Doctoral Dissertation

COMMUNICATING THE ANNAN PLAN: NATIONAL IDENTITIES, NATIONALISM AND INTERETHNIC NEGOTIATIONS IN DIVIDED CYPRUS

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APPROVAL FORM

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is interested in the relationship between media and national identities in divided Cyprus. It explores how the mainstream media constructed national identifications during a period of intense negotiations for peace settlement, known as “the Annan period”, and the ways in which individual Greek-Cypriots perceive that they used ideas of the nation and national identifications during the said period. In doing so the thesis critically examines the development of media constructed national identities vis-à-vis hegemonic tropes used to explain identity in Cyprus and in particular the Cyprocentrist-Hellenocentrist antagonism. The thesis approaches national identities as processes of “imagining” which are not static perceptions of who one is but may change or be modified in time.

Over the last 40 years in Cyprus, the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot communities have been locked in ongoing yet unsuccessful negotiations for a peace settlement. During most of the post-1974 period, the conflict has been a “calm” one. Focusing in particular on the Greek-Cypriot community, the thesis approaches negotiations as both routine and crisis news events. It foregrounds empirically how, in times of progress in the negotiations, the disputed settlement assumes a media epicentre of national identity discourses which draw and amplify more routinely prevalent national identity discourses.

Based on a qualitative analysis and drawing on literature in nationalism and media studies, the thesis has uncovered the complex ways the “national” we was used during the period studied. It shows how media-projected norms of national conformity either closed or shifted the boundaries of we: on the one hand the us/other binary homogenized opponents but also ourselves and on the other hand the boundaries of we opened up to include the other. The study confirms that neither Cyprocentrism nor Hellenocentrism, are static boundary formations of us and the other. By contrast, media discursive shifts between Hellenocentrism and Cyprocentrism, revealed that the confrontation between nation and state, as two antagonistic nationalistic codes, was not prominent in the said period. The study provides evidence however of exclusionary Cyprocentric constructions of identity premised primarily on uses of the state as a symbolic wall cementing the boundaries of we. In this regard, we explore constructions in the media of the Turkish-Cypriot community as an “absent/present” other as its interests and needs were tailored to project Greek-Cypriots’ own wishes. Yet, the thesis highlights the dislocation of the master dichotomy of us vs. other in media
representations during the events which followed the relaxation of bizonal movement restrictions in April 2003.

Building on Greek-Cypriots’ own accounts, the thesis concludes that, overall, national imaginings across and within communities become a “political prison” of the ethnic “other”, who becomes an absent/present “other”. But the community doing the “imagining” also tends to remain trapped within such conceptualisations: Participants of the study, about ten years after the referenda, understood the antagonism between Hellenocentrists and Cyprocentrists as being part of political elites’ own struggles for power still many explained how they could not go beyond nationally instigated perceptions about the other or the conflict. Yet this “imprisonment” is neither static nor should it be taken for granted, as there are instances during which otherwise powerful national identifications may break down and unravel in different directions. Additionally, the study shows a novel meta-analysis of nationalism and national identities from the perspective of individuals and in this context we provide evidence of an identity “fatigue” which problematizes further ideas on the naturalization of national identity.

Overall, the thesis in answering the central research questions guiding the study, puts forward a claim and an assumption for further investigation. The claim manifested is that Cyprocentrism and Hellenocentrism were not necessarily antithetical during the Annan Period. The assumption is that it is possible in the future, for exclusionary and inclusionary tendencies within Cypriotism to become antagonistic. The exclusionary form tends to focus on civic identity to exclude other communities, not necessarily the Turkish-Cypriots who are in a way often included in this imagining as their presence fortifies the sovereignty of the state. On the other hand, inclusionary Cypriotism, despite emphasizing Cypriotness, remains tolerant towards others. Nevertheless, emphasis on the state should be addressed in other contexts as not merely related to a “civic” identity but also a cultural one.

**Keywords:** Cyprus conflict, media analysis, nationalism, national identities, qualitative interviews
CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................................. viii
CONTENTS ............................................................................................................................................. x
LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................................................... xiii
ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................................................. xiv
NOTES TO THE READER ...................................................................................................................... xv
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. xvi
  Research Rationale .............................................................................................................................. xviii
  Research Approach ............................................................................................................................. xxii
  Thesis Structure and Chapter Outline ................................................................................................. xxix
1 Historical and Theoretical Considerations ......................................................................................... 1
  1.1 Media, Nationalism and National identities .................................................................................... 2
  1.2 Cypriot Media, National Identity, and Nationalism .......................................................................... 8
  1.3 The Annan Period and its Aftermath .............................................................................................. 27
  1.4 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 32
2 Methodology ....................................................................................................................................... 34
  2.1 Research Questions and Methods .................................................................................................. 35
  2.2 Media Study: Thematic Qualitative Analysis ................................................................................. 35
  2.3 Qualitative Interviews .................................................................................................................... 47
  2.4 Reflexivity ...................................................................................................................................... 53
3 Representations of the Process: Between a “Dead End” and “Hope”, and Cyprus’s International Position ........................................................................................................................................ 57
  3.1 Tight Deadlines, Ultimatums and Constructed Consensus ............................................................. 58
  3.2 External Actors, Mediators and the Question of Cyprus’s International Position......................... 69
  3.3 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 87
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 ................................................................................................................................. 99
Table 2 ................................................................................................................................. 100
Table 3 ................................................................................................................................. 110
ABBREVIATIONS

AKEL: Progressive Party of Working People [Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζόμενου Λαού]
AKP: Justice and Development Party [Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi]
BRTK: Bayrak Radio Television Corporation
CTP: Republican Turkish Party [Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi]
DISY: Democratic Rally [Δημοκρατικός Συναγερμός]
DIKO: Democratic Party [Δημοκρατικό Κόμμα]
EDEK: United Democratic Union of the Centre [Ενιαία Δημοκρατική Ένωση Κέντρου]
ELAM: Nationalist Popular Front [Εθνικό Λαϊκό Μέτωπο]
EOKA: National Organization of Cypriot Fighters [Εθνική Οργάνωση Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών]
NAM: Non-alignment Movement
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO: Non-governmental Organization
PASOK: Panhellenic Socialist Movement [Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα]
PIO: Press and Information Office
PRIO: Peace Research Institute Oslo
KISOS: Movement for Social Democracy [Κίνημα Σοσιολογικού Κόμματος]
RoC: Republic of Cyprus
SBA: Sovereign British Areas
TMT: Turkish Resistance Organization [Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı]
TRNC: Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
UNDP: United Nations Development Program
UNFICYP: United Nations Forces in Cyprus
USAID: United States Agency for International Development
NOTES TO THE READER

Throughout this thesis, a number of historical and ethnological data pertaining to Cyprus are used and all relevant extracts, originally in Greek (media data) or in the Cypriot idiom of Greek (interview quotes) are my translations. When necessary the Greek original is left in brackets []. For example, “τριχοτόμηση” was translated as “trisection” and in the text it is written “trisection [τριχοτόμηση]”. To ensure that readers with non-specific knowledge of Cyprus will be able to fully comprehend the study, a list of abbreviations is provided. However, it is useful to clarify some other points. First, when referencing the two larger Cypriot communities, I have used Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot after considering other alternatives. The dash between Greek and Cypriot and Turkish and Cypriot is evidence of the intersections of the two, which is further discussed in the introduction and several other chapters.

The thesis follows the style recommended by the APA 6th edition. Yet it is useful to note that italics are used for words cited as a linguistic examples and quotation marks surround words when they are used in a normal context. The quotation marks are meant to keep the writing “objective”.

In the thesis I refer to the fifth version of the Annan Plan. However, when relevant, the specific version is noted (e.g. Annan Plan I).

The author’s voice is usually represented via the inclusive pronoun “we”, but in sections which have a personal focus “I” is used, such as in this Note, the methodology chapter and the empirical chapters of the interview analysis (particularly) when it was imperative to show the interaction between the participant and the researcher.

Finally, some of the findings of Chapter 4 have been published and some have been presented at international conferences as have the findings of Chapter 8.
INTRODUCTION

In April 2004 Cypriots were confronted with a dilemma: to accept or reject a United Nations (UN) proposal, called the Annan Plan, which aimed to end the long-lasting ethno-territorial division of their eastern Mediterranean island with a bizonal, bicomunal federation. Two simultaneous referenda were organized, one for the Turkish-Cypriot community and one for the Greek-Cypriot side. The results of the referenda were controversial. Over 75% of the Greek-Cypriot community voted to reject the Plan while about 65% of the Turkish-Cypriot community voted in favour of it. The Greek-Cypriot No vote represented a de facto veto, as there was a condition that both communities would need a majority Yes vote for the Plan to be implemented. About a week later, on 1 May 2004, the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) joined the European Union (EU) as a new member state, but the EU acquis communautaire was suspended in the Turkish occupied territory in the north of Cyprus. At the time of writing this thesis, Cyprus remains ethnically divided as subsequent attempts to reach a settlement failed, although new negotiation efforts commenced in May 2015. In the interim, the two sides opened more crossing points across the divide, and have cooperated on a number of issues mostly under the auspices of the UN.\(^1\)

In the aftermath of the referenda, a number of academic works, policy analyses and news stories were written in an attempt to understand and interpret the results. One popular assumption draws a connection between the Greek-Cypriot No vote and the influence of nationalism (Loizides, __________________________

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1 One noticeable example is that of the identification of more than half of the 2000 missing persons from both communities who disappeared during the intercommunal conflicts of 1963, 1967, and the 1974 war -- an issue which remained a stalemate for decades. Despite the establishment of a UN Committee for Missing Persons (CMP) in 1981 aiming to recover and identify the bodies, the process only started after 2003, and, as Yakinthou (2008, p. 17) noted, CMP’s work was stalled for 20 years because “neither side has welcomed the political consequences attached to exhumation of these remains.” Notably, between 2006 and 2015, 969 bodies were exhumed and 595 were identified (http://www.cmp-cyprus.org/).
2007). Another assumption delineates the influential role that the media played in directing the Greek-Cypriot No vote (Taki, 2009; Stavrinides, 2009). However, there has been little systematic research published on the referenda-identity-nationalism nexus as well as the media-Plan nexus, and various academic works have raised more questions than it is currently possible to answer. In responding to some of these questions, this thesis, informed by the two fields of media and nationalism studies, makes a modest contribution. Specifically, this research is addressing a gap in the literature related to mainstream media constructions of Greek-Cypriot national identities during the Annan period.\(^2\) The thesis contributes to the study of Cypriot identities and Greek-Cypriot media by focusing on their intersections. A second aim of the thesis is to shed light on how and to what extent Greek-Cypriot individuals currently may or may not use ideas about the nation or national identities to understand the Cyprus conflict and a solution, and on their perceptions of how they used ideas of the nation or national identities to make sense of the Plan during the April 2004 referenda. About ten years after the referenda, the study searched to see how Greek-Cypriots reflect on the said period bringing an exploratory insight in a research field dominated mostly by quantitative approaches (see for example Lordos, 2006, 2009; Score Index 2013-1015). Neither of the objectives of this study had been previously addressed in depth, specifically within a qualitative research paradigm. Perhaps more importantly, they had not been addressed together in a single study.

Nationalism and national identities in Cyprus have attracted significant academic attention, and they are considered to represent a major driving force in the island’s ethno-territorial division (Peristianis, 2006; Pachoulides, 2007; Papadakis, 2008a, 2008b; Mavratsas, 1997; Kizilyurek, 2009). Yet, although a growing body of research has also focused on the Cypriot media (Gumpert &

\(^2\) For the purpose of the thesis, the Annan period is defined as a time frame extending from the presentation of the first version of the Plan (Annan I) in November 2002 to the April 2004 simultaneous referenda which concerned its fifth version (Annan V). The Plan was named Annan Plan by the then UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan.
Drucker, 1997; Panayiotou, 2006; Bailie & Azgin, 2011; Higgins, 2011; Christophorou, Şahin & Pavlou, 2010; Ersoy, 2010; Şahin, 2008, 2011; Way, 2011; Aliefendioglu & Arslan, 2011; Stubbs & Taşeli, 2014; Carpentier & Doudaki, 2014), not adequate attention has been given to the potential role played by the media in the growth of nationalism and the construction of national identities and in general in the contemporary reproduction of the Cyprus conflict.

**Research Rationale**

This thesis focuses on the Annan Period and the 2004 referenda because as argued they were a turning point in divided Cyprus (Navaro-Yashin, 2012, p. 221; Bryant, 2004, p. 1). We approach the said period also as a period of transition given that it signalled a movement from one stage to another while a return to the previous stage appears rather impossible. Specifically, the Annan Plan represents the first and only time that a complete settlement was prepared and proposed to Cypriots since the de facto ethno-territorial division of the island in 1974. Furthermore, it was the first and only time that the general Cypriot public participated in the peace negotiation process and the first time that any national population was asked to approve or reject UN proposals (Kyriakides, 2009). Additionally, during the said period the first checkpoint was opened across the divide, ending the long-enduring status of complete division between the two communities.

As a number of commentators have noted, despite its principle aim to reunite Cyprus, the Plan divided Cypriots across ethnic lines as well as within their own communities (Christophorou et al. 2010; Loizides & Keskiner, 2004). In the Greek-Cypriot community, which forms the focus of the study, only two options were available: vote No and “join the camp of the ‘patriots’ or vote Yes and join the ‘surrendering’ ones, the ‘traitors’” (Christophorou et al. 2010, p. 5). The resounding rejection of the Plan by the Greek-Cypriot community disappointed Turkish-Cypriots who felt that Greek-Cypriots had rejected them (Stavrinides, 2006; Sahin, 2008; Navaro-Yashin, 2012), and arguably this led to a renegotiation of Turkish-Cypriot identity, giving rise to the expression of a
form of Turkish-Cypriotness instead of a common Cypriotness shared with Greek-Cypriots (Sahin, 2010).

The predominant cleavage marking life in Cyprus since colonialism is the conflict between its larger ethnic communities, the Greek-Cypriots (77%) and the Turkish-Cypriots (18%). Despite structural tensions within and across communities (Loizos, 1974; Panayiotou, 2011; Lacher & Kaymak, 2005), the ethnic division became dominant as two antagonistic ethnonationalisms developed (Papadakis, 2008a), with Greek nationalism vying for union, or enosis, with Greece, while Turkish nationalism aimed at partition (Taksim). Cypriotism as an alternative form of identity that countered the politics of ethnonationalism also developed within both communities. Cypriotism or Cyprocentrism represents a form of contra-nation, territorial, or civic identity which emphasizes the significance of the state, or Cyprus, as a place (Peristianis, 2006; Pachoulides, 2007; Papadakis, 2008a; Mavratsas, 1997). In parallel, the conflation of ethnic, civic and political identities has been a hegemonic trope for understanding identity in postcolonial Cyprus, since the Left tends to associate with Cypriotness as an alternative discourse to ethnonationalism, whereas the Right tends to identify with Greekness (Peristianis, 2006; Loizos, 1998; Papadakis, 2006).

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3 Papadakis, building on Smith (1991), argues that the form of the two competing nationalisms in Cyprus was ethnic nationalism which “underlines common history, ancestry, language, culture and religions with the people of the ‘mother-lands’” (Papadakis, 2008b, p. 5). However, it should be acknowledged that nationalism in Cyprus took different forms and content, depending on the influence and dynamics of local and global power struggles. First, one must recognise the effect of the wider Greco-Turkish conflict (Katsiaounis, 1996; Kitromilides, 1979; Kizilyurek, 2009) in the rise of nationalism and identity formation in Cyprus. Second, the role played by the rivalry among the most powerful states also needs to be taken into account (Anagnostopoulou, 2004; Agathangelou, 1997). In relation to the nationalist goal of enosis, Loizos argued that it “meant very different things, at different times, to different categories of people” (p. 133).

4 Political categories such as Left and Right are used in the way they have been instrumentalised in the context of Cyprus politics. See for example Peristianis (2008, pp. 217-233, 237) on how identity perceptions correlate with political ideology and political parties.
In the aftermath of Cyprus’s independence from British colonial rule in 1960, processes of territorial de facto divisions intensified, ultimately leading to the creation of ethnically homogenous territories. The year 1963 has been characterised as the first division (Pachoulides, 2007). Clashes between pro-independence and pro-enosis Greek-Cypriot nationalists preceded (Peristianis, 2008) the 1974 Turkish invasion. The Greek junta-instigated coup represented, perhaps, the apogee of the intra-Right clash within the Greek-Cypriot community. The invasion resulted in the de facto division of Cyprus as the vast majority of the Turkish-Cypriot community moved to the north of the island and Greek-Cypriots occupied the south which remained under the umbrella of RoC. The north declared itself a sovereign state in 1983, and only Turkey has since recognised it. A UN-controlled buffer zone, the Green Line, separates the two parts and remained closed to almost any inter-community traffic from 1974 until April 2003.

There is evidence that during the Annan period the opponents and the supporters of the Plan in both communities promoted their respective positions on the Plan using various symbols which directly or indirectly associated a position on the Plan with perceptions of national identity. One example is the waving of the flag of Cyprus by fierce opponents of the Annan Plan to celebrate President Papadopoulos’s televised speech, which called for a resounding No to the Plan, “appropriating those as a symbol of Greek Cypriot identity and resistance to the foreign plots” (Loizides, 2007, p. 184). On the other hand the supporters of the Plan appeared willing to adopt the new flag proposed by the Plan with blue, yellow and red stripes. In the literature, it is argued that although both President Papadopoulos and his political opponents who supported the Plan appealed to Cypriotness, the latter differed by appealing to the unity of the divided space and internal pluralism (Panayiotou, 2011). It is also argued that President Papadopoulos and his political allies won the identity battle and “established a form of Greek-Cypriot nationalism driven by isolationism and lack of trust for the international community” (Loizides, 2007, p. 184). Although many
assumptions of the Plan-identity nexus have been expressed and may correctly reflect the climate of the period, there is little empirical support on which to make a conclusion.

Mainstream media circulated information about the Plan, which arguably represented an epicentre of nationalist repertoires (Christophorou et al., 2010; Sahin, 2011) in a pre-social media (Facebook or Twitter) era. It has been noted that in the Greek-Cypriot community the Plan “was the cover story of the six dailies 59 times out of 66, during only 11 days” (Christophorou et al. 2010, p. 13). Also the Yes and No debates took place in the media (Taki, 2009).

The media in Cyprus has projected the “other” on a routine basis mainly through their coverage of the interethnic negotiations for a peace settlement. Their power to define the “other” perhaps had more influence during conditions of complete division between 1974 and 2003, which was a period characterised by almost complete lack of interpersonal and intercommunal contact. The relative definitional reach of the media in times of complete division as well as in the pre-2003 period prompts questions of how media deal with conflict and about the interplay between media and the construction of national identities. For example, we have yet to address in a comprehensive manner the role of the media in both communities in the construction of national consensus and in the reproduction of predominant ideologies, including but not limited to nationalism. Nevertheless, multiple assumptions on the media-nationalism nexus, as Schlesinger once argued (cited in Law, 2001, p. 299), need to be demonstrated and take into consideration that people do not uncritically consume or reproduce official nationalist ideology (Demertzis, 1996, p. 79). This research first explores mainstream media’s presentation of national identities and forms of nationalism these may represent. Second, our focus on Greek-Cypriots’ own accounts of the Plan allows to examine intersections (if any) between individuals’ ideas of nation and national identification and their historical memories for the Plan during the referenda period. Ten years elapsed between the rejection of the Plan in April 2004 and the in-depth interviews we conducted in 2013. This ensured reflective accounts in view of important developments which took place in the in-between period.
locally and globally which include the presidential election for the first time of the head of Left AKEL who negotiated with also Left affiliated Turkish-Cypriot leader, the discovery of hydrocarbons just off the southern coast of Cyprus but also the deep economic recession into which the Greek-Cypriot economy entered particularly after March 2013 as a result of the 2007/08 global financial crisis.

**Research Approach**

This thesis set out to examine how the mainstream Greek-Cypriot press constructed Greek-Cypriot identities during the Annan Period with an in-depth analysis of where the boundaries of the national we were drawn as well as how Greek-Cypriots themselves used (if at all) ideas of the nation, or “what it means to be a people” (Calhoun, 1997, p. 99), to make sense of the Plan. Given these objectives, the research consisted of two empirical studies: a qualitative media analysis and qualitative or in-depth interviews. Specifically, the data were drawn from Greek-Cypriot daily news sources from 2002 to 2004 and in-depth, qualitative interviews with Greek-Cypriots conducted in 2013.

One could argue that existing research on the Plan mirrors the polarization of the period, as studies can be broadly divided into works which considered the Plan a unique opportunity for reunification (Georgiades, 2007; Pericleous 2007; Yakinthou, 2009; Loizides, 2009), particularly given that the alternative option was the continuation of division (Trimikliniotis, 2009b) and works that considered it catastrophic because it was unworkable, unbalanced, and undemocratic (Palley, 2005; Coufoudakis, 2004; Kyriakides, 2009; Emilianides, 2009). From the side of the Plan’s supporters, Yakinthou underlined that the Plan was based on consociational politics and it “was carefully and methodically constructed to create a state which addressed both groups’ primary concerns and fears, as well as their most important demands” (2009, p. 23). On the other hand Kyriakides warned that “it [the Plan] would have renewed the much maligned arrangements dating from the end of British colonial rule” (2009, p. 67), and Emilianides argued that it would turn
Cyprus into a “servant state” and a Turkish protectorate (2009, p. 93). Notably, Yakinthou (2009) said the Plan was based on consequential UN proposals, whereas Palley (2005) claimed it was the result of blackmail by external actors, including the UN, which led the process. Nevertheless, relevant studies have contributed to unravelling the complexity of the period at various levels. This study does not aim to enter into the details regarding the content of the Plan nor the negotiation process, although it does refer to both. Overall this thesis approaches the Plan as primarily a UN-inspired proposal whose purpose was in principle to reunite Cyprus under a federation.

The study approached media as mutually constituted with society (Mosco, 2009) and as institutions playing an important role in the reproduction of predominant ideologies, such as nationalism, and (re)constructing national identities on a routine basis. Nevertheless the media are spaces in which one can find principle meanings and constructions (Doudaki, 2015), and therefore they are where one can look for official constructions of national identities. The study, in a critical engagement with the banal nationalism thesis (Billig, 1995, 2009), concurs with the argument that national homogeneity does not exist either within or beyond established nations (Skey, 2009; Billig, 2009), and that it is problematic to take for granted the link between national identities and “banal flaggings of nationalism in the media” (Slavtcheva-Petkova 2014, p. 43). Thus, we take the position that the media may be drawing attention to an “identity of identities,” while multiple, often fragmented and antagonistic, identities characterize societies. In this regard, the qualitative interviews assist to take a view “from below” (Hobsbawm, 1990; Madianou, 2005), drawing out potential links between the elitism of national identities and how individuals make sense of national identities and nationalism.

Qualitative interviews are approached from a central concern which runs throughout this dissertation, which is to answer how and in what ways do individuals reproduce dominant beliefs related to the “nation”. Also central to the interviews is how individuals may challenge national ideologies in ways which may problematise the notion of hegemonic construction. This approach,
while recognizing the power of mass media to reproduce predominant ideologies (Caragee, 1973; Hall, 1982; Mylonas, 2014; Doudaki, 2015) as well as that of other institutions, concurs with findings of media and audience studies which suggest that the media-power nexus should not be taken for granted (Madianou, 2005). In this regard the thesis aims to add to our understanding of “agency” (Shome & Hedge, 2002; Spivak, 1988) in relation to the phenomenon of nationalism and national identities. Interviews provide an in-depth exploration into the ways that individuals perceive that the “solution” intersects with ideas about the “nation”, the “other” but also on their perceptions of how it intersects with conflicts for power within the Greek-Cypriot community. In this regard, in-depth interviews go beyond the aims of an “audience” study and provide an in-depth examination of individuals’ situated perceptions and reflections. As argued, in-depth interviews ensure access to “reflections” which allow assessing the way(s) these reflections may create meaning and understanding in the present: “In that sense ‘all the ‘past’ and all the ‘future’ relevant to the study are observable” (Gomm 2008, p.271). Using primarily the lens of anthropological and socio-cultural approaches the study emphasizes the “active interplay” (Lasky, 2005) between identifications, agency and the Cyprus “solution” filling a gap in the existing literature and providing avenues for future research.

Overall, this thesis considers Cyprus’s negotiations as “routinely not routine” news events (Madianou, 2005, p. 168; Avraamidou & Kyriakides, 2015) to signal an understanding that, although the media regularly cover negotiations (Christophorou et al., 2010), the reports always have an element of crisis about them: The negotiations may lead to a settlement or perhaps rekindle the conflict. Either outcome could lead to a radical alteration of the status quo that would greatly affect life on the island. The Plan and the referenda, though part of the negotiations’ routine, were also non-routine events which sometimes constituted “crisis” events during which identity construction becomes more explicit at both the individual level and in the media (Petersoo, 2007, p. 423).
The thesis approaches nationalism as an ideology (Billig, 1995) which entails prioritizing a set of “imaginings” of belonging to a national community (Anderson, 2006), and as a form “through which a variety of responses, aspirations and interests are expressed” (Furedi, 1994, p. 21). In examining the media the emphasis of the study is on the discourse of nationalism (Demertzis, 1996; Özkırımlı, 2005). Additionally, emphasis on the nation as an imagined community allows the study to account for how people used it to make sense of the social world although this study approached it as an ideological construction. This perspective also allows us to transcend the disputed ethnic or civic divide (see, for example, Özkırımlı, 2005, Billig, 1995) and focuses more on how nationalism and national identities use mechanisms of exclusion and inclusion (Özkırımlı, 2005).

We concur with Miles (as cited in Cashmore, 1996, p. 254) who claimed that national boundaries are not natural or inevitable but result from historical processes. We adopt a similar approach concerning national identities as socially constructed which are neither fixed nor static. As Billig (quoted in Davidson, 2000, p.17) argued:

In one sense, identity refers to what is characteristic of and perhaps specific to a particular group or community: in this sense, national identity designates the particularities of tradition, politics, history, geography and culture insofar as these enter into a prevailing conception of a nation.

In this thesis, to emphasize identity as a process the term “national identification” is used in some instances. National identification instead of “identity” defines the non-static nature of identities better and underlines that they are processes (Hall, 1996; Özkırımlı, 2005; Brubaker & Cooper, 2000). Hall (1996a, p. 344) argued that: “We have now to reconceptualise identity as a process of identification. ... It is something that happens over time, that is never absolutely stable, that is subject to the play of history and the play of difference.”

