iii) Propaganda and (iv) Advertising and Public Relations.

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“Employment of moral exclusion as a demonization tool against the PKK in Erdogan’s discourse”.

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Abstract

This paper constitutes an inter-disciplinary approach between political communication and social psychology. More specifically, the capacity of moral exclusion theory to interpret the strategy of a politician was examined. In this case Erdogan’s international political discourse against the PKK was analyzed. The PKK organization was linked with the Kurdish issue, a domestic internal policy matter for Turkey. Historically, during the early Democratic period of 1920 in which the Kurdish minority wanted an autonomous state in Turkey was the main reason for this dilemma (Içduygu, Romano, & Sirkeci, 1999). The nationalist faction, however, of the Kurds and the demands for autonomy began in 1984 with the active action of the PKK, the Kurdistan Workers ' Party (Bacik, & Coskun, 2011). This conflicted environment between the Turkish government and the PKK from the historical past to recent years creates specific behavioral tendencies between them. According to these, a qualitative content analysis was used in Erdogan's discourse for the period of November 2018 to March 2019, which was the main pre-electoral period for Turkey. The corpus applied was extracted from his official page on the internet and the language used was English. The analytical tool utilized was the theory of moral exclusion and specifically Opatow’s typology (1990). This theory was

compatible with the context thus, the examination of an international demonization strategy against the PKK was achieved. In order to analyze the corpus, an observation annex was created. The research limitations are the usage of posts only in the English language, which is a functional way to examine the messages created from Turkey to an international level and the time period, as a way to examine how Erdogan wishes to influence international conscience about the Kurdish issue as an upcoming leader.

KEYWORDS: *Moral exclusion, Demonization, PKK, Turkey, Political communication.*

Introduction

Since the establishment of the Turkish state, the Kurdish issue was part of the national governmental agendas (Icduygu, A.,1999) and is enabled as a domestic internal and foreign policy issue. The foundation of the PKK organization was an act of reaction against the assimilation policies of Turkey and at the same time a way to establish an autonomous Kurdish state (Bacik, 2011). Since 1984, the dynamic action of the PKK has been threatening by guerrilla warfare the stability of the state as well as the existence of the Kurdish minorities in neighboring states (Iran, Iraq, Syria) influencing transnational relations (Robins,1993). AKP's policy on the Kurdish issue, focuses on the disarmament of the PKK and in the creation of a respectful environment for the Kurdish minority (Efegil, 2011).

The Turkish government aims to maintain the stability of the state while at the same time the PKK organization aims to establish an autonomous nation that contains a part which is included in the Turkish borders. This case could be interpreted by the realistic conflict theory. The environment between the two examining groups namely the PKK and the Turkish government, which have strong disagreement for limited sources, creates conditions of realistic conflict, a fact that justifies specific behavioral tendencies between them (Brief, 2005).

This paper investigates the way in which the Kurdish issue and specifically the PKK's action is depicted in the Turkish government's international political discourse in order for the actual goals behind Erdogan's rhetoric outcomes to be examined. The corpus was collected from Erdogan's official website and included all the references about the PKK in the main pre-electoral period (November 2018 to March 2019). The chosen language of the collected texts was

English as a way to explore the demonization process at an international level as English is a universal language. In addition, the corpus which was studied, is easily accessible worldwide, has a wide range of receivers and the statements that are posted highlight Erdogan's strategic decisions at an international level.

For the qualitative content analysis moral exclusion theory was implemented. This theory is a functional analytical tool in this context, due to the fact that the two examining groups are under conditions of realistic conflict which triggers this phenomenon thus, there was an expected outcome. More specifically, the theoretical typology was utilized as it was constructed by S.Opotow in 1990 in facets of the phenomenon. The statements were studied based on a qualitative content analysis through the use of observation annex.

Theoretical Framework

In intergroup relations, the demarcation between in-group and out-group has roots in the human ontology (Ainsworth, 1979; Shaffer, 1979) and social identity theory which is based in intergroup relations (Hogg, 2016). This is related with the need of the person to draw from his in-group where he belongs, the emotion of security and protection (Turner, 1979). The differentiation between safe and potentially unsafe people has survival value and humans, probably for the same reason, like other organisms, tend to fear the strange, the unusual (Homstein, 1976). Social identity theory was conceived and born as a theory of intergroup relations, conflict and cooperation between groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

Situations such as crises, war, or a competition between groups for valuable but limited resources, according to realistic conflict theory, could distribute intergroup relations and breed hostility (Brief, 2005). According to this theory, several social scientists underlined the view that in-group gain is the out-group loss, translated as a threat, which leads to negative feelings and phenomena as discrimination against the otherness and internal cohesion (e.g., Bernard, 1957; Boulding, 1962; Coser, 1956; Sherif, 1966; Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961). In addition, difficult and stressful conditions that prevail for a given time in a society, as well as the conflict and competition that can be developed among individuals or groups, are another major cause of moral exclusion. (Deutsch, 1990· Leets, 200· Clayton, & Opotow, 2003).

Each person has beliefs about who deserves a just behavior. The total of these beings are included in his/her "scope of justice (Opotow, 1990). Deutsch

(1974, 1985) defines the scope of justice as the psychological boundary of one's moral community; a narrow conception of community results in a constricted scope of situations in which considerations of justice govern one's conduct.

Moral exclusion occurs when individuals or groups are perceived as outside the boundary in which moral values, rules, and considerations of fairness apply. Those who deviate from the "moral community" are perceived as undeserving beings. Consequently, a harmful behavior is considered as just. This harmful behavior encompasses a broad definition of both severe and mild forms of moral exclusion. Moral exclusion involves many different ways manifested by the in-group to the out-group. Moral exclusion is the complete marginalization of a group by the society. It is based on its intensity which could be found in phenomena from discrimination to mass murders. (Opatow, 1990).

Moral exclusion theory was methodically organized by Susan Opatow in 1990. The facets of moral exclusion constitute symptoms that define this phenomenon and Opatow's typology was organized in two manners. The first one is the scope. Some facets are moral-exclusion specific and some others could be found in interpersonal everyday life. The second manner is the intensity of the phenomenon. Mild facets are signs which do not portray the intention of violence, such as prejudices while severe facets, like genocides, depict the intention of ferocity, (Opatow, 1990). The following tables contain all aspects of moral exclusion by the category, if they are exclusion-specific and can be found only in moral exclusion or if they have a wider use in inter-personal everyday life as well as whether they are mild or severe.

Table 1: Exclusion specific processes (Opatow,1990).

Exclusion Specific processes
1. Biased evaluation of groups
2. Derogation
3. Dehumanization
4. Fear of contamination
5. Expanding the target
6. Accelerate the pace of harm-doing
7. Open approval of destructive behavior
8. Reducing moral standards
9. Desecration
10. Self-righteous comparisons

Table 2: Ordinary processes (Opatow, 1990)

Ordinary processes
1. Groupthink
2. Transcendent ideologies
3. Deindividuation
4. Moral engulfment
5. Psychological distance
6. Condescension
7. Technical orientation
8. Double standards
9. Unflattering comparisons
10. Euphemisms
11. Displacing responsibility
12. Diffusing responsibility
13. Concealing the effects of harmful behavior
14. Glorifying violence
15. Normalizing violence
16. Temporal containment of harm-doing

Table 3: Mild facets

Exclusion specific processes - Mild facets
1. Biased evaluation of groups
2. Derogation
3. Dehumanization
4. Fear of contamination
5. Expanding the target
Ordinary processes- Mild facets
1. Groupthink
2. Transcendent ideologies

3. Deindividuation
4. Moral engulfment
5. Psychological distance
6. Condescension
7. Double standards
8. Unflattering comparisons

Table 4: Severe facets

Exclusion specific processes – Severe facets
1. Accelerate the pace of harm-doing
2. Open approval of destructive behavior
3. Desecration
4. Reducing moral standards
5. Blaming the victim
6. Self-righteous comparisons
Ordinary processes- Severe facets
1. Technical orientation
2. Diffusing responsibility
3. Displacing responsibility
4. Glorifying violence
5. Normalizing violence
6. Temporal containment of harm-doing
7. Concealing the effects of harm-doing
8. Euphemisms

The current study aimed at exploring the strategic usage of this phenomenon via the investigation of Erdogan’s discourse against the PKK. Despite the fact that moral exclusion could be found in every society and it is a part of human ontology, this phenomenon can be strategically applied in political communication in order to cluster the society, demonize targets and legalize actions against them.

Historical Framework

The Kurdish issue is one of the main internal policy issues that Turkey encountered almost since the creation of the Turkish state. The main historical reasons for the Kurdish issue are the processes of the Kurdish minority to create a state and a nation during the early Democratic period of 1920 (İçduygu, Romano, & Sirkeci, 1999). In 1978, the PKK organization, which has totally changed the nature of the Kurdish issue, was formally but clandestinely established. Its mission was to make a communist revolution by guerrilla warfare, and establish an autonomous Kurdish state (Criss, N.B, 1995). The nationalist faction, however, of the Kurds and the demands for autonomy began in 1984 with the active action of the PKK, the Kurdistan Workers ' Party (Bacik, & Coskun, 2011). The goal differentiations between the PKK organization and the Turkish side form their relation which is based on conditions of realistic conflict over time.

Recently, the Kurdish referendum for independence in September of 2017, of the Kurdish Region Government brought all regional countries, mainly Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria to denounce the declaration and an Iraqi military operation ensued to claim Iraqi sovereignty over the semi-autonomous region. Turkey, despite its excellent economic relations with the Iraqi Kurds and their semi-autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), allowed the Iraqi military to take back its border with Turkey, perhaps in expectation of similar support in the future when Turkey would launch an operation to uproot the PKK-affiliated group from Afrin, on its border with Syria. (Anas, 2018). On 20th January of 2018, Turkey started a cross-border “Operation Olive Branch” in cooperation with Free Syrian Army in Syria’s Northwestern Afrin region. (Ayhan, 2019). The Olive Branch operation for the Turkish side constitutes a means of self-defense and a way to achieve stability inside its borders, a goal that is at stake because of the terrorist attacks of the PKK organization. This aspect was referred in the international press by the Turkish minister of foreign affairs Mr. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu.

Through the theoretical and historical framework analysis, several research questions were posed. This paper was based on the rhetoric depiction of the PKK in order to find out how Erdogan aims to influence the international conscience against it. The identified facets of moral exclusion which were utilized via the qualitative content analysis illuminate the base of Erdogan’s rhetoric demonization strategy against the PKK. Finally, the fact that, the PKK organization is

related to the Kurdish issue added in raising the following question; whether the Kurdish minority was depicted as a connotation of this organization or if these two were rhetorically and strategically differentiated.

Methodology

In order for the above research questions to be answered, a qualitative content analysis was implemented through the use of observation annex. The variables included the date, verbatim, target, identification of moral exclusion facet as well as research notes of the strategy. The unit of analysis was each verbatim that contained moral exclusion phenomenon. The validity of the data was examined by a creation of two different observation annexes in which the researchers identified the matched facets of moral exclusion in the same verbatim. In case of dissent concerning the matched facet, a third researcher examined the specific verbatim.

The time period of investigation was the main pre-electoral period for Turkey which is limited from the 1st of November 2018 to 31st of March 2019. This time period was chosen because the Kurdish issue and especially the action of the PKK organization constitutes an internal policy issue and as a result the references about the PKK organization were increased in comparison with the previous time, because this was part of his political agenda as an upcoming leader. In addition, the Kurdish referendum of 2017 for independence and the on-going war-torn conflicts underline the existence of a polarization between Turkey and the PKK organization inside the Turkish borders. This is another indication in which aggressive rhetoric with the strategic use of moral exclusion was expected.

The chosen source, which is Erdogan's official page, is characterized by its accessibility and wide audience. The collected statements in the English language, which is an international language stress the statements that Erdogan wishes to be strategically seen and influence the audience at an international level.

Moral exclusion theory constitutes the analytical tool of this study. To be more specific, the typology was implemented in the analysis as it was methodically organized by Susan Opatow in 1990 in facets of the phenomenon. The following table contains the facets of moral exclusion together with the differentiation regarding their mild or severe aspect, as they were found in the analysis drawn from an example of Erdogan's statement:

Table 1: Identified Severe facets

<p>Severe facets (Contain violent intentions).</p>
<p>Normalizing violence.</p> <p>“Accepting violent behaviour as ordinary because of repeated exposure to it and societal acceptance of it”.</p> <p>Example: <i>“stressed that Turkey's fight against terrorism will continue without hesitation in Syria's Afrin”.</i></p>
<p>Open approval of destructive behaviour.</p> <p>Accepting a moral code that condones harm doing.</p> <p>Example: <i>“the terrorists in this region will be buried in the trenches they have dug”.</i></p>
<p>Normalizing of violence.</p> <p>“Accepting violent behavior as ordinary because of the repeated exposure to it and societal acceptance to it”</p> <p>Example: <i>“our efforts to fight against terrorist organizations such as Daesh, PKK and FETO, reflect our respect for our neighbours and represent a prerequisite for the security of the European nations – of which Turkey is part”.</i></p>

Table 2: Identified mild facets

<p>Mild facets (Do not contain violent intentions).</p>
<p>Biased evaluation of groups.</p> <p>“Making unflattering comparisons between one’s own group and another group; believing in the superiority of one’s own group”.</p> <p>Example: <i>“ The fight against all these organizations will continue with determination in the weeks ahead by mobilizing all means and capabilities, especially during these days in which we have entered the electoral period”.</i></p>

Derogation.