Following arguments that neither ideas of the nation nor national identities are static, but undergo changes reflecting particular power relations (Özkırımlı, 2005), the thesis asked which forms did national identifications take during the specific period and under which contexts did they
change. The study of the national we and in general of national identities in Greek-Cypriot media needs to consider that the media operate in a situation where there is a recognized state but not a “nation” in the sense of an established nation (Billig, 1995) as antagonistic national identities developed historically within both communities, which have thus far prevented the development of a Cypriot nation (Peristianis, 2008).

Despite emphasis on national identities in the context of ethnic division, this thesis acknowledges that the Cyprus conflict is not merely an ethnic conflict (see Trimikliniotis & Bozkurt, 2012 on the interactions of the “global” and the “local” in the production and reproduction of the Cyprus Issue). As argued: “Conflicts over Cyprus were never simply a struggle over the territory of the island, but simultaneously a battle for hegemony within each community.” (Lacher & Kaymak, 2005, p. 152). Additionally, the thesis concurs with arguments that foreign powers played a significant role in national identity construction (Polis, 1996, p. 68, Agathangelou, 1997). It is in this context that we set out to investigate constructions of national identities in the mainstream press across the Left-Centre-Right political spectrum.

We chose not to focus on overtly nationalistic discourses, for example those emerging from or articulated by far right-wing organizations, like the Nationalist Popular Front (ELAM), because it would skew our understanding of other forms of national identities and perhaps we might not notice other nationalisms. Therefore, focusing on the media across the political spectrum allowed for an examination of the reproduction of nationalism, not as a “monster” (using Billig’s 1995 metaphor) or as an explicit articulation of “blood and belonging” (Ignatief, 1993, cited in Skey, 2009), but as an “identity of identities” which may reinforce an “Us vs Others” binary through a more diffuse appeal to the wider population. The analysis focuses on the use of the national we but also on tacit meanings related to the use of history, the state, and the “other” in the media to

5 ELAM (http://www.elamcy.com/) has close connections with the Greek neo-Nazis organization, Golden Dawn.
instigate a sense of belongingness to a “nation”. Subsequently, the study followed Billig’s (1995) call for a shift in focus to banal forms of nationalism but without losing sight of more prominent forms that may manifest during a period of routine, contested division.

The study also drew from a broader literature of sociological and anthropological works on Cyprus which have disrupted the monologue of nationalism in both communities by providing evidence of anti-nationalist contestation, even when nationalism was hegemonic. In relation to the Greek-Cypriot community, anthropologist Peter Loizos’ (1974, 1975, 1988) integrated micro and macro levels of analysis (cited in Peristianis, 2006) to study the development of nationalism in the pre- and post-1974 periods, and argued that Greek-Cypriots preferred peace over enosis if the latter required the continuance of violence as a condition of its fulfilment (1974, p. 115). Panayiotou’s (1999; 2006; 2012) focus on the communist Left as a modernizing movement showed that a Left-orientated subculture questioned ethnonationalism at different phases in the pre-1974 period. Panayiotou (2011) claimed that Cypriot consciousness developed as an alternative identification to Greekness and Turkishness, even prior to independence, and Papadakis drew attention to nationalism as a contested process by focusing on competing narratives between left- and right-wing supporters in both communities (1998, 2005).

Recent studies reporting on the aftermath of the opening of the Green Line crossing points in 2003 and the referenda in 2004 revealed a gradual fragmentation within the Greek-Cypriot community of the official rhetoric in relation to the solution (Demetriou, 2014; Yakinthou, 2008). For example, Yakinthou (2008) pointed out shifts in the representation of missing persons and underlined that effort towards a positive resolution of this humanitarian issue only succeeded after the referenda. Demetriou (2006, 2007) argued that the 2003 opening of crossing points led to a reconfiguration of political subjectivities in Cyprus leading to an “unspoken” but “lived” reunification (2006, p. 65). Such studies show clearly that engaging with different levels of analysis provides critical insights of “the whole.”
Overall, this thesis sheds new light on the debated issue of Cypriot identities, and contributes to our knowledge of how such debate developed and was expressed during the turning point here delineated as the Annan period. The study contributes to nationalism studies through an empirically grounded case-study of the Greek-Cypriot media’s use of nationalistic repertoires of *we* and *other*. Overall the study’s approach represents the first single study of Greek-Cypriot identities from two perspectives: a view from above which concentrates on mainstream media constructions and a view from below which concentrates on Greek-Cypriots’ personal accounts. By focusing on the Annan period the thesis demonstrates how when there is progress in the negotiations, the disputed settlement may assume a media epicentre of national identity discourses, which draw on and amplify more routinely prevalent national identity discourses. By shedding light on how Greek-Cypriots made sense of the Plan this study shows a novel meta-analysis of nationalism and national identities from the perspective of individuals within the Greek-Cypriot community. This provides evidence that the Cyprus conflict, at the level of individuals, is approached not only as an ethnic conflict but also as a conflict of power within each community.

A fuller appreciation of the link between mainstream media and constructions of national identities during the Annan period will help to shed light on how mainstream media, national identities and the Cyprus settlement intersect. The study aims to make a contribution to the fields of media and nationalism studies respectively. In addition, the study’s empirical findings offer a starting point for future research in this area. Finally the thesis provides new insights on the significance of the Annan period which led to reformulating and questioning commonsensical beliefs in relation to the Cyprus’ solution, and the related issues of national identity, nationalism and their exclusionary and inclusionary tendencies.

The empirical focus of the study is on the Greek-Cypriot community because the researcher is fluent in Greek but not in Turkish. To focus equally on both communities (taking for example a comparative approach) would require a good working knowledge of both languages. However,
another important reason relates to the aims of the study. While other studies have focused on antagonistic perceptions and positions across the two communities in relation to the conflict in general and the Plan in particular and more so on maximalist positions on various disputed issues (see for example Sözen & Özersay, 2007), this study focused on one community in order to illustrate whether antagonistic perceptions and positions exist within it. Other studies have followed a similar approach and their results have been illuminating, for example Navaro-Yashin’s study of nationalism in the everyday within the Turkish-Cypriot community (2012), or Stubb’s and Tacheli’s study of media development under colonialism (2014). It is expected that this study, by taking this approach, will unpack greater complexity within the Greek-Cypriot community which, like the Turkish-Cypriot community – is often viewed as a homogenized group (Bozkurt & Trimikliniotis, 2014).

**Thesis Structure and Chapter Outline**

In Chapters 1 and 2, the thesis is situated theoretically and methodologically, the empirical chapters which follow build analytical arguments through critical reference to our data. The study provides two empirical analyses: the first looks in detail at the relevant meanings in the mainstream press. The second considers individual perceptions, reflections and attitudes. Both meet at the theoretical and empirical intersection provided by media, nationalism and Cyprus’ studies.

The first chapter grounds the interdisciplinary approach of the thesis theoretically by critically engaging with studies on media and nationalism and national identity and then reflecting on the historical intersections between Cypriot media and nationalism. It focuses more on how studies problematized the role of contemporary media in the daily reproduction of national identities. Additionally it provides definitions of the key terms used in the thesis, Hellenocentrism and Cyprocentrism, and provides a background to the presentation of the Annan Plan and discusses significant local and global developments related to the Cyprus Issue and which took place since the 2004 referenda.
The Methodology chapter comes next and it lays out the research questions and justifies choices on the methodology used to undertake the empirical research. Specifically it outlines the rationale and the steps to design and conduct the qualitative media analysis and the qualitative interviews. Finally, the reflexivity part provides insights on the correlations between the researcher’s own experiences and the thesis’s topic and methodological choices. It is expected that this chapter will contribute to a more “transparent” account of the thesis (Finlay, 2002, p. 210).

The following chapter details representations of the negotiation process on the Plan and provides a background to the fourth chapter. It shows two dominant representations of the process: a dead end or an opportunity for a settlement. Additionally the chapter uncovers media representations of the role of external actors and mediators in the process and in this way it sheds light on how they were used to construct the category of “us”, which is explored further in the next chapter.

The fourth chapter focuses on representations of national identities and how they intersect with the Plan, engaging critically with the concepts of Hellenocentrism and Cyprocentrism. In this regard it addresses the main research questions of the media analysis. Representations of the Turkish-Cypriot community and “ordinary” Greek-Cypriots entail an exploration of how the media depicted average Cypriots in the negotiation process. The chapter concludes by briefly introducing the rationale of the second empirical study with the qualitative interviews so as to provide a bridge between the two empirical studies.

Chapter 5 sketches the multiple perceptions and arguments provided by Greek-Cypriot participants who supported or disagreed with the Plan (Yes and No groups respectively) and how they self-rationalised their respective referendum votes. While there is evidence of divergent positions across and within the Plan’s supporters and opponents, there is also evidence of convergence of positions, and the chapter highlights both.
Chapter 6 analyses participants’ opinions in defence of ethnic division and their ideas that some Greek-Cypriots may prefer division rather than reunification. The chapter also analyses No voters’ ideas of the nation and identifications in relation to the threats they perceive, against which rejection of the Plan was expected to offer protection. Perceptions across Yes and No participants on the power of nationalism as a threat to peace are also analysed.

Chapter 7 reports on both groups’ ideas of the nation and identity as social constructions and illustrates that ideas of the nation are not reproduced passively. By contrast, people expressed awareness that such ideas may be the result of “social engineering” rather than natural sentiments.

Chapter 8 analyses participants’ perceptions of the role of the media during the Annan period and the referenda. From the onset of the field study, participants shared their frustration that the Annan period had been extremely confusing and that many did not understand the Plan. Therefore, Chapter 8 covers such perceptions and sketches participants’ ideas of the ideological role of the media between 2002 and 2004 and beyond.

The Conclusion presents the main findings of the two empirical studies, illuminating their intersections. It will show how the press constructed forms of Greek-Cypriot identities during the Annan period and how participants used ideas about the nation or national identities to make sense of the Cyprus conflict and the solution and how they perceived that they used them during the Annan period. Finally the chapter proposes ideas for future work which may answer some questions which this thesis left unanswered and subsequently, may overcome its limitations.
1 Historical and Theoretical Considerations

This thesis takes an interdisciplinary approach to its central questions. The empirical and theoretical tradition in media and nationalism studies that emerged mainly through often critical engagement with Billig’s banal nationalism thesis (1995; 2009) is one of the points we focus on, whereas we develop the thesis’s main understandings on nations and nationalisms, drawing from works that credit mass media in processes of nation-building within the modernist tradition. It builds on insights from bodies of literature such as anthropology, political science, and sociology.

This chapter explores first how key theorists of nationalism invoke, to varying extents, mass communication in their accounts of the birth and expansion of nationalism (Gellner, 2006; Anderson, 2006; Hobsbawm, 1990). Then we address the media-nationalism nexus using the lenses of communication theories and in particular the social communication approach. Broadly, both fields –nationalism studies and communication studies – have posited that the media had a key role to play in both the birth of nationalism and the construction of national identities and their reproduction after the establishment of nationalism as a dominant political ideology (Demertzis, Papathanasopoulos & Armenakis, 1999, p. 28).

The chapter also addresses the specifics of the Cyprus case, with the understanding that Cypriot media developed in a context of competing national identities and competing nationalisms in the foreground. Although research has not systematically focused specifically on the media-conflict or media-nationalism nexus regarding the Greek-Cypriot community, various studies, even incidentally, have argued that the media reflected these antagonisms and contributed to their reproduction as they have contributed to the demonization of the “other”. Nevertheless, as alternative and competing ideologies to ethnonationalism progressively developed, alternative media also made their appearance, in the sense that they projected forms of Cypriotism which were critical of nationalist repertoires and supported bicomunal cooperation. The chapter also provides
definitions for the primary terms of Cyprocentrism and Hellenocentrism, which the thesis systematically employs. Additionally, the Chapter critically reviews a set of quantitative and qualitative studies which emerged in the aftermath of the referenda addressing Cypriots’ dispositions across the divide on issues of reconciliation and coexistence. We conclude with background of the Annan Plan, presented in November 2002, and the subsequent 2004 referenda on its fifth version, Annan V along with referencing important developments, locally and internationally, in the aftermath of the referenda and which relate to the Cyprus Issue.

1.1 Media, Nationalism and National identities

It is acknowledged in the literature that different media forms have played a pivotal role in the birth and expansion of nationalism (Demertzis, 1996). In the 18th and 19th centuries, mass print media contributed to the development of nationalisms, while radio played that role during the interwar years, and television came to the fore at the end of the 20th century (Demertzis, 1996, p. 352). Waisbord argued that electronic media, such as radio and television, “helped to overcome spatial and literacy obstacles…as sounds and images could convey representations of nationhood” (Waisbord, 2004, p. 377). Nevertheless, the media/nationalism nexus remains understudied (Waisbord, 2004).

Most works that credited mass media for being part of the nation-building process are within the modernist tradition on the origins of nationalism (for example Anderson, 2006; Gellner, 2006; Hobsbawm, 1990). That is, they described nations as products of modernity, unlike primordialists or ethnosymbolists. Primordialists claimed that nations pre-existed modernity (for example van de Berghe, 1995) or, at a minimum, came from primordial sentiments (Geertz, 1963), intrinsically

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6 This thesis cautiously refers to the organization of the theories of nations and nationalism into groups such as modernist, premordialists, and ethnosymbolist, as researchers argue these categories are oversimplifications (see for example Hale, 2002, and Chatzopoulos, 2002, on divisions within the premordialist approach, and Ozkimirli 2000, who argued that modernists should not be approached as a unitary group).
these theorists have not been preoccupied on the media’s role in nation construction (Madianou, 2005). Ethnosymbolists have argued that nations are based on “ethnies” or ethnic groups, which pre-existed modernity (for example Smith, 1991). Smith, a leading exponent of ethno-symbolism (cited in Özkırımlı, 2000), referred to the role of media in processes of formation of “ethnies” or ethnic cores into nations. Nations, he argues, needed mechanisms such as the media and education to produce new citizens of the nation (Smith, 1991, p. 69) bound together by common culture, ideologies, aspirations, and understandings (Smith, 1991, p. 9). While ethnosymbolism does not exclude a media-nationalism link, ethnosymbolists have not charted the link empirically or theoretically. Postmodernists’ studies of marginalized groups and postcolonial contexts have addressed the role of the media, and some, like Chatterjee (1993), have done this vis-à-vis criticizing modernists’ approaches to the phenomenon of nationalism.

In his pioneering work on the origins of the nation, Gellner (2006, p. 120) argued that the ways the modern media work “automatically engenders the core idea of nationalism”, as they entail a “one to many communication”, and therefore “what is actually said matters little” (Gellner, 2006, p. 120):

That core message is that the language and style of transmissions is important, that only he who can understand them, or can acquire such comprehension, is included in a moral and economic community, and that he who does not and cannot, is excluded. All this is crystal clear, and follows from the pervasiveness and crucial role of mass communication in this kind of society. What is actually said matters little.

Hobsbawm (1990), in his study on nationalism, concurred with Gellner’s definition of nationalism as a modern phenomenon that is “primarily a principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent” (Gellner, 2006). He added that nations are products of “social engineering” (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 10). Yet Hobsbawm proposed taking “a view from below” (1990, p. 9) of nations and nationalism, i.e., “in terms of assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and interests of ordinary people” (1990, p.10). He underlined (1990, p. 11) that “official
ideologies of states and movements are not guides to what it is in the minds of even the most loyal citizens or supporters,” and that one cannot assume “that for most people national identification – when it exists - excludes or is always or ever superior to, the remainder of the set of identifications which constitute the social being,” as well as that “National identification can change and shift in time”. He suggested that “mass media standardized homogenized and transformed, as well as, obviously, exploited for the purposes of deliberate propaganda by private interests and states” popular ideologies (1990, p. 141-142). Hobsbawm emphasized that modern media made “national symbols part of the life of every individual” (1990, pp. 141-142). Billig’s banal nationalism thesis (1995) echoed this, noting that nationalism embeds the routines of life through the media illustrating a theoretical interest in the individuals’ lived experience of national identities (see also Madianou, 2005).

Anderson (2006) indicated the role of print capitalism in his theorization of the nation as an “imagined community,” rejecting, like Gellner and Hobsbawm, primordialist claims as to the nature of the nation. He underlined processes of “imagining” the nation rather than socioeconomic processes, but highlights that if not for print capitalism, the nation could not have been imagined as a political community, “inherently limited and sovereign” (2006, p. 6). Anderson argued print capitalism “reproduced print-languages capable of dissemination through the market” (2006, p.44), clarifying that:

It is [the nation] imagined as a community because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings [2006, p. 7]

Anderson situated the birth of the phenomenon of nationalism in the Creole communities in the Americas, saying it was pirated across the globe from there. Despite his emphasis on the colonial world, Anderson has been criticized for supposedly suggesting the rest of the world had to
imagine its nation in the same ways as the West, thereby reinforcing Europe and the Americas as the “only true subjects of history” (Chatterjee, 1993, p.5). Nevertheless, his critics agree that “print-capitalism provided ‘the new institutional space for the development of the modern “national” language’” (Chatterjee, 1993, p. 7). Other postmodernists have noted the significant, if ambiguous, role of print media in the development of nationalism in postcolonial contexts (Bhabha, 1994). A number of studies have shifted interest from the great narratives of nationalism to more fragmented analysis, focusing for example on gender, minorities, migrants, and other marginalized groups (see for example Bhabha, 1994; McClintock, 1993, 1997). Nevertheless, as McClintock argued in her works on gendered nationalism, nations are “laboriously fabricated through the media and the printing press” (1997, p. 105).

From a communication perspective, researchers such as Innis (1951) and McLuhan (1994) had considered before Anderson that the role of print-languages and in particular typography to be instrumental for the birth of nationalism. Innis (1951) noted that “The rise of vernacular literature hastened and was hastened by the growth of nationalism” (p. 167) and McLuhan contended that “Print created individualism and nationalism in the sixteenth century.” (1994, p. 19). McLuhan also underlined that “Political unification of populations by means of vernacular and language groupings was unthinkable before printing turned each vernacular into an extensive mass medium” (1994, p. 20). The social communication approach emphasized that communication processes in modernity played a significant role in the birth of nation-states but also in how nations continue to be held together “from within” (Schlesinger, 2000, p. 105; Deutsch, 1953). As Calhoun (1997) noted, building on this approach, communication infrastructures “facilitated space-transcending linkages which encouraged people to give up the narrow outlooks of their native villages for an understanding of themselves as individual members of the nation” (p. 107).

Billig shifted critical attention from fierce forms of nationalism to banal nationalism. His banal nationalism thesis states that the media constantly but subtly flags an “identity of identities”
“Complex habits of thought naturalize, and thereby overlook, ‘our’ nationalism whilst projecting nationalism, as an irrational whole, on to others,” he wrote, of the processes that focus on fierce forms of nationalism over banal nationalism (1995, p.38). Notably, Billig’s thesis primarily focuses on established nations such as the UK and the US (1995; 2009), yet he noted that non-Western nations frequently involve “the banal reproduction of national symbols” (2009, p. 2).

Some researchers have followed the banal nationalism thesis in order to understand supra-nationalism as well as divergence within nationalist discourses. Applying Billig’s thesis, Law found that the Scottish press “more explicitly enunciated” national identity than the English press (Law, 2001, p. 314). While Billig focused on newspapers, Phillips (2012) has built on his ideas to argue that the Qatari-based Al Jazeera flags a supranational Arab identity, addressing Arabs across state boundaries (2012). Cann concluded that TV “plays an important ideological role in the construction of nations” (2013, p. 737) and in the case of Turkey, Yumul and Ozkirimli, following Billig, concluded that “the media perhaps play the most remarkable part in the daily reproduction of nationhood” (2000, p. 801).

The existence of banal Europeanism (Cram, 2001; Slavtcheva-Petkova, 2014) and banal Americanism in the UK (Slavtcheva-Petkova, 2014) complicates the banal nationalism thesis, as do studies that examine how the routine of everyday life express embedded nationalism through symbols and institutions. Kuusisto underlines the creation of “togetherness” within and differences between communities through banal symbols and practices across the Catholic/Protestant divide in Northern Ireland (2001). Rhys and Merriman draw out intersections between hot and banal nationalism by examining bilingual road signs as “markers of identity politics in Wales” (2009, p. 172). Scholars also encounter the reproduction of nationalism through institutions like a bank in Scotland (Hearn, 2007) or Banal Catalanism by Catalan institutions (Crameri, 2000).
Methodologically, researchers have followed Billig in employing deictic analysis, particularly focusing on the deictic word *we* as having great importance in “discourses about nations and national identities” (de Cillia, Reisigl and Wodak 1999, p. 163 in Petersoo, 2007), particularly media discourses (Billig, 1995; Petersoo, 2007; Madianou, 2005). Riggins (1997) noted that “inclusive and exclusive pronouns are ‘most revealing of the boundaries separating Self and Other’” (p. 8 in Petersoo 2007). Petersoo contended that, in Scottish media, *we* represents “different national categories to different readers” (2007, p. 433). Madianou showed that the repeated use of *we* in Greek TV news does not mean that audiences reproduce banal nationalism “unproblematically” (2005, p. 131).

Critical media and communication studies have long argued that mainstream media as cultural institutions contribute to the reproduction of predominant ideologies and building consensus (Caragee, 1973; Hall, 1982; Doudaki, 2015). Doudaki (2015) pointed out that “the dominant mainstream media are privileged spaces where the main discourses of society are reconstructed, most often by hegemonic actors offering their interpretations on social reality and their views on both the dominant and alternative versions of reality” (2015, p. 3). To extend the argument, media are spaces in which main “national” norms are flagged repeatedly during routine periods or during periods when nothing significant happens in relation to the “nation”, as Billig argued, and perhaps more fiercely during heated periods or periods of nationalist fervour. However, opposition to predominant ideologies may be articulated even within the media itself (Croteau, Hoynes and Milan, 2011, p. 165), particularly when political and economic elites have conflict (Hall, 1982).

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1 In this tradition, a key theoretical concept of “hegemony” (Gramsci, 1975), is used to uncover media’s role to construct and gain consent (see for example Hall, 1982)
1.2 Cypriot Media, National Identity, and Nationalism

The field of media studies in Cyprus is growing (Gumpert & Drucker, 1997; Panayiotou, 2006a, 2006b; Bailie & Azgin, 2011; Higgins, 2011; Christophorou, Şahin & Pavlou, 2010; Ersoy, 2010; Şahin, 2008, 2011; Way, 2011; Alifendioglu & Arslan, 2011; Stubbs & Taşeli, 2014; Carpentier & Doudaki, 2014) and some studies have addressed media coverage of peace negotiations even though not systematically (Panayiotou 2006a; Bailie & Azgin, 2011; Way, 2011; Şahin, 2008, 2014; Christophorou, Şahin, and Pavlou, 2010; Christophorou, 1993). Recently, systematic interest on the negotiations and the representation of the “other” has emerged primarily within the peace journalism tradition (Ersoy, 2006, 2010; Bailie & Azgin, 2008; Ciftci, 2014).

The 19th century marked a turning point towards print culture (Panayiotou, 2006a) or written culture (Bryant, 2004) in Cyprus as part of the island’s modernization (Panayiotou, 2006a, 2006b; Şahin, 2008). Despite low literacy levels in Cyprus, the first newspapers exerted significant influence, as literate individuals at cafes and clubs read them aloud to the illiterate (Bryant, 2006; Şahin, 2008; Katsiaounis, 1996). Katsiaounis (1996) argued that the appearance of newspapers contributed to the development of Greek nationalism; Şahin (2008) argued that the Turkish-Cypriot press contributed to the transformation of Turkish-Cypriots from Ottoman Muslims into Turks, and Panayiotou claimed that the Greek-Cypriot press contributed to the enhancement of the understanding of Cypriot Christians as “Greek” (2006a, p. 27).

The first Greek-Cypriot newspapers used formal Greek or katharevousa, and newspapers catering to Turkish-Cypriots used standard Turkish. Christophorou et al. (2010) argued these monolingual8, community-centred newspapers reified ethnic differences, and Panayiotou (2006a) argued that schools and the press that relied on the print medium also furthered the two

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8 With the exception of the first Greek-Cypriot newspaper which was bilingual, published in Greek and English (Sophocleous, 1995).
communities’ separation. In fact both communities would have found newspapers difficult. Formal Greek was the language of educated Greek-Cypriot elites who contributed to and managed the newspapers, but most Greek-Cypriots spoke the Cypriot idiom (Panayiotou, 2006a; Bryant, 2006). Likewise, standard Turkish was uncommon in Cyprus. Şahin (2008) argued that publishers of Turkish-Cypriot newspapers sought a wide audience and that they garnered readership elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire as well as Cyprus. Panayiotou described these adoptions of “correct language” by the press of both communities as the first “structural form of censorship in the public sphere of Cyprus” (2006a, p. 29). The Cypriot linguistic form has survived to present day despite this censorship, which he argued is evidence that the print medium failed to achieve a total dominance (Panayiotou, 2006a; 2015b).

The first Greek-Cypriot newspaper was titled “Κύπρος-Cyprus.” It began publishing August 29, 1878, after the Sultan ceded Cyprus to the British. Its publisher was a teacher, Theodoulos Constantinides, who was financially supported by Greeks of Cyprus in Cairo (Sophocleous, 1995). The British permitted its publication on the condition that it appeared in Greek and English. From the start the publication emphasized its aim of cultivating Greekness. Also, the first woman’s magazine published in Greek in Cyprus appeared in 1906 with a lead commentary titled “To Greek Women” [Προς Ελληνίδας] that emphasized the magazine’s aim of providing a Greek-centered [Ελληνοπρεπή] education and intellectual development to Greek women of Cyprus.

The Turkish-Cypriot press began to develop in 1890 with the arrival in Cyprus of a group called “Young Turks.” These supporters of Kemal Attaturk fled Istanbul at the beginning of 1890 to avoid being persecuted by the Sultan (Bryant, 2006; Şahin, 2010; Kizilyurek, 2009). Their arrival marked the beginning of the conflict between the modernists and the traditionalists within the Turkish-Cypriot community, and Soz and Ses newspapers featured Kemalist/modernist arguments as well as criticism of the Sultan (Bryant, 2004; Kizilyurek, 2009). The Turkish-Cypriot press progressively protested enosis as nationalism intensified in the Greek-Cypriot press.
Satirical publications differed from newspapers in that they sought to address all Cypriots (Bryant, 2005). Some of these publications were wholly or partially published in the Cypriot dialect, rarely employing standard Turkish or formal Greek (Sophocleous, 1995). The press affiliated with the communist Left not only lacked emphasis on the Greek nation but it also projected fierce anti-enosis ideas and instead proclaimed bicomunalism. They emerged in the 1920s and 1930s, which was a period marked by class conflicts, and the appearance of the first labour unions (Ioannou, 2011, p. 31), and during which the Left appeared as a political power that could inspire bicomunal patriotism (Panayiotou, 2011, p. 9) while simultaneously challenging ethnonationalism and British authority by juxtaposing the goals of Cyprus independence and emancipation respectively to enosis and colonialism. Therefore the public sphere reflected processes of social transformation and struggles for power.

The first Greek-Cypriot left-wing newspaper, *Pirsos* (*Torch*), was affiliated with the first socialist party, the Cyprus Labour and Rural Party. It was published for three years, between 1922 and 1925 and had a circulation of 1,000-1,500 copies (Loizides, 2007). The second, *Neos Anthropos* (*New Human*), was controlled by the Cyprus communist party and was published from 1925 to 1930. *Avgi* (*Dawn*) was a magazine and was published from 1924 to 1925, and was characterized as the print form of the modernizing dimension of the emerging Cypriot communism (Panayiotou, 2015a). These three publications opted for *demotiki* Greek instead of *katharevousa* Greek. British colonials (Sophocleous, 1995) sought to suppress these and other leftist publications, and succeeded in closing down *Neos Anthropos* in August 1930 under a law adopted in May 1930.

After a revolt in 1931 by the Greek-Cypriots, called the Oktovriana, British intolerance towards the Cypriot press of both communities increased, and a 1934 printing law halted the printing of a number of newspapers (Stubbs & Taşeli, 2014; Şahin, 2008). This period of severe regime, which ended in 1939, was known as “Palmerocratia,” named after the head of British administration in the island (Stubbs & Taşeli, 2014).
After World War II both Greek and Turkish nationalisms became more intolerant and they progressively developed forms of anti-communism, deeming communist ideas unpatriotic, even though AKEL, which succeeded the Communist party in the 1950s, also at certain historical conjunctures embraced enosis (Anagnostopoulou, 2004; Kitromilides, 1979). Both Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot press reflected the deepening of the Left-Right division, their respective oppositional positions on issues of national belonginess and Cyprus’ future, and the hegemony of nationalism since the 1940s (Bozkurt & Trimikliniotis, 2014). Şahin (2008) gave the example of Turkish-Cypriot publications Türk Sözü and Sabah supporting Turkishness while left-wing Emekçi (Worker) and İnк İnkılâpçı (Revolutionary) supported bicommmunal cooperation and class struggle.

From 1955 to 1959 EOKA, the Greek-Cypriot militarist organization was active, and both nationalisms reached their peak intolerance of alternative views. In 1957 Turkish-Cypriot nationalists founded the Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT) to counter EOKA and to promote the goal of partition among Turkish-Cypriots. The Turkish-Cypriot press intensified its support for partition (Stubbs & Taşeli, 2014). Turkish ethnonationalism took a violent turn and paramilitary groups murdered left-wing Turkish-Cypriot journalists and supporters of bicommmunal cooperation in this period. The Halkin Sesi newspaper described the assassinated publisher of İnк İnkılâpçı, a publication of the Turkish-Cypriot trade union, as “a known communist servant” (Halkın Sesi, 25 May 1958, cited in Stubbs & Taşeli, 2014). Ayhan Hikmet and Muzaffer Gürkan, publishers of Cumhuriyet, were killed in 1962, after Cyprus’s independence. During EOKA, the British closed down four left-wing newspapers, including İnк İnkılâpçı (Stubbs & Taşeli, 2014, p. 290).

British authorities founded the Cyprus Broadcasting Cooperation (CYBC) in the 1950s, broadcasting programmes in Greek, Turkish, and English. Interestingly, CYBC broadcasted entertainment programmes called “sketches” that were in the Cypriot dialect. Cypriot sketches were theatrical in style and their plot focused around everyday life, and apparently became popular among the general public (Panayiotou, 2015b, 2006; Roussou, 2006; Maniou & Photiou, 2013). In
1953 and 1957, respectively, the first radio station and the first television channel went on the air. Cyprus thus became the first country in the Middle East that had television service (Willis, 1964). Both communities perceived CYBC programming as British “candy” meant to control them (Willis, 1964) and maintain economic and cultural control (Way, 2011). After independence, the Cypriot government decided to keep CYBC (Way, 2011) and have it supervised by a board of five Greek-Cypriots and two Turkish-Cypriots (Willis, 1967). The weekdays were divided between the two communities to broadcast in their respective language. It also operated two separate Radio services, one in each language, and had a few English programmes. In 1963 the intercommunal strife that ended governmental cooperation in most organizations left CYBC under the complete control of the Greek-Cypriots. Within days Turkish-Cypriots started broadcasting on Bayrak radio, shortly followed by five other radio stations (Way, 2011). The Turkish-Cypriot leadership used Bayrak to counter the propaganda of Greek-Cypriot controlled CYBC (Way, 2011). In 1983 Bayrak incorporated all radio stations and the television channel (Way, 2011).

The press reflected the hegemony of nationalism in both communities, but also intracommunity tensions and conflicts after Cyprus’ independence in 1960 and especially during the years of intercommunal strife in 1963 and in 1967. During bicomunal conflicts, anti-enosis and pro-Left media closed down (Christophorou, 1993) because of the intolerance to counter-ethnonationalist positions in Cyprus’ public sphere. In this regard, censorship was “national,” but it had been more covert in the Greek-Cypriot community, while it was open and intense in the Turkish-Cypriot community (Anastasiou, 2002). Journalists in both communities who opposed nationalism were labelled as traitors, but Turkish-Cypriot journalists were persecuted, threatened, and in some cases assassinated.

The Greek-Cypriot press considered that the 1960 Zurich Agreements leading to Cyprus’s independence did not meet the expectations of the Greek-Cypriot people, but advocated for their acceptance (Christophorou, 1993). The press reflected conflicting approaches on the issue of
independence: AKEL’s *Haravgi* supported independence and nationalist oriented *Eleftheria* supported enosis (Christophorou, 1993). The Greek-Cypriot press also reflected divisions within the Right. Specifically, some nationalist publications assailed others for being incompletely dedicated to nationalism. In relation to the Turkish-Cypriot community, the Greek-Cypriot press fiercely criticized the leadership but differentiated between the leadership and simple people (Christophorou, 1993). The Turkish-Cypriot press also reflected tensions and conflicts about the new status quo (Stubbs & Taşeli, 2014; Şahin, 2008) but the domination of the Turkish-Cypriot nationalist leadership was almost complete, so most outlets supported partition. One exception *Saval*, opposed the nationalism of the Turkish-Cypriot leadership (Şahin, 2008). After the July 1974 coup and the Turkish invasion, the Greek-Cypriot press competed to blame one another for the ensuing catastrophe that the coup and the invasion had brought. *Machi*, the owner of which headed the “government” after the coup, from 15 July 1974 to 23 July 1974, showed no evidence of admission that perhaps the coup and the enosis politics of its owner may had contributed to the invasion (Jüngling, 2005). On the other hand *Haravgi* and *Phileleftheros* co-sided with President Makarios before and after the coup (Jüngling, 2005).

After 1974, citizens could not cross the divide between the two communities or communicate across it by telephone, telegraph, or postal connection for about 30 years (Gumpert & Drucker, 1997). Arguably they could watch TV or listen to the radio of the other community (Gumpert & Drucker, 1997; Panayiotou, 2006a), but it seems likely that progressively fewer and fewer were able to understand it, as the numbers of those people who knew the other’s language progressively decreased (Özerk, 2001). Turkish language knowledge has always been less common among Greek-Cypriots, and while Turkish-Cypriots historically had a greater comprehension of Greek, it is documented that it too has decreased over time (Özerk, 2001).

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9 The introduction and expansion of internet enhanced inter-communal communication in the mid-nineties (Gumpert & Drucker, 1997).
As well, broadcast media, radio, and television focused on news of the communities they served, referencing the other community primarily in their news coverage of the negotiations that followed the 1974 war. In parallel all Greek-Cypriot newspapers evinced a will for a continued struggle (Christophorou, 1993) whereas, as Şahin (2008) described it, the Turkish-Cypriot press “represented the nation as united, homogenous and stable, making differences between members of the national community invisible, which aided the nation building process” (p. 76). Still there was a pro-regime newspaper and an oppositional one (Kocaman, 2006). Denktash-led regime intolerance to oppositional views exemplified in acts of persecution or even prosecution of dissident voices within the media (Şahin, 2008).

The media landscape in both communities transformed in the 1990s with the privatization of electronic media, radio, and television. Subsequently a plethora of electronic private media emerged that arguably adopted the nationalist repertoires of the print media (Panayiotou, 2006a; Şahin, 2008). The association of the emerging private media with Hellenocentrist nationalists and, in the case of a television, with the Church\(^{10}\) ensured that there was no room in the public sphere for a “Cypriot identity”, and the permissible dogma was that in Cyprus there are Greeks and Turks (Panayiotou, 2015b). Intolerance in the north towards oppositional views continued. The intolerance became clear with the murder of journalist Kultu Adali in 1996, arguably for criticizing the regime, the imprisonment of the editor-in-chief of the Afrika newspaper, Sener Levent, and the prominent journalist, Memduh Ener, who wrote for Afrika in August 2002 criticizing Denktash. In relation to the Greek-Cypriot community Panayiotou (2006a) argued that media created moral panics in the 1990s, terrorizing oppositional national views. To back his claim, he referenced the so-called motorcyclists’ events in 1996 in which two Greek-Cypriots were murdered during anti-occupation demonstrations in the buffer zone.

\(^{10}\) The Orthodox Church of Cyprus owned and ran the radio and television channel “The Discourse” [Ο Λόγος].
Overall, existing studies criticised both Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot media in Cyprus for demonizing the other side and strengthening nationalism (Bailie & Azgın, cited in Way 2011, p. 30; Ersoy, 2010, p. 91; Christophorou et al, 2010; Şahin, 2008, 2011; Stubbs & Taşeli, 2014; Panayiotou, 2006a). The two communities’ media developed separately and led to separate public spheres (Panayiotou, 2006a), with boundaries cemented in 1974. Yet Christophorou et al. (2010) found that the media of both communities historically have in fact been very similar “in their approaches and construction of their respective mediated reality” (p. 181). Panayiotou has argued that historically the hegemony of nationalism in the Greek-Cypriot community defined strict boundaries for permissible public discussion in general but also in the media (2006a; 2006b; 2012; 2015). He underlined that Cyprus has had an unofficial “journalistic thought police” ensuring adherence to the ideology of nationalism (2006a, p. 30). Şahin presented evidence that the Turkish-Cypriot media historically has sought to manufacture a national consensus to disseminate nationalist ideas (2008, p. 89). Under enforced separation, which was complete until April 2003, each community’s members’ primary experience of the other community were its political leaders representing the other in diplomatic negotiations (Christophorou et al. 2010, p.1). As Yakinthou (2009) noted, most of these negotiators had nationalist backgrounds, which likely contributed to demonization. Local news was primarily intra-community oriented.

**Media and the Annan Plan.** In relation to the role of the media during the Annan period, existing studies seem to have suggested that the nationalist pattern in the Turkish-Cypriot community broke down as most of them supported the Plan and reunification. Specifically, they argued that Turkish-Cypriot media “reflected a spectrum of opinions” on the Plan (Şahin, 2008, p. 79) and followed the norms of peace journalism (Çiftçioğlu, 2014). By contrast, researchers have criticized Greek-Cypriot media for reproducing the conflict paradigm and demonizing Greek-Cypriot supporters of the Plan.
A report showed that all the Greek-Cypriot dailies, apart from Alithia, projected directly or indirectly that accepting the Plan violated the national interest, while only two out of six Greek-Cypriot dailies supported the Plan (Christophorou et al, 2010). According to the same report, of the Greek-Cypriot newspapers that fiercely disagreed with the Plan, Simerini and Machi emphasized Greekness, while left-wing Haravgi stressed bicomunalism while in the end it did not support the Plan. Overall, Turkey, instead of the Turkish-Cypriot community was the main “other” negatively represented yet it is also argued that in 2002 Phileleftheros, Alithia, Machi and Simerini referred occasionally to the Turkish side in ways which included also the Turkish-Cypriot leadership or the Turkish-Cypriot community (Christophorou et al, 2010). Another study found that all Greek-Cypriot television channels prior to the referenda emphasized anti-Plan positions and that negative representations of the Plan predominated in the Greek-Cypriot media overall (Filippou et al. 2009).

Taki (2009) argued that Greek-Cypriot mass media inaccurately presented the Plan as unjust to Greek-Cypriots (2009, p. 179). Panayiotou (2006a) noted that most of the Greek-Cypriot media leaned towards nationalism, nonetheless he pointed out that, in covering the events after the opening of crossing points in April 2003, they projected images of reconciliation. But then, he continued, media “resumed control” (2006a, p. 31) and created an environment opposing the Plan.

Studies of the period after the referenda have shown that mainstream media in the Turkish-Cypriot community, which had presented Greek-Cypriots in a positive light, became more negative once the Plan was rejected by Greek-Cypriots (Ersoy, 2010, p. 86). Regarding the Greek-Cypriot media, the same study noted that representations of the “other” did not change significantly before or after the Plan. According to Ersoy’s (2010) findings based on press data of both communities published in 2006, the press across the divide used mainly negative headlines. Şahin also argued that the reports of the Ledra Street crossing opening in 2007 emphasized Turkish Cypriotness rather than a common Cypriotness, contrary to 2003 when the Ledra Palace crossing point opened, and the media emphasized Cypriotness (2008, pp. 240-241). Ways (2010) concurred in a study of Turkish-
Cypriot radio coverage on the 2007 opening of crossing points that the selected radio stations reinforced anti-solution perspectives.

Panayiotou (2006a) argued that the plethora and spread of electronic communication and networks make partition impossible in the future. He underlined that electronic communications, such as chats and blogs “can be a promising return to orality” which encourages unmediated forms of communication between the two communities, contributing to the eventual de facto reunification of Cyprus (2006a, p. 32).

**Cyprocentrism and Hellenocentrism: A short critical appraisal.** Broadly, the politics of identity developed in the Greek-Cypriot community in correspondence with two antagonistic perceptions of national identity: the territorial/civic or Cyprocentrism, and the ethnic or Hellenocentrism. Cyprocentrism represents identification with the state while Hellenocentrism emphasizes Greekness (Peristianis, 2006; Pachoulides, 2007; Papadakis, 2008b; Mavratsas, 1997). In parallel, the conflation between ethnic/civic and political identity has been a hegemonic trope for understanding identity in postcolonial Cyprus (Peristianis, 2006; Loizos, 1998; Papadakis, 2006) since identification with Cypriotness as an alternative discourse to ethnonationalism was strongly associated with the Left and identification with Greekness with the Right. Proponents of each point of view accused the other of betrayal, betraying the ethnosity through extreme Cypriotness, or betraying the state through extreme Hellenocentrism (Peristianis, 2006, p. 115).

The seeds of the conflict between the two communities and in specific between the Greek and Turkish nationalisms were sown in the 1878–1960 colonial period (Kitromilides, 1979). In the pre-colonial era, Kitromilides (1979) argued that for the Greek-Cypriots what existed was “a generally conceived national orientation of Greek Cypriot elites” (p. 19). Most scholars have agreed that Turkish nationalism developed as a reaction to Greek nationalism and that Kemal Ataturk's secular reforms in Turkey influenced it in the 1920s (Bryant, 2004; Kizilyurek, 2009; Kitromilides, 1979; Richter, 2010), but partition became its ultimate national claim by the 1940s. Nevertheless,
these competing identifications formed in what Bozkurt and Trimikliniotis (2014) term “a historical framework determined by class, status, and power conflicts” (p. 245).

Panayiotou (2011) defined Cypriot consciousness as a modern politico-cultural phenomenon which hellenocentrists treated with suspicion. Cypriotness emphasized independence as a means of gaining Cypriot autonomy and recognized the coexistence of different communities, religions, and cultures as a key element of the Cypriot historical experience (Panayiotou, 2011, p.1). At least two types of Cypriotism emerged since the colonial period: leftist, emphasizing class and opposition to colonialism/imperialism, and liberal, emphasizing the concept of the citizen (Lanitis, 1963). After independence, a new form of Greek-Cypriot identity differentiated state from nation (Papadopoulos, 1964 cited in Panayiotou, 2011). Yet, in the public sphere these identifications with Cypriotness were rarely expressed, at least until the 1990s when a number of symbolic Cyprocentric moves took place, including a more widespread use of the Cypriot flag (Panayiotou, 2015b).

Mavratsas (1997) argued that Cypriotism is a form of Greek-Cypriot nationalism, despite being civic or anti-ethnic, because it emphasizes “history, homeland, culture” (1997, p. 723). He also argued that Cypriotism “has largely developed in explicit opposition to Greek nationalism in Cyprus” (1997, p. 722), and that emphasis on Greekness poses “serious obstacles to accepting political cohabitation, in whatever form, with the Turkish Cypriots” (p. 733). Arguably, an understanding of Cyprus as a place where different communities coexisted drove Cypriotism (Panayiotou, 2011; Papadopoulos, 1964), as well as an understanding of class as more politically important than ethnicity (Pachoulides, 2007, p. 353).

Research has also focused on the intersections of the two identities in their contemporary forms. Pachoulides (2007) described the ways in which the two forms of identity intersect, subtly suggesting that they may not always be in opposition. Pachoulides (2007) found four *topous* of
Greek-Cypriot identity, organized across the axis of Hellenocentrism and Cyprocentrism but seems to have ignored the possibility that some Cypriots might identify with neither form. Peristianis (2006, p. 101; 2008) argued that in the present day the intersection of Cyprocentrism and Hellenocentrism best explains Cypriot identities. However, he still appears to characterise them as homogenous, with loyalty to the nation competing with loyalty to the state and argued that the forms of identities and nationalisms Cyprocentrism and Hellenocentrism reflect could battle again (2006, 2008). He (2008) argued that “Greek-Cypriots had after all become a cohesive imaginary community,” but, “[n]ot as Greeks, not as Cypriots, but as Greek-Cypriots” (2008, p. 264). Still he speculated that “if in the future they were once again to share a federal state with the Turkish-Cypriot[s], Greek national identity would again strength” (p. 289). He attributed the rejection of the Plan in 2004 to the state’s increased prominence among Greek-Cypriots who considered the Plan potentially risky (p.2, 2008).

Vural and Peristianis (2008), in a study based on interviews from both communities conducted a few months prior to the April 2004 referenda, claimed that “the conventional ethno-nationalist division and the left-right divide are no longer sufficient in understanding the conflict in Cyprus” (p. 39). They described the following groups of politico-ideological tendencies linked to ideas on national identity – the monists, the cosmopolitans, the state-wide federalists, the communal federalists, the ethnic competitors, and the separatists. Monists, most of whom are Greek-Cypriots, supported majoritarian rule so as to guarantee the hegemony of the Greek-Cypriot majority in the new state. Cosmopolitans in both communities wish for a new state which would encourage civic identity. State-wide federalists of both communities see federalism as the only means to achieve Cyprus reunification and consider Turkish and Greek identities as sub-identities to Cypriotness.

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11 According to Pachoulides (2007), the first identity topos is Cypriotism which shows identification with Cyprus and in parallel adopts a soft Hellenocentrism. The second is ellinotropismos, characterized by intense Hellenocentrism and a weak Cyprocentrism. The third is Greek-Cypriot nationalism, characterized by intense Hellenocentrism and intense Cyprocentrism. Finally, Greek-Cypriot patriotism adopts a soft Hellenocentrism and a soft Cyprocentrism.
Communal federalists, most of whom are Turkish-Cypriot, stress the protection of the differences of the two communities within a federation. Finally, the ethnic competitors and separatists, who generally are Turkish-Cypriots, support division, stressing ethnocultural identity over Cypriotness. Peristianis (2006, 2008) also focused on the correlations between national and political identity. He concluded that the so-called soft-liners on the Cyprus solution, also known as pro-federalists, adhere to civic nationalism and they are primarily supporters of Left AKEL and Right-wing DISY. One the other hand he argued the hard-liners, or anti-federationists, adhere to ethnic nationalism.

In spite of the return of Hellenocentrism in the 1990s and the long-lasting partition and the rejection of the Plan, studies found that Greek-Cypriots increasingly see themselves as Cypriot rather than Greek, while Panayiotou (2015b) has noted the appearance of Cypriot symbols in the public sphere alongside with Hellenocentric ones. Polis (1996) described a gradual disaffection “of Greek Cypriots with Greeks and Turkish Cypriots with Turks” (p. 82) in the 1990s. In a survey taken in 2002, 47% of respondents identified as Cypriots, 10% as more Cypriot than Greek, 35% equally Cypriot and Greek, and only 5% said that they feel Greek (Peristianis, 2006, p. 107). Loizides (2007) argued that both communities consider themselves separate from the other but as more Cypriot than Greek or Turkish.

**Greek-Cypriots’ accounts and perceptions: Interpersonal contacts and division.** Before the referenda, the Cyprus issue was discussed at high level negotiations at which Cypriots of both communities were not involved (Yakinthou, 2009; Lordos, 2009; Emilianides, 2009). However Annan III, submitted on 26 February 2003, provided for referenda regardless of the leaders’ consent (Özersay, 2005, p. 384). This shifted power from the political elites to the Cypriot public, and in general the referenda, as rightly argued, earned “the Cypriot public a seat at the negotiating table” (Lordos, 2009). After the referenda, attention shifted to the need to engage the public in the overall process (Kaymak, E., Lordos, A., & Tocci, N., 2008). A number of public opinion surveys were conducted to measure peoples’ views and which subtly argue that the Greek-Cypriots made a
mistake in rejecting the Plan, but there is “hope” they would answer affirmatively in the future (Georgiades, 2007; Kaymak, E. et al., 2008; Lordos, 2006a, 2006b). These opinion surveys have shown that there is little animosity between the two communities, in spite of Greek-Cypriots’ No vote (Georgiades, 2007; Lordos, 2006b). Relevant studies have focused on the role of the leadership and external actors, arguing they will allay people’s fears of accepting coexistence, and ultimately secure passage of a Plan similar to the Annan Plan. However the Plan’s opponents call for a fundamentally different settlement (Kyriakides, 2009), claiming its defeat was final.

Studies of the Greek-Cypriot rejection of the Plan have focused on the issue of security (Georgiades, 2007; Kaymak et al., 2008; Lordos, 2006b; Faustmann, 2009; Stavrinides, 2009). For example, Stavrinides (2009), taking a social psychological approach, argued that Greek-Cypriots had collective fears, some of which related to the internalization of national identity and nationalism (2009, p. 211–212). But this study focused on Greek-Cypriots’ Greek national identity and therefore it may have omitted fears relating to Cypriotness. Other studies in the post-referenda period and despite an increased pessimism in relation to the prospects for a solution focused on Cypriots’ dispositions on issues of reconciliation and coexistence across the divide and have shown that most Cypriots across the divide share no animosity for one another (Lordos, 2006; Georgiades, 2007; Sitas, Latif and Loizou, 2007). Specifically, a study conducted about a year after the referenda has shown that that about 42% of Cypriots across the divide are “well-disposed towards reconciliation” still an important percentage of more than 39% considers that partition will be cemented (Sitas, Latif and Loizou, 2007). Another survey (Georgiades, 2007) showed that fourfifths of its 150 Greek-Cypriot respondents not only do not mistrust Turkish-Cypriots but also believe that the two communities can peacefully coexist. Interestingly, 43% of the survey’s respondents pointed out that overall the Greek-Cypriots as a community are not very ready to reunify with the Turkish-Cypriot community. Finally, the survey (Georgiades, 2007) concluded that ethnocentric perceptions in both
communities are at “comparable, mediocre levels” (p. 573) and emphasized that the Greek-Cypriot No vote was not a rejection of reconciliation and coexistence (p. 583).

The latest Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index (SCORE 2015)\(^\text{12}\) designed to measure the “state of peace” has shown that within the Greek-Cypriot community it is the young people (18-25 years old) and women who are not very open to a political settlement. In this regard, young Cypriots appear to perceive that they are more culturally different to Turkish-Cypriots. On the other hand within the Turkish-Cypriot community it is the right-wingers who appear less ready for a solution. Overall almost half of Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots consider that a federation is tolerable.

Taking a social representation approach Psaltis (2011) has identified three clusters within the Greek-Cypriot community in relation to intergroup relations based on a representative sample. A percentage of 33.4% (Cluster 1) of the sample identified with pro-reconciliation positions and also self-identified more as Cypriots rather than Greeks when “Cypriotism” is inclusive of the Turkish-Cypriot community. Cluster 2 named as “Communitarianism” (43% of sample) appear to adhere more to a Greek-Cypriot-centric identity and being more attached to Greekness although still critical towards ethnonationalism. Finally Cluster 3, the “Ethnonationalists”, that is those identifying with the Greek nation formed 28.9% of the sample. Interestingly, it is argued that within this group some may prefer partition rather than sharing power with the Turkish-Cypriot community (p. 94). Cluster 3 ideologically belongs to the extreme right-wing while Cluster 1 and Cluster 2 affiliate with center and left-wing ideologies with the first showing readiness to encompass the idea of a Cypriot nation and the second as being more attached to Greekness (p. 92).

Reviewing relevant studies has shed light on the general tendencies across the divide in relation to the “other” as they “measure” more dispositions in relation to issues of coexistence,

\(^{12}\) Results available at [http://seedsofpeace.eu](http://seedsofpeace.eu)
reconciliation and willingness to accept a federation. As Trimikliiotis (2010) concluded, such studies provide evidence that reconciliation is possible under a set of requirements and despite that significant forces systematically set roadblocks against this potential within both communities. Yet such studies also provide evidence, even if en passe, that not only dispositions about the “other” but also perceptions in relation to one’s own community may significantly influence people’s stance on the Cyprus Issue and willingness for a solution. Psaltis (2011) showed for example that a majority disapproves ethnonationalism considering that it has contributed to Cyprus’ conflict but also Georgiades has shown that a significant proportion of Greek-Cypriots (43%) consider their own community as not being ready for a solution. An in-depth exploration of such perceptions which are reflections not only about the “other” but also about “us” in the Greek-Cypriot community remains still under-studied. They prompt questions which necessitate a qualitative approach to answer them such as: in what ways do Greek-Cypriots consider that their own community, and perhaps not the “other”, may object to a solution? Does this perception cuts across the traditional Left-Center-Right axis? How does, if it does, relate to the Hellenocentric/Cyprocentric debate?; if ethnonationalism is considered as a “bad” nationalism for a significant part of the two communities, how about other forms of nationalism: do they recognize that other forms of nationalism may exist or if they do, then do they also see them as “bad” nationalisms? Could there be others, beyond “ethnonationalists” who may prefer partition than reunification and for which reasons?