Disparaging and denigrating others by regarding them as lower life forms or inferior beings-e.g., barbarians, vermin.

Example: *“They all are parasites that feed off the blood of innocent people”.*

Fear of contamination.

“Perceiving contact with others as posing a threat to one’s own well-being”.

Example: *“its efforts to clear Syria of all terrorist organizations within the framework of its political unity and territorial integrity, and to restore peace in the country, and that Turkey will never allow the terror corridor sought to be established along its southern borders.”*

Unflattering comparisons.

Using unflattering contrasts to bolster one’s superiority over other’s.

Example: *“Since they [PKK terrorists] realized that they cannot fight against Turkish soldiers, they try to provoke the innocent locals”.*

Dehumanization.

Repudiating others’ humanity, dignity, ability to feel, and entitlement to compassion.

Example: *“These killers”.*

Groupthink.

“Striving for group unanimity by maintaining isolation from dissenting opinion that would challenge the assumptions, distortions, or decisions of the group”.

Example: *“Let us develop a joint attitude against all terrorist organizations”.*

Psychological distance.

Ceasing to feel the presence of others; perceiving others as objects or nonexistent.

Example: “...the PKK—listed as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the US and the EU—has been responsible for the deaths of some 40,000 people including women and children”.

Interpretation of the data

According to Opatow’s codebook (1990) one differentiation about the facets of moral exclusion is the existence or not of violent intention. In the examined corpus we located nine facets of moral exclusion that appeared, from which seven were the mild ones which do not contain the intention of violence. According to the aforementioned result, it is clear that in the specific examined period a demonization process against the PKK exists and it relied on a rhetoric deconstruction aiming to damage its image internationally.

In Erdogan’s rhetoric outcomes there was an attempt to demonstrate Turkey’s superiority against the otherness, namely the PKK. This strategy was achieved by the usage of the facets of biased evaluation of groups and unflattering comparisons. The facet of biased evaluation of groups was strategically used by Erdogan in order to globally establish the superiority of his government and society in comparison with the PKK by the usage of negative direct or indirect comparisons. There was an effort to create a common ground at an international level in which the Turkish government will be linked with emotions of security and peace whereas the PKK organization will be associated with emotions of fear and insecurity. Erdogan highlighted in a biased way the sectors that he promised to improve (education, security, healthcare) thus, once again he emphasizes widely that he is a capable leader, trying to reinforce the superiority of his own government.

Erdogan’s references in the next generations aimed to rise up emotions and expectations for the future and to reinforce the belief that his government can provide security. For this reason, both a direct and indirect comparison was made in which the PKK organization is not capable to protect its members. The following reference, “*we are fighting by our means*”, was used to remark the superiority of the Turkish government in general and in military/administrative sector against any external enemy that poses the balance and security of the Turkish people in danger. References like “*we have not abandoned*”, “*we have welcomed everyone with open arms regardless of religion, language*”

are used in order to be internationally approved that Turkey has internalized the western standards. The specific statement creates in this case an indirect comparison with the PKK organization which has internalized values based on violence and immorality.

The facet of unflattering comparisons, was used to bolster once again in international principles, the superiority of his government and society against the PKK by clearly making direct comparisons. The statement “*Since they [PKK terrorists] realized that they cannot fight against Turkish soldiers, they try to provoke the innocent locals*” underlines the military power that Turkey has in comparison with the weakness which the PKK organization has in this sector and its inability to fight equally.

The facet of psychological distance, illuminates a part of a rhetoric strategy in which the PKK is projected completely different from the western standards and Turkish values. The used narratives, such as terrorism, aimed to denote the distance between the PKK and the West in order to demonize the first one.

The facet of derogation aims to project the PKK as a devaluated otherness by the usage of arguments that are based on its actions. In the statements included this facet, Erdogan continues to distance himself from the PKK, which he underestimates by a disputation of its legitimate basis through the use of adjectives such as “*problematic*” - this is the way he intends to make it clear that the Turkish government does not recognize the PKK as a political organization. The ability of the PKK as a political entity to forge strong links with societies is underestimated thus, it calls into question the PKK's ability to stand both politically and temporally. In addition, Erdogan seeks to compare its own government with the PKK, which links it with authoritarian regimes, military coups, and minority rule in general, in order to prime in the audience's memory structured historical narratives, like Nazism, and to make an indirect comparison with his own government once again and the security it provides. Erdogan has associated the PKK organization with terrorism, that has specific characteristics in the international conscience which are shifted to the PKK organization in order to be demonized. In addition, he referred to them as *snakes and parasites that drink the blood of innocent citizens*. Both statements aim to shift specific characteristics to the PKK organization. Snakes are hostile animals, which constitute a threat for their environment, and they are sneaky. Similarly, parasites are a disease that should be cured otherwise the whole organism will be destroyed. Indirectly, the Turkish side announces that intends to exterminate

the snake which is a threat for Turkey and find a cure for the long-lasting disease which contaminates the healthy part of Turkey.

The facet of dehumanization in Erdogan's rhetoric outcomes was used in order to reduce feelings of compassion about the PKK. The deconstructive rhetoric works as a legalization of Turkish violent intentions and as a justification for current and future actions that are targeted for the PKK. The link between the rhetoric deconstructive strategy and the international approval of any kind of behavior from the Turkish side is the practice of groupthink facet. This facet was utilised in Erdogan's statements in order to mobilize the international society against terrorist organization targeting indirectly the PKK in order for the Turkish decision making against it to be accepted. The example of "*Let us develop a joint attitude against all terrorist organizations*", constitutes Erdogan's desire to be globally dominated and aims to mobilize a common strategy against terrorist organizations in general and specifically to create a strong justification for its intentions.

The facet fear of contamination, was used in order to be underlined in the international level that this kind of organizations in general, constitute a threat not only for Turkey but for the mankind as well. The used statement "*to clear the region of YPG/PKK terrorists*", contains either the normalizing of violence or the fear of contamination because the referenced verb "*clear*" indirectly declares the pathogen which the PKK organization created and the threat of Turkey's well-being and the cleanse indirectly includes the usage of violence.

The severe facets used strategically as the result of the PKK's demonization. The rhetoric intention and justification of violence followed the full deconstruction of the PKK in order to be accepted at international conscience as a means of avoidance of mass reactions. The facet of open approval of destructive behavior aims to an international level of acceptance of a moral code that contains harm. In his statements, the strategic use of verbs like "*will continue*", "*vanquished*" and "*completely defeated*" is a hint of the next violent actions performed by the Turkish side.

The facet of normalizing violence constitutes another way of Turkey to justify its violent intentions by a projection of violence as being normal. In addition, the use of the words "*every measure*" and the use of "*clean*" verb confirm a high degree of tolerance for violence. The justification for such behavior is therefore, the protection of borders and security, which should be the

goal of every government in order to ensure the well-being of the state. The use of the verb to "*cleanse*" is strategically used and places violence as a completely and even tolerable form of the the PKK behavior. Likewise, it has negative implications as the use of the verb "*cleanse*" indicates that the PKK is "*dirty*" both internally and externally. Additionally, it has a high intensity of immorality and it is clear that he mobilizes demonization strategies towards the PKK, which is considered as an out-group and it is associated with derogated feelings and negative evaluations.

Conclusion

Reaching to conclusions, a demonization strategy appeared in the analyzed corpus of the specific pre-electoral period. The fact that in Erdogan's rhetoric outcomes nine facets of moral exclusion were identified, from which seven were the mild, that do not include the intention of violence and two the severe ones that include the intention of violence, is a conclusion which underlines that the demonization process tends to be achieved by the moral deconstruction of the PKK, its members and those who support their actions. This strategy aims to create a legitimate base in which Turkey's current or future actions, which are targeted against the PKK, will be justified or accepted at an international conscience with the arguments of self-defense, protection of the Kurdish minority and the Turkish society. As far as the Kurdish issue is concerned, a demarcation between the Kurdish minority and the PKK organization appeared, despite the fact that the PKK was founded as a reaction with the aim to solve the Kurdish issue. To be more specific, the Kurdish minority was depicted as a victim of the PKK's action at an international level. This narration is useful in Erdogan's discourse, in order to call the international attention to focus on the PKK, that constitutes a threat for the Turkish state and of the Kurdish minority by its actions. The goal behind this depiction is to disorient the international conscience about the Kurdish issue in order to be unsolved, serving the Turkish interests. In addition, the hostile discourse against the West is avoided while at the same time a common identity between Turkey and the West is rhetorically constructed. In this way, Erdogan tries to depict that Turkey has internalized the western standards and his state is a legal state. Erdogan's choice in this specific period could be interpreted as an attempt to appeal new allies and to gain the recognition as a capable intended international leader. The aim of this study is the avoidance of reactions or the acceptance of his future choices in decision making both in an internal and a foreign policy.

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Indian Democracy 2.0: The Rise of ‘New India’ and the Role of Social Networks

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Abstract:

Post 2014 as put by people, media and the present government there is an emergence of New India. This new India is significant for it is the product of financial reforms after 1990s and the communication revolution which took place after 1990s and post 2000. As soon as India entered the 21st century, which is said to be the 4th Industrial Revolution era, the focus shifted to being a knowledge society from the old agricultural society and at the same time it confronted various challenges too. The challenges related to social, political and developmental issues remain as they are since they reflect the time/changes occurred in every regime. However, the real obstacle is associated with communication when one talks about democracy and the way it is applied, for media is said to be the fourth pillar of democracy. In communication, the role of traditional media in the old sense and the emerging social media with the availability of smart phones and other communication gadgets have become more significant. This has made the communication process more dynamic, leading to making a situation ideal for forming a sound public sphere for public opinion formation and decision making. Nonetheless, a question arises whether this public sphere serves the democracy essentials. In addition, it poses another question; how in this new India, these new communication technologies are bringing change; and how the citizens-cum-consumers of new India respond to this communication? What kind of content generation occurs in the public sphere platforms?

For this reason, the present paper attempts to define the communication changes happened in the past three decades and further how these changes transformed the socio-political-cultural scenario thereby influencing the democratic practices of the country. This transformation does not only shape

democracy but the ordinary systematic public discourse. These developments would be analyzed in the context of political regime and their ideological stand and how social network becomes a powerful tool for the amplification of those ideological stands into public consensus leading to the present democratic development of India 2.0.

Keywords: *Democracy, Public Sphere, Public Opinion, 4th Industrial Revolution Era, Social Network, Ideology.*

I. Introduction

After its independence, India chose to be a democratic state which provided all its citizens with equal rights, with the power to exercise adult franchise irrespective of caste, creed, religion, and gender. This modern state truly reflected the spirit of the promised vision of bringing the Sangha (the Union) as envisioned by Buddha, the imagined congregation based on equality and defined principles to follow; where everyone had got the equal opportunity to attain Buddhahood (reach their full potential).

The birth of new nations after the Second World War included the independence of India from the British colonial rule. Just after the independence, it was a challenge for our founding fathers to shape a country with so many diversities in the aftermath of the partition to come and walk together towards one vision. That is, to build a new India which should be proud of its heritage and cultural past but at the same time look towards the challenges of a new world and shape it accordingly. It is indeed reflected in the Tryst with Destiny speech of how the first PM of India envisioned the country should proceed.

It is said that the history is shaped by the time and people who inhabit in that era. India remained blessed in true sense owing to the great stalwarts having studied well and having realized the true potential of Human life, such as serving the humanity born at that time and shaping the history of India, post-British oust. These people did not only fight for the Indian freedom from the British rule but addressed the social evils of the society as well through their writings, public discussions and demonstrations and mass movements. That is how an appropriate nation is built and a foundation for a robust democratic structure is laid where contrary viewpoints and people of varied backgrounds participate in building and shaping the history of a country. In this context,

we are looking at the example of India which chose to be a Sovereign, Democratic, Republic ensuring that all its citizens have access to Justice, Liberty, Equality and Fraternity in the country in which later on, the 42nd Amendment to the Constitution 1976, added socialist and secular unity and integrity to the nation. Thus, the Preamble to the Constitution of unrestricted India contained the basic ideals, objectives, and philosophical postulates, the Constitution of India stands for and where this new independent nation would like to march. Justifications for constitutional provisions are provided and to which the elected representatives and the citizens must adhere. This was the idea of India put forth at the time of independence and which was carried forward as a legacy and guiding principle to keep India as a cohesive society respecting one and all.

Now, the question arises regarding the guiding principles and standards of India whose foundation was laid on 26th November 1949 and this New India post-2014 which the author has referred to as India 2.0. What is the basic difference between the two versions of India? How does this new India respond to the interests of citizens, nation, corporate and global challenges? As mentioned in the abstract, the real challenge is associated with communication when one talks about democracy and the way it functions, for media is said to be the fourth pillar of democracy. That is to say, with the advent of social media, the communication process has become more dynamic leading to making a situation ideal for forming a sound public sphere. However, the question arises whether this public sphere serves the democracy fundamentals. What is more, another question is posed; how are these new communication technologies bringing change in this new India; and how do the citizens-cum-consumers of new India respond to this communication? What kind of content generation occurs in the public sphere platforms?