This thesis aims to shed light on the dynamics that the Plan created in Cyprus and how Greek-Cypriots, ten year after, reflect on it. In order to do this, it takes an exploratory approach, avoiding homogenizations of supporters of the Plan and the opposition. As such, it holds no particular opinion about the value of the Plan itself and that Yes or No votes were neither “good” nor “bad”. The thesis also maintains that neither the votes people cast nor the identity constructions that perhaps were the backdrop for their votes were inevitable and static. Rather, the current analysis treats the votes as reflecting balances of power in Cyprus at the time.
Özkırımlı (2005) argued that people become national through everyday contact with institutions. However, as with all ideologies, nationalism and national identifications do not prevail unproblematically or without any resistance. He further underlined “the importance of micro-level analyses for a fuller understanding of nationalism,” arguing that:

In that regard, reproduction can be seen as the outcome of an interaction between agency and structure, or between individual paths and collective-institutional projects (2005, p. 174).

This brings back to Hobsbawm’s (1990) argument that it is necessary to look at things “from below” in parallel to a view “from above” to fully explain nationalism and national identities, this thesis emphasizes individuals’ accounts. Thus, it is important to address the complete division between Turkish- and Greek-Cypriots from 1974–2003. While Cypriots themselves, especially left-affiliated organizations, as well as outside actors, such as the EU, UN, and the US, sponsored bicommunal events mainly over the course of the 1990s, few Cypriots actually participated.13 Therefore rapprochement activities not only did not involve the masses of the two communities, but the groups who participated may have been positively disposed towards reunification and coexistence before their meetings. Media represented these initiatives in a negative light as a rule, suggesting, for example, that participation was antinational (Anastasiou, 2002; Karayianni, 2011). Only specific spots across the Green Line in divided Nicosia and villages which remained bicommunal after 1974 reminded people of the “other”. Thus, most Cypriots’ knowledge about the other community came from schools, families, and the media.

13 Left-affiliated groups organized and dominated most of these meetings, although not exclusively. Karayianni (2011) referenced initiatives hosted by the EU in 1996 in Brussels, in which individuals of both communities participated, and a year later in the north and south of Cyprus in which trade unions participated. The US also funded bicommunal contacts through the Fulbright programme, for example between business people of both communities. The UN sponsored bicommunal events, most of them cultural, as well.
While the Green Line that separates the north from the south is officially a ceasefire line and both territories are highly militarized, large-scale violence has not occurred in Cyprus since 1974. Arguably, Cypriots of both communities have come to understand the Cyprus issue more as “an issue for political negotiation between the leaderships of the two sides” (Demetriou, 2005, p. 19), while UN efforts to control interethnic conflict to prevent a Greco-Turkish war, which would affect the balance of power in the region during the Cold War, also contributed to this form of peace under conditions of complete division (Yakinthou, 2009, p. 125).

Navaro-Yashin (2012) argues that, in the north after 1974, nationalism had not become hegemonic, despite a “symbolic and material Turkey-fication of place and territory” (p. 45). The legal limbo of the state in the north contributed to a sense of impermanence and to Turkish-Cypriots criticizing nationalist ideology (Navaro-Yashin, 2012). Additionally, Bozgurt and Trimikliniotis (2012) point to a great frustration among the Turkish-Cypriot community with Turkey’s “overpowering presence” (p.7) in the north and reference massive mobilizations in 2011 which drew on “Cypriotist” identity. The south is internationally recognized as the RoC, and after 1974 national and state symbols emphasized Greek-Cypriot power over the south that excluded Turkish-Cypriots. Symbols such as the gigantic TRNC flag painted on the side of the Pentadaktylos mountains in the north, which is visible 20 miles south of the Green Line, reminds the Greek-Cypriots of the others’ nationalist claims on the island. These symbols lie in the intersections of a heated/banal symbol: On the one hand it underlines partition as an atrocity conducted by the other and therefore constitutes a controversial symbol and on the other hand it may have become part of the everyday in a time of relative peace, which may have made it essentially pointless to most observers.

14 For a discussion of perceptions of the Green line as a border, see Demetriou, 2005.
In this context of a banal/hot division and at a time when movement across the divide was still forbidden in November 2002 the UN presented Annan Plan I to the leaders of the two communities. In April 2003 the regime in the north opened the first crossing point in Nicosia with no preceding official announcement (Demetriou, 2007; Navaro-Yashin, 2012). Thousands of Cypriots began to cross, and they were barred only if they did not show their state-issued identification cards to the others’ authorities. According to Demetriou (2007), the Greek-Cypriot government offered no guidance to Greek Cypriots in the face of the event, suggesting it was surprised as well. Panayiotou described the events as a form of “revolution,” because Cypriots of both communities massively swamped the buffer zone to visit the other side, “breaking down boundaries and unifying pace” (2006a, p. 31). Complete ethno-territorial division had consolidated with the 1974 invasion, but it ended in April 2003. Psaltis survey (2011, p. 97) has shown that the vast majority of Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots who supported reconciliation (70.3% of Greek-Cypriots and 75.2% of Turkish-Cypriots) welcomed the opening of the crossing points as creating an opportunity for ameliorating bicommmunal relations. Yet the survey (Psaltis, 2011) also
noted frustration and fears for an “increase of crime, losing jobs, normalisation of segregation in the case of GCs or fear of assimilation and losing in trade competitiveness in the case of the TCs” (p. 97). Mistrust, the study concludes, within both communities has been and continues to be widespread and to this end the longlasting “monoperspective” representations of the Cyprus Issue by education and the media has been instrumental (p. 99).

1.3 The Annan Period and its Aftermath

The UN presented a total of five versions of the Annan Plan over the course of 18 months (November 2002–April 2004) before they put its fifth version (Annan V) to a referendum in both parts of Cyprus.15 There were stalemates and periods of significant developments (termed here “hot periods”) over the course of the negotiations. For example, as the UN Secretary-General noted, “most of 2003 was a fallow period” (S/2004/307 para.6). The UN led the negotiation process, strategically aligning negotiations on the Plan with Cyprus’s EU accession process16, considering Cyprus’s and Turkey’s EU accession processes created important incentives for both sides to consent to a settlement (Yakinthou, 2009). Palley (2005) claimed the UK to be the “driving force behind the plan” (p.48-49). The 1960s Zurich Agreements that led to Cyprus’s independence had made the UK, along with Greece and Turkey, a guarantor power.

The UN presented Annan II in December 2002, prior to an EU Summit on EU accession, which would decide on RoC’s and Turkey’s accession progress respectively. The presentation of Annan III in February 2003 took place in the midst of the Greek-Cypriot presidential campaign. Tassos Papadopoulos, backed by left-wing AKEL, his own centre-right party, Democratic Party

15 The negotiation effort started before 2002 (Özersay, 2004) and the Annan Plan was based on a UN draft of 2000, titled “Preliminary Thoughts” and which noted that a single Plan would be prepared and the two communities would be asked to decide on it through separate referenda.

16 It is widely argued that Cyprus EU accession negotiations (1995) renewed international interest for settling the Cyprus issue (see for example Palley, 2005 and Pericleous, 2007).
(DIKO), the Social Democrats (KISOS, today EDEK), the Greens, as well as some smaller coalitions, and Alecos Markides, who had support from some influential members of DISY, challenged the current two-term president, Glafkos Clerides, of DISY. Papadopoulos allegedly represented the hard-liners in relation to the solution (Pericleous, 2007, p. 460) while Clerides and Markides supported it (Christophorou, 2005a, p. 102). In Turkey presidential elections had occurred in November 2002, and the pro-EU Justice and Development Party (AKP) had prevailed. The new Turkish leadership seemed ready to compromise and to agree on a solution in order to facilitate Turkey’s EU accession (Carkoglu, 2002; Suvarierol, 2003; Ulusoy, 2008). Turkish-Cypriots organized massive demonstrations in which they proclaimed their Cypriotness in conjunction with their willingness for a solution and democratization in 2002 (Panayiotou, 2011). The electoral majority of left-wing Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi (CTP) in December 2003 reflected a significant rift with the partition politics of Denktash in the Turkish-Cypriot community.

Having failed to reach an agreement before the December 2002 EU Summit and after a period of stalemate, it was only in January 2004 that Turkey declared its willingness for new talks and this created a new momentum for an agreement on the Plan. In February 2004 at a UN-led meeting in New York, Denktash and Papadopoulos agreed to negotiate. They also committed that if they could not agree, the UN could finalize the Plan and submit it to simultaneous referenda to their citizens, so that a reunited Cyprus could enter the EU before May 1, 2004, if the measure passed. Events unravelled in different directions thereafter. Denktash was make to walk out of the negotiations, expressing his profound disagreement with the Plan and Papadopoulos finally called on Greek-Cypriots to reject the UN Plan.

The weeks before the referenda were tense among Greek-Cypriots, with opponents of the Plan casting themselves as patriots and the supporters of the Plan as traitors (Christophorou et al., 2010, p. 5; Stavrinides, 2009, p. 215). Most Greek-Cypriot political parties supported Papadopoulos’ rejection, but DISY, as well as a small liberal party, Enomenoi Dimocrates (EDI),
campaigned strongly for Yes (Lordos, 2009). Most Turkish-Cypriot parties and NGOs campaigned for a Yes vote. The Orthodox Church’s most prominent representatives expressed their profound disagreement with the Plan (Anastasiou, 2007; Stavrinides, 2009). Stavrinides (2009) characterized the Greek-Cypriot community’s opposition to the Plan as reflecting the position of the establishment:

When the vast majority of political leaders, the media, and the financial and religious key figures described the proposed settlement as a threat for the Greek Cypriot interests, the job of rejecting the plan by the people was a very easy task. (2009, p. 215)

In the aftermath of the referenda international actors including the UN and Turkish-Cypriots alike questioned the Greek-Cypriot community’s willingness to find a compromising solution. By contrast international actors praised Turkish-Cypriots for their will to compromise (Lacher & Kaymak, 2005). Within the Greek-Cypriot community the Yes/No polarization continued and was reformulated within claims, put forward also by President Papadopoulos and reproduced systematically by the media that certain Yes opinion leaders including journalists and civil society organizations were bribed by the US to promote the Plan (Christophorou, 2005a). Simultaneously, the stalemate which followed arguably led to increasing voices within the Greek-Cypriots favouring partition (Trimikliniotis, 2010) while the predominant discourse justifying its rejection by the Greek-Cypriot community is that it was a dis-fyncional Plan (Trimikliniotis, 2009b, p.113). Notably these debates entailed divisions not only between the supporters and the opponents of the Plan but also within the two groups. A predominant issue of conflict within the No “camp” was whether the Plan provided for a bizonal bicomunal federation and by extent whether a solution should be a bizonal bicomunal federation (see Trimikliniotis, 2009b). Within this context, a part of the No camp developed ideas for a solution with the “right context” [σωστό περιεχόμενο] consciously and strategically avoiding the terms “bizonal” and “bicomunal” while AKEL, also No supporter, stressed the bizonality of the settlement.
Officially, both communities through their leaders reiterated in subsequent agreements and statements\(^1^7\) their mutual will for a bizonal, bicomunal federation. On the other hand, the UN emphasized in official documents and statements that the solution would be “Cypriot-led” or “Cypriot-owned”\(^1^8\) (Trimikliniotis and Bozdurt, 2012) in an effort perhaps to downplay mistrust to external actors particularly within the Greek-Cypriot community given that it appeared that the No vote was also let by suspiciousness against the international community (Loizides, 2007). But perhaps this emphasis is also representing an understanding that the Plan had failed to address a set of concerns of the “ordinaries” of both communities who felt, once more, that a settlement was “imposed” on them. Nevertheless, the debates at the level of the mainstream were pointing to conflictual approaches on the solution within the Greek-Cypriot community despite the numerical magnitude of the No vote in 2004.

Negotiations in the post-referenda period take place within crucially different geopolitical and local conditions. For example the RoC joined officially and in a celebratory manner the EU May, 2004 but faced an immense financial crisis, as has happened to a number of Eurozone countries due to the 2007/2008 global financial crisis, and which led the RoC to the debt

\(^{17}\) See for example the Agreement of 8\(^{th}\) of July 2006 between Papadopoulos and Talat which underlines their commitment “to the unification of Cyprus based on a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation and political equality” (available at [http://mail02.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/793035B13B07CD8FC225727C00353501?OpenDocument], the 23\(^{rd}\) of May 2008 Joint Statement by Greek-Cypriot Leader Christofias and Turkish-Cypriot Leader Talat (available at [http://mail02.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/32EA5AF09120DE02C225746300291825?OpenDocument]), and the 11\(^{th}\) of February 2014 Joint Declaration of the two leaders, Anastasiades and Eroglu on the re-enactment of the talks (available at [http://mail02.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/627FB126018F4B8BC2257E60002DBAD4?OpenDocument]).

\(^{18}\) See for example UN Secretary General press statements following Christophias and Eroglu January 2012 meeting in New York ([http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/54BFE6A5257E4DE9C22579FB002E8F06?OpenDocument&print]) and UN Special Adviser Espen Barth Eide’s press statements after the election of Turkish-Cypriot leader Akkintzi in May 2015 ([http://cyprus-mail.com/2015/05/05/un-urges-sides-to-grasp-unique-opportunity/]).
mechanism of Troika\textsuperscript{19}. Then, it is the discovery of hydrocarbons off the shores of Cyprus which arguably “regionalized” the Cyprus problem within the EU and Middle-East energy geopolitics (Trimikliniotis, 2012, p.26) raising tensions between Turkey and RoC but also, for some, creating a new momentum for an agreement. In the meantime, the Turkish-Cypriot regime in the north continued to experience a situation of economic instability and economic dependence on Turkey (see Trimikliniotis, Ioakimoglou & Pantelides, 2012).

The year 2008 was marked by the election, for the first time, of AKEL’s leader as a President of RoC. President Papadopoulos despite having led succesfully more than 75% of his community to voicing a resound No to the Plan lost the February 2008 elections as the Greek-Cypriot voters sent to the second round the DISY and AKEL candidates. Both candidates emphasized the need for a compromise on the Cyprus Issue and as argued their respective parties “demonstrated no major disagreements on the national issue” (Loizides, 2012, p. 195). AKEL’s leader, Dimitris Christophias, finally defeated in electoral votes Yiannakis Kasoulides, a DISY EU MP and supporter of the Plan and achieved election under the slogan “Just [Fair] Society – Just [Fair] Solution”. Christophias negotiated unsuccessfully from September 2008 to April 2010, despite certain progress (Panayiotou, 2012), at a new round of direct talks with Turkish-Cypriot leader, Mehmet Ali Talat, also a left-wing politician. Nationalist Dervis Eroglu replaced Talat at the leadership of the Turkish-Cypriot community and also proclaimed his will for a solution. Direct negotiations continued between Christophias and Eroglu yet they effectively freezed when RoC assumed the EU presidency in the summer of 2012. It should be noted that the main opposition party, DISY, for most of Christophias presidency supported the negotiation efforts or was far less

\textsuperscript{19} Troika is a media-inspired term to describe the International Monetary Fund, the European Central bank and the European Commission. For the impact of austerity policies introduced as part of the Cyprus Memorandum Programme see Demetriou, 2015; Officer & Taki, 2013, Ioannou, 2014.
confrontational compared to AKEL’s coalition partners, DIKO and EDEK which expressed throughout the process profound disagreements (Loizides, 2012).20

The next round of talks which commenced in 2013 between the newly elected right-wing President Anastasiades, a supporter of the Annan Plan and Eroglu also led to a stalemate. The latest effort began in May 2015 between Anastasiades and known pro-solution Turkish-Cypriot politician, Akinci but has yet to lead to a conclusion.

1.4 Conclusion

This chapter has explored how existing scholarship has problematized media-nationalism link and contextualized this problematisation via a brief outline on Cyprus media history and the development of nationalism and national identifications in the island. The chapter has theoretically foregrounded the study and provided evidence that, despite an increase in media literature focusing on Cyprus, there are significant gaps in the research terrain. One such uncharted research domain is the Annan period, which this thesis seeks to fill.

This chapter noted primordial-based arguments for the development of nationalism, but the thesis draws largely on modernist arguments to understand nationalism and national identifications. The approach is subsequently extended to an understanding of “Cyprus”: Neither Cyprocentrism nor Hellenocentrism is static, and the distinction between them can be analytically useful, but only if it does not lead to unfounded homogenizations. This thesis will examine exclusionary and inclusionary tendencies of Greek-Cypriot identities, including those that may emphasize the nation and those that may emphasize the state. We recognise that Cypriot identities can take new forms and it is their possible transformations in the Annan period which is the focus of this study.

20 For the major agreements which the two leaders reached throughout this negotiation effort see Loizides (2012), Trimikliniotis and Bozkurt (2012).
Finally, this thesis concurs with two important arguments which have emerged in relevant scholarship. First, that the mainstream media play a pivotal role in reproducing nationalism and national identities, and second, that their power is not uncontested as ordinary people may question even the most powerful ideologies. This second argument drives the study’s interest on individuals’ perceptions of national identities.
2 Methodology

The study adopts a qualitative approach so as to explore the intersections between media, national identities and peace negotiations in divided Cyprus. While we recognize the value of quantitative approaches, we are not here concerned with uncovering statistically representative ideas of the majority, but with initiating a line of research in an under-researched historical, geopolitical and analytical domain. Our starting point – the Annan Plan – allows for an in-depth investigation into how tacit meanings and ideas related to peace negotiations intersect with identity constructions in the press and, on the other hand, with people’s ideas of the nation and national identity. The concepts of antagonistic Cypriot identities, Cyprocentrism and Hellenocentrism, are viewed through a critical lens throughout the research to guide the analysis. It is expected that this methodological approach will clarify how Cypriot identities relate with positions on the Plan, thus filling a gap that is missing from the literature.

The research design consists of two main, interrelated empirical studies: a qualitative media analysis and qualitative interviews. The media study focuses on data published between 2002 and 2004; the interviews, carried out in 2013, generate “after event” data. While the media study of the Annan Period, to an extent, provides the basic topics covered in the qualitative interviews, the asychronization of the two does not allow for a direct comparison of their findings. The datasets intersect in the sense that the former provides a view “from above” and the latter a view “from below”. In this way, these parts constitute two sides of the same research coin, in line with the general aim of this thesis. For both studies sampling was purposeful (Mason, 2002), driven by the research questions and not by a concern for representativeness (Miles & Huberman 1994; Macnamara, 2005; Mason, 2002).

In this chapter we lay out a “methodological log” of research decisions so as to provide the reader with a transparent guide to the trajectory of the research undertaken (Finlay, 2002, p. 225).
We conclude by offering a reflexive “confessional tale” which situates the researcher within the overall study (Finlay, 2002, p. 210).

2.1 Research Questions and Methods

From the onset, two questions guided the media analysis: How and in what ways did the mainstream Greek-Cypriot media construct Greek-Cypriot identity during the Annan Plan negotiation? and, whether these identities refer to the Turkish-Cypriot community in an inclusive or exclusive manner.

Qualitative interviews aimed to gather data by asking how and in what ways individual Greek-Cypriots perceive that they used ideas about the nation or national identities to make sense of the Cyprus conflict and a potential solution during the April 2004 referenda. Additionally, the research took a parallel path (similar to conducting media ethnography) and examined how participants think about the media’s ideological role during the Annan period. Admittedly, there were endless paths that the analysis could have taken given the richness of participants’ accounts.

2.2 Media Study: Thematic Qualitative Analysis

The method used for the media analysis was a thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 12) which is “a method for identifying, analysing, and reporting patterns (themes) within data” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 6) and one that “interprets various aspects of the research topic” (Boyatzis 1998 as cited in Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 6). As a research method, this thematic analysis boasts the advantages of capturing less dominant themes but without losing sight of what appeared more frequently in the data. It was preferred over other qualitative methods, for example discourse analysis, because the study is not interested in theorising about language, but focuses on the content of meanings rather than on the form and the rhetorical organization of discourse (Baka & Triga, 2010, p. 8). Yet to uncover banal reproductions of national identities, it also concentrated on the use of the national deixis and specifically that of the national “we” (Billig, 1995).
To identify analytical themes, we combined the inductive and the theoretical approaches so that the coding categories and then the analytical themes emerged from the data themselves. This exercise was the result of “the active role the researcher always plays in identifying patterns/themes, selecting which are of interest, and reporting them to the readers” (Taylor & Usser, 2001 cited in Braun & Clark, 2006, p. 7). When identifying themes, we were also guided by the theoretical background of the study, and the themes of interest, which are presented in the analytical chapters, are those which related more rigorously to the research questions.

The analysis took into consideration each newspaper’s ideological and political positions, which were already quite clearly defined, as their positions have been operationalised in the context of Cyprus, such as Left, Right, Centre-Left, and Centre-Right. The aim was to avoid assessing that the selected media data were written merely as a response to events, but to recognise that they were perhaps part of a strategy, and in parallel to not lose sight of the data and their meanings. When necessary to support the analysis in the relevant chapters, each newspaper’s ideological position is noted, recognizing that the media are part of a given society and are known for their political positions.

**The process.** The selection process set out to collect the appropriate data corpus in answer to the research problem. As argued, “[i]n much qualitative research the analytical process begins during data collection as the data already gathered are analysed and shape the ongoing data collection” (Pope, Ziebland, & Mays, 2000, p. 114 ). The advantage of this is that it allowed us to refine the scope of the research to capture the richness of the data. As noted, while collecting data, “it is impossible not to start thinking about what is being heard and seen.” (Pope et al., 2000, p. 114).

**Selecting the media sample: Daily newspapers.** The study focuses on the daily Greek-Cypriot press. Already the introduction of the thesis discussed the important role of the press in the reproduction of nationalism and the construction of national identities in both routine and heated
periods. However, for this study it was even more significant to focus on the press than on other media because the Greek-Cypriot press was expected to provide richer data for answering the research questions compared to television news programmes. In specific, all major, public and private television channels projected negative opinions of the Plan during the said period (Filippou et al, 2009) but newspapers, although most projected anti-Plan views, still presented a larger spectrum of positions (Filippou et al, 2009; Christophorou et al, 2010). As also noted in the introduction of the thesis this has been a pre-social media era while from the newspapers which supported the Plan only Politis had an online presence\(^2\). Although all daily newspapers in Greek apart from Alithia [Truth], represented Annan I as “anti-national” by the referenda Politis also openly supported the Plan. In the aftermath of the Plan’s presentation in November 2002 all the daily newspapers in Greek language projected the “solution” as the ultimate goal of the Greek-Cypriot community while depicting that the “other” (Turkey or Turkey and Turkish-Cypriot leadership and/ or community) set roadblocks to the efforts for a settlement (Christophorou et al, 2010).

Studies have shown that the Greek-Cypriot press had been more pluralistic compared to television channels in the sense that it represented more views within the political and ideological spectrum in relation to the Plan. At the time there were six daily newspapers in Greek language (and one in English) and many had ties with political parties. Most of the six dailies were aligned with the Right and had ties with DISY\(^2\) and only one, Haravgi [Dawn], with the Left and specifically with AKEL as it is officially representing the party’s views. Machi, Simerini and Alithia associate and represent views within the Right: Machi [Battle or Struggle] launched in the aftermath of

\(^2\) A search in the web archive (www.webarchive.com) has shown that Simerini had an online presence since 2001. Also this searched showed that Phileleftheros had some online presence since 2001 but became more intense after 2002. Nevertheless, the online editions of newspapers are expected to align with the views and positions of the print editions.

\(^2\) As Loizides (2012) clarified, DISY after 1974 incorporated various tendencies within the Right: moderate centre-right but also ethnonationalists, ex-EOKA B’ members and supporters (p. 185).
independence (along with *Tharos* [Courage]) by the figurehead of the 1974 coup and also known as “Turk eater” due to killings of Turkish-Cypriots in 1963 (Richter, 2010, p. 179), Nicos Sampson, is ran to the present day (although not issued daily) by his family while his son is a DISY MP. In 2004 *Machi* had a circulation of 1200 copies (Vasiliadou, 2007). *Simerini* [Today] the third largest daily according to Alexandrou (2006) and with a circulation of 6,500 copies in 2004 (Vasiliadou, 2007, p. 203) represents rejectionist views within the Right and the Center (perhaps more closely linked to official positions by DIKO) and arguably is the newspaper which reflected DISY’s position in the 1970s (Panayiotou, 2013). *Alithia* is owned by a DISY MP (and since 2013 Minister of the DISY government) and has been characterised as a “total supporter of the Plan” (Alexandrou, 2006, p. 45) while in 2004 it had a circulation of 5000 copies (Vasiliadou, 2007). *Politis* [Citizen] and *Phileleftheros* [Liberal], the second and first largest dailies respectively (Alexandrou, 2006) although not affiliated with a specific political party and despite claims for being “neutral” (Panayiotou, 2013) still move in-between the Center-Right than the Left: *Politis* perhaps represents views mostly connected with the liberal or “modernising” Right which supports a federated solution and *Phileleftheros* took historically pro-government positions, with the exception perhaps of AKEL’s General Secretary Presidency between 2008-2013, and which also adopted anti-Plan positions between 2002-2004 with an emphasis on conspiracy theories in relation to external mediators (Panayiotou, 2013).

Evidently the Greek-Cypriot press at-least during the period of concern, numerically leaned more towards the Right than the Left and towards anti-Plan than pro-Plan positions. But one could argue that the Right monopolized the control of the major private Greek-Cypriot television channels as at the time no television station was affiliated with the Left and which are owned by big-businessmen who, arguably, opposed the Plan due to their own economic interests (Trimikliniotis, 2010, p. 153). In specific, *Antl* television and radio station head by Loukis Papaphilippou had an audience share of 20.3% and 21.5% in 2004 and 2003 respectively (Christophorou, 2005b). *Mega
television channel owned by the Church of Cyprus and partially by the Greek Mega TV had an audience share of 15.9% in 2004 and 17% in 2003 (Christophorou, 2005b). Sigma television, part of DIAS conglomerate as well as Simerini and Proto radio station and headed by Costis Hatzikostis had a share of 25.4% of audience at the time (Christophorou, 2005b). Studies have shown that all these television channels, including the public CYBC aligned with anti-Plan positions. It is expected that their radio counterparts adopted the same pattern perhaps with the exception of AKEL affiliated ASTRA which reportedly leaned towards Yes than No (Christophias, 2004). All publicly-owned radio stations of CYBC (save from the Fourth programme which at the time broadcasted a Greek radio station programmes-see Christophorou, 2005b, p.2) are expected also to have aligned with the governmental position for a rejection of the Plan. All media belonging to the DIAS conglomerate, the largest Greek-Cypriot media company which includes Simerini, Sigma television channel and Proto radio channel are expected to having followed the same stance and to have supported No at the referenda (Alexandrou, 2006 p. 73). Ant1 television adopted anti-Plan positions and in this regard it is expected that Ant1 FM radio also projected these positions23. Overall, television channels emphasized the views of those political forces which were not satisfied by the Plan while about a week before the referenda and a week after (April 16, 2004 to 28 April, 2004) they were found to be prejudiced against the Plan (Filippou et al 2010).

In a nutshell, existing studies seem to suggest a hostile media environment in relation to the Plan, when it was first presented as well as the week preceding the April 2004 referenda. However, within the existing newspapers there were some differentiations as two dailies finally supported a Yes vote. With this background in mind we decided to focus on the press instead of television and radio channels expecting that this would ensure a richer data corpus. We expected also that

23 Ant1 electronic media are not linked to a print media.
positions of the Right wing press which held anti-Plan positions would be representative also of the private TV channels, namely Mega, Ant1 and Sigma: specifically Simerini’s positions would be expressing predominant views of its electronic counterpart, Sigma. Nevertheless newspapers’ closed party ties is evidence of the importance of the Greek-Cypriot press at the time in circulating predominant evaluations of the Plan among the political elites.

From the onset, the idea to use one pro-Plan and one anti-Plan newspaper was rejected, as this could homogenize the data all the way through to the selection process of Yes or No positions. By contrast the study aimed to investigate and shed light on the variety of positions within the two groups. To ensure a rich data corpus, data were taken from all six daily newspapers in Greek language during the said period. Thus, the study achieved to include a range of positions across the political spectrum and not only representative positions of the Left, the Centre or the Right vis-à-vis the Plan. This sample choice helped to avoid the risk that one would find uniformity. As the analysis showed the newspapers projected a diverse range of perspectives on No or Yes votes in the referenda.

The newspapers which form the focus of this study and their respective positions on the Plan (Christophorou et al., 2010; Panayiotou, 2013) are the following: Machi a right-wing, ethnonationalist newspaper which held anti-Plan positions; Simerini also a right-wing newspaper, which is part of the DIAS conglomerate and which was also against the Plan; Alithia, closely linked to DISY which was in favour of the Plan; Phileleftheros, the oldest Greek-Cypriot newspaper, which does not have links to a specific party, although it revealed its dissatisfaction with the Plan primarily through its editorials; Politis, the newest newspaper in the sample, which was pro-Plan; and finally Haravgi, the official newspaper of Cyprus’s left-wing, communist party, AKEL, which was aligned with the party’s decision for a “soft” No to the Plan.

Units of analysis: Editorials and lead commentaries. The main units selected for analysis were editorials and lead commentaries because they were found to be the most appropriate data to
answer the research questions. This was decided after a process of data familiarization (see below) which supported arguments in the literature that editorials tend to concentrate politically significant symbols (Lasswell, 1942, p. 14). Subsequently, the choice of editorials for this kind of exploratory study was also backed by theory. Editorials are considered the institutional voices of each medium (Perales, 2009; Hall, 1982), acting as a newspaper’s “ideological map” (Perales, 2009, p. 16). Also they represent “conversations among a society’s economic and power elites” (Izadi, & Saghaye-Biria, 2007, p. 141), hosting predominant ideological assumptions in a society (van Dijk, 1992). They offered in effect the view from above that the study was interested in.

This study is interested in meanings and positions, but not in judging the media’s objectivity or biases, which would necessitate examining news stories instead of opinion pieces or editorials and perhaps taking a radically different methodological path. Initially we sought only unsigned editorials to reduce biases in the selection process, however not all newspapers published an unsigned editorial. We used the lead commentaries from one newspaper because they were signed either by the editor-in-chief or prominent journalists of the newspaper, and so functioned as an editorial.

**Data familiarization and data collection.** The process of data familiarization included collecting and reading various articles and opinion pieces from the six newspapers before finalizing the data corpus. It began with a review of the issue of *Phileleftheros* on Sunday, 17 November 2002, after the Plan had been presented. Because the press in Cyprus has yet to be completely digitized, it was not possible to do a complete online search with the exception of some digitized editions of *Phileleftheros*, the only digitized newspaper at all in Cyprus at that time and for the specific period. This exercise illustrated that news stories included more “facts” and official statements and to a lesser extend evaluations, whereas commentaries, written by journalists, editors, politicians or a members of the general public, and editorials were more exploratory. Therefore, it was decided to exclude news articles from the sample, and the same exercise was repeated for each
newspaper separately. Finally, to minimize bias in the selection process and to keep the sample to a manageable number, given the large number of commentaries, it was decided to choose available editorials, and lead commentaries in the case of Haravgi, which are defined for the purpose of this research.

This familiarization process proved very informative regarding the content and form of the Greek-Cypriot press, particularly in relation to editorials. It showed that five newspapers published unsigned editorials and four of them publish them in their front pages. Haravgi did not publish a conventional form of an unsigned editorial and during the said period it did not publish a regular column actually written by its editor-in-chief. But again there were exceptions to these tendencies in most newspapers. Therefore it was necessary to decide which units of analysis to use without jeopardizing the quality of the study.

It is useful to focus on the decisions regarding the selection of units for analysis from Haravgi, which as already noted, did not have any unsigned editorial or any signed consistently by its editor-in-chief. It was decided to use a daily column as a unit of analysis because it resembled an editorial. It was titled “One Every Day” [Ενας Κάθε Μέρα] and it analyzed newsworthy events, and was signed by prominent political journalists of Haravgi, including its editor-in-chief. The column acted like an editorial in both content and form: It was written by prominent political journalists of the newspaper, often by its editor-in-chief, and it was positioned in a visible place within the publication (top-center of the page).

Haravgi is AKEL’s official newspaper, and most of the journalists contributing to this column are members of the party and/or members of its steering committee. Therefore the column was expected to express AKEL’s points of view or points of view of factions within the party, but at the same time it carried each person’s bias, as a classic editorial would do (van Dijk 1995, cited in Bonyadi & Samuel, 2013). Of course the choice had its limitations, with the most obvious one being that, whereas all other units of analysis were unsigned to reflect the newspaper’s institutional
positions, this column was signed. Still it was necessary to include units from Haravgi, otherwise the study’s focus on the widest possible spectrum of positions would have been jeopardized, and particularly given that Haravgi was, at the time, the only newspaper affiliated with the Left. For the purpose of this study, the column is called a “lead commentary” to show its importance compared to other commentaries published in Haravgi and also its institutional connection with the newspaper and, by extension, with the party.

Period of focus. The study focuses on the negotiation period, from the presentation of Annan I until the referenda in April 2004, which as explained in Chapter 1 consisted of several important events. The few media studies on the Plan focused on a very specific and limited period. For example, Filippou et al. (2009) studied media coverage from 16 April 2004 to 28 April 2004, and Christophorou et al. (2010) analysed press editions published between 28 to 31 October 2002, between 20 to 22 November 2002, and between 7 to 10 December 2002. By covering a larger period, it was expected to explore the development of positions and ideas over time. The strength of this choice is evident in the analysis itself.

The study focuses on editorials and lead commentaries mainly in the Sunday editions of each newspaper after an important event took place which related to the Plan. We expected that the editorials would respond by addressing the Plan or related issues. The responses were triggered by events involving elites who were part of the high-level negotiations, either in an international or local capacity (top-down), and by developments within society (bottom-to-top). The selected events were expected to complement each other in the analysis (Madianou, 2005), and all of them concerned directly or indirectly both communities, although some are more Greek-Cypriot centred (such as the election of President Papadopoulos). Of course it was predicted that editorials and lead commentaries would probably evaluate the Plan and the negotiation process.

Initially we decided to focus on editorials published after six events. Yet this did not give sufficient data to build the analysis, so a collection of more data followed using the same selection
criteria. The concept of theoretical saturation is relevant, and as argued: “The study proceeds until there is theoretical saturation – gathering data until no new relevant data are discovered regarding a category and until the categories are well developed and validated.” (Rudestam, & Newton, 2007, p. 108).

This is a timeline of the events from which data were collected:

11 November 2002: Presentation of Annan I
12-13 December 2002: Copenhagen European Council Summit
16 February 2003: Election of President Tassos Papadopoulos
23 April 2003: Opening of crossing points across the divide
14 December 2003: Turkish-Cypriot elections
10 February 2004: New York Agreement
19 February 2004: Talks begin in Nicosia
25 March 2004: International meeting at Burgenstock (8 days)
7 April 2004: Papadopoulos’s televised speech calling for a resounding NO.

When the Sunday edition did not have an editorial, then the editorial of the Saturday edition of the same weekend was used. There were, however, two exceptions to this rule. First, the opening of the crossing points in April 2003 took place during the Easter holidays and there was no Sunday edition right after the event. The second exception concerned President Papadopoulos’s televised speech which advised people to issue a resounding No and which was also made during national holidays and after which there were no Sunday editions. For both cases, data published the

24 Politis did not publish an editorial in its Sunday editions and did not always publish one in its other editions. For example, Politis did not have an editorial on the 29 April 2003 and 10 April 2004, which fell within the period of focus. Overall Politis did not have an editorial in four of its editions and Haravgi did not have a lead commentary in one edition. From December 2003 to April 2004, Machi’s front-page editorial was replaced by an opinion article written by Ouranios Ioannides, who was a guest columnist and an ex-Minister of Education in the right-wing government of Glafkos Klerides. These opinion pieces were not included in the sample.
day after were used. Also, as developments happened quickly after the New York Agreement in February 2004, we used data from all Sundays afterwards.

The editorials obtained from each newspaper were limited to those that had anything to with the Plan or the Cyprus issue. In this regard, four editorials, which were irrelevant, were excluded from the final data set (for a list of all the editorials and lead commentaries used see Annex II).

**Front pages.** A thematic qualitative analysis was conducted on the front pages of each daily on Sunday 17 November 2002, which was the weekend after Annan I was presented. This was found necessary in order to build the analysis in relation to newspapers’ positions on the negotiation process and to ground a main analytical argument. This becomes clearer in Chapter 3.

Overall, 57 editorials and six front pages form the data set. The sample from Machi and Politis consists of the Saturday unsigned editorial when there was not one in the Sunday edition. The sample of Simerini, Alithia and Phileleftheros includes unsigned editorials-- most published in Sunday’s editions.

**Pilot study.** To test the analytical strategy, a pilot study was conducted which entailed coding part of the data collected, in particular the commentaries and the editorial published in Phileleftheros on 17 November 2012. As expected, the Plan dominated the edition; it was the lead story on its front page and also formed the focus of its editorial. The codes used to organize the data were “solution” and “identity”, and those were further broken down into sub-codes. The codes which emerged from this exercise are: (1) Solution broken down into (a) process (b) external actors; (2) Identity broken down into (a) Us and (b) Others. These two general codes were used throughout the coding process beyond the pilot study with some modifications. The first code, “solution”, concerned more procedural issues and their evaluation, leaving aside the actual content of the Plan. The code “identity” concerned references to Greek-Cypriot identity such as references to the Greek nation, history and the state. The exercise signalled that the method was appropriate.
Coding and defining analytical categories. Coding was exhaustive in the sense that all the data were assigned at least one code. As argued, “Codes are tags or labels for assigning units of meaning to the descriptive or inferential information compiled during a study” and “are usually attached to ‘chunks’ of varying size-words, phrases, sentences or whole paragraphs.” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 56). In the process, further sub-codes were created and used and others were merged together, and extracts from each unit were organized into Tables, each of which concerned a different code. Coding was a recurrent procedure, as bits/extracts were moved from one code to the other. This is the “cyclical procedure” which Iosephides (2008, p. 37) referred to when describing how qualitative research is continuous, while Braun and Clack (2006) referred to it as the “recursive process” that entails moving “back and forth as needed, throughout the phases” (2006, p. 16).

One of the advantages of qualitative analysis is the generation of unanticipated insights (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p.37; Mason, 2002; Iosephides, 2008). Indeed, themes emerged that were not fully or coherently anticipated, such as the concept of the “enemy within” or how the press represents Greek-Cypriots’ role within the solution process. In particular, it was established that the category of “us” was constructed in relation not only to the internal “other” but also to perceptions of Cyprus’s international position. After the initial coding, the relationships between the different codes became clearer, and the codes were then organized in a meaningful manner to show this relationship. Each of the analytical chapters is built on relevant themes which emerged throughout the analytical process.

A clarification is needed in relation to the analysis of the national syntax. To examine banal forms of nationalism, the thematic analysis focused also on the use of the national syntax in the data, building on Billig (1995) and other studies that have examined the national “we” in the media (Petersoo, 2007; Law, 2001; Cann, 2013; Yumul and Ozkirimli, 2000; Madianou, 2005). Specifically, the analysis focused on the national we and not the newspaper we (Petersoo, 2007).
the Greek language the pronoun *we* is not always necessary, as the first person plural is indicated by the case ending of the verb. In addition, the Greek word *mas* [μας] is used to mean *our* or *us*. Therefore, focus was also on these words.

The conclusions and interpretations of the analysis may be verified by referring to the data themselves, extracts of which appear in the empirical chapters. When feasible and relevant the findings are quantified in order to clearly illustrate prevalence in quantitative terms mainly for “descriptive reasons” (Iosefides, 2008, p. 28).

2.3 Qualitative Interviews

**Logic and rationale.** Qualitative interviews were found to be the most appropriate method to generate data for this study, and the data generated provided insight into how individual Greek-Cypriots reflect on the Plan, what their experiences were during the said period, and how and in what ways these intersect with ideas of the nation or national identifications. Qualitative interviews are a common research method which “allows for an in-depth exploration of people’s situated or contextual accounts and experiences, rather than a more superficial analysis of surface comparability between accounts of large numbers of people.” (Mason, 2002, p. 65). For this study, the qualitative interviews allowed participants to be exploratory and they assisted the interviewees in recalling events and experiences from when the Annan period took place. It is noticeable that participants provided detailed and rich accounts.26 Because so much time had elapsed between an admittedly polarized period (see the study’s Introduction and Chapter 1) and the interviews, participants were able to open up and explore their perceptions in a relaxed atmosphere and most

25 In this part, as explained in the Note for the reader, the inclusive *we* is switched with *I*.

26 Notably, many participants said that they remembered more than expected, which indicates that talking with the researcher assisted to evoke memories. Nevertheless, the study never intended to collect “facts” from these interviews on events.
probably much less polarized than had the interviews being conducted at a period closer to the referenda.

Participants’ perceptions were used to build analytical explanatory schemes. Metaphorically speaking, this method offered a way to get “into participants’ heads”, and the following paragraphs present in more details the how(s), why(s), and way(s) we tried to achieve this in order to tell a “truth” (knowledge) (Carter & Little, 2007). Overall, the process was treated more as a discussion with a purpose than as an interview (Mason, 2002).

Planning and conducting the interviews. The focus of the study is on Greek-Cypriots who were of voting age during the referenda. This is evidently a large pool from which to choose participants, so to minimize it selected participants come from two cities: the capital, Nicosia (my birth city), and the small coastal city of Paphos (where I lived during the field study). The main aim was to have participants who would ensure a rich and diversified sample. As already noted, in qualitative research, samples are purposively selected to serve the research questions rather than to be statistically representative (Ritchie, Lewis, & Elam, 2003, p. 78).

Initially, interviewees were recruited using the snowball technique (Iosefides, 2008; Mason, 2002), which led to finding participants outside the researcher’s wider social circle. A concern was that people would be reluctant to share their views because the topic was sensitive and, as discussed in the introduction of the thesis, it divided Greek-Cypriots between the Yes and No supporters. Eventually, it became obvious that people were very willing to share their perspectives and experiences. Also the study includes people from my wider circle expecting that they would be open to discussing their views without feeling intimidated as they already trusted me; this is a practice used mostly in auto-anthropology (Panourgia, 2009; Chavez, 2008).

Having recently moved to Paphos, I did not have many ways to find participants there, so I used the snowball technique, starting with neighbours I did not know very well or my husband’s colleagues, who then introduced me to others. Not having valuable “social capital” necessary to
conducted social research led to delays in the process. People, whom I never met, appeared very willing to participate and help me with my research mostly out of solidarity, as they had nothing personal to gain out of the process. It is noticeable that when I asked a participant to suggest others, s/he would start thinking of friends or relatives who were political, active in politics, or had strong views. However, by including only these people it would surely bias my sample, so I encouraged participants to propose anyone, leaving aside specific criteria. In the process, I managed to have a rich sample.

After completing seven interviews with individuals of diverse backgrounds and of both genders, the interviewing strategy was refined. I noticed that participants’ accounts questioned the usual perceptions about the Yes and No groups and characterised them as being too homogenous, particularly in relation to the No group’s constructions. To examine whether this was a coincidence, I recruited more No participants to interview. I stopped interviewing when I considered that I had enough data to build the analysis and when not much new information was forthcoming. Also, I wanted to keep data to a manageable size, otherwise it would be almost impractical to analyse in-depth many more interviews.

In total I conducted 42 interviews, complemented with notes taken during the fieldwork. Participants were from diverse ages, and social and political backgrounds. There were 26 participants who had been opposed to the Plan (No group) and 16 participants who had agreed with the Plan (Yes group). As already mentioned, I interviewed more No voters to examine in more detail the divergence of perceptions within this group as the sample of Yes supporters reached the stage of saturation earlier. The interview time ranged between 50 minutes to 120 minutes. All interviews conducted were recorded and then transcribed by a linguistic professional. Before beginning with the interview, I asked for each person’s consent to participate in the interview and I

27 Notably, I paused interviewing twice to reflect, and these “breaks” allowed me to refine the aims of the study and interviewing techniques.
explained that the purpose of the interviews and the analyses of them was for my PhD research. I also explained that I would not use their real names or other information which would make them identifiable. Most interviews took place at the participants’ houses or other places which ensured privacy and comfort.

**Conducting the interviews: “Getting into their heads”**. The Annan Plan was the starting point of each interview, and I asked a general introductory question, such as What was your stance on the Plan? or Do you remember what or if you voted at the referendum? This allowed the interview to take different paths without losing sight of the general themes that it aimed to explore. Still, I tried to focus on the particularities of each participant so I could explore areas that I suspected s/he would have richer insights to offer. For example, I asked military officers about their specific experiences being in the National Guard (see Chapter 5 under the section Beyond the National: Intra-ethnic Conflicts of Interest). After each interview, I made notes about issues which appeared analytically important – a practice which gave a more ethnographic and anthropological character to the study.

Each interviewee was the protagonist of his/ her interview, and every insight provided was treated as rich and important. I did not share my own views and experiences about the Plan during our discussions, but encouraged participants to open up and share theirs. I chose to be absent but at the same time present, to prompt but not to lead. Admittedly, I wanted to “get into their heads” – although acknowledging this was impossible. For better results, I self-trained in interviewing techniques mainly by reading both theoretical and empirical studies before and during the fieldwork. I used open-ended questions that permitted more spontaneous and elaborative responses. Some of my questions could be characterised as “provocative” in the sense that I brought to the participants’ attention – in a subtle manner – thoughts or events contradicting their own main argument. I rarely used this method but, when I did, it helped secure a more natural environment, as in the real world we often find ourselves in a position to justify our views, and for every argument
there is a counterargument. I interviewed people who expressed views with which I disagreed, and in these cases I followed Haskell (1990) who encouraged to “enter sympathetically into the alien and possibly repugnant perspectives of rival thinkers” (p. 132). In effect, I did not express my disagreement but rather, I expect, that this was not obvious to participants.

As already noted, occasionally, some participants asked for my views during the interviews, which made me feel uncomfortable. For example, one participant asked me directly what I believed. I reacted in a way which allowed for a flexible discussion, by saying, “I am also considering all these issues or reflecting on similar grounds.” In general, I tried not to reveal my stance. This “flexibility” or “conversation with a purpose” (Mason, 2002, p. 62) proved to be beneficial, as the interviewee in this case felt more comfortable to express herself. I did not want participants to feel that they were interrogated but that it was a discussion around specific themes.

The themes that each discussion aimed at covering can be grouped in the following broad categories: to self-identify the reasons for supporting or rejecting the Plan, to discuss issues of national identifications and nationalism (indirectly or occasionally directly), and their perceptions of how they recalled the media’s role in the said period. I asked questions about national identification at the end if it had not already been covered. This is because I did not want to cause them to assume that I would link their opinions about the referenda to some kind of national identity, especially considering how politicized identities are in Cyprus. Regarding the media’s role, a theme which gives to the study a media ethnographic angle, this was refined in the process: Participants’ recurrent references to media biases and lack of information on the Plan prompted an exploration of these perceptions in more depth and their intersections with ideas on the medias’ ideological role in general.

After interviewing or talking to people and producing “data”, the analysis followed with the goal of telling a “truth” (Frank, 2004; Carter & Little, 2007). To organize the interview transcripts
in a manageable way, I uploaded them into Nvivo\textsuperscript{28} where I did a preliminary analysis (initial coding see Annex II). Most of the analysis was then made by hand, following the recursive process.

**Characteristics of the field.** I entered the field during a period in which the Greek-Cypriot community had been hit by a severe economic crisis. Specifically, in March 2013, the RoC had become the fifth Eurozone state entering a sovereign debt programme, which was financed by the Troika. Cyprus was unique in that it was the only state for which a bail-in was proposed and partially implemented, which entailed a levy on non-insured deposits in one of the two locally-owned Banks while the other one was dissolved. In addition, at that time there were no negotiations on the Cyprus issue. In effect, I went to talk about something which had taken place almost ten years ago, while people were preoccupied with the economy. What I recorded in this regard was criticism towards the economic and political establishment in the Gramscian sense:\textsuperscript{29} lack of trust, anger, and frustration. I treated this as an advantage for the research in that the crisis apparently turned the Annan Plan into a more relaxed topic of conversation, allowing for in-depth discussions and not merely political manifestations. Nevertheless, the economy was like a ghost that haunted almost all encounters with the participants, causing them either to realign their beliefs or to reinforce them. Thus, more questions arose that turned my interest away from the subject of “ethnic” conflict and more towards power relations and political subjectivities, which were still very relevant to the conflict itself as well as the Plan. This is covered in the analytical chapters that follow.

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\textsuperscript{28} Nvivo is a platform for analyzing data, particularly for qualitative research (http://www.qsrinternational.com/products_nvivo.aspx ).
\textsuperscript{29} Cyprus was in effect entering “a new social, economic and political status quo overseen by Troika” (Airaghi & Avraamidou, forthcoming). According to Gramsci, “A crisis occurs, sometimes lasting for decades. This exceptional duration means that incurable structural contradictions have revealed themselves (reached maturity), and that despite this, the political forces which are struggling to conserve and defend the existing structure itself are making every effort to cure them, within certain limits, and to overcome them.” (1975, p. 178).
\end{flushleft}
Analysis and writing the “anthropos”. Writing is “an integral part of research when a story is crafted” (Frank, 2004, p. 430), and a good story, a good method, or the combination of the two are never enough to provide an adequate explanation of the phenomena studied. Not being an anthropologist by training but greatly influenced by anthropological works, I took the words of a trained anthropologist that the writing of ἀnthropos, which is an anthropography rather than a reporting on data, is “as an act of making public, of bringing up to the point where discourse is located, the writing of ἀnthropos, of the human being as the only universality of experience that can be claimed, as its main location” (Panourgia, 2009, p.21). As Boon (cited in Panourgia, 2012) argued, there is no recipe for this exercise, “just a willingness to engage in its telling” (p. 21). In this particular case, the aim was not to just organize and present representative quotes by participants, but “to elevate them above being the predictable reflections of people in their situation” (Frank, 2004, p. 430-431) providing explanatory schemes.

The analysis of the qualitative interviews is presented in Chapters 5 to 8. Extracts from participants’ accounts are provided in an effort not only to make my analytical points clear but also to show the richness and the depth of the accounts collected.

2.4 Reflexivity

This study is influenced by “insider positionality” (Chavez, 2008) due to my Cypriotness and by my having experienced the Annan period personally and having voted at the referenda. To conduct the study, I used my personal knowledge as a background, but my objective was to leave aside my own perceptions and experiences and focus on the meanings of the data generated from the two empirical studies. As others have argued, “the ability to put aside personal feelings and preconceptions is more a function of how reflexive one is rather than how objective one is” (Ahern, 1999, p. 408). By referring to reflexivity, I mean the understanding that a researcher is part of the social world that s/he studies (Frank, 1997) and how this could affect the study. In this regard, I
have tried throughout this chapter to be transparent in relation to the choices made regarding the methods used to conduct this study. In this reflexivity part, I discuss my “motivation” for conducting the study and specifically how my personal experiences made me interested in looking at the views “from above” and “from below”. It is imperative to outline characteristics of my Cypriotness which hopefully will allow the reader of this thesis to see how they intersect with the theoretical and methodological choices of the study. The media analysis was more straightforward, as I was not involved in the generation of the data which came from secondary sources. This was not the case, however, for the second study. Therefore this part relates in more direct ways to the qualitative interviews.

My personal experiences, as I have almost always been part of the “field” I wanted to study, had been “whispering” that multiple, counter-hegemonic truths circulate in Cypriot society, but that such alternative “truths” rarely find their way to the public sphere or to official institutions. This absence concerns so-called national issues in particular. For example, my experience at school is that as a child I had to learn a “truth”, which is that we are Greeks. Simultaneously, in the realm of everyday life – outside the school walls and printed history books – various “philosophers” I knew, who had very little official education, told other “truths”. These truths often opposed the politically correct ones. For example, some argued, that we are Cypriots, not Greeks, or that we are not the only victims of the conflict but that we were also the perpetrators of atrocities against the other. I am referring here to close family members, neighbours and family friends, whom I listened to while I was growing up as they deconstructed almost word-for-word mediated and educated-based beliefs about “the war”, or “the conflict” – in essence about us and the other. I call them the everyday philosophers of my life so as to signal how, despite being dissident “minds”, in my view they were not dissident or rebellious in practice.

I remember an incident which I think is indicative of what I am trying to explain. I was still in elementary school, when right across the street from our house were plastered posters of the
EOKA I and II leader, General George Grivas Digenis. EOKA I was the anticolonial movement from 1955 to 1959, and EOKA II was a paramilitary nationalist group participating in the 1974 coup for enosis with Greece. Grivas had also been the founder and head of Organization X in Greece which proclaimed fierce anti-communist positions.