II. NEW INDIA AND NEW DEMOCRACY

Sunil Khilnani (Khilnani, 2004) defined New India in the context of post 1991 economic phenomenon and post 2002 jingoistic nation going after each other to prove this country to be a Hindu nation and others should live at the mercy of majoritarian pressure. This view was limited to the context of one party ruling in a particular state but the desire to rule the nation with the shift towards the Centre (New Delhi). This understanding of the society was reflected in post 2014 when after almost three decades one party came into

full majority and at the same time the party having its root in the Hindu idea of a nation. Moreover, this discussion becomes more significant given the fact that the same party came in power again in 2019 with majority rule. Additionally, the Prime Minister in his address to the Joint Session in Parliament has underlined the fact that this is the rise of New India while announcing the start of Goods and Services Tax. Same notion was reiterated by the PM and other elected representatives of the ruling party on many occasions while commenting on different issues of social-political relevance. Whether it is the issue of rising notion on oneness of India, NRIs getting connected to their lost roots, India's rising global presence, teaching lessons to those who slaughter cow or cases of mob lynching hailed as coming to religion based democracy. Thus, this discussion is crucial in this context.

The PM had to emphasize the fact that this country is run by the Constitution and the holy book of this new India constitutes the Constitution of India and the temple constitutes the Parliament. This was revealed when in 2014, the Prime Minister bowed to the stairs of the Parliament before entering and in 2019 he bowed to the book, Constitution of India. In contrast, a completely opposite scenario was observed on the streets where people with religious bent of mind were motivated by the right wing cultural outfits, in the name of the majority rule and ruling party rebelled against the rules and regulations as scribed in the Constitution of India. The ruling party had to underline the fact that it does not follow the Hindu norms which according to other platforms wish to establish Hindu Rashtra. As a result, the ideology with which the government came into power faces numerous contradictions both in the social and public life and in constitutional norms. This development could be discussed more clearly in the context of the comparison between post-1950 and post-2014 India.

III. COMPARISON BETWEEN POST-1950 AND POST-2014 INDIA

Taking Sunil Khilnani's Premise (Khilnani, 2004) and other criteria developed by the author of this paper, the following comparisons have been made:

S. No.	Criteria	India of Post-1950	India Post-2014
1.	Buildings and Infrastructure development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Chandigarh • Cannaught Place • Bhubaneshwar • Bhopal • Gandhinagar • Bhilai • Rourkela • Durgapur • Bhakhra Nangal Dam* • Establishment of BARC • Establishment of ISRO <p>Khilnani (2004, pp. 107-149)</p> <p>*Temples of Modern India (mentioned by J. L. Nehru)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Highest Statue of Vallabh Bhai Patel in Gujarat (Statue of Unity) • Re-naming Mughal Sarai Railway Station to Pt. Deen Dayal Upadhyaya Junction. • Re-naming Allahabad to Prayagraaj. • Ayodhya Ram Temple (in the process to be built after Supreme Court's Verdict) • Highest Ram Statue in U.P. (Proposed) • Highest Statue of Deen Dayal Upadhaya in Varanasi. • Smart Cities Proposed (None came into existence; Definition dubious) • Kashi to Kyoto (Real Face of Kashi, being the oldest living city is getting lost; imitation of Japan). • Kashi Vishwanath Mandir Complex in Varanasi.
2.	Event Organisation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Asian Games 1951, (also in 1982; Commonwealth Games, 2010) • Grand Yoga Day 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kumbh Mela 2019 (Grandest Ever in Modern Indian History) • Pravasi Bhartiya Sammelan (Non-Residential Indians)

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Indo-Pak Friendship Games 	<p>Convention) 2019 in Varanasi</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • International Yoga Day after the approval by the UN and support by 175 countries. • Westminster Town Hall, London (Bharat Ki Baat Sabke Sath) • Madison Square Garden Modi's Speech • Howdy Modi and Namaste Trump • Cancelling all Sports and Cultural ties with Pakistan.
3.	Refugees	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dalai Lama settled in Dharamshala • Post partition: refugees irrespective of religion and faith allowed to settle in India as per the Constitution and law of the land. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Citizenship Amendment Act, National Population Register, National Register of Citizens. • NRC in Asom (Assam) resulted in disturbance there. Disturbance with Bangladesh on this issue. • Detention centres built for illegal non-registered citizens. • Hindu refugees and other related faith need not worry. They will get citizenship through CAA. They will not be put in detention centres. Mentioned by ministers of the Centre.

4.	Political Stance	<p>Non-Aligned Movement; defined the philosophy of choosing one's path.</p> <p>Later shifted after the death of Nehru and the post-1991 era.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Americanisation of India; imitation. (outside India) • Coming closer to America. • Imitation of Indira Gandhi in terms of absolutist power. (inside India)
5.	Kashmir	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Indo-Pak War, resulting in Pakistan Occupying some part of Kashmir. • Issue was taken to the United Nations leading to status-quo. • Special Treaty by the Government of India with Maharaja of Kashmir for the special status of Kashmir and Kashmiri people. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Turned into Union Territory (Article 370 and 35A removed).
6.	Mahatma Gandhi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Father of the Nation • Nathuram Godse, a convict in the court of law for killing Gandhi. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Icon of Swachh Bharat Abhiyaan (cleanliness drive) • Godse Hutatma (declared as great Soul on many public gatherings by the leaders of the ruling party). • Temple dedicated to Godse tried to be established in Meerut, Uttar Pradesh. • Pragya Thakur (Malegaon Convict) who declared the act of killing Gandhi correct. Given PM ticket

			and got elected; Put in the cabinet committee on Defence then removed. Had to apologize in the Parliament over her remarks.
7.	Vishwaguru	Establishment of Universities, IITs, IIMs, IISER, FTII, AIIMS, AFMC.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Target on Critical Schools (Jawaharlal Nehru University, Jadavpur University, University of Hyderabad) • Reorganization of the administration of FTII. • Proposed new IITs; Jio University (Institute of Excellence; not in existence) • Streamlining Projects with Action Research Orientation (STRIDE). • Unrest and disturbances in the Universities all over India. JNU row.
8.	Diplomacy	Friendly ties with the countries. NAM stance.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PM appeared on the poster of Benjamin Netanyahu seeking elections in his country. • Howdy Modi promoting Trump (Abki Baar Trump Sarkar) in US and Namaste Trump in India for gaining support of NRI's of Gujarati origin.

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Asserting Power on the countries and neighbours. • Diplomatic ties with many new countries and win over the foes.
9.	Agriculture and Farmer Issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Green Revolution • White Revolution 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tokenism of Kisan Samman Rashi (Rs. 6000 per annum) • Farmer Suicide Rates rising. • Farmers strike in New Delhi; farmers from south and other parts demonstrated. • Farmers Relocated for the Statue of Unity (Irony: ‘Sardar’ title given to Patel after his involvement in the farmer’s movement in Bardoli); approx: 3300 crores spent.
10.	Watershed Time/ Speech	Mid Night Declaration of Independence. Tryst With Destiny. Joint Parliament Session	Midnight Declaration of Goods and Services Tax from the Central Hall of Parliament. Joint Parliament Session. Underlining Rise of New India.
11.	Economic Policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mixed Economy • Five Year Plan • Planning Commission 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • More focus on Capitalism. • Planning Commission got scrapped. • NITI Aayog got established. • Pocket Centric Development. • Financial Assistance to Russia. • Modi: “Government has no

			<p>business in business.”</p> <p>Disinvestment and selling off substantial section of railways, BPCL, BSNL, Air India, etc.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bank Fiasco, Merger of Banks, Shutting down of P&M Bank; Demonetisation. • Touching the Reserving money of RBI and LIC. • 5 Trillion Dollar Economy (Proposed to Achieve)
12.	World Recognition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nehru getting awards/ recognitions from all over the world. Undisputable leader. • Time Magazine issues, numerous occasions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Modi getting awards from UAE, Bahrain, Russia, Palestine, Afghanistan and many more. • Most Powerful Leader in 2019 according to British Herald. • Modi in Time Magazine (Twice) • Most Followed Politician on Twitter (31.1.M)

Table 1. Comparison Between India of 1950s and post-2014

IV. PUBLIC SPHERE AND PUBLIC OPINION FORMATION

With the technological development and emergence of new media particularly social media, the way people interacted and shared information changed a lot. From mere connecting with old friends and family living far away to the present globalised world which uses it for socio-political reasons, the transmission of message is multiplying. Modern communication had been shaped by memes, trending issues, cyber bullying, trolling and even sharing viral

content. This new media also became the potent medium for forming public sphere for developing rational critical debates.

Habermas (1974) has defined public sphere as “a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed. Access is guaranteed to all citizens. A portion of the public sphere comes into being in every conversation in which private individuals assemble to form a public body.”

Habermas (1974) while further clarifying the concept, has mentioned that “Citizens behave as a public body when they confer in an unrestricted fashion—that is, with the guarantee of freedom of assembly and association and the freedom to express and publish their opinions—about matters of general interest. In a large public body this kind of communication requires specific means for transmitting information and influencing those who receive it. Today newspapers and magazines, radio and television are the media of the public sphere.” This definition was put in the context of old media and nowadays social media can be included in this.

This medium has potential while at the same time vulnerabilities and limitations. While facilitating the above mentioned functions it also put forth various discourses related to society and public life. In India at present, the rational critical political debate has focused on two main poles: the Bhakts Vs the Chamchas. That is to say, the Bhakts are the ones who support BJP and right wing ideology blindly while the Chamchas are the supporters of Congress and liberals who support this ideology for getting personal benefits. Apart from this, no other distinction based on thought, ideas, philosophies or ideologies exists. Even if it exists, it has come down to name calling in which the political leaders irrespective of political lines and even the Prime Minister is participating. Terms and Phrases like *Libtards*, *Sickular*, *Khangressi*, *Urban Naxals*, *Chowkidaar Chor Hai*, *Khujliwal*, *Feku*, *Yuvraaj*, *Pappu*, *Pachas Crore ki Girlfriend*, *Naamdar vs Kaamdaar* and many more are the part of political conversations on social media. There is no discussion on real issues of national development and all leaders are mostly talking and discussing general issues like Mangoes, their struggle, Yoga, Akido, etc.

The only issue which has become crucial on social networking sites is Pakistan bashing, raising Kashmir and Article 370 issue, and presenting Muslims as outsiders. The content analysis done by Peeing Human Channel (a social networking website which develops online comedy, satirical content on Politics)

run by Ramit Verma, gives a result of about 202 debates that were held on different TV channels. This study was conducted in 19 October 2019 across four major Hindi news channels Aaj Tak (Dangal programme), News 18 (Aar Paar), Zee News (Taal Thok Ke), and India TV (Kurukshetra). The results are the following:

S. No.	Issue Raised	No. of debates
1.	Attacking Pakistan	79
2.	Attacking the Opposition (including Nehru)	66
3.	Praising Modi and the BJP/RSS	36
4.	Ram Mandir	14
5.	Bihar Floods	03
6.	Chandrayaan Moon Mission	02
7.	Rape Case against Swami Chinmayanand	01
8.	PMC Bank Scam	01
9.	Education	00
10.	Healthcare	00
11.	Public Infrastructure	00
12.	Farmers' Distress	00
13.	Poverty and Malnutrition	00
14.	Women's Safety	00
15.	Environmental Protection	00

Table 02: Issues and no. of debates occurred on Television

One can notice that objectivity and rational critical debate are totally missing. Only pre-present dispensation and ultra nationalist content is generated not even considering the guidelines of Supreme Court regarding coverage of Babri Masjid case or Broadcasting rules. Rationality has gone so low that a

union minister of Railways and Commerce states that “Maths didn’t help anyone, not even Einstein, to discover the law of gravity”. This era has been defined as post-truth era where there is no distinction between truth and lies. This half-baked truth or lies presented as facts are circulated to develop an agenda around the nationalist one. Even members of the same political party were executed to take political leverage which came into light through investigations in West Bengal. Educational institutes like JNU and eminent professors like Romila Thapar (not limited to her) are targeted and referred to as anti-nationals. These social networks have become a significant tool to circulate fake news. Even the present Home Minister of India, former party president asked its party volunteers to circulate fake news for it in favour of the party. In the book “India Misinformed: The True Story”, editors like Pratik Sinha, Dr. Sumaiya Shaikh, Arjun Sidharth refer to different kinds of fake news being propagated in India in the past few years. Fake news is categorised based on different topics:

- Spreading Communal Discord (17 Cases were referred)
- Building Brand Modi (07 Cases)
- Portraying Opposition Parties as Anti-Hindu (03 Cases)
- Rahul Gandhi – The Favourite for targeted Propaganda (06 Cases)
- PM Modi and the BJP targeted (09 cases)
- Other Targeted Politicians (08 cases)
- False Historical Claims (03 cases)
- Maligning Jawaharlal Nehru (05 Cases)
- Mainstream Media (05 cases)
- Targeting Individuals (04 cases)
- Fake Polls, Fake Lists, Fake Accounts (09 Cases)
- Science (06 cases)

One can understand the extent of penetration of fake news in India. After a strong suggestion to form the information society where all individuals produce, consume and propagate, information has reached a stage where nobody can claim to differentiate between truth and falsity. It even causes anxiety, chaos, awe and many times results into a violent outcome. To be more specific, there had to be some sharing regulation adjustments in Whatsapp involving only five persons at a time. Similarly, group administrators in India declared

that they will be held responsible regarding any possible wrong, hateful messages which might be promoted on any group platform.

V. CONCEPTUALIZING THE DEMOCRATIC CHANGE AND COMMUNICATION PARADIGM

At present, there is a stark deviation from the Buddha's Dispassionate state (State) reaching the Promised Ram Rajya while following the tenets of Saam, Daam, Dand, Bhed of Krishna which rely on the idea that there is no difference between the truth and falsity in this world of Maya; usage of falsehood is sanctified if it is for the sake of establishing righteousness. Interestingly, the Buddha's and Rama's path were the same; the path of Truth; the means and the goal should both be truthful.

New Media is such a world of Maya (Virtual) and a person using this medium for his personal advantage and agenda is Narendra Modi at present. On the other hand, the country which had declared equal space for everything has some reservations for certain sections of the society. This is equally reflected through the social media by the hate expressed for respective communities. Sohini Sengupta (Sengupta, 2019) in her article "How WhatsApp 'Truths' Thrive on Middle-Class Anxieties" demonstrated that the promise of web 2.0 as progressive, transformative and democratic appears to have been captured by post-truth "viral content" that promote anxiety, insecurity and xenophobia. She underlined Harsin's idea regarding the 21st century post-truth world which is characterised by competing convictions, and elite manipulation of 'truth markets' through "emotional message targeting" (Harsin, 2018).

Social media groups are not only promoting anxiety in terms of social well-being, women security, and lynching but also in terms of identity. The identity based on caste, religion and region has unexpectedly risen. The groups are asserting themselves in the given political scenario where the Kamandal (right wing ideology) is trying to override the Mandal Commission (which sanctioned OBC quota). This is echoed in the false propaganda being promoted against the reservation policy for the depressed class of society. A new reservation segment (10%) has been introduced in terms of economic background for those who do not belong to lower caste segment. The present government promoted its PM as the face of OBC from the organization which is largely Brahminical. The Rohini Commission has been established to revise the OBC quota for those who do not have the benefits of the reservation and remove

from the group those with the most advantage. The social media groups in terms of caste and class struggle have been created in India which have divided the country, developing false notion of hatred causing each group to try to assert their identity. This is even replicated in academic institutions. Consequently, there exists the resurgence of caste identity in the present scenario and for any government which targets any group benefits or harms them leading to counter reaction. The middle class which increased post 1991, also gave rise to the aspirations and dreams of the middle class. The epitome of the middle class dreams saw the rise of two significant personalities in the Indian public life Sachin Tendulkar and Shahrukh Khan; both coming from the common middle class family and reaching the zenith of success. Manmohan Singh government gave Bharat Ratna to Sachin Tendulkar, who became the first sports person to receive the award. This award was given in the aftermath of rising movement against the government in India against corruption movement.

a. Public Sphere, Online Activism to Bubble Democracy

These social media platforms are gradually turning into filter bubbles owing to their algorithmic restrictions for each user. A filter bubble (see also information cocoon) is the intellectual isolation that can occur when websites make use of algorithms to selectively assume the information a user would want to see, and then give information to the user according to this assumption ... A filter bubble, therefore, can cause users to get significantly less contact with contradicting viewpoints, causing the user to become intellectually isolated (Murray, 2010). **Graham Meikle** (*Meikle, 2002*) in his book '**Future Active: Media Activism and the Internet**' has defined Internet Activism as 'political uses of networked computers that attempt to affect social or cultural change in the offline world: a politics which can use the graphical and multimedia capabilities of the web as well as text-based applications such as email'.

Furthermore, **Allen Rusbridger** (Rusbridger, 2010), the former editor of The Guardian has defined the characteristics of new media by saying that this technology has brought a new model of transmission of information, messages and news compared to the traditional gatekeeping model/ top to bottom approach of news flow. He has put that with this new technology now the bottom to top approach would come where news and its content would be directed by the audience, based on what they want to see and the issues they want to

address. For this reason, there comes a completely opposite model known as bottom-up approach. This approach is at present largely guiding the Mass Media model on TV news platforms in India. Here, the discussions are held based on the topic mostly discussed on social networks mainly rumour-based, propagandist, fanning passions compared to proper rational dialogue to churn out the best principles for the benefit of the society.

Manuel Castells (Castells, 2012) in his book *Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age* (2nd Ed.) has defined networked communication as mass-self communication. It is **mass communication** because it processes messages from many to many, with the potential of reaching a multiplicity of receivers, and of connecting to endless networks that transmit digitized information around the neighborhood or around the world. It is **self-communication** because the production of the message is autonomously decided by the sender, the designation of the receiver is self-directed and the retrieval of messages from the networks of communication is self-selected. Mass self-communication is based on horizontal networks of interactive communication that, by and large, are difficult to control by governments or corporations. However, it can follow a user and analyse his psychographics to float the political ideas for their own benefits.

Thus, in the given content each user lives in their own bubble (cocoon) of information forming their world view and thought process engages in that kind of dialogue and promotes their viewpoints. In this networked society guided by algorithms one would never know the potential of public sphere and democracy and each would live in their own bubble. Therefore, a democracy is formed which is promoted by the self, for the self and of the self. Consequently, it serves no one except the self while democracy is a community constructed of a group of people and not self-centred creatures.

Similarly, this concept can be adopted in another context where each user gets to know one issue when it starts trending on different social media platforms or the generation of viral culture which keeps on changing and shifting every day. Although everyone is engaged in the discussion and dissent (Passive Activism/Slacktivism), the real change emerges when counting in the metadata through hashtags. As a result, this shifting of issues is like bubbles in the rain where the bubbles keep on bursting as soon as they are formed. That is to say, the longevity is very short and so is the case with the new (social) media as the public sphere platforms; the issue discussed has shorter life and gets erased

from the human minds once another issue arises. This bursting bubble does not lead to a proper rational critical discussion for the real change which is imperative for democracy. Thus, this type of democracy is turning into a bubble democracy in which one idea is associated with two different contexts as mentioned above.

b. RISE OF RSS AND CURIOUS CASE OF SPIRAL OF SILENCE

The rise of Narendra Modi and BJP getting power for two consecutive terms with full majority reveals another notion about the Indian democracy. When India adopted its constitution, it declared itself a society based on equality for everyone. Earlier, India allowed Muslims and people of all faith to stay in the country post-partition while Pakistan became another nation based on religion. This was the dominant opinion at that time under the leadership of the congress, Nehru and Gandhi. However, at that time the RSS had the deviant opinion of making a Hindu Rashtra. It took almost 70 years that the deviant was developed into the dominant. It should be noted that the pain, hatred, violence which was not expressed at that time and swept under the carpet has come out. This is happening partly because of the grassroot activities of RSS like Shakha, opening schools with the RSS ideology and working under the garb of cultural organization but taking political stands; a kind of parallel government. This got further facilitated by the social media (New Media) where their ideas could be promoted through these public platforms. That is why the PM Modi's reluctance to give interviews to the news channels and attend press conferences is reflected here. The government and its allies are using the informal network to pressurize the formal media network with the journalistic ethics binders to bow down to the passion of public rather than rational stand of their profession, for example, the fourth pillar of democracy (Rusbridger's concept discussed above). This public pressure and passion can be reproduced from the hearing of Ram Janma Bhoomi's case in Supreme Court where it gives the judgment taking into consideration public's emotion and faith.

Consequently, the traditional mass media is toppled down by the social media, where the rational-critical thought process is not developed and sane voices of democracy are targeted. Thus, the deviant (RSS ideology) becomes the dominant right wing ideology of this 'New' India channelized by social media with around 38% vote share of BJP in 2019.

c. DIFFUSION OF INNOVATION: RAM RAJYA AND OPPORTUNE LAGGARDS (LAGGARDS/ LATE MAJORITY)

India took a leap in different eras. In the modern sense, the leap of modernity and scientific revolution happened after 1947, where we marched forward to attain what the modern developed nations have achieved for their people. Even the leap is seen where in the avatar system of Hinduism we moved from Ram to Krishna to Buddha; from violence to compassion; from restrictive religious kingships fighting for dominion to Sangha where everyone is equal and should work together for establishing peace and order in the world. In this context, the whole idea of going back and establishing Ram Rajya is the attribute of a Laggard who is still trapped in the past and unwilling to change. Although this group of people enjoy all the benefits of the modernity, they politically take us back to the world of kings and avatars where people look for the 'One' to solve all their problems. In contrast, these people (every single person) would not be the king as in the case of democracy but would take sudden and impulsive decisions guided by the social order. In this regard, the rise of laggards is due to failure of the Innovator and early Adopters. These largely form the academic community apart from few public intellectuals who confined themselves to high walls of their institution and seem to have forgotten the importance of their ideology to reach to the masses; taking it from the books to the field, among the common people. The attack on academic institutions results in failure of the academic community to connect to the masses. That is why the people in power transmit messages like Harvard vs Hard work denigrating the importance of education, nothing happens after acquiring PhD, the businessmen contribute more than PhD scholars, urban naxals are to name few. These academics have never written popular writings, if done then confined to publications of big publications of cities or their writings never reached the masses. After JNU row the scholars initiated public lectures, a fact which was circulated through social media.

VI. CONCLUSION

Overall, the rise of Modi answers to youth force as well as the reaction of people towards the growing corruption. The idea that he has no family to support is promoted a lot to address the anxiety related to the increasing corruption in India and one family ruling the country since the independence. The youth do not identify with the Congress leadership as they have not achieved or

performed anything in life except living on the legacy given to them by the fact that they are born in the Nehru family. The youngsters who strive daily to make their living do not identify with Rahul Gandhi but middle class youth icons like Sachin Tendulkar, Shahrukh Khan and M.S. Dhoni who made their mark. Therefore, in the counter they feel that they have only one answer Modi who comes from the humble background; who is promoted as the main solution for all miseries; who is not corrupted; who is a decision maker; who has 56 inch chest. He might be having the right intentions but his actions and philosophies are questioned. He might be acting as per managing between personal vices and trying to adhere to the constitutional norms and the best interest of India. Best catch 22 situation is of Godse and Gandhi; this itself defines his idea. If Godse is regarded as 'hutatama' (Great Soul), then the nation is in a way sanctioning religious killings if it satisfies according to dharma (righteousness). Then law and order situation would arise and everyone would be free to settle their own scores which is a dangerous situation for the democracy. No Community rule but Self-Rule (Selfie generation) would take place.

K. P. Shankaran (Shankaran, 2019) in his article "Tyranny of the Majority" in The Indian Express refers to the criticism of present form of representative democracy by Gandhi. Gandhi referred to it as 'a costly toy of the nation', a reference to British parliament. He discussed the direct form of democracy. For Gandhi, the idea of a nation state was itself a deception and he feared that once India adopted it, it would forever be forced to run a representative form of government in order to avoid the menace of a possible dictatorship. This aversion for representative democracy stemmed from his conviction that it would in no time degenerate into an anti-people institution in a multicultural and multi-religious context like India. Based on personal interests, the majority and its leader would decide the course of nation. This is the situation in India ever since the independence and especially at present there is more emphasis on this. The Representative Democracy works on the vote banks. If we do not want to resort to the tyranny of majority rule and future generations paying the price for it; then Shankaran opines Gandhian option is the best way: Gram Swaraj further leading forward to deliberative democracy of the modern times.

The greatest challenge lies within the role of media as the fourth pillar of democracy which needs to be reflected and sustained by the government, media professionals, people and business world. The impact of social media is visible but does not seem to serve the principles of democracy for consensus

building. On the contrary, it is becoming a tool for ghettos on social media platforms leading bashing/trolling the 'Others'. Consequently, social media is promoting chaos at a greater extent compared to the sound public sphere for rational-critical debate.

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The role of network communicative competence of the personality in the development of democracy

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ABSTRACT

The relevance of the problem is determined by the interconnectedness and interdependence of modern processes of communication and the development of democracy - the most important trends in social development that determine the vector in the civilization dichotomy "progress-regression". The epicenter of the development of modern forms of communication and competent participation in them is concentrated today in virtual reality. The article presents a conceptual justification of the communicative competence of a person in virtual reality as a special sociocultural space: communicative competency is presented as a personality characteristic associated with the essential features of social communication, as a phenomenon representing the social reality of an individual; It substantiates how virtual reality defines and transforms the characteristics of communicative competence. The empirical results presented in the article summarize the nature of the influence of communicative competence on the processes of democratization in modern Russian social practices, the contradictory nature of this influence is shown, and ways to overcome this inconsistency are proposed.

KEYWORDS: *Democracy, Communicative competence of the personality, Virtual reality, Factors of influencing the democratization of society.*

1.Relevance

The processes of democratization and liberalization, an increase in the space of freedom in modern society are accompanied by the appearance in the communicative space of many autonomous entities - individuals and groups. Their activity is practically not regulated by institutions, and is subject only to self-regulation. Depending on their own ideas about social participation, freedom of speech, right to expression, influence on decision-making, and many others, individuals build their interactions. In fact, modern society is a complex structure consisting of many self-organizing actors interacting with each other.

With the expansion of the space of social reality, the increment of the communicative space due to the virtual interaction, these actors become more noticeable, and their interaction is more and more dense. Moreover, there is a clear shift in the share of communication towards a virtual one. According to VTSIOM¹, 45% of Russians over 18 use some kind of social network at least once a day. The maximum level of involvement is shown among young people - in the group of 18-24 years old, since 91% use social networks every day, while the middle generation is an active participant in network communications.