My house was in a settlement area that the government built for the 1974 displaced Greek-Cypriots, as both my parents are displaced from the north. Most of my family, who are of Left roots but with no organic link to any political party, believed that Grivas embodied the disaster and turmoil they experienced in 1974. They considered Grivas the “catastrophe” of Cyprus [ο καταστροφέας της Κύπρου] – the initiator of their personal and collective pain. Grivas remained a supporter of enosis and an anti-communist after independence and formed and led the paramilitary EOKA II group which was supported by the Greek Junta (Danopoulos, 1982). He died in 1974, just months before the coup was executed and the Turkish army invaded. The posters prompted discussions among my family members and neighbours and criticism which focused mainly on those who had put them there. If I can recall correctly, the culprits were called “fools” for still supporting Grivas despite the obvious catastrophe that he brought because of his nationalism. Labelling his followers “fools” served to demote the importance of the event as an action done by people of low intelligence rather than extreme nationalists.

The event was in effect reduced to a foolish action rather than a nationalistic incident. It impressed on me that no one attempted to remove the posters which hung on a public wall just five meters outside their gardens. By contrast, the posters of Grivas’ face were allowed to remain, a banal “everyday” symbol of the conflict, destroyed only through time and natural decay. This is only one incident I remember which along with others initially created within me a sense of frustration: like living between obedience (in practice) and disobedience (in theory). Eventually, these experiences raised more questions about Cypriot society. They led to an underlying impression that to make sense of this society – despite a veil of conformism which appears to cover
it – one had to consider not only what is on the “surface” or in the mainstream but also the ideas which circulate in the everyday lives of individuals. Panayiotou (2015b) has conceptualised this as a “rift” between the hegemonic discourse and the everyday.

The referenda on the Annan Plan and the entire 2002-2004 period appeared to me as a unique opportunity to examine the circulation of the period’s “truths”, both in the realm of the mainstream and at the level of individuals. Conducting the research, what was surprising (admittedly positively), despite my Cypriotness and my “insider’s positionality”, was that I had yet many things to learn from Cypriot everyday philosophers. Their shared accounts provided a unique contribution to this study, and I expect that their analyses contributed to knowledge in general, as they opened up the study to many interesting analytical paths. On a personal level, they assisted me in deconstructing any homogenizing perceptions I may have had in relation to the Plan and the referenda, and particularly in relation to the opponents of the Plan, as I had voted a resounding Yes. Thus, they enabled me to see divergence of perceptions in relation to the referendum votes and positions. I hope that the analysis has captured the participants’ “truths” even momentarily.

Through interviews with Greek-Cypriots, and having the Annan Plan as a starting point, we learn how individuals perceive national identity antagonisms, how and in what ways they reacted to the possibility of reunification in 2004, and how they understand the “self” and the “other”. We also explore their perceptions on the media’s ideological role during the Annan period and beyond. Above all, we learn that these perceptions are not static but come into being in a dialogue between agency –from below- and processes “from above”.
3 Representations of the Process: Between a “Dead End” and “Hope”, and Cyprus’s International Position

This chapter concentrates on media representations of the negotiation process with a specific focus on representations of external actors and mediators. By contextualizing and foregrounding representations on the process, the chapter provides a background for the investigation of representations of Cypriot identities in the next chapter.

The first part of the chapter presents the ways in which the selected editorials and lead commentaries represented the negotiation process on the Plan, either as a dead end or as an opportunity for a settlement. According to the first position, the process was a dead end from the beginning, and the editorials expected it to lead to a catastrophe. According to the second position, the process created an opportunity for a settlement despite certain weaknesses. In-between the two positions, the analysis tracks efforts to build consensus on the process and by extension on the Plan despite such polarized positions. Therefore another main argument of the chapter is that despite a consensus on certain issues concerning the negotiation process, such as frustration over tight deadlines, this appeared to be superficial, but what actually existed were sharp oppositions on how the process and in effect the Plan were evaluated.

In the second part, the chapter focuses on media representations of the role of external actors and mediators in the process. Selected data specifically referenced the UN’s role in the process as

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30 The thesis’s introduction clarified that it is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss in-depth the features and the strategic moves that the negotiation process on the Plan entailed. As expected, however, and as underlined in Chapter 2 on Methodology, the selected data tended to evaluate the process and it is these evaluations which form the focus of this chapter.
the official mediator between the two sides, the US as a “higher” or “primary mediator” (Byrne, 2006, p. 2), the UK, a guarantor power, Greece and Turkey, the ethno-guarantors, and the EU. Only one of the editorials referenced Russia’s role. By looking at how the selected newspapers construct the roles of these actors, this analysis sheds light on views regarding Cyprus’s disputed international position. All of the editorials took the position that Cyprus belonged to the “West”, but they disagreed as to which “West” it was part of: a US-led or an EU-led West. This controversy was most evident in the newspapers of the Right, with supporters of the Plan adhering to the first position, and its opponents, the second. The other newspapers maintained that the process had to remain under the auspices of the UN, even though they criticized that the UN functioned under US hegemony. The chapter also uncovers the position that Turkey played a much more significant role in the process compared to Greece. Through unpacking representations of the negotiation process, the chapter demonstrates that media representations of external actors played a pivotal role in the construction of us.

Overall, representations on the negotiation process and the mediators indicate a struggle which entailed turning the Plan into a message, a system of communication or, building on Barthes (1972) “a signifying consciousness, that one can reason about while discounting its substance” (p. 108).

3.1 Tight Deadlines, Ultimatums and Constructed Consensus

A major criticism in the selected press concerned deadlines set by mediators within which the two sides were expected to agree on the Plan. The argument claimed that UN deadlines were so tight that they did not allow Greek-Cypriot negotiators to present and discuss ideas to improve the Plan. On the one hand some adopted positions that deadlines were in fact asphyxiating ultimatums, and equated them to blackmail. On the other hand some argued that, despite tight deadlines, it was still possible to achieve improvements.
The argument about ultimatums underpinned a general criticism that external actors, perhaps with the UN’s assistance, aimed to impose the Plan, which consequently would not be the result of “free” negotiations. An example is an editorial by *Simerini* (23 February 2003) which asked the following rhetorical question: “How is it possible to reach a solution within three days on an issue which remains unsolved for decades?”

Following this logic, significant disagreements divided the two negotiating sides and they could not be transcended in a short period, if at all, under the circumstances. *Politis* for example held the second position which thought of the process as an opportunity despite certain weaknesses such as the tight deadlines: “It is obvious that the tight deadlines set by Kofi Annan in his document create (very) serious problems for the correct evaluation and substantive negotiation of the Plan” (16 November 2002). According to the editorial, UN-imposed tight deadlines and set roadblocks making it difficult for Greek-Cypriot negotiators to propose ideas to improve the Plan, but it was still possible to achieve a positive outcome.

The above examples are from two newspapers representing opposite opinions of the Plan: *Simerini* which opposed the Plan from the beginning and *Politis* which finally supported it at the referenda. Despite their being written at different times of the process, each argument was reused throughout the process. At first glance, it might seem there was concensus against tight deadlines, but in fact these positions were in sharp opposition, as one constructed the process as catastrophic and the other represented it as an opportunity for a solution.

Despite contrasting viewpoints in the various editorials, the analysis noticed often an attempt to construct a concensus (see also Chapter 3, Representations of Ordinary or Simple Greek-Cypriots). The following example is an editorial published by *Phileleftheros* shortly after the presentation of the Plan which argued that there was a concensus in the Greek-Cypriot community that the Plan could not be accepted as it was. In effect, this particular editorial reduced
disagreements to the explicit strategy about when to reject the Plan: right away or after negotiations. The editorial noted, for example, that:

If these or other modifications of its basic content do not take place, then the Plan cannot be accepted. Whether it should be rejected right away, as some believe, or be simply not accepted without negotiations, this is another matter. [A matter.] which is related to tactics and to how developments are going to be strategically managed. (17 November 2002)

The editorial divided reactions to the Plan into two groups: those asking for its immediate rejection and those supporting that it should first be negotiated and then rejected. More importantly, the editorial argued that the two groups did not share any significant disagreement, but they agreed that the Plan could not be accepted as it was. However, the analysis shows that negotiations on the Plan prompted conflicting approaches and creating a controversy over the Plan. As Hall et al. argued, “Open appeals to consensus are particularly prevalent when conflict is most visible” (1978, p. 56), and as Barthes might argue:

We are dealing here with a mechanism based on a double exclusion” where “one reckons all the methods with scales, one piles them up on each side as one thinks best, so as to appear oneself as an imponderable arbiter endowed with a spirituality which is ideal and thereby just, like the beam which is the judge in the weighing. (Barthes, 1972, p.81)

By extension, the analysis takes the position that to invoke consensus at a time of opposition is a strategy in its own right for attaining a hegemonic position in a debate and for building a desired consensus. This is also an example of how newspaper editorials and lead commentaries often appear to speak in a seemingly non-biased manner on behalf of all, constructing the Greek-Cypriot community as having homogeneous perceptions of the Plan, while in fact it had not been so (see also Chapter 4).

The first practical deadline: December 2002 EU Summit. This part focuses on the positions of the newspaper editorials and lead commentaries regarding the alignment of Cyprus’s
EU accession process to negotiations on the Plan. Such positions represent reactions to the UN strategy to align negotiations on the Plan to Cyprus’s EU accession negotiations (Yakinthou, 2009) so that a reunited Cyprus could join the EU, and they foreground the opposite approaches of the negotiation process on the Plan. The analysis shows that these positions crystalized particularly in relation to the December 2002 European Council Summit (the Summit) on EU enlargement, before which the UN expected the two sides to accept or reject the Plan and specifically to agree on its founding principles. Building on the prospect of Cyprus and Turkey joining the EU, the UN presented the first version of the Plan approximately a month before the 2002 Summit with the aim to “bring the effort to a decisive conclusion in the coming weeks” (UN, November 2002, p.3), and presented an updated version (Annan II) only two days before the Summit.

The Summit took place in Copenhagen, Denmark on 12 and 13 December 2002, and there it was decided to admit ten new member states including Cyprus. In addition, the EU member-states decided at the Summit that Turkey’s accession negotiations could start only if the country could confirm by the 2004 December Summit that they had fulfilled all the Copenhagen criteria (Kirisci, 2010). The deadline represented a practical target because it was irrevocable (Pinfari, 2012) as the Summit could not be postponed. The UN urged Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot negotiators to come to an agreement ahead of the date, at least on the Plan’s founding principles.

31 The UN Secretary General clarified the rationale of this strategy by emphasizing that prospects of Cyprus’s and Turkey’s EU accession provided a timeline within which they could reach a settlement (UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, United Nations Statement to the Press, 1 April 2003, S/2003/398, 1 April 2003, Para 6).

32 Both leaders, Clerides and Denktash, accepted the Plan as a basis for negotiations, despite Denktash being negative towards it. Palley argued that Clerides also showed frustration with the first version of the Plan (Palley, 2005, p.33).

33 There are two kinds of deadlines in a peace negotiation, the artificial and the practical (Pinfari, 2012). The practical deadlines are those which are “beyond the control of the parties involved” (Pinfari, 2012, p. 4) and are “irrevocable” (Pinfari, 2012, p.4). The artificial deadlines are those to which the actors involved, or at least some of them (for example, the mediators) agreed and which tend to set a “target date”.

61
The analysis of the data highlighted a popular position against associating Cyprus’s EU accession process and the negotiation process. Concurrent editorials, published in *Simerini, Machi* and *Haravgi*, asked that the two processes be disengaged. A point often made was that connecting the two processes resulted in tight deadlines which did not provide enough time for substantive negotiations. They supported a “clear” EU accession, meaning without needing a parallel commitment to the Plan. *Haravgi*’s editor-in-chief argued before the Summit took place that mediators “pushed” the Cyprus government to sign “the Annan Plan here and now” (Gkiourof, 15 December 2002). After the presentation of the Plan, *Machi* argued that Greek-Cypriots had had “a gun put to their head” (17 November 2002), exemplifying perceptions of immense pressure to accept the Plan right away.

An example of a moderate reaction to the Summit “deadline” was a *Politis* editorial which argued that the tight deadlines set by the UN Secretary General made it difficult for substantial negotiations, and it added: “The 21st of December is decisive and after this date there will be no negotiation on the substances of the founding agreement34, which will be already signed by the two sides” (*Politis* 16 November 2002). According to the editorial, the Plan would not be able to be changed substantially after the Summit. In this context the two sides were treated more like prisoners of the process rather than negotiating parties. *Alithia* wrote about the Summit deadline more positively and suggested that the Plan, despite its weaknesses, represented an opportunity for a solution. Specifically, the editorial noted: “[We should] make the best of the Annan Plan, without glossing over those sections, for which a negotiation battle will be fought towards their improvement” (17 November 2002). The word “battle” to describe the negotiation process shows that *Alithia* expected that the Greek-Cypriot negotiators would be required to exert significant effort to improve the Plan although it was possible.

34 Reference to founding agreements concern the UN proposal called Foundation Agreement containing the main provisions of the Plan which the UN expected the two parties to sign.
Finally, the Summit reiterated that Cyprus would be able to join the EU regardless of a settlement, but Turkey was not given a date to begin its own EU accession negotiations. In response to this development, editorials by newspapers which favoured the disengagement of the two processes represented the Summit outcome as a diplomatic triumph. *Simerini* for example noted the following:

> During the past month, these [editorial] columns continually waged an uncompromising battle. To prevent the association between accession and solution of the Cyprus issue, based on the Annan Plan. Yesterday’s decision on Cyprus’s accession vindicates our line, despite a commitment to negotiate on the Plan. [...] We took [achieved] the country’s accession without signing an abortive solution. And we secured time frames for a real negotiation of the Annan Plan. (15 December 2002)

It is clear in the extract that the newspaper favoured the disengagement of the two processes and considered the Summit’s outcome a success. The editorial described the Plan as “abortive”, which clearly has negative connotations, even though it argued that separating the two processes provided time to negotiate it. *Machi* (15 December 2002) used analogous arguments that the disengagement of the two processes provided more time to negotiate and improve the Plan and also underlined that both communities could benefit by EU membership.\(^{35}\) However, both newspapers remained consistent with their anti-Plan arguments until the referenda.

Other editorials reflected positions within the Greek-Cypriot community that the prospect of EU membership could act as a catalyst to achieve a solution (Demetriou, 2008). *Haravgi*’s editor-in-chief underlined that EU accession was a means towards achieving a settlement and emphasized that this was the ultimate national goal of the Greek-Cypriot community. The lead commentary supported unlinking the two processes and highlighted the contribution of the Greek-Cypriot opposition parties towards this success although it still maintained there was a need for a UN

\(^{35}\) The said editorial is also an example of how a nationalist anti-Plan rhetoric was merged with the broader discourse (of leftist origin) of bicultural co-existence and which is explored in the next Chapter.
solution. “The next day [after the Summit] finds us at the forefront of this struggle. For a correct solution of the Cyprus [Issue] on the basis of principles and UN declarations” (Gkiourof, 15 December 2002).

The following part complements the analysis by presenting reactions to the February 2004 New York Agreement which provided a roadmap to the April 2004 referenda.

**February 2004 New York Agreement: A road-map to the referenda.** In February 2004, following an invitation by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, the leaders of the two communities, Tassos Papadopoulos and Rauf Denktash, travelled to New York where they committed to negotiating “in good faith” on the basis of the Plan to achieve a settlement through separate and simultaneous referenda before 1 May 2004, Cyprus’s official day of EU accession (UN Press Release, 13 February 2004). The two leaders also committed to agreeing on what changes should be made and to complete the Plan by 22 March 2004. Should they not agree on anything by then, the Secretary General would convene a meeting of the two sides with the participation of Greece and Turkey, in order to finalize the Plan by 29 March which would then be submitted to referenda (UN Press Release, 13 February 2004).

After the UN’s announcement, *Haravgi, Politis, Phileleftheros and Alithia* wrote positively about the New York Agreement, whereas *Machi* also had positive references. The following is an excerpt from *Haravgi*’s commentary:

> The most important thing is that the negotiations begin again. And this is achieved because of the g/c [Greek-Cypriot] side if we recall that it was the g/c [Greek-Cypriot] side that urged for negotiations [to begin] in time to avoid tight deadlines. (Koulermou, 15 February 2004)

36 The lead commentary had also fierce anti-governmental positions as it was written during the presidential campaign.
The commentary, written by a lead political journalist, emphasized the willingness of the Greek-Cypriot side to negotiate on the Plan. It also pointed out that the Greek-Cypriot side aimed to quickly return to negotiating so as to avoid tight deadlines. *Politis* used analogous arguments to state that it was the Greek-Cypriot side which pressed hard for new talks: “Difficulties begin as of now, with the beginning of the negotiations, which was always the aim of the Greek side” (14 February 2004).

It is noticeable that both editorials acknowledged weaknesses and difficulties, yet they still supported the resumption of negotiations. *Phileleftheros’s* editorial (15 February 2004) was not as positive, and referred to the agreement as the “lesser of two evils” but also wrote that some Greek-Cypriot politicians and other groups were uncomfortable with it. Specifically, it noted that some Greek-Cypriots had hoped President Papadopoulos would “entomb” the Plan, that is to explicitly reject it or avoid negotiating it. This is a relevant extract by the said editorial:

> The President of the Republic, Tassos Papadopoulos, in New York enjoyed the full support of the former President and the political leadership of the country. He put up a battle and succeeded in getting the lesser of two evils for the Greek-Cypriot side. His consent to efforts to repeat the dialogue caused the discomfort of politicians and of groups who wished that during [Papadopoulos] his days the Annan plan would be entombed […]. President Papadopoulos through his statement in New York defined as a success of our side the fact that we drove the Turkish-Cypriot side back to the table of the Annan Plan, which the occupation leader Rauf Denktash considered dead. (15 February 2004)

The editorial echoed *Politis* and *Haravgi’s* arguments that some within the Greek-Cypriot community disagreed with the New York agreement. Additionally, vis-à-vis such disagreements, it emphasized that Greek-Cypriots wanted new talks on the Plan to begin, contrary to the other side and specifically Turkish-Cypriot leader Denktash, who considered the Plan “dead”.

*Alithia’s* editorial used a celebratory tone arguing that the agreement set the seeds for reaching a solution within a specific time frame. It said that:
The train began to move and it will travel along the rails set by the last agreement of New York on a certain schedule and following a predefined way. There is no going back. And we will explain further down why. This one-way is unique for Cyprus’s history because it leads to salvation. (22 February 2004)

That the editorial said the agreement provided a road or the “rails” to a solution is perhaps pointing to its provisions that in case of disagreements the UN would complete the Plan, erasing the possibility of a new deadlock.

_Machi_ described the New York agreement as a diplomatic success for the Greek-Cypriot side but shared a strong conviction that the other side would not uphold the agreement. Specifically, it argued that sooner or later “the mask of Ertogan and Denktash” would fall, implying that eventually they would step back as they always did (_Machi_ 14 February 2004). _Simerini_ remained negative about the Plan and the new process. Its relevant editorial expressed a dissatisfaction with the agreement, repeating arguments that the Plan would dissolve the state, and it claimed that President Papadopoulos had no legal or moral obligation to sign it.

_Front pages in the aftermath of the presentation of Annan I_. The editorial analysis is complemented by a qualitative thematic analysis (using predetermined categories) of each newspaper’s Sunday front pages, from the 17 November 2002, which was a few days after the presentation of the Plan. The driving questions of the analysis is whether and to what extent each newspaper declared the negotiation process on the Plan as a dead end, or whether and to what extent they represented it as an opportunity.\(^{37}\)

_Politis_’s front page led with a poll on Greek-Cypriots’ perceptions of the Plan. The headline emphasized Greek-Cypriots’ fears about security in relation to the Plan, but also their support for

\(^{37}\) In _Alithia_, _Machi_ and _Simerini_, the editorials formed part of the front page, positioned on the bottom of the front page, while _Haravgi_’s editor-in-chief signed a front page commentary, in addition to the one published as a lead commentary.
the negotiations. It included Erdogan’s statement during a visit to the north: “Now is the time for the solution of the Cyprus [issue] and for concessions from both sides.”

Alithia’s lead story underlined the readiness of the Cypriot and Greek governments to negotiate the Plan under the headline: “Athens and Nicosia are fully ready for negotiation”. It reported the Greek Prime Minister’s warning about negative consequences by prolonging the division: “The prolongation of no solution and division entail dangers.” By highlighting the opinion of Greek-Cypriots’ major ally, the newspaper gave a more positive tone to the prospect of a solution. Another lead story focused on AKEL’s reaction to the start of negotiations on the Plan, and was titled: “AKEL: Negotiations without tight deadlines”.

Haravgi led with AKEL’s official position on the Plan, under the headline “Prerequisites for the Annan Plan”. A subtitle clarified that the requirements concerned the party’s opposition to tight deadlines so as to achieve improvements. Other news stories emphasized concerns that, under the pretext of making progress in the negotiations, President Clerides would find ways to prolong his presidency and perhaps postpone forthcoming presidential elections. Another lead story underlined that the Plan equated to the solution, and it clarified in a subtitle that there will be “little room for changes during the negotiations and in [the negotiations will be conducted] in the spirit of give and take”.

Simerini’s headline was “Forget Kyrenia”. Kyrenia is an occupied coastal city 28 kilometres north of Nicosia. The title was a statement attributed to the Greek President who had reportedly said it to Greek-Cypriot representatives from Kyrenia. The argument is that the Plan did not foresee the return of displaced Greek-Cypriots to Kyrenia as it would remain in the Turkish-Cypriot administrative zone. Another story emphasized Cyprus’s and Greece’s support for negotiations titled “They [Cyprus and Greece] have agreed and move forward”. The front page also focused on Erdoğan’s position that the Plan was negotiable but underlined his demand for “two sovereign
founding states.” Finally, Simerini devoted a news story to the recently founded “Patriotic Movement of Citizens” proclaiming their opposition to the Plan.

Phileleftheros’s main title was “Give and Take U.S. – EU for Cyprus and Turkey”. The headline is an example of opinions of US’s involvement behind the scenes of the negotiations and how Cyprus’s and Turkey’s EU accession prospects provided a momentum to agree on the Plan. The front page also had a story on Turkish generals’ influential “territorial maps” in the Plan. It concerned information that the two administrative zones and the territories which would be subjected to adjustment were formed by Turkish generals. Another title read “The United Nations do not see any prospects for changes: Every change will be paid for ‘dearly’”, and it is indicative of opinions in other newspapers too that the Plan was a fait-accompli, which could not be changed substantially.

Machi led with a so-called revealing story titled “And a Vatican hand in the Annan Plan” The story suggested that the Pope managed to put provisions into the Plan which would protect the interests of Cypriot Maronites, specifically, to put villages in the north that were traditionally predominantly Maronite under Greek administration. Noticeably, it published an article about anti-Greek sentiments in the Turkish army. The story, titled “This is how they spear [λογιζομαι] the Greeks”, described systematic cultivation of anti-Greek sentiments in the Turkish army. It also had a story alleging that the Turkish army had prepared the territorial maps of the administrative zones of reunited Cyprus.

In a nutshell, this qualitative reading of the said front pages reveals that they adhered to the two positions already identified in the analysis of editorials. On the one hand the presentation of the Plan created a prospect for a settlement, although there were some different opinions, and on the other hand, specifically Machi, Simerini and Phileleftheros underlined aspects of the Plan and the negotiation process more negatively, again to different degrees.
3.2 External Actors, Mediators and the Question of Cyprus’s International Position

This part presents positions taken in the selected editorials and lead commentaries on the external actors, namely the US and the UK, as the driving forces behind the negotiation process, and the UN which was referenced as being under their influence for most of the time. Focus is on the controversy which the role of the two actors created. On the one hand the interest of the two powerful states, the UK and the US created a momentum for a solution, and on the other hand they both were accused of being responsible for aiming to impose the Plan. The sense of controversy was high among the three newspapers of the Right, Machi, Alithia and Simerini.\(^{38}\) Whereas Alithia was the only newspaper which represented the role of the US positively, the other two often adopted forms of anti-Americanism. Apart from looking at the involvement of those governments in the negotiation process, it is necessary to also consider how the media viewed the roles of Greece, Turkey and the EU to complete the inquiry into the representations of external actors.

Overall, the ways in which the press constructed mediators provided in parallel an answer to a longlasting question as per Cyprus’s international position. The 1960’s slogan “Cyprus belongs to the West,” includes a statement which depicts certainty of belongingness to the western bloc and is representative of how Cyprus’s international status was a disputed issue in the midst of the Cold War (Hatzivassiliou, 2005). The main debate was whether, after independence, the state would seek complete integration into the western world through joining US-controlled NATO or if it would seek wider support by joining the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) (Hatzivassiliou, 2005; Ker-Lindsay, 2010). Archbishop Makarios opted to join the Non-Alignment Movement\(^ {39} \) and to

\(^{38}\) The selected sample of Politis was not rich in its coverage of mediators (see also the discussion on the study’s limitations, Chapter, 9 Conclusions).

\(^{39}\) Upon joining the EU Cyprus left the NAM as this was a requirement.
integrate in the West through the UN.\textsuperscript{40} Argyrou (2010) argued that Greek-Cypriots never really considered Cyprus as part of the Third World despite its colonial past. The analysis has taken into consideration this background to unpack the tacit meanings of positions referencing international actors.

**The (controversial) driving forces of the negotiation process and the role of the UN.**

The selected press made recurring references to “powerful” states that played a significant role in the negotiation process, often from behind the scenes. In some instances, editorials indicated clearly that these powerful states were the US and the UK whereas in other cases this was implied. The position coincides with arguments that the US and the UK played the most important role in the process, exercising a huge influence on the UN (Palley, 2005, p.48-49). In this regard the analysis presents positive and negative editorial positions on the role that those two countries played. As only *Alithia* responded positively to the US and UK governments being involved, the first theme concerns samples from *Alithia* almost exclusively. The analysis first presents positive positions and moves progressively to the negative positions. Editorials in *Alithia* illustrated positions that it was in favour of the Greek-Cypriot side, and that the US government took interest in the process, which created the momentum for a solution and catalyzed developments towards the referenda. *Alithia* also had pro-NATO sentiments and the newspaper generally exhibited forms of “Americanism”. For example, *Alithia* wrote that Cyprus should align with the US and NATO, and ultimately it extended the historical slogan “Cyprus belongs to the West” to mean that Cyprus belonged to a US-led West. The other two newspapers of the Right,\textsuperscript{41} *Simerini* and *Machi*, were of the opinion that

\textsuperscript{40} Turkish-Cypriot Vice-President Kutchuk did not veto the decision though he disagreed with it (Ker-Lindaay, 2010).

\textsuperscript{41} This manifested opposition between *Alithia* on the one hand and *Simerini* and *Machi* on the other hand signals historical political cleavages within the Right and specifically between a pro-NATO and pro-UK political elites of the Right in the aftermath of Independence, under the leadership of Glafkos Klerides and the more fierce supporters of *enosis* like Nicolas Sampson (the founder of *Machi* and named “President” after the 1974 coup) who questioned Clerides’ nationalism because of his connections with the UK (see Loizos, 1974).
Cyprus belonged to a different West, and created a subjective qualification that some external actors, namely the EU, were the “good” West, whereas the US and the UK were the “bad” West, and consequently, Cyprus’s international position belonged with the EU.

**US and the momentum for a solution.** *Alithia’s* editorials consistently emphasized that what created the momentum for a solution was when the US showed interest in it and they urged Greek-Cypriot negotiators to exploit this interest and build on US initiatives. Notably for *Alithia* the US was “rightly” the driving force of the process. The following is an indicative extract of *Alithia’s* positions towards the US and how the Greek-Cypriot side should have reacted to it:

> There is discomfort for the momentum shown instead of focusing specifically on the fact that the powerful mediators maintain the Cyprus problem at the top of international priorities, despite the prevailing war atmosphere in the region and the preparation to attack Sadam’s regime. It is fortunate that the interest is still preserved. (23 February 2003)

> It is clear that the US and its close ally, the UK, were the powerful mediators to which the editorial referred, given the reference to the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. The editorial emphasized with relief that powerful mediators maintained their interest in Cyprus despite other pressing geopolitical issues. Perhaps more importantly, the editorial criticized how Greek-Cypriots reacted negatively to this interest. Another editorial (18 April 2004) used comparable arguments:42

> Such a great interest was not there for contempt, but to be taken advantage of. And it is not open to any further distortion. BESIDES, Mr Powell did not leave any doubts regarding the painful consequences that will follow, in case the current morbid climate, which has been developed as such through distortions and counterfeiting by foolish rejectionism, is not overturned. Mr Powell recommended making use of the given opportunity, so that a united Cyprus enters the EU. And he did not forget to warn that: "There will be no second chance." After pointing out

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42 Interestingly, the editorial characterized the opponents of the Plan as “unwise” [αφρων]. That is a word also used to criticize the initiators and supporters of the ethnonationalist coup, some of whom the newspaper was linked to, by those who objected the coup.
that "this is a well-balanced plan that satisfies the interests of both sides," the American minister proceeded to say: "This is a golden chance that will not be repeated in the following decades."

INDICATIVE of such suspense is the backlash revealed towards the Russian ambassador, so as to influence its [Russia’s] stance at the Security Council. That is to halt the US effort of ensuring an active manifestation and a guarantee by the Security Council.

The editorial quoted the then US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, who referred to the Plan as a “golden opportunity” and that “there will be no second chance.” The editorial presented Powell as an advisor, while an earlier editorial (29 February 2004) used phrases such as “practical involvement” and “strategy of the powerful” when referring to the US’s role, evidently, in an effort to counter one of the main arguments of the Plan’s opponents that it was being imposed on Greek-Cypriots – which the analysis already showed. The position taken by Alithia was that if Greek-Cypriots rejected the Plan, Cyprus would be isolated internationally, and more importantly it would be disliked by the US: even if less powerful international actors would act otherwise, what was important was the US’s reaction.

It is noticeable that in another editorial Alithia emphasized a high-level meeting on Cyprus during which staff members from the US Department of Defence participated and reiterated President Bush’s support for the Plan. The meeting reportedly discussed the idea to celebrate Cyprus’s reunification at a NATO meeting in Istanbul. The editorial, referencing the Pentagon and NATO in a celebratory context, is indicative of a form of Americanism and pro-Westernism under US hegemony. Alithia criticized the opponents of the Plan and mainly the government for setting roadblocks against US efforts in the UN Security Council to support the Plan. Specifically, it underlined a Greek-Cypriot instigated Russian veto against a US and UK sponsored resolution for the UN to back the Plan.

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43 Russia justified its veto by arguing that the said resolution exercised indirect pressure on Cypriots to vote Yes.
Unlawful pressures to accept the Plan. Other newspapers’ main position was that the US and UK unlawfully exercised immense pressure on the Greek-Cypriot negotiators as well as the general public to accept the Plan. Similar arguments developed across a wider range of positions in relation to the role of the two actors to promote anti Greek-Cypriot plots. The following is an excerpt from Phileleftheros which claimed that the US was the driving force and the unquestionable leader of the negotiations and also theorized that for as long as the US supported that there would be a solution based on the Plan before Cyprus’s accession to the EU, then this would be accomplished:

At the negotiations there is no progress. Hence the Americans but also the United Nations use/activate other leverage to achieve the desired outcome. The visit of the special representative of the State Department, Thomas Weston, and of the number two at the United Nations, Sir Kieran Prentergast, proves that the international organization will not allow the effort to sink at any cost. One way or another it wishes to have a result. (29 February 2004)

The argument is that the US and the UN would use any means to ensure an agreement on the Plan. Such arguments reproduced ideas that the US controlled the UN, which acted as a secondary player. It referenced visits by US and UN officials to Cyprus as examples of the intense US interest, but also as examples of US pragmatic involvement to achieve its aims. In another editorial, Phileleftheros’ presented as a given that mediators tend to comply with Turkey’s blackmail while “our” side is usually more perceptive to their pressure: “Which [solution] would be offered by the mediators, who usually succumb to Turkish blackmail. And directed with pressures –in fact through blackmails- to our side, as the most convenient and receptive of ‘suggestions’” (23 February 2003).

Politis held a similar position and emphasized that powerful actors exerted pressure on the Greek-Cypriot side during the process in order to protect their own interests. Though it does not name the US or the UK, it alluded to them when noting that “the political leadership owes it to safeguard the interests of the country, which can be threatened by both the effects of international interests and our own mistakes” (14 February 2004). This editorial by Politis, is another example of
how the interplay of international interests is taken for granted as a constituent part of the Cyprus negotiation process.

In some cases the US and the UK were coupled together as a single external actor. Simerini, Machi and Haravgi used the term “the American-British actor” [αγγλοαμερικανικός παράγοντας] and the term “Angloamericans”. This language has negative connotations and clearly points to the identification of the two states’ geopolitical interests and strategies. The three newspapers published opinions, which differed in extent and content but which had as a common point of reference that the Plan promoted US, UK and Turkish interests in the region rather than the interests of Cyprus, and the UN tolerated and supported it. Earlier attacks concerned the Clerides’ right-wing government (who had been negotiating until the December 2002 Summit) that it had been receptive to explicit pressure by mediators to accept the Plan “as it was”.

Machi’s editorials44 present evidence of a form of anti-Americanism by some of the opponents of the Plan within the Right. In some instances Machi mixed a rather left-oriented, anti-imperialistic rhetoric and a Hellenocentric one. For example it charged that US-funded bicultural activities were recruiting Greek-Cypriots to support an unpatriotic compromise (21 February 2004). It criticized such projects for reducing the Cyprus issue to a “psychological” problem and a problem of interethnic relations and silencing its international dimension. Machi, even more importantly, attacked Greek-Cypriots who, they alleged, had collaborated with or who were bribed by the US in schemes devised to promote the Plan. The editorials maintained that with the assistance of local Greek-Cypriots, the US made unlawful interferences to secure a Yes vote from the Greek-Cypriot side. In this context, Machi used the US to construct the category of the enemy within and therefore us (see also Chapter 4).

44 Machi severely and explicitly criticized the US in six editorials.
Notably, Machi’s criticism against the US concerned not only its role in the current process but the paper’s pre-existing views about the US’s superpower status and its geopolitical but also cultural domination. In one such editorial Machi (17 April 2004) described a US secret operation in Cyprus to promote the Plan. It said that Americans “arrived on our island with their suitcases full of American tricks” and that these were “invisible to the simple people with whom they built relationships.” The editorial criticized characteristics of what it considered as “Americanism” and clarified that “tricks” related to the marketization of politics as part of the American way of life. In particular, it described the US government’s use of political marketing, communication strategies and psychology to persuade and secure their own public’s consensus for its aggressive foreign policy called the “War on Terror”. The argument is that Americans came to Cyprus to promote the Plan using comparable strategies to those the US government used to gain the American public’s support for the Iraqi invasion. Nevertheless, it argued that in Cyprus’s case, the Americans failed, as the majority of the Greek-Cypriots were expected to reject the Plan, contrary to the American people, who tend to uncritically “buy” their government’s propaganda.

Another issue raised in relation to external actors was the offer of foreign financial assistance for the implementation of the Plan. Machi compared this financial assistance given by international donors to the US aid for Bosnia, Palestine and East Timour (28 February 2004). The editorial drew explicit comparisons with countries and people considered as victims of the US’s “new world order” in a rather ideologically informed context, drawing its arguments from anti-imperialist and anti-American rhetoric. Phileleftheros (29 February 2004) also wrote about international aid to illustrate international efforts to influence Cypriots to vote Yes. That editorial said that the “foreigners” planned to meet just a few days before the referenda to discuss giving international aid to a reunited Cyprus, expecting that this would influence people of both communities to vote Yes.
The following excerpt, by Haravgi’s chief-editor, is indicative of an ideologically informed position against the role of the US in international relations, and not only in relation to Cyprus:

But there are myriad examples of brilliant struggles in which the people were the protagonists fighting for the ideals of freedom, of Democracy, for progress against obscurantism. I write this for all who side with pressures and warnings by various foreigners that will be exercised on our side to accept even worse things than those foreseen in the current Annan Plan and which is negotiated by both sides. Those who voice [ντελαλίζουν] the pressures as a menacing whip against the g/c [Greek-Cypriot] side and show us the ruins of Iraq or the examples of Kosovo and the multi-shredded former Yugoslavia at what do they really aim? To panic the people that if they do not accept any bad solution they would be chopped by the powerful of the world/planitarcheioi global headquarters. (29 February 2004)

The actual target of the commentary was again internal actors and probably Right-wing supporters of the Plan criticized for siding with external actors who coerced Greek-Cypriots to accept the Plan. The editor-in-chief aimed to confront warnings about the consequences if the Plan was rejected against the will of powerful actors. The commentary did not refer to pressures by the international community in general but specifically to those exerted by the US. The word “planitarchio” drew connections to the then US military campaign, or “War on Terror”, referring to Iraq and Kosovo as examples of victims of this policy.

In general, Haravgi did not adopt the sold-out argument of Simerini and Machi, but rather depicted those Greek-Cypriots who sided with the US as willing “servants” of the US and the UK. Another lead commentary of Haravgi noted the following:

It [the international community] feels that this event is one of its own success for several reasons. In fact, Ankara is forced to enter into talks. Even if the occupation leader regarded the Annan Plan dead or Ankara invoked it as a benchmark. (Koulermou, 15 February 2004)

The lead commentary had a positive tone for the role of the international community to restart the negotiations. Notably, it commented on a greater international community, beyond just powerful mediators. This builds a position that generally international interest is welcomed but that the UN should be solely in control of the negotiation process with as little influence from the US as possible.
One of Phileleftheros’s editorials justified Greek-Cypriots’ negative attitude towards the UK as being a postcolonial suspicion. It characterised the British as a “red flag” for most Cypriots who are sceptical about every British idea or proposal because “Cyprus and its people have often been burned by London’s policy.” The editorial advised that “[t]he initiative of the movements should not belong to the British.” Interestingly, the British were acknowledged to be an “easy” target because Cypriots tended to dislike them, so it suggested that the British should keep a low profile in the process.

Another issue of concern was that Greek-Cypriots should maintain their credibility in the international community. Phileleftheros emphasized that foreigners, not only the US, should not blame the Greek-Cypriot side for a potential deadlock. Specifically it noted, “We must not give the slightest chance to the occupation leader or to foreigners to put the burden on our side of any responsibility for the stalemate which is maintained” (29 February 2004).

In two editorials, Phileleftheros supported AKEL’s proposal to postpone the referenda. In this case it presented foreign interference for a postponement as positive. This is a characteristic extract of the said editorial:

Six days before holding the referenda on our island, the Americans and the British have been engaged in a race to achieve the approval of the Annan Plan. This effort aims at satisfying the conditions AKEL put forward in their request for the referenda to be postponed.

A Machi editorial from 27 March 2004, titled “The diversions of the UN”, was an example of a critical position of the UN’s role and noted, “This cannot be an organisation of Justice. It is a wolf in sheep’s clothing. It is a Trojan horse, at the hands of powerful and lawless contries which aim just to satisfy their own geostrategic interests marginalizing justice.” The metaphor of the UN being a wolf in sheeps’ clothing is indicative of claims that the UN tried to trick the Greek-Cypriot negotiators into accepting a catastrophic Plan. This comparison is evidence of a claim around at the time that the UN wanted to trap the Greek-Cypriot side. The analogy drawn between the UN and
the Trojan horse is also interesting: the UN is used by powerful states, that is, the US and the UK, to trick the Greek-Cypriots into making dangerous concessions.

Irrespective of whether the editorials took a positive or negative perspective about the foreign actors, they all maintained that the US and the UK played the most important role in the process and had influence over the UN, the official mediator. Anti-Plan arguments maintained that the UN did not act as a free or neutral agent but aimed at protecting the geopolitical interests of the US and the UK through the Plan. In parallel, some editorials juxtaposed the role of the powerful mediators to the will of the international community, often as represented in UN resolutions. In this regard, criticism of the UN unfolded in two directions. The right-wing anti-Plan positions argued that it was possible to replace the UN Plan with a European one. *Haravgi, Phileleftheros* and *Politis* argued that despite weaknesses of the process, the road to a solution still had to go through the UN. *Haravgi*, for example, recurrently underlined that the solution should be based on UN principles and resolutions, indicating on the one hand that, if the Plan violated the principles, then it should be rejected, and on the other hand that the UN remained the place within which a solution should be reached. *Politis* and *Phileleftheros* were critical about the UN’s tight deadlines or that it was receptive to acts that favoured Turkey. *Alithia* stood apart from the other papers in defence of the UN, characteristically noting in one of its editorials that the UN could not overtly criticize one side or the other because it had to maintain “mutually accepted balances” (23 February 2003).

**The two ethnoguarantors: Greece and Turkey.** This part explores editorial positions and positions in the lead commentaries on the role of the two ethnoguarantors, Turkey and Greece, in the negotiation process, and also on the ways that the Plan concerned them and not only Cyprus. Nevertheless, such positions were often from the national point of view, and this parameter forms a focus of Chapter 4, yet it is unavoidable not to be referenced here as well.

One position that the analysis noted and which relates to the section “The first practical deadline: December 2002 EU Summit” is that Greece, being an EU member, played a significant
role in Cyprus’s EU accession.\textsuperscript{45} For example, \textit{Politis} described Greece’s contribution as “real battle-fighting” (14 December 2002), emphasizing that the Greek government used its EU membership to “boost efforts to solve the Cyprus problem by creating the conditions for continuing the negotiations after the Copenhagen Summit” (16 November 2002). \textit{Phileftheros} declared every Cypriot [Cypriot here equals Greek-Cypriot] was grateful to Greece for its significant contribution in achieving Cyprus’s EU membership. \textit{Phileleftheros} took a national point of view to evaluate Greece’s role in the process as well as the moral support of the “Greek brotherhood”. Specifically, its editorial noted with an emphasis that if it had not been for Greece, Cyprus would not have been able to join the EU (15 December 2002). Furthermore, it wrote that “when national forces target realistically and with consistency, they can achieve even the most difficult goals”. \textit{Politis}, on the other hand, remained focused on the procedural role of Greece and its significant assistance in Cyprus EU accession process.

The Greek government or Greek politicians became targets for editorial criticism when it was anticipated that they supported the Plan.\textsuperscript{46} For example, \textit{Simerini} wrote on 17 November 2002 the following denunciation:

\begin{quote}
For Clerides, the era of jokes ended. Now he has to see not how he will remain President. Makarios constructed the “Zurich” [agreement] under the…pressure of Athens, to become a President of a state. Will he [Clerides] dissolve the state and Cyprus to remain President with the help of the Pontius Pilate, zeibekiki national policy and…the pressures of the modernizing Athens?
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{45} For example, it is argued that Greece threatened to veto Europe’s enlargement process if EU did not include Cyprus (Iseri, 2004; Palley, 2005).

\textsuperscript{46} Notably, just prior to the referenda, a new Greek government was elected, and right-wing politician Costas Karamanlis replaced Costas Simitis as Prime Minister. It is argued that both Greek governments were “anxious that the Cyprus question be settled without further delay” (Palley, 2005, p. 56).
The willingness of both governments to agree to the Plan caused the editorial’s attack. Reference to a “Pontius Pilate, zeibekiki national policy” is indicative of wider criticism of the Greek government’s policy for its Turkish relations as anti-national. Essentially, this editorial was accusing Greece of “washing its hands” of the Cyprus problem, of not staying on Cyprus’s side in the matter, and perhaps of distancing itself from the sufferings of the “Greeks of Cyprus”. Furthermore, the editorial referenced the controversy of the then Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yiorgos Papandreou, dancing a Greek folk dance (zeibekiko) before the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, while visiting Turkey. Some in both Greece and Cyprus found Papandreou’s dance offensive, given Cyprus’ occupation, and criticized it as anti-nationalistic (Yennaris, 2001 Sept. 5 2001 & July 3, Kathimerini). The then Greek government of PASOK, led by Costas Simitis, implemented a so-called mordenizing project (Moschonas, 2001), which aimed to restore relations with Turkey. This is why the editorial underlined that the “modernizing” Athens put pressures on Nicosia to accept the Plan.

The said editorial also referenced the problematic relationships President Makarios had with concurrent Greek governments in the past. It claimed that Makarios signed the London and Zurich agreements, which led to Cyprus’s independence, under pressure from Athens. The editorial used this as an analogous historical example to support its general argument that the Greek government was playing a negative role as other Greek adminstrations had done in the past.

In another editorial Simerini set in quotes the term “motherland” which is used in ethnonationalist rhetoric to show that Cyprus is part of Turkey and Greece respectively. Putting quotation marks around the word motherlands is evidently a way for the writer to distance her/himself from such approaches. The following is the extract from that piece:

Denktash will require and will demand things that the Greek side would refuse, and rightly so, to grant. Where will this lead the situation? In a stalemate. The “Motherlands” will be asked to intervene. Does anyone have the illusion that Turkey will deviate from what the occupation leader is implementing upon its orders? (29 February 2004)
The assumption made is that in the case of a stalemate due to maximalistic positions of the Turkish-Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktash, Greece will do the “right” thing, but there is an acknowledgement that the deciding factor is Turkey and not Greece.

In another editorial, Simerini was particularly negative about ex-Greek Prime Minister, Konstantinos Mitsotakis, who publicly supported the Plan. In the entire editorial, Simerini openly accused Mitsotakis of aiming to “deliver Cyprus to Turkey” (18 April 2004). What initiated the attack were Mitsotakis controversial statements that President Papadopoulos followed “a dead end stance on the Cyprus issue” and also that he “tarnished Hellenism as a whole” by rejecting the Plan (Christou, 12 November 2004). The editorial did not make explicit reference to these statements but evaluated them. Mitsotakis was already a controversial figure, and the phrase “Cyprus is the prostitute of the Mediterranean” has been attributed to him (Constantinou, 2003) as his reaction to Makarios’s foreign policy in the 1960s. In parallel Simerini’s editorial emphasized that Karamanlis’s government, of the same party as Mitsotakis, supported the Cypriot government’s decision to reject the Plan. So it presented Mitsotakis as a deviant Greek example. Alithia propounded that Karamanlis’s government actually supported the Plan:

The Presidential [Palace] squints and whistles in a carefree manner, leading the way to the sidewalk of fraudulent demagogy. It does not take into account that the majority of political leaders in Cyprus and Greece disagree with it and do not share its aphorisms towards a burial of the Annan Plan 5. PASOK took a strong position in favour of the Plan. Prime Minister, Mr. Karamanlis winked to YES. Synaspismos supported it. (18 April 2004)

By the time that the editorial was published it had become obvious that the majority of Greek-Cypriot voters would vote No at the referenda, but Alithia argued that the majority of Greek politicians of the broader political spectrum (from the Right to the Left) clearly supported the Plan.

Clearly, the newspapers did not refer to Greece with the same intensity as they referenced Turkey, but the analysis has thus far shown what the main positions were. By contrast, the selected editorials and lead commentaries emphasized Turkey’s significant role in the process. Editorials
opposing the Plan argued that Turkey either did not want a solution or aimed at a solution that would render the entire country under its direct or indirect control, leading to Cyprus’s Turkification. The following extract from a Simerini editorial is a characteristic example:

It should be understood by Nicosia and Athens that Turkey does not want a solution to the Cyprus problem. Or, if it gives the impression that it wants a settlement, it demands that this fully meets its own requirements and specifications. That is, the presence of Attila and settlers in perpetuity, strong, guarantee and intervention rights. Preservation of its strategic interests acquired. Non-subversion of the imbalance of power between Greece and Turkey. Cyprus protectorate [Protektoratopoisi]. (23 February 2003)

The editorial argued that Turkey either does not want a solution or wants only a solution tailored to match its own interests and its long-standing aim to control Cyprus. However, the editorial emphasized doubts whether the governments of Cyprus and Greece shared this view. The editorial in a way called both governments to come to their “national sense”. Simerini repeated analogous arguments representing Turkey’s aim as static and emphasizing in parallel that the weak Greek-Cypriot side could not subvert Turkey’s intransigence. Machi also adopted similar positions that Turkey’s aggressive plans for Cyprus remain unchanged, and it warned of the dangers of taking Turkey’s strategic moves to compromise at face value: “Turkey’s goal to set Cyprus under its complete control remains unchanged so as to serve its own political-military and financial interests. This is clear and nobody should disregard it” (29 April 2003).

Another editorial by Machi, after the New York agreement argued that at the end Turkey would step back – as it has always done – and that its hypocrisy would be finally exposed. The title of the editorial is indicative: “The time of the truth and the masks” (14 February 2004), pointing to an expectation that sooner or later Turkey’s intransigence would be exposed. Evidently, Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s victory in Turkey’s presidential elections in 2003, was seen as a significant political development, because Erdogan’s government arguably showed unprecedented will to compromise on Cyprus if this would open a way towards Turkey’s EU membership. Even the fierce
opponents of the Plan could not remain completely indifferent towards such developments, and it is in this context that Machi’s editorial was written.

The analysis noted also the position that without Turkey’s agreement there could be no solution. An example from Phileleftheros is an editorial which argued that to an extent it is natural for states and nations to protect their interests, but it emphasized that Turkey had long crossed the line in the case of the Cyprus issue (by invading and occupying north Cyprus). The editorial implied that in order to reach a viable and stable agreement, Turkey would have to step back from its expansionist nationalistic aims to control Cyprus either directly or indirectly. The following is an extract:

One may argue that each country is entitled to promote its national interests. In Turkey's case the issue is different. During this period culminates a multi-year effort to solve the Cyprus problem. The effort is for the agreement to be functional and viable. There is no space for new adventures or for temporary arrangements. Turkey, as an occupying power, cannot demand any arrangements which will ensure its eternal presence in Cyprus. (28 March 2004)

A recurrent problem the newspapers underlined in relation to Turkey's role in the process, was that it supported maximalistic positions which the Greek-Cypriot side could not accept. Most worried that Turkey would negotiate for enhanced bizonality and separate sovereignty provisions through which it would secure its influence and presence in Cyprus in the long-term. For example, an editorial in Politis (14 February 2004) after the New York agreement noted that: “The scenario of the Turkish side, which it seems to ask for enhanced bizonality, separate sovereignty and more importantly to perpetuate its own presence (political and militant) on the island, must keep our leadership alerted.”

The anti-Plan rhetoric kept returning to the role of the “Anglo-Americans”, further indicating a Western split (as discussed previously) between Greek-Cypriot elites and namely within the Right. However, the Greek-Cypriot side, they argued, had twice defeated Turkey in the diplomatic arena. The first was at the 2002 EU Summit which reiterated that Cyprus would join the
EU regardless of a solution and which gave Turkey only a provisional date to begin its own accession negotiations. In a more cautionary context, the 2004 New York agreement was presented as a success, as Turkey was brought back to the negotiating table. For example, Haravgi noted that Turkey was “forced” to accept new talks (15 February 2004) while Machi used a celebratory tone. These ideas can be seen also as paradoxical, given that all newspapers took for granted that the Greek-Cypriot position was weak compared to Turkey, because the Anglo-Americans arguably prioritized Turkey’s interests. A pro-Plan editorial in Politis presented the Plan and the referenda as diplomatic victories in their own right for the Greek-Cypriot side vis-à-vis Turkey. It argued that Turkey, a powerful country, was made to compromise and to return occupied areas (17 April 2004). There is evidence that supporters of the Plan had a strategy to point to divisions between the Turkish-Cypriot leader and the Turkish government to argue that Turkey was ready to compromise whereas Denktash remained irreconcilable.

One of the positions that the analysis noted and which concerned both Greece and Cyprus was that a solution would be to the benefit of the people of both countries. Specifically, an agreement was expected to contribute to peace and stability not only in Cyprus but also in Greece and Turkey. One of Haravgi’s lead commentaries (23 February 2003) wrote that a viable solution would contribute to peace and cooperation between Turkey and Greece. Alithia (22 February 2004) used a comparable argument and emphasized the positive prospects for the three countries in the EU if a solution were reached based on the Plan. This leads to the next part of the chapter which focuses on representations of the EU.

Representations of the European Union. The analysis has already shown editorals’ negative positions about how the UN aligned the Plan’s negotiation process with Cyprus’s EU accession. Specifically, they criticized the UN strategy and especially the alleged threats made to the Cypriots to accept the Plan to become an EU member state briefly dampened Greek-Cypriot hopes that the EU was to play a positive role in an agreement. For example, Machi argued that
pressures to accept the Plan using Cyprus’s accession process created disillusionment among Greek-Cypriots: “It [The public] listens to tell him to forget the promise that by EU accession and more on that by European Accession that the possibilities for a fair solution and Cyprus reunification would be multiplied” (17 November 2002). According to the editorial, while the people [the Greek-Cypriot community] expected EU accession to bring a fair solution, all they got in return was a catastrophic Plan and threats that, if they did not concede, then their EU accession could be jeopardized. Such editorials however are evidence that even momentarily, perhaps the EU stopped being the “sacred cow” of Cypriot politics (see Trimikliniotis, 2001).