This change in the mode of social life, communication, as well as the growth of freedom puts forward new requirements for participants. There is a need for communicative competence. The emergence of new necessities for the participants' communicative competence in the interactions raises a number of questions, the answers to which allow us to reveal the relationship of modern communication processes and trend development of modern Russian life forms in the general sociocultural and civilizational context. Among them: which signs of social communication are essential, and which are variable? How reflected are the essential features of social communication in virtual reality and whether they contribute to maintaining the integrity of the social space, or it distorts and exposes its existence to risks. What characteristics of communicative competence in network interaction contribute to the development of democracy as a form of existence of a modern civilized society? That

1. *Sociological Encyclopedia* (2003), vol 2. National Public Scientific Fund. Head of Project Semigin G.Y. M.: Misl, p. 863.

is, to the extent that, in line with civilizational criteria developed by human culture, they are rapidly developing modern communicative practices and communicative competence of an individual.

II. Conceptual basis for the study of communicative competence as a factor in the development of democratization.

Communication in the broad sense is perceived as an exchange of information and a means of communication of any objects of the material and spiritual worlds as well as, a type of a person's social activity in the space of social connections and interactions. Two different approaches to understanding interaction are significant for appreciating the essence of communication and forming the skills to effectively implement it, that is, communicative competence. The first is connected with the concept of communication as the transmission of a message and is presented in works devoted to understanding the phenomenon in terms of the technical means of communication (W. Weaver and C. Shannon, G. Lasswell). In this case, communicative competence is associated with the ability to ensure delivery of a message to the addressee, that is, it comes down to solving the technical problem of conveying information. It should be noted that this mechanistic understanding of communication and communicative competence is still quite widespread (people are rarely inclined to care about whether they are understood correctly). The second approach is linked to a realisation of the social meaning of communication and is reflected in its interactionist models (U. Shramm, Ch. Osgood). In this model, a response action is laid down, that is, feedback, which makes it possible to level out distortion of information and achieve an understanding of the meaning laid down by the author. In this case, the subjective meanings of the communicants and their coordination come to the forefront, which implies the presence in the structure of communicative competence of certain values (respect for the interlocutor), communicative skills (the ability to understand another, the ability to listen). The ability to understand is represented by different representatives of interactionist theories in a variety of ways: for G. Garfinkel (1981), the ability to understand is associated with entering the context, with J. Mead (2008) - with the discovery of familiar, shared, generally accepted cultural symbols, with E. Hoffman (1971) - using frames - recognizable and shared by all participants in social practices, understood clearly. The effectiveness of the interactionist theory of communication is associated with the

presence of the skill to understand another, listen, provide feedback, the separation of meanings, feelings, positions, values in the process of interpersonal and social interaction.

Communicative competence is designed to support the knowledge, skills and abilities essential for effective communication. If the success of communication is assumed through feedback, leading to the achievement of a certain community integrity, then communicative competence will include such a parameter as the ability to maintain the stability of social interactions and connections. As a result, in broader terms it can promote social inclusion. Based on the above-mentioned theories, the exchange of meanings and understanding, the people's skill and ability to convey and understand meanings, as well as provide feedback, becomes crucial. In this case, communicative competence is perceived as a person's capability and willingness to optimize interaction, taking into account mutual expectations and attitudes and at the same time common interests and values. The end result of communication is more likely to become an agreement.

The basis of the formation of communicative competence is the image of communication that arises in the participants' minds during the interaction, their understanding of the essence of communication as a phenomenon and its value, the attitude towards other participants in the communicative process and awareness of their value, tolerance for one another, as well as reflection of their own contribution to communication and its value. The ability in the process of communication to build a balance between these components is a reflection of the level of democratization in society. In the practice of communication, this is expressed in trust, respect and taking into account the expectations of others and at the same time the interests of different participants involved in the interaction.

Virtual reality introduces such a component into the characteristics of social interaction as artificiality, authenticity, simplicity, simulation (Ivanov, 2002, p.4.) Additionally, it manifests itself in different planes - psychogenic (creating imagination of object images in their real absence), sociogenic (real relationships between people on the basis of images created by the imagination), technogenic (interaction between the human-computer interface mode) (Malchenkov, 2014, p. 55). Today's technogenic virtuality has acquired a total scale of development and consequences in all areas of public life: social (media, in particular), political, economic - in the form of a simulation of the

institutional structure of society. This interpretation is reflected in the research of A.V. Sokolov (2011), D.V. Ivanov (2002), A.P. Moiseeva. (2010), I. Malchenkova (2014) and others, when virtuality appears as "... a simulation or substitution of social life (personal and public) created by users on the basis of computer technology and imitating, modeling social processes of constant reality" (Malchenkov 2104, p.56). Regarding the social content of virtualization with sociocultural multidimensionality, multi-positioning and transforming flows of spaces and timeless time, according to D.V. Ivanov, consists in simulating the institutional structure of society, which is primarily relative to technical content "(Ivanov, 2000: 96 pp.). This understanding of the virtual reality essentials is fundamental and points to the specifics of the existence of a virtual communication space as "... an artificially created interaction environment carried out through network interaction "(Zubok YA, Chankova EV, 2019, p. 144) and communicative competence. In these interactions, a person is replaced by their virtual representative - email, skype name, nickname in blogs, chats, networks, twitter, phone number efon in messengers and many others. The specificity of this interaction is manifested in distance, anonymity and imagination. A person can act in an interaction both under their own and fictitious name, or anonymously. This creates a situation of uncertainty and an open social reality, which requires recognition, imagination and completion through the individual choice of appropriate methods. In the virtual communicative competence of an individual, there is a shift from the adoption of an institutional model to its construction; there is a mobility of the norms and practices of interactive communication, reflexive self-regulation of individual interactions, subjective validation of the reliability of information. Flexibility and mobility of interactions; installation on quick surface contacts and optionality, emotional autonomy, decreased empathy and "network jargon" - becomes characteristic of communicative competence in virtuality.

The following empirical results are summarized in the nature of the impact of communicative competence in virtual reality on the democratization processes in modern Russian society.

II. The empirical results

1. **The value of communication was measured by the question "What is the meaning of communication for you?"** Despite the pragmatization of relations in modern Russian society, for most Russians, communication is of terminal value. Its highest values are noted among women especially in the older age group.

The terminal value of communication (its intrinsic value for the respondent) was determined by a set of semantic meanings: inner need, pleasure (communicate with a pleasant person), goal (communication itself). Its value was 65.3% (internal need - 24%, pleasure - 35.2%, goal - 6.1%). Communication as an instrumental value (achieving other goals through communication) consisted of semantic values that were distributed as follows: means (exchange of information) - 19.1%, necessity (as needed) - 12.7%, duty of courtesy - 2, 9%. In general, the instrumental value of communication was 34.7%. Moreover, among women, the terminal value of communication is higher (69.2%) than among men (60.8%). Among young people aged 18-29, it corresponds to the average value in the general distribution (65%), but then its values decrease - in the age group of 30-39 years to 63.1%, and in the group of 40-49 years to 61, 5%. That is, in the most socially active age groups, the proportion of instrumental values of communication is growing. This is apparently due to the rationalization of production and business relations in a market environment. Among 50-59 year olds, terminal communication values again approach the average (64.8%) and reach their maximum values after 60 years (71.1%). That is, the value of communication as a component of communicative competence expresses a shift to the zone of instrumental values, that is, pragmatization of relations, which reduces the intensity of the development of democratic trends in society.

2. **Reflection of the attitude towards the participants in the interaction is trust.** It is the result of the image of one another - a specific person, group, or social institution. The level of trust fixes the willingness to enter into interactions and accept the partner as safe, and his expectations and contribution to joint decisions as significant.

Options	Distribution of answers,%		
	Now everything is so unstable, and it seems that anything can happen	With the current mess and uncertainty, it's hard to understand what to believe	Today you cannot be sure of anyone, you cannot trust anyone
I agree	76,5	60,4	56,3
Disagree	18,7	31,0	35,0
Difficult to answer	4,8	8,6	8,6

Table 1 “ Degree of trust”

As you can see, the level of distrust exceeds trust, which reflects the degree of uncertainty and tension. However, every third Russian has not lost a sense of confidence and ability to trust others. This group is a potential for strengthening communication and the basis of democracy.

3. Trust positively affects the removal of barriers and the democratization of the communicative process itself

Connection between trust/distrust and the characteristics of partners in interpersonal interactions

General trust/dis trust	Traditional characters		Modern characters	
	Requirements for the qualities of partners, %	Value of communication,%	Requirements for the qualities of partners, %	Value of communication,%

	Moral	Ethno-national	Religious	Term. value	Business	Accomplishment (success)	Instrument. Value
Trust	83,0	20,9	24,7	62,1	56,6	44,4	37,9
Distrust	83,3	32,1	32,5	58,7	56,4	49,4	41,3

Table 2 “Generalized trust / distrust”

Among the proponents of trust, i.e. those who disagree with the judgment that no one should be trusted, there is a higher value of the terminal value of communication (62%), and a lower value of requirements for the national-ethnic (20.9%) and religious (24.7%) characteristics of partners, compared with values of similar characteristics among distrusting respondents (58.7%, 32.1% and 32.5%, respectively). In other words, generalized trust positively affects interactions with partners, increasing the terminal value of communication between them, and leveling national-ethnic and religious differences.

4. Attitude on trust positively affects the level of solidarity in the immediate environment, which is especially pronounced in the youth environment.

Consent / disagreement with the judgment: <i>“Today, no one can be trusted.”</i>	Relationship level:			
	in a family,	with neighbors	in a team	with respondent’s active civil position
Agree	6,20	5,58	5,68	5,47
Disagree	6,40	5,62	5,84	5,50

Table 3 Connection of trust / distrust with relationships in the immediate environment (mean on a seven-point rating scale)

The table shows the presence of a stable relationship of trust of young people with a positive assessment of the state of interpersonal relations. That is, among respondents who trust others, they have a higher rating of love in the family (K = 6.40 versus 6.20 among those who do not trust), friendship with neighbors (K = 5.62 versus 5.58), solidarity in the team (K = 5.84 versus 5.68) and higher self-esteem of the level of activity of one's own life position (K = 5.50 versus 5.47).

5. Let's consider what signs appearing in communicative interaction are the most significant for solidarity.

To determine the basic foundations of solidarity, the following question was used: “When treating another person, on what grounds do you feel disposed to them (recognize“ your own ”) or mistrust (refer to“ stranger ”)? From the proposed set of features, they were selected based on the ratio of trust / distrust.

Location, trust Rather, location Rather distrust, Distrust To
 , for the common good 31.3 53.7 14.0 1.00 3.15
 20.4 47.1 27.7 4.70 2.83
 50.1 42.6 6.05 1.25 3.41
 24.2 57.8 14.7 3.40 3.03
 31.1 48.2 21.1 1.10 3.08

Features	Scale/rate				
	Confidence and trust	Rather confidence	Rather distrust	Distrust	K
Striving for high standards	31,3	53,7	14,0	1,00	3,15
The desire for their own well-being	20,4	47,1	27,7	4,70	2,83
Empathy	50,1	42,6	6,05	1,25	3,41
Pragmatism	24,2	57,8	14,7	3,40	3,03
Modesty, shyness	31,1	48,2	21,1	1,10	3,08
Neglect of accepted norms, provocative behavior	8,50	17,4	50,7	23,3	2,12
That he is of the same nationality as you	29,5	60,9	7,60	1,90	3,19
The fact that he is a representative of another ethnic group	9,8	52,4	31,1	3,40	2,64

**Table 4 “Trust and distrust in relation to other in interpersonal interactions”
(K –means on a four- point rating scale)**

As can be seen in table 4, the signs characterizing the maximum assessment of trust (we-image) were: responsiveness, compassion; belonging to one nationality; modesty, shyness; striving for high standards; desire for their own well-being. Among the signs that received the maximum values of distrust (they-image), stood out: neglect of accepted standards; belonging to another nationality; pragmatism, practicality.

Thus, demonstrating behavioral attitudes consistent with these attributes serves to build confidence. Additionally, the ability to demonstrate and recognize them is part of communicative competence.

6. More detailed studies show differences in the way the principles of democracy are reflected in communicative competence in the communicative space of real and virtual interactions. It was revealed that in the network interaction, the importance of the ability to understand the other person is reduced (twice as compared to the real one), as well as the importance of respect for the other. This factor captures the distortion of the essence of communication, which, in our opinion, is associated with disorientation of the personality in the communicative space of virtuality. This factor also indicates a decrease in the trend of democratization, which is impossible without respecting and understanding the other person’s position.

Real interaction effectiveness indicators	Effective Real Communication Skills Index	Effective Virtual Communication Skills Index
Understanding what you want to say	0,81	0,48
Understanding what your partner wants to say	0,83	0,49
Respect another person’s position, even if he is wrong	0,59	0,42

Table 5” Communication skills in the real and virtual interaction”

7. It has been revealed that the respondents - Internet users- are prone to changing the norm of behavior, its revision, and reconstitution. Compared to respondents included in real interactions, they are more individualized and emancipated. However, the nature of this emancipation is such that the attitude towards solidarity, tolerance and acceptance of the other is poorly represented in the way of communication among these individuals. In this form, freedom is more about disintegration than about democratic unification. Moreover, in a virtual space, the level of satisfaction with interaction in the sphere of public interests is higher than in reality. This group has lower fatigue and higher involvement than the group of real interactions. Among the latter, communicative relations are shifting towards the private sphere and communicative competence is developing in this zone.