Then, the media were enthusiastic when, at the 2002 EU Summit, Cyprus was assured it would become a member regardless of a solution. For example, Phileleftheros said that the Summit created incentives to Turkey to agree to a solution (28 March 2003). Alithia, used analogous arguments that Turkey would be now occupying a European state and that Turkey would not join the EU without a solution. Such arguments are indicative of hopes within the Greek-Cypriot community for a dramatic Turkish move or some apocalyptic moment after Cyprus’s EU accession which would lead to a more just solution. Progressively, those opposed to the Plan proclaimed an overwhelming support for a EU-brokered Plan.

The analysis noted positions indicative of an understanding that EU accession was much more than a strategic move for a solution. An example is a Politis editorial which described Cyprus’s EU accession as the fulfillment of a dream (14 December 2002). Others, as already seen, used the EU to build arguments against the Plan characterised as “anti-European” or “not European enough”. An editorial of Simerini (December 15, 2002), characteristically noted that the people’s (in the context of the editorial, people equalled Greek-Cypriots) consciousness was “European and democratic” reflecting ideas that a so-called European consciousness is superior to other forms of consciousness and that Greek-Cypriots belonged to Europe. Most claimed a solution should respect fundamental EU principles and human rights and they expected the Plan would have incorporated
those principles. Yet to some, the Plan did not abide by EU rules and they developed a position for a European solution vis-à-vis the UN Plan. Specifically, the opponents of the Plan said that the content of the Plan did not improve after the EU Summit but became even worse. Still they cultivated the hope that EU accession would help Greek-Cypriots realize their aspirations for a fair solution. Using this argument, editorials asked people to reject the Plan, with the view that once the RoC became an EU member-state, it could pursue a fair, “European” solution. Simerini was one particular newspaper that promoted the idea for a European solution and the following is a characteristic extract:

A new initiative must lead to a clearly European solution, and not an Anan-iki\(^{47}\). It would be an unthinkable tragedy for Cyprus in the EU to be confronted again with the Annan nightmare.

(April 13 2004)

Other editorials also discussed that there was disagreement between the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot sides as to how the EU acquis communautaire would be applied after a solution. The argument was that the Greek-Cypriot side did not want permanent derogations from the EU acquis, whereas Turkey did (Phileleftheros, 28 March 2004).\(^{48}\)

More interesting perhaps is how the press constructed the EU’s own position on the Plan. One claim was that the EU did not support an anti-European Plan, like the Annan Plan. Specifically, one of Simerini’s (22 February 2004) editorials interpreted statements made by Gunter Verheugen, European Commissioner for Enlargement, as proof that the EU was against it, and emphasized that the Plan violated core EU principles. On the other hand, Alithia argued that the US and the EU shared identical views on the Plan, perhaps in its effort to show international actors were in

\(^{47}\) Anan-iki means a solution similar to the Annan Plan.

\(^{48}\) According to Palley, the EU was always willing to accept permanent derogations even from fundamental European principles (Palley, 2005, p. 56).
agreement and not only the US supported the Plan. It suggested that the “rejectionists” closed their eyes to the “Americans” and the “Europeans” (18 April 2004).

### 3.3 Conclusion

The first part of this chapter presented two predominant positions found in the media in relation to the negotiation process on the Plan. One represented the process as a dead end from the beginning and that it was not a result of negotiations but it was imposed by mediators who explicitly threatened the Greek-Cypriot negotiators that they would not be allowed to join the EU if they rejected the Plan. The other position claimed that it was an opportunity for a solution. Notably the negotiation process on the Plan was marked by different kinds of deadlines within which the mediators expected the two sides to agree on the Plan. Both positions emphasized the negative effect of UN imposed deadlines in the negotiation process on the Plan. One opinion proclaimed such deadlines as anathema and the other advised Greek-Cypriot negotiators to resist pressures to accept the Plan without improvements.

The analysis tracked the two positions throughout the selected period and reveals where each newspaper stood on the issues as follows: Simerini and Machi consistently represented the negative, dead end point of view, demonstrating their profound opposition to the Plan from the time it was presented, whereas Alithia adopted the second position, arguing that the Plan created a unique opportunity for a settlement. Politis and Haravgi used arguments from both sides, but were closer to the second position albeit to different extent. Phileleftheros leaned more to the first position. These opposing views also inform the argument that there was no consensus on the solution in general and on the Plan in particular, despite efforts in some editorials to present that there was.

By exploring references to external actors or mediators in the selected newspapers, the analysis reveals that the US and the UK were seen to be the driving forces behind the process. In
support of these findings, the chapter provides examples of efforts to cast the US as an enemy as well as an “other” when the aim of the editorial was to construct the idea the enemy also came from within, which extends to the category of “us”. The chapter presented arguments that the US worked behinds the scenes to exercise immense pressure on negotiators to accept the Plan and bribed influential Greek-Cypriot politicians and journalists, who the editorials criticized for being “American agents”.

Simerini, Machi and Haravgi often linked the US and the UK as a single external actor and they used the terms “the Anglo-American actor” and “Anglo-Americans”. Simerini and Machi opted for a European solution as opposed to the UN (but American inspired) Annan Plan, Haravgi insisted that the process should remain under the control of the UN despite portraying an ideologically informed criticism of US’s international role as an imperial power. Criticism of the UN’s role in the process related to ideas that it was under the influence of the US and the UK instead of being neutral and fair.

Mistrust of the external actors, namely the US and the UK, relates also to how those two countries have been almost omnipresent in the history of the Cyprus issue. What mattered was not only their perceived role in the current process, but also the media’s pre-existing views about their role in Cyprus and the world in general, in a historical perspective. In addition, when reflecting on the level of anti-Americanism in some of the selected data, one must consider that they were published during the period when there was profound criticism against the US-led invasion of Iraq. The US’s justification to invade, that Saddam Hussein held weapons of mass destruction, was questioned causing controversy in the UN Security Council.49 Relevant positions in the Cypriot

49 The US created a so-called Coalition of the Willing, initially consisting of 48 countries. However, the UN Security Council was divided, and finally the only major EU countries which joined it were the UK, Italy and Spain whereas Germany, France and Russia disagreed with the US rationale (Yoo, 2003).
press reflected such criticism against the US and its so-called “War on Terror”, using an anti-imperialist framework.

Opinion pieces in newspapers referred to Greece for its positive role for Cyprus’s EU accession. Beyond that, it was clear that Greece officially supported Greek-Cypriot negotiators and positions. However, the findings showed that, in the newspapers affiliated to the Right, there were differing assessments of the Greek government’s position towards the Plan. In pro-Plan editorials, the Greek government discretely supported the Plan, anti-Plan positions pieces argued the Greeks supported the Cypriot government’s decision to reject it. Significantly, all newspapers shared the position that Turkey played a significant role in reaching an agreement. The problem all newspapers had with Turkey was that it supported maximalistic positions which the Greek-Cypriot side could not accept.

In a nutshell, the following conclusions can be drawn in relation to each newspaper’s views on the question of Cyprus’ international position. *Simerini* mainly adopted the position that there are two West(s), the “good” one represented by the EU and the bad one represented by the US and the UK. The target of criticism in constructions of the “bad West” was not the entire international community or the West in general, but “Anglo-americans”. Evidently in this second position, Cyprus and Greek-Cypriots belonged to the good West. Selected editorials from *Alithia* exemplified a form of Americanism whereas *Machi* portrayed typical forms of anti-Americanism. While *Alithia* supported the accession of a reunited Cyprus’ with NATO, *Machi* and *Simerini* projected the US as an “other” threatening “us”. Overall *Alithia* represented the Plan’s proposed solution coupled with Cyprus’ EU accession as the apogee and fulfilment of Cyprus’s westernization given that the US and the EU supported the Plan. *Simerini* constructed the EU as the ideal forum which could provide the leverage to confront Turkey’s aggression and reunify Cyprus on Greek-Cypriot’ terms. The Left resorted to historical repertoires of anti-imperialism but insisted that despite weaknesses in the ways the UN acted the solution had to go through the UN. *Politis* and *Phileleftheros* often adopted pro-
EU arguments expecting that Cyprus’s EU membership would provide an advantage to the Greek-Cypriot community in the negotiations but did not adopt the argument that there should be an EU solution vis-à-vis a UN proposed one.

This chapter analysed the findings of the editorial positions on the negotiation process and the external actors, and has provided a background to the next chapter which explores media representations of national identity. Some of the issues the chapter analysed are returned to in Chapter 4 to illustrate that constructions of the negotiation process and external actors contributed to the media’s construction of national identities and to who “we” are. Specifically, positions on Greece, Turkey as well as on the US, UK and the EU also relate to ideas of who “we” are and who the “other” is.
4 Cyprocentrism and Hellenocentrism: Between and Beyond Interethnic Relations.

Central to this chapter is an exploration of representations of national identity in the selected press. Specifically, the chapter locates the representational boundaries of the national we as constructed by the Greek-Cypriot press during the Annan period. In doing so the chapter critically examines the development of the media’s constructions of national identities by unpacking hegemonic tropes used to explain Greek-Cypriot identity and in particular the Cyprocentrist-Hellenocentrist antagonism. In foregrounding identity constructions in the press, the analysis offers an in-depth understanding of the complexity of the Plan-identity nexus.

The chapter begins with an exploration of the use and the tacit and different meanings of we/us in the Greek-Cypriot press, taking into consideration the controversy surrounding Cyprus’s identities. It entails observing that the selected newspapers belong to an ideological and/or political camp identified with different, often conflicting ideas of national belonging. The chapter presents an examination of modes of address used to refer to us so as to explore the extent to which they fall between and/or beyond Cyprocentrism and Hellenocentrism. The exercise reveals that newspapers used the following categories: People, Citizens, Cypriot, Greek-Cypriots, Greeks of Cyprus, Cypriot Hellenism and Greek. More importantly, the analysis also reveals a general preference for Cyprocentric categories while only a few Hellenocentric modes were used and always in combination with Cyprocentric ones.

The analysis is complemented by examining how the editorials and lead commentaries used history and the state to construct the categories of us and the other. Findings confirm that nation and

30 We noted different versions for Greek-Cypriots, for example G/c [Ε/κ] or Greekcypriots [Ελληνοκύπριοι] or greekcypriots [ελληνοκύπριοι].
state were not in opposition during the said period. Moreover, insights generated from theory of the politics of fear and its intersection with the media (Altheide, 2006, 1997; Furedi, 2007) help to unpack the fears, threats, risks and concerns related to the acceptance or rejection of the Plan and their use in constructing Greek-Cypriot identity(ies).

In order to go beyond representations of ethnic and national identity and to illuminate representations of power relations within the Greek-Cypriot community, the analysis focused on newspapers’ constructions of the role of the people in the negotiation process. We found a similar process of discursive othering of the ordinary people of both communities represented most of the times as secondary “players” in the process for a solution. By contrast, the press constructed solution primarily as the responsibility of political elites.

Finally the chapter examines how the press represented the reactions of the two communities in the aftermath of the opening of the Ledra crossing points in April 2003.

4.1 National Syntax: Between Distancing and Reconciliation

This part explores examples of how small, deictic words represent big dichotomies in the context of Cyprus’s negotiations. In particular, words like we, us, and our were routinely used to represent the distance that separates us from the other while representing us and the other as fixed, predetermined and antagonistic categories. Given the context of the Cyprus peace negotiation process in which there are two main parties, usually called “sides” (Christophorou et al., 2010), to an extent it was expected that the media would represent the binary of us and the other\(^{51}\) using expressions such as our side and their side. In this regard, we found that side would often replace or be used in combination with the word our. This binary formed the cornerstone of many predominant arguments developed in relation to the Plan, tending to homogenise the two communities and subsequently to distance them. Chapter 3 showed media’s use of mediators, and in

\(^{51}\) See also Madianou (2002, p. 186) on the frame of us and other in reporting conflicts.
particular the US and the UK, to construct the category *us*. In this chapter, this finding is confirmed by the use of deictic words which reproduce these external actors as an *other*. In parallel we noted cases which used a more open *us* and *we* which was inclusive of the *other*. Finally the press used the national syntax to criticize political opponents within the Greek-Cypriot community and therefore it revealed internal political cleavages in relation to the Plan.

**Distancing us and the other.** *Machi* put forward that “we have the right on our side” (14 February 2004), reflecting a characteristic Greek-Cypriot position according to which the solution represents a collective demand of the Greek-Cypriot community for “justice” (Bryant, 2001, p. 904). Following this logic, the Cyprus issue should be defined primarily as a problem of invasion and occupation of one state by another, simultaneously recognising atrocities committed by the Turkish side against the Greek-Cypriot community. This is evidently a strictly Greek-Cypriot centric perspective, as stressing how we have the right on our side explicitly underlines that the other is not entitled to claim justice since it is implicated directly (Turkey) or indirectly (Turkish-Cypriots) for causing injustice against us.

Another editorial piece used analogous arguments noting that our side was “fragile and vulnerable” (*Phileleftheros*, 17 November 2002), thus implying that the powerful other is the only unjust element. Being fragile and vulnerable is related to how the Greek-Cypriot community, although the numerical majority in Cyprus, is perceived as a minority in the region given Turkey’s power and size (Yakinthou, 2009). In this context, the Turkish-Cypriots’ minority status within Cyprus is silenced and so is the probability that they also feel vulnerable. A *Machi* editorial used the Greek word *mas* [μας] as *we* to describe immense pressure by mediators on our side during intense negotiations on the Plan. It noted that “We were put in a vice” (14 February 2004) that is in a situation where one could not escape from. Arguments that the US and the UK exercised unlawful pressure on *us* to make significant concessions despite *our* disagreement contributed further to the construction of *us* as vulnerable but also to build unity within.
A Simerini (15 February 2004) editorial noted that: “From 1963 to the present day, for 40 years, we have turned to the United Nations to find our rights”. In this context, we are the only victim of the conflict and our long-lasting struggle to achieve collective justice through the UN is “just” and “legitimate”. To clarify, we are the only victim of the conflict who engaged in a long-lasting battle for collective justice vis-à-vis Turkish aggression and currently, during the Annan period, to resist US/UK-led international “plots” tolerated or even encouraged by the UN.

The use of the word mas [μας] reproduced further the us-other dichotomy as mas, was sometimes used to mean our and other times us. In the following example the Greek mas [μας], meaning we and us, is used multiple times vis-à-vis the Americans and the Europeans, the so-called “preachers” [ιεροκήρυκες] of the Plan:

The Preachers of the Plan made up whole scenarios around the donors. The Americans and the Europeans who will (supposedly) come to reimburse us (can the holy of holies be compensated?). Those famous donors will however meet on April 15. Check the dates, because this is very important. On the 25th of March, we will be called (?) to decide on the Plan having a double referendum. What they are not telling us is that on the 15th of April a preparatory meeting will be held. Provided we will decide the dissolution (God forbid) of the Republic of Cyprus, they will then decide on the peanuts that they will give us. (Machi, 28 February 2004)

The extract is representative of an ambiguous anti-Western syndrome reflected in right-wing positions against the Plan. Interestingly, the newspaper puts the Europeans together with the Americans while eventually it developed arguments for a “European” solution, which it juxtaposed to the Plan. The example used the argument that acceptance of the Plan equated to the dissolution of the state in return for a “piece of bread” or “peanuts”.52 In parallel it confirms findings of Chapter 3 which showed the use of mediators, and in particular the US and the UK, to construct the category

52 Foreign aid concerned external financial support of the Cypriot economy for the implementation of the Plan had both communities voted Yes.
of *us*. The following extract also confirms this finding and in addition is an example of how anti-Turkism was combined with anti-Americanism to constitute the category of *us* in anti-Plan arguments from a right-wing perspective:

The Cypriot man [*Ο Κύπριος*] was not swept aside and did not buy the canned tales like a naive little American. He saw the truth and acknowledged from the outset the copper of the neo-sultans. (*Machi*, 17 April 2004)

Notably, the same editorial, referencing the Turks as neo-sultans, constructs Turkey as fixed in time taking a primordial approach to the existence of nations.

The following extract by *Politis* illustrates a concern that the Plan could transform the RoC to a confederation than a federation, in-line with Turkey’s aims. Specifically, the editorial called *our* leadership to resist such efforts:

The scenarios of the Turkish side, which seems to aim for the strengthening of bi-zonalitiy, separate sovereignty and mainly to perpetuate the presence (political and military) of Turkey on the island must keep our leadership in continuous vigilance. (14 February 2004)

Another example of the use of *mas* to mean *our* is from *Haravgi*, in a commentary, written by the editor-in-chief after the December 2002 EU Summit (see Chapter 3, the section titled The first practical deadline: December 2002 EU Summit) in which she stressed a collective will for a “fair” and “viable” solution making it appear unquestioned. “Our strategic aim, however, is a fair and viable solution for our national issue, which remains within our priorities.” (Gkiourof, 15 December 2002). The commentary reminded “us” that the strategic aim of Cyprus’s EU membership was to contribute to a solution. It is therefore an example of the use of “our” not necessarily to distance the other but to stress that we want a solution. Still, it reproduces “us” as a concrete category sharing identical collective goals.

Overall, the previous examples represent two predominant discourses of the Greek-Cypriot community (at least prior to 2004). The first, more clearly shown in *Haravgi*’s piece, is that a
solution is unquestionably a top priority and a collective aim for the Greek-Cypriot community. In the second by Machi, we are represented as vulnerable and therefore the target of immense pressure namely by the UK, the US, and the UN which aim to ensure that we would accept the Plan.

Reconciliating. The following is an example by Politis, which, although it maintained the categories of us and the other, it simultaneously showed compassion with the other but without rejecting that we have also been victims of their direct or indirect atrocities. In this context, justice appears as a relative concept as history is approached from the perspective of both communities to claim that both suffered as a result of the ethnic conflicts:

We will always remember ’74, but and the Turkish-Cypriots will always recall ’63. For no one will there be full justice. (Politis, 17 April 2004)

Although the master categories of us/other are maintained through deictic words, the suffering of the other is explicitly acknowledged. While the editorial acknowledged the collective suffering of the Greek-Cypriot community by referring to the 1974 war, it also referenced 1963, a period characterized by intercommunal strife that severely affected the Turkish-Cypriot community. Subsequently the editorial also acknowledged the suffering of the other in an effort to show how “justice” can be subjective vis-à-vis nationalist repertoires which tend to focus only on our suffering, silencing the suffering of the other.

An editorial in Alithia, in the wake of the crossings opening in April 2003, used the first person plural to speak of all Cypriots, noting that: “It appears again before us the opportunity to transform our land into a paradise.” In this context it is more probable that us included all Cypriots, or at least, the Turkish-Cypriots and the Greek-Cypriots. Additionally, our is used in an inclusive manner to emphasize Cyprus as the common “patria” of both communities. The editorial suggested transcending the ethnic divide towards a new paradigm of coexistence and reunification opening the boundaries of we.
**Internal political cleavages.** The analysis also unpacked critical uses of the first person plural *us*, illustrating significant internal political cleavages in relation to the Plan and the solution in general. For example, an editorial by *Alithia* (13 April 2004) fiercely criticized the Greek-Cypriot government for promoting a catastrophic rejection of the Plan that would leave *us* in a limbo: “We were suddenly found in a sea of confusion, in which we sail without a compass and without a safe destination, seeking excuses and pretexts for a catastrophic denial.”

The extract described the entire Greek-Cypriot community as sailing in a “sea of confusion” because of Papadopoulos’ government’s decision to reject the Plan. It predicted that the rejection of the Plan would be catastrophic. A *Politis* editorial also used *we* to criticize the Greek-Cypriot community and specifically the polarization between Yes and No supporters, noting that “we have succeeded, once more, to be split into two camps” (22 February 2004). Polarization is criticized as our repetitive idiom in times of crisis. In another example, an editorial by *Simerini* criticized “our people” and foreigners for aiming to dissolve the state (December, 15 2002) while the following extract, by *Phileleftheros*, emphasized that the national interest should be prioritized:

> The national interest arises above everything else. The times our place goes through currently are too dramatic to not trouble all of us and hasten to send a clear message of marginalisation for all those who find discord to be convenient. (13 April 2004)

The editorial, by sending a warning to those “who find discord to be convenient,” underlines a concern with internal disagreements, pointing to polarizing and conflicting approaches to the Plan among Greek-Cypriot political elites. The aim it is to achieve some kind of national conformity and consensus and which evidently did not exist.

### 4.2 Forms of Identities: Mixing Modes of Address

To unpack complexities related to identity antagonisms and competitive forms of nationalism this part examines the modes of address of each newspaper. Specifically we noticed the
following categories used in the newspapers we studied to refer to us: people, citizens, Cypriot, Greek-Cypriots, Greeks of Cyprus, Cypriot Hellenism and Greek. The analysis revealed a general preference towards Cyprocentric categories during the period studied as our sample used only a few Hellenocentric terms and always in combination with Cyprocentric ones. In particular, *Simerini*, *Phileleftheros* and *Machi*, using Hellenocentric terms, were negative towards the Plan, whereas *Politis* and *Alithia*, which supported the Plan, and left-wing *Haravgi*, avoided Greek-centric categories. *Simerini*, *Machi* and *Phileleftheros* switched between Hellenocentric and Cyprocentric categories even within the same paragraph of the same editorial. All newspapers used the categories people, citizens and Cypriot as homologous to Greek-Cypriots and to a lesser extent to both communities. Overall to speak of both communities, editorials and lead commentaries used references such as “Greek-Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots” or compatriots or to the “entire Cypriot people”.

Table 1 quantifies the uses of the different categories by each newspaper, and the data studied shows all newspapers have a general preference towards Cyprocentric categories, which foregrounds the argument that the few Hellenocentric terms used were still combined with Cyprocentric ones. Table 2 provides examples from the data for each category.53

53 Few editorials referred to other Cypriot minorities like Armenians, Maronites or Latins.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>Simerini</th>
<th>Machi</th>
<th>Phileleftheros</th>
<th>Aithia</th>
<th>Politis</th>
<th>Haravgi</th>
<th>Avg.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People/citizens/Cypriot=Greek-Cypriot</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>47.62</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>38.46</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>41.67</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens/People/Cypriot=All Cypriots</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.52</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15.38</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16.67</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>60.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek-Cypriots</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19.05</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15.38</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>41.67</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek(s) of Cyprus/Cypriot Hellenism</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23.81</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23.08</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16.67</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greeks</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.76</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8.33</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2
Examples of Cyprocentric and Hellenocentric Categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Sample Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cypriot=Greek-Cypriot</td>
<td>And the last Cypriot knows [All Cypriots know] and also recognizes that If it wasn’t for Greece and more particular, if it wasn’t for some steersmen of the national policy [for Cyprus to access the EU], this major goal would have not been achieved. <em>(Phileleftheros, 15 December 2002)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People=Greek-Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots</td>
<td>A people that demands and requires justice cannot be trapped again in injustice. <em>(Alithia, 29 April 2003)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cypriots=Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots</td>
<td>Cypriots are hostages of Ertogan <em>(Koulermou, N., 21 December 2003)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek-Cypriot</td>
<td>Can the Greek-Cypriot man feel vindicated based on historical precedent and current data? Our answer is YES! <em>(Politis, 17 April 2004)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek(s) of Cyprus</td>
<td>The Greek [man] of Cyprus is not a nomad on this land <em>(Machi, 17 April 2004)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greeks</td>
<td>The Greeks have already responded with a thunderous NO to this blackmail. <em>(Simerini, 28 March 2004)</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the first example of Table 2, it is argued that “even the last Cypriot [All Cypriots] recognizes Hellas’s [sic] contribution to Cyprus’s EU accession.” In this context, the term *Cypriot* is not inclusive of both communities as in the “last Cypriot” only Greek-Cypriots can be included. On the one hand this use of Cypriot to mean Greek-Cypriots blurred the lines between being Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot, implying that Cyprus includes only Greek-Cypriots to the exclusion of all others, but on the other hand it emphasizes Cypriotness rather than Greekness. In some cases the boundaries of “people” or “Cypriot” could be interpreted either as exclusive or inclusive of the Turkish-Cypriot. For example, in a *Phileleftheros* editorial argued that most Cypriots are suspicious
of the UK (18 April 2004). In this context, Cypriots could be referred to as including or excluding other Cypriots; nevertheless, it is a Cyprocentric rather than Hellenocentric reference.

The second example of Table 2, written by Alithia after the opening of crossing points, “people” is used to refer to the Cypriot people which consist of both communities. In this regard the concept of justice cuts across the two communities as a mutual concern rather than strictly community-based. In Haravgi’s commentary by a prominent political journalist of the newspaper, the use of Cypriot is inclusive of all Cypriots who are set as one people vis-à-vis Turkey’s aggression.

In Table 2, the extract by Machi is an example of the use of a nationalist rhetoric to reject the Plan. Greeks arguably have been here eternally while reference to nomads vis-à-vis us is a negative representation of other people and cultures as inferior. Still the same editorial also suggested that Cypriots resisted American pro-Plan plots and thus did not undervalue Cypriotness. In the last extract of Table 2 Simerini used the category Greeks, suggesting that rejecting the Plan was an act of national resistance to blackmail by mediators, particularly the US and the UK. However Simerini’s editorials used Cyprocentric codes extensively, exemplifying the predominant argument “to reject the Plan to preserve the state” (analyzed furthered in this chapter in the section titled “Cyprocentric and Hellenocentric codes: History and the state”).

The analysis recorded a significant shift after the opening of the crossing points when people of both communities embraced one another en masse despite having lived apart for the past 30 years. Even Machi and Simerini employed terms underlining commonalities such as “simply Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot” (Simerini, 29 April 2003) or a “civil society” that transcended the leadership (30 April 2003). There were also calls for “responsible behaviour” (Machi, 29 April 2003) or to not visit our occupied land as tourists (Haravgi, 29 April 2003; Phileleftheros, 30 April 2003) or shoppers (Politis 29 April 2003), which demonstrates a concern that people crossing were
crossing not only their internal “border” but also the borderline of a nationally correct behaviour (see also Chapter 4, section “The Rupture: Opening of the First Crossing Point”).

Notably, editorials and lead commentaries did not consistently use the same mode to address the audience or to specify who we are. In particular, as Table 1 shows, a mixture of various and often opposing identifications is more prevalent in Simerini and Machi. The following by Simerini (28 March 2004) is another indicative example of this tendency:

A new Zurich cannot be revived or haunted in Lucerne, Switzerland. The Cypriot people cannot be slaughtered again like in 1960. In these five historic days [the following] will be judged: [...] The Republic of CYPRUS, namely the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus, are facing a constitutional and legal abomination. The Annan Plan leads to dissolving the Republic of Cyprus, which has endured the Turkish-rebellion [τουρκοανταρσύα], the coup, and