Table 6 “Active in real and virtual communications”

IV. Summary

Communicative competence of the individual is a factor determining the effectiveness of the communication flow at various levels: between citizens, between citizens and government structures - regarding the adoption of political decisions and their nature. The key to democratization is values and trust, solidarity, the ability to understand and respect the position of another and another position in the structure of communicative competence. The institutions

of socialization, in particular, the mass media institute, play a decisive role in enhancing communication skills.

In modern Russian practice, in such a rapidly developing field as virtual space, the influence of the communicative competence of citizens on the development of democratic processes is controversial. Inconsistency is manifested, on the one hand, in the expansion of free communication, emancipation, the development of reflectivity of communicative competence, the presence of trust and values of communication, on the other hand, in disorientation of communication participants in an open communication space, a decrease in the value of understanding and respect for the other. That is, from the institutions of socialization a more expressed fulfillment of their functions is required for the development of the communicative skills of the individual - as a result, for the development of democratic traditions as a sociocultural achievement of mankind.

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"What kind of Democracy and what kind of Mass Media do we have today?"

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*Presentation using Power Point, images, outlines, sketches
and cartoons with oral presentation/analysis*

Summary

The Athenian, direct, democracy was applied evolutionarily for about 140 years (from 462 BC to 322 BC in Attica) resulting in the creation of culture- for example, anything that is freely provided to all citizens and results in their well-being.

In Athens, when Democracy was prevailing, justice, philosophy, theatre, poetry, games, applied arts etc. and the principles of all sciences, were available freely to all citizens for the first time.

The modern "representative" (or parliamentary) Democracy differs greatly from direct Democracy. For this reason, as a practical development and an improved version of the representative Democracy, the participatory Democracy is preferred these days.

In the last 200 years or so with the spread of typography and the global prevalence of the 3rd industrial revolution (electricity, electronics, telecommunications, information technology, internet, etc.) the media has emerged evolutionarily, which today, at the beginning of the 4th industrial re-startion (Robotics, artificial intelligence, virtual reality, nanotechnology, Blockchain, drones, 5G etc.) play a dominant role in people's everyday life.

In today's age, of speed, of insufficient leisure as well as tranquility, peace, joy and happiness for too many people, and where human values, quality of life and also survival of the human race are in question, mainly due to the visible danger of the negative and perhaps non-reversible effects of climate change, one of the most imperative questions that afflict thinking people is 'what kind of Democracy and what kind of Mass Media prevail today'?

Do the people (Demos) really prevail, that is, the opinion of the majority? And if so, how is that opinion shaped? Are citizens really informed or manipulated by Mass Media? Is Orwell and the followers of conspiracy theories increasingly verified? Do fake news, fake journalists, fake experts and fake representatives or fake city/ State leaders dominate?

Keywords: *Democracy, Media, Corruption, Interplay, Dialogue.*

Introduction

The first rhapsody of *Odyssey* begins by referring to the efforts made by the goddess Athena to convince her father Zeus to stop the long and endless adventures of Odysseas (Ulysses) at sea to return unharmed home (to Ithaca). This is precisely where Homer makes the first reference to the implementation of democratic procedures, on Olympus: Almighty Zeus says that the decision must be taken by the Council of the Gods and not by him. Poseidon (who brought a focus on Ulysses' return because he blinded his son, Cyclop Polyfimos) was absent in the country of the "distant Ethiopians", something that Athena cleverly exploited, and thus the decision favourable to Odysseas was taken by the Council of the Gods unanimously.

PART A

In 508 B.C., Kleisthenis, the Athenian (member of Alkmeonides family) laid the foundations for the democratic reform of Athens. The Athenian, direct, Democracy was applied evolutionarily for about 140 years (from 462 BC to 322 BC) in the city of Athens and Attica resulting in the creation of culture, for instance anything that is provided seamlessly to all citizens and leads to their well-being.

In Athens of Democracy the principles of all sciences, as well as justice, philosophy, poetry, holidays???, games, applied arts, theatre and many others were provided freely for the first time to all citizens. Nowadays, part of our daily vocabulary use such as democracy, dialogue, counterpoint, voting and much more refers to elements of the Greek theatre such as stage, presidency, orchestra, foreground, backstage, stands, lane.

The modern "representative" (or parliamentary) Democracy differs greatly from the direct Athenian Democracy. For this reason, as a practical development and an improved version of the representative Democracy, the participatory

Republic (Town Halls, Associations, Groups, Non-Governmental Organizations, Voluntary Organizations and others) is preferred by the public.

For the last 200 years or so, with the spread of typography and the global prevalence of the 3rd Industrial Revolution (electricity, electronics, telecommunications, information technology and internet) as well as today, with the beginning of the 4th Industrial Revolution (robotics, artificial intelligence, virtual reality, augmented reality, nanotechnology, Block chain, drones, 5G and many more) Mass Media play a dominant role in people's everyday life.

PART B

These days we live at the age of speed, of the absence of sufficient leisure time as well as tranquility, peace, joy and happiness for too many people. It is an era in which human values, quality of life and survival of the human race, are in question mainly due to the visible danger of the negative and perhaps non-reversible effects of climate change.

In our days, at the beginning of the 21st century, where interplot and corruption dominate in almost all levels and activities of man, one of the imperative questions that afflict thinking people is "what kind of Democracy and what kind of Mass Media do we have / need"?

Is it, for example, democratic to vote for someone as Prime Minister or President to implement a specific programme approved by the majority of people and the next day (or after a few weeks or months) to negate a lot of their serious promises? Is it democratic the fact that there is no way to bring the leader back into order or to punish them in a way, other than to wait until the next election for a possible majority vote against them? The same question applies to unfulfilled serious promises to the people or a 180-degree turn on behalf of the supreme lord after a referendum (e.g. Greece 2015) or after their election (Cyprus, bank deposit theft in 2013, which was very artfully named 'haircut').

In democratic countries is there really Democracy, does the opinion of the majority prevail? And if so, how is that opinion shaped? Who really controls any relationships between owners and senior executives of powerful Mass Media (newspapers, TV, Radio stations) with strong executive centres or strong local and/or international economic operators?

What kind of control is applied and what are the criteria for the quality of television stations, presentation mode, broadcast duration/ frequency and news suitability? Is the enormous power and influence of the Mass Media always used in favour of citizens? Is it even used against them? The 'new' era, the 'new' data, the 'new' policy, the 'new' detergent, the 'new' opportunity, how new is it?

The vast majority of media project the political parties as the "cells" of Democracy. However, how can that be the case if it goes against basic principles of biology? Cells form tissues, tissues form organs, and organs form body systems. So the question is "how can political parties, which have organs and bodies be cells?".

Are citizens actually informed or manipulated, terrorized, bombarded with news, programs and fake heroes of zero value? Is Orwell and the followers of conspiracy theories increasingly verified? Do fake news, fake journalists, fake experts, fake researchers, fake professors and fake representatives or leaders of the City (of the State) dominate?

Is there sufficient scrutiny by the relevant bodies of the State of the accounts of Mass Media and the political parties? Do parliamentary parties pass laws or vote against others based on party or personal interests? Does the Judiciary work as it should? Is justice always bestowed properly and on time? Why do drug dealers and "traders of ideas" prevail?

PART C

Who can name up to five (5) democratic countries worldwide where Democracy is actually applied and immediately justify their response? Is Greece included in these countries? What about the Republic of Cyprus, where in October 2019 , it was mentioned by the General Attorney in a public address that there are many tangible examples of corruption and interplot in various state bodies and beyond?

Brief constructive discussion on all the above can be initiated primarily in the classrooms of schools and universities in an ethical and democratic way, sensibly and utilizing age-appropriate vocabulary and always according to the objectives, regulations and mission of education as well as simple reasoning.

Words that Matter: A Glossary for Journalism in Cyprus: A Socio-Legal Appraisal

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‘To forget is an art that must be practiced in advance. To be able to forget always depends upon how one remembers.’

Søren Kierkegaard, Rotation of the Crops (1843)

Abstract

In 2018, the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe) issued a document entitled ‘Words that Matter: A Glossary for Journalism in Cyprus.’ The aim of the Glossary was to contribute to the peace building process through an alteration in media narrative of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot community. This paper argues that the Glossary is seriously flawed in that it drastically reconceptualises internationally recognised events, namely the invasion and occupation of Cyprus by the Turkish army. Within this scope, the Glossary has dangerous free speech implications, does not respect the right to remember, as recognized by the United Nations and essentially requires journalists to go beyond their role of truthfully reporting facts. The above argumentation is supported by analysis of theories of free speech, jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights on free speech as well as literature on remembrance and ethical journalism.

Keywords: *Journalism, Cyprus, Free speech, Glossary, Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe*

Introduction

In the summer of 2018, the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe) issued a document entitled ‘Words that Matter: A Glossary for Journalism in Cyprus.’ It was written by four journalists, two Greek Cypriots and two Turkish Cypriots, and was supervised by an international expert,

the President of the Ethical Journalism Network. It was financed by Germany and the Netherlands through the OSCE FOM (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe Freedom of the Media) project entitled ‘Cyprus Dialogue.’ In the publication’s foreword, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, noted that it is a ‘glossary of alternatives to negative words and phrases’ which aims to ‘promote the sharing of stories and experiences and, eventually to help ease tensions.’ Both the Representative and the international expert of the project underlined that this glossary is not about political correctness and that journalists should remain free. Nevertheless, this paper argues that, notwithstanding the optional and non-State nature of the glossary, its content does raise free speech concerns, disregards the right to remember and does little to serve an effective peace building process. To this end, the paper will commence with a critical assessment of the glossary and some of the words and their alternatives. It will continue with an assessment of the freedom of expression as envisaged by classical thinkers and provided for in international human rights law, making particular allusion to the freedom to receive information, the freedom of the press and media pluralism. Subsequently, it will assess the extent to which non-state actors have duties and obligations in the realm of free speech and media pluralism. It will close with an analysis of the framework of ethical journalism and the internationally acknowledged right to remember and link it to the Cypriot setting of a stagnant but ongoing conflict.

1. The Glossary: A Semantical Overview

The glossary contains fifty-six words which are allegedly used by the Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot media and are considered by the drafters to be allegedly problematic or, using the phraseology of the OSCE’s Representative, ‘negative.’ The glossary contains an explanation of the alleged problematic nature and suggests an alternative word or words in approximately three-quarters of cases.

As an example, let us take the words *Pseudo-Government/So-called Government/ Government*:

Explanation of problematic nature: ‘There is a Turkish Cypriot view that these phrases or the use of inverted commas demonstrates political bias. They are used to delegitimize Turkish Cypriots, their administration, representatives and leaders. They believe they were obliged to establish their own administrative

structures to organize the life of Turkish Cypriots after the suspension of power-sharing provisions of the Republic of Cyprus constitution and that until a political solution is achieved they have no other alternative but to live in this state.’

Alternative: Turkish Cypriot administration

In the majority of words, such as the one above, the explanation of problematic or sensitive usage resulted from the offence caused to the ‘other’ community (in most cases offence caused to Turkish Cypriots) due to the status quo of the island as invaded and occupied by the Turkish army. In fact, whenever words alluded to this reality, alternatives were not found, as, for example, for the terms ‘Invasion’ and ‘Occupation.’ The Glossary states the following:

Invasion:

Many Turkish Cypriots view this term as offensive and controversial when used to describe the Turkish military operation in 1974. They believe that this term takes no account of Turkey’s right to intervene under the Treaty of Guarantee and, further, diminishes the fact that the operation happened in response to a Greek-backed military coup that overthrew the elected president of the Republic of Cyprus and had the intention of uniting Cyprus with Greece.

Occupation:

There is a Turkish Cypriot view that this term is offensive and controversial when used to describe the Turkish military operation in 1974. They believe that this term takes no account of Turkey’s right to intervene under the Treaty of Guarantee and diminishes the fact that the operation was in response to a Greek-backed military coup that overthrew the President of the Republic of Cyprus with the intention of uniting Cyprus with Greece.

In relation to words used by the Turkish Cypriot press, the allegedly problematic areas were mostly related to the existence of a sovereign state in the northern part of the island. In this realm, the glossary requests the media to use, *inter alia*, the terms ‘green line’ instead of ‘border’ and ‘crossing point/barricade’ instead of ‘gate.’ Interestingly, terms such as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, a ‘State’ recognised only by Turkey was deemed offensive to Greek Cypriots but no alternative was found. In practical terms, the only alternative that could be found would mirror the reality which the drafters of the glossary sought to covet, namely, that Cyprus experienced an internationally

recognised invasion and occupation. As with the ‘TRNC,’ finding another word would also mean disregarding UN Security Council Resolutions condemning the unilateral military actions by Turkey against Cyprus and the occupation of the Northern part of the island by Turkey. In fact, thirteen out of the fourteen words in which an alternative was not found involved the status quo following the island’s de facto division.

In only a handful of the words did the issues of negative stereotyping and/or incitement to discrimination or hatred constitute the motivation for amending language and, subsequently rhetoric. Examples of these words include ‘lady’ used by the Turkish Cypriot media to refer to Greek Cypriot women and which the drafters allege is a derogatory term and should be replaced by Greek Cypriot woman. The term ‘*infidel*’ is another one, also allegedly used by the Turkish Cypriot media to refer to Greek Cypriots or the Republic of Cyprus. The alternative given was ‘Greek Cypriots.’ Further, the term ‘hero’ allegedly used by the media of both communities to refer to persons who allegedly committed war crimes against the other communities. It is not noted which people the Glossary is actually referring to but it does hold that such a term glorifies violence and continues the spread of hatred between the communities. The causal link between the use of the word hero and the subsequent glorification of violence is not effectuated.

Thus, several key conclusions can be made. Firstly, the term ‘allegedly’ is used in the paper since the drafters offer no qualitative or quantitative evidence to demonstrate if/how/when the words are used and the proximity of their use by the media. This manifests the lack of scientific backdrop of the drafting of the Glossary. Further, it must be noted that the Glossary was drafted by a small team, with the journalists not having gone through a public recruitment process and with the methodology used by them to determine the allegedly problematic words not being made public. Secondly, apart from a few words, as described above, which allegedly constituted discriminatory and/or stereotypical and/or hateful or derogatory terms, the rest of the words were deemed problematic because of their meaning as to the interpretation of historical events. In fact, these words, without any historical or contextual analysis, were deemed negative and offensive because of the way in which they depicted or presented the interpretation of the Cyprus problem. This, by default, demonstrates the particularly problematic nature of the Glossary in that it seeks to reinterpret events and realities. Thirdly, on a practical level, the Glossary in itself is quite

bizarre in that it seeks to provide alternatives to words which are used by the media of each community and which allegedly (without any scientific proof) cause offence to the other community. However, due to predominantly linguistic obstacles, as a general rule, the communities do not follow each others' media unless a translation is given, once in a while, for a particularly 'hot' topic. In this sense, what is the actual impact of the Glossary? To ease tensions through the media or to alter the narrative of the media for other purposes than those set out in the Glossary?

2. Perpetuation of Segregation?

Although this article cannot be a history lesson, a few words must be said about the island's communal segregation which resulted from several factors and, in particular, British rule. As with many other colonies, the 'divide and conquer' principle adopted by the colonisers led to communal animosity, segregation and polarization. In the case of Cyprus, this reality permeated into the Cypriot constitution which, in 1960, established the country's administration on the separation of two communities – the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot. The rest of the island's recognized groups, namely, the Armenians, Latins and Maronites, are described by the constitution as religious groups. As set out in the Constitution, the religious groups were later asked which 'community' they wished to belong to, with all three voting in favour of the Greek Cypriot community. On a socio-political level, the three religious groups are absent from the peace-talks and reunification efforts. In light of the above, it is unfortunate that the Glossary did not recognize the problematic and unsustainable nature of the communal separation of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots but, rather, founded the entire publication on this separation. In continuation of Kierkegaard's above-mentioned quote, how one remembers depends on their actuality of things, with stark differences evidently present in the conceptualization of historical facts by Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. In fact, the words proposed and the problems identified with given expressions (with the majority of these expressions surmounting from the use of words and phrases by the Greek Cypriot press) appeared to alter the actuality of remembrance. This is not a tangible or feasible task that can be achieved through a catalogue of alternative linguistics. Further, the glossary did not acknowledge the three religious groups which have been invisible in the process to date. On the contrary, the glossary states that:

‘the two main communities in Cyprus-Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots- have suffered equally.’ Although legally the other groups are incorporated into the Greek Cypriot community, the plight of, for example, the Maronites who were displaced from the village of Kormakitis is, thereby, not integrated in the drafter’s theoretical conceptualization of the Glossary, eliminating, once again, the religious groups from being part of or benefiting from any initiative taken for peace.

3. The Freedom of Expression: A Central Tenet to a Pluralist Society

The Cyprus Journalists Union (CJU) rejected the Glossary on the grounds that it did not agree with its overall content but, in light of free speech, called on every journalist to act on his/her own free will⁴. It did not extrapolate on why it disagreed with the content but did place a large emphasis on free speech, which was ultimately the reason for the position adopted by this body, namely to call on journalists to choose how/if they wish to adopt the Glossary. In fact, the decision to leave it to the discretion of each and every journalist to decide for him or herself backfired when two hundred and ten Greek Cypriot journalists signed a letter which held that, if the CJU did not take concrete steps to report the Glossary to international organisations and revoke it completely, the journalists themselves would report it to organisations such as the International Federation of Journalists, the European Federation of Journalists, the OSCE and the Free Press Office of the United Nations⁵. The intense disagreement with the Glossary arose from the signatories’ belief that, amongst others, it lacks scientific backdrop and was construed based on the personal beliefs of four persons appointed without established criteria who were, in fact, used as a Trojan Horse to promote a certain political will⁶. The CJU did not report the Glossary to the aforementioned organisations and, so, the journalists proceeded to do so. Up until the time of writing (June 2019), the journalists received no response from any of the three institutions.

4. Announcement of the CJU made on the 17/7/2018: <http://www.esk.org.cy/anakoinosis2018_cat.html> [Last accessed 14 June 2019].

5. ‘210 Journalists go against the CJU’ <<https://cyprustimes.com/kypros/kinonia/210-dimo-siografoi-ta-vazoy-n-me-tin-enosi-syntakton-gia-to-glossari/>> [Last accessed 14 June 2019]

6. Ibid.

In light of the above, it must be noted that freedom of expression functions on two levels *vis-à-vis* the Glossary. Firstly, in relation to whether the Glossary itself violates freedom of expression and related principles, such as media pluralism, and secondly, whether the CJU's decision to reject the Glossary as a collective but to leave it up to the individual journalist to opt how he/she will handle it is in fact protective of freedom of expression. Here, it must be reiterated that the Glossary was and remains an optional document. No journalist is obliged to follow it. Yet, it does set a linguistic framework for those who wish to use it in Cyprus as well as foreign journalists who wish to report on Cyprus and may not have the contextual knowledge of the situation to the extent of local journalists, constituting a linguist guideline for them. Despite the fact that this is not a binding document, it still sets out words that should and should not be used by journalists. For this purpose a section on the meaning and essence of freedom of expression, as extrapolated on by key thinkers and set out in international human rights law, is a necessity.

Freedom of expression is a central tenet of a free and democratic society. It is the vehicle through which people can receive and disseminate opinions and information and the framework in which the plurality of the media and the freedom of information are protected. The importance of free speech can be traced in classical scholarship to that of Aristotle⁷, Milton⁸ and Mill⁹, lies at the foundation of journalistic ethics and is located in documents and laws of the international and European legal spectrum. Aristotle was a strong promoter of free speech and, particularly argued for 'robust public discourse as a means to promote citizen awareness and vigilance.'¹⁰ Milton perceived any restriction to expression unnecessary since the truth would always reveal itself in the end, a position which was directly correlated with his own faith in God since 'the truth he speaks of is divine, and its triumph is assured by God's own omnipotence.'¹¹ In a more secular appraisal of the public space and the

7. See, for example, Aristototle's Rhetoric

8. John Milton, '*Aeropagitica*' in Rufus Wilmot Griswold (ed), '*The Prose Works of John Milton*' (1st edn. Philadelphia: John W. Moore, 1847) (original version: 1644)

9. John Stuart Mill, 'On Liberty' in Mary Warnock 'Utilitarianism and On Liberty (including Mill's Essay on Bentham and Selections from the Writings of Jeremy Bentham and John Austin' (2nd edition, Blackwell 2012)

10. Eric Heinze, 'Hate Speech and Democratic Citizenship' (1st edn. OUP 2016) 116

11. Mark Slagle, 'An Ethical Exploration of Free Expression and the Problem of Hate Speech' (2009) 24 *Journal of Mass Media Ethics* 238, 240.

position of speech, therein, Mill attached a particularly high threshold to expression, arguing that ‘there ought to exist the fullest liberty of professing and discussing, as a matter of ethical conviction, any doctrine, however immoral it may be considered.’¹²

In relation to international human rights law, Resolution 59(1) of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly’s first session, holds that ‘freedom of information is a fundamental human right and ... the touchstone of all the freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated.’¹³ On a UN level, this freedom was first protected by Article 19 of the non-binding but highly pivotal Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which provides that:

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

The UDHR was the first concerted international post-World War II initiative to set out a general framework for the provision and protection of the freedom of expression. As with other human rights and freedoms set out, therein, there is no incorporation of a limitation clause on Article 19. Instead, it is limited by the generalized limitation clause set out in Article 29 which provides that:

In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.

Following the UDHR, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) substantiated the freedom of expression, particularly in relation to legitimate restrictions that can be imposed thereon. Article 19, therein, provides for the freedom of opinion and expression, stating that:

1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.

12. John Stuart Mill, ‘On Liberty’ in Mary Warnock ‘Utilitarianism and On Liberty (including Mill’s Essay on Bentham and Selections from the Writings of Jeremy Bentham and John Austin’ (2nd edition, Blackwell 2012) 99

13. General Assembly Resolution 59(I): Calling of an International Conference on Freedom of Information (14 December 1946)

2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may, therefore, be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others (b) For the protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or morals.’

General Comment 10 of the Human Rights Committee (HRC), the monitoring body of the ICCPR stipulates that:

‘because of the development of modern mass media, effective measures are necessary to prevent such control of the media as would interfere with the right of everyone to freedom of expression.¹⁴’

Moreover, in its jurisprudence, the HRC held that freedom of expression is ‘of paramount importance for any democratic society¹⁵ and has time and again underlined that Article 19 is paramount for journalists’ expression.¹⁶

On a Council of Europe level, Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) stipulates that:

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or

14. CCPR General Comment No. 10: Article 19 (Freedom of Opinion), Adopted at the Nineteenth Session of the Human Rights Committee, on 29 June 1983.

15. *Tae Hoon Park v Republic of Korea*: CCPR, Communication no. 628/1995 (5 July 1996)

16. See, inter alia, *Mavlonov and Sa’di v Uzbekistan*: CCPR, Communication no: 1334/2004 (19 March 2009), *Bodrozic v Serbia and Montenegro*: CPCR, Communication no: 1180/2003 (31 October 2005), *Rakhim Mavlonov and Shansiy Sa’di v Uzbekistan*, CPCR: Communication 1334/2004 (28 April 2009)

penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.

The highest judicial authority for human rights in the European space, namely the ECtHR has extrapolated on free speech. In *Handyside v The United Kingdom*, the ECtHR held that the ‘freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of [a democratic society], one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the development of every man.’¹⁷ In *The Guardian v The United Kingdom*, it held that the freedom of expression is applicable not only to information or ideas that are ‘favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb.’¹⁸ The significance of granting a high threshold of protection to free speech and the status of expression as a central tenet of a democracy has been subsequently reiterated by the Court time and again. Within the ambit of Article 10, the press has the duty to ‘impart information and ideas on matters of public interest’¹⁹ and there is a corresponding ‘right of the public to receive such information.’²⁰ In the framework of journalism, Article 10 is subject to the condition that journalists ‘are acting in good faith in order to provide accurate and reliable information in accordance with the ethics of journalists.’²¹ In this realm, it is argued that reporting matters of public interest in an accurate and reliable way could be hampered by a guidebook of words which journalists have to rely on for purposes of, allegedly avoiding offence.

In the case of *Jersild v Denmark*, the Court dealt with the limits of Article 10 in the framework of journalism. Here, the journalist was interviewing a group of racist young people who called themselves the Greenjackets. The

17. *Handyside v The United Kingdom*, Application no. 5493/72 (ECHR, 7 December 1976) para. 49

18. *The Observer and The Guardian v The United Kingdom*, Application No. 13585/88 (ECHR, 26 November 1991) para. 59

19. *Sunday Times v United Kingdom*, Application no. 6538/74 (ECHR 26 April 1979) para.65

20. *Ibid.*

21. *Fressoz and Roire v. France*, 21 January 1999; *Bergens Tidende and Others v. Norway*, 2 May 2000.

journalist was fined under national law on the grounds that he had not made adequate effort to counter-argue the groups' positions. The Court found a violation of Article 10 and held that:

'the punishment of a journalist for assisting in the dissemination of statements made by another person in an interview would seriously hamper the contribution of the press to discussion of matters of public interest and should not be envisaged unless there are particularly strong reasons for doing so.'²²

A commentary on the role of journalists, more generally, could be deduced from the Court's positioning in *Jersild*, namely, that journalists have the important role of informing the public on matters of public interest and the State cannot impose a particular *modus operandi* on when and how the journalist should tackle such issues. Although not a State restriction, the case's substance *vis-à-vis* the requirement of non-regulation of journalistic approach and style is significant when appraising the content of the Glossary. Drawing on this line, a link could be made with the Glossary under consideration herein. Suggesting a particular method of action, in our case, particular words that can and cannot be used in reporting matters of public interest, the Glossary is restricting the very freedom which is part and parcel of the role of a journalist, namely, to report matters in the manner they choose to do so.

National law, in the form of Article 19 of the Cypriot Constitution protects freedom of expression and has more similarities to Article 10 ECHR than Article 19 ICCPR, particularly in relation to the limitation grounds incorporated and to the incorporation of the term 'public' before 'interference.' More particularly, it holds that:

1. Every person has the right to freedom of speech and expression in any form.
2. This right includes freedom to hold opinions and receive and impart information and ideas without interference by any public authority and regardless of frontiers.
3. The exercise of the rights provided in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary only in the interests of the

22. *Jersild v Denmark*, Application no. 15890/89 (ECHR 23 September 1994) para 35.

security of the Republic or the constitutional order or the public safety or the public order or the public health or the public morals or for the protection of the reputation or rights of others or for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.

Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to conduct an in-depth assessment of these articles, a few pointers will be made. Firstly, the ECHR and the Cypriot constitution have a longer list of limitation grounds than the ICCPR. Further, the ICCPR holds that this right should be enjoyed ‘without interference’ without stipulating the source of restrictions. On the other hand, the ECHR and the Cypriot constitution prohibit ‘public interference,’ thereby, alluding to State action. Does this mean that the ECHR and, as such, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and national courts deal only with the legitimacy of restrictions to free speech, as these emanate from public actions, whereas the ICCPR deals with restrictions emanating from State and non-State actors? Given the nature of the ICCPR as imposing the obligation on States Parties to guarantee human rights²³, it is unrealistic and, as things stand, legally flawed to argue that Article 19, therein, could be used directly against non-state actors. In fact, as noted in General Comment 31 of the HRC, ‘obligations are binding on States [Parties] and do not, as such, have direct horizontal effect as a matter of international law.’²⁴ However, State responsibility, as this emanates from the ICCPR, is not limited to the vertical State-individual/group relationship in that the State is also obligated to protect individuals/groups from Convention rights violations by private individuals and groups. More particularly:

‘States have ‘positive obligations... to ensure Covenant rights will only be fully discharged if individuals are protected by the State, not just against violations of Covenant rights by its agents, but also against acts committed by private persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment of Covenant rights

23. Article 2(2) ICCPR: Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant

24. General Comment No. 31 Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant: 05/26/2004. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13.

in so far as they are amenable to application between private persons or entities. There may be circumstances in which a failure to ensure Covenant rights as required by article 2 would give rise to violations by States Parties of those rights, as a result of States Parties' permitting or failing to take appropriate measures or to exercise due diligence to prevent, punish, investigate or redress the harm caused by such acts by private persons or entities.'

A parallel of the Committee's theorization of Article 19 can be made with international refugee law, whereby persecution can be found to exist if this results directly from State practice or from the inability or unwillingness of a State to protect a person from persecution conducted by individuals and groups ranging from non-state actors to family members. Given the rapidly changing spectrum of contemporary information society and the enhanced role of, *inter alia*, private IT companies, such as social media platforms and internet service providers, in deciphering the dissemination of information, the vertical model of State-individual/group relationship is not the only one relevant. On one level, normative and theoretical concerns of free speech violations arise in that, in practice, the Glossary seeks to alter the rhetoric of journalists through replacement of words. On another level, the issues of whether there has been an actual violation of free speech in line with the nature and status of the aforementioned legal provisions arises. To extrapolate on this further, the role of non-state actors in the framework of free speech protection needs to be considered.

4. Non-State Actors, Free Speech and Media Pluralism

As noted above, an important element of Article 10 ECHR and Article 19 of the Cyprus Constitution is that they both stipulate that *public* interference is prohibited. The Glossary was an initiative that took place within the framework of the 'Cyprus Dialogue' project of the OSCE, an intergovernmental organisation to which Cyprus is one of the fifty-seven participating States. It was drafted by journalists and expertise was offered by the President of the Ethical Journalism Network, an independent body. As such, the Glossary was not an initiative of the Government of Cyprus. On the contrary, Cyprus President Nicos Anastasiades placed himself against the Glossary, holding that this initiative was 'untimely'²⁵ and that the 'the Cyprus problem will be resolved

25. 'Greek Cypriot Journalists Reject Bicomunal Glossary' <<http://www.ekathimerini.com/230778/article/ekathimerini/news/greek-cypriot-journalists-reject-bicomunal-glossary>> [Last accessed 14 June 2019].

with actions, not words.²⁶ This non-state nature of the Glossary is a significant element to the current discussion since the legal implication of a government directly formulating the narrative and rhetoric to be adopted by journalists would have clear cut free speech implications. On one, basic level, it could be argued that this is a Glossary developed within an independent, non-governmental ambit and is of optional use to journalists and, as such, no legal issues arise *vis-à-vis* free speech or media pluralism. On another, more substantial level, recognition of the realities of the current era where information and communication transcends the scope of the State, the duties of non-state actors should also be taken into account. Important to this argumentation is the 2018 Committee of Ministers' Recommendation on Media Pluralism and Transparency of Media Ownership. This document stipulates that media freedom and pluralism are 'crucial corollaries of the right to freedom of expression'²⁷ and are:

'central to the functioning of a democratic society as they help to ensure the availability and accessibility of diverse information and views, on the basis of which individuals can form and express their opinions and exchange information and ideas.'

Whilst the centrality of media pluralism in the functioning of a democracy has been reiterated on a Council of Europe level in, *inter alia*, case-law of the ECtHR and Committee of Ministers' recommendations, the 2018 recommendation makes an important observation. More particularly, it holds that:

'The media play an essential role in a democratic society, by widely disseminating information, ideas, analysis and opinions, acting as public watchdogs and providing forums for public debate. Traditional media continue to play these roles in the evolving multimedia ecosystem, but other media and non-media actors, from multinational corporations to non-governmental organisations and individuals, increasingly carry out such roles as well. All such actors should be accountable to the public in a manner appropriate to the roles they play in relation to the free circulation of information and ideas.'²⁸

26. Ibid.

27. CM/Rec(2018)1[1] (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 7 March 2018 at the 1309th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies)

28. Ibid.

Although the non-media actors in the case of the Glossary, namely, the OSCE and the Ethical Journalism Network are not actually disseminating information on the Cyprus problem in the forms of news and commentary, they essentially pre-developed the content and definitional framework to be used by journalists who do write on the Cyprus problem. To this extent, they directly affect the free circulation of ideas and information on the island and beyond. Therefore, given the non-binding and non-state nature of the document itself, the technical and substantial thresholds of hard law have not been transcended. However, as per 2018 recommendation, the drafting of this Glossary should have also played by the free speech/free press rules.

5. Journalists and the Pursuit of Truth?

In the forward of the OSCE representative, it was underlined that this Glossary seeks to replace some ‘negative’ words and phrases so as to ‘encourage sensitive communication,’ promote the ‘sharing of stories and experiences’ and ultimately ‘help ease tensions.’ This, therefore, draws a picture of journalists as having the role of contributing to the peace building process of Cyprus through a change in their narrative. With the aim of analyzing this, it is necessary to conduct an assessment of what the role of journalists actually is when reporting matters which may be of a sensitive nature to some. In the sphere of ethical journalism, ‘the respect for truth and the right of the public to truth²⁹’ as noted by the International Federation of Journalists, is ‘the first duty of the journalist,³⁰’ who must be functioning within a framework of free speech in order to be able to investigate and report such truth. The Glossary, however, covets the internationally recognised truth of an invasion and illegal occupation for purposes of promoting words that do not offend. Moreover, ‘objectivity has been called the defining norm of modern journalism.³¹’ This position has been criticized by those some such as Merrill who hold that news is actually a ‘construction of reality rather than a description of reality.³²’

29. IFJ Declaration of Principles on the Conduct of Journalists: <<https://www.ifj.org/who/rules-and-policy/principles-on-conduct-of-journalism.html>> [Last accessed 14 June 2019]

30. Ibid.

31. Thomas E. Patterson, ‘The political roles of the journalist’ in Doris Graber, Denis McQuail and Pippa Norris (eds.) ‘The Politics of News; The News of Politics’ (1st edn . CQ Press 1998) 28

32. Morten Skovsgaard, Erik Albæk, Peter Bro, Claes de Vreese, ‘A reality check: How journalists’ role perceptions impact their implementation of the objectivity norm’ (2013) 14 *Journalism* 3, 24

Others, such as Glasser and Storker, argue that objectivity in fact, leads to ‘detached and disinterested journalists who take no moral stand to improve the society they are supposed to serve.’³³ Although the intention behind the Glossary might have been to ensure that journalists are not disinterested and not detached and that they, instead, contribute to the difficult process of peace building on the island, the method chosen was a step too far given that the words incorporated therein and the words deemed to be problematic related to internationally recognized events. Interesting to note are the guiding principles of the international expert body associated with the Glossary, namely, the Ethical Journalism Network, which includes truth and accuracy which is ‘the cardinal principle of journalism.’³⁴ By defining terms such as ‘invasion’ and ‘occupation’ to be of offence and, thereby ignoring realities recognized under international law and within the framework of international relations, the Glossary is actually prompting journalists to pervert the course of truth and accuracy when discussing the Cyprus problem. Although the mission and vision of the drafters, that being to contribute positively to the peace building process in Cyprus should be applauded, the manner in which they attempt to achieve this is problematic since it is not in line with basic precepts of journalism, namely the pursuit of truth and accuracy, meddling in the ambit of free speech.

6. The Right to Remember in a Reconciliatory Setting

Beyond the framework of free speech and pertinent to the Cypriot contextual reality is the right to remember within the ambit of a reconciliatory setting. In 2005, the UN published the Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through action to Combat Impunity. Principle 3, therein, reads as follows:

‘A people’s knowledge of the history of its oppression is part of its heritage and, as such, must be ensured by appropriate measures in fulfillment of the State’s duty to preserve archives and other evidence concerning violations of human rights and humanitarian law and to facilitate knowledge of those violations. Such measures shall be aimed at preserving the collective memory from extinction and, in particular, at guarding against the development of revisionist and negationist arguments.’

33. Ibid. 25

34. Ethical Journalism Network, ‘The Five Principles of Ethical Journalism’ <<https://ethicaljournalismnetwork.org/who-we-are/5-principles-of-journalism>> [Last accessed 16 June 2019]

One of the journalists who drafted the Glossary tweeted the following:

‘This Glossary is not an attempt to deny or erase the past, but a conscious effort to promote a culture of understanding between communities’

However, despite this comment, the author of this paper begs to differ and instead argue that neutralizing atrocities through the recommendation of words which are perceived by the Glossary’s drafters to be less offensive to the ‘other community’ such as ‘Turkey/Turkish army/Turkish government’ rather than ‘Turkish Invader’ or the ‘Southern part of the Island’ rather than the ‘Free Areas’ appears to disregard the right of either side of the conflict to know and acknowledge its history of oppression. On one level, there is no need to develop negationist or revisionist arguments for purposes of narrative alteration and, subsequently, reconciliation. On another level, it could be counter-argued that forgetting is a necessary part of reconciliation which has been described as having ‘a policing function,³⁵’ a process which is ‘intensely politicized.³⁶’ Namely, for reconciliation to take place certain memories are put to the side for purposes of the wider good of reconciliation and societal reconstruction. Such an approach is famously considered important by Max Weber who, in discussing post-World War I Germany, argued that:

‘Instead of searching like old women for the ‘guilty one’ after the war –in a situation in which the structure of society produced the war– everyone with a manly and controlled attitude would tell the enemy, ‘We lost the war. You have won it. That is now all over. Now let us discuss what conclusions must be drawn according to the *objective* interests that came into play and what is the main thing in view of the responsibility towards the *future* which above all burdens the victor.’ Anything else is undignified and will become a boomerang. A nation forgives if its interests have been damaged, but no nation forgives if its honor has been offended, especially by a bigoted self-righteousness. Every new document that comes to light after decades revives the undignified lamentations, the hatred and scorn, instead of allowing the war at its end to be buried, at least morally.³⁷’

35. Cillian McGrattan & Stephen Hopkins, ‘Memory in Post-Conflict Societies: From Contention to Integration?’ 16 *Ethnopolitics* 5, 492

36. *Ibid.*

37. Max Weber, ‘Politics as a Vocation’ (1919): <<http://anthropos-lab.net/wp/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Weber-Politics-as-a-Vocation.pdf>> [Last accessed 15 June 2019] 22.

However, despite the nobility that are the foundations of Weber's viewpoint, in this manner, such reconciliatory linguistics may 'mask continuing antagonism.'³⁸ In fact, Derrida takes it a step further, arguing that the construction of particular memories 'arouses a suspicion... [and] awakens us.'³⁹ This is particularly so in a country like Cyprus which continues to be divided and conflict, although non-violent, is (stagnantly) ongoing.

Conclusion

In sum, regardless of any reconciliatory intentions on the part of drafters and supporters, this document is problematic for the reasons stated above, namely, the drastic reconceptualization of historical events and their interpretation through mere word changing, the continuation of the peace path on the dogma of segregation and the disregard of the country's religious groups from this initiative. Furthermore, it is also of concern due to its free speech implications. Although this is an optional document, supported by an international organization and dismissed by the Union of Cypriot Journalists on free speech grounds, the image of a journalist writing a piece with a 56 page handbook at his or her side to double check what and how something is being phrased makes me shudder slightly. Let us not forget the role Mnemosyne, the Titan goddess of memory and remembrance and the inventress of language and words, played for the Ancient Greeks. For them, memory was a significant gift from the Gods which allowed them not only to remember but also to reason and foresee the future. Initiative should, thereby, focus on reconciling and making sense of each other's remembrance for people's collective future, rather than proposing Jean Calvin's Christian oblivion.

38. Cillian McGrattan & Stephen Hopkins, 'Memory in Post-Conflict Societies: From Contention to Integration?' 16 *Ethnopolitics* 5, 492

39. Jacques Derrida, 'Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International' (Translated by Peggy Kamuf) (1st edn. Routledge 1994) 97.

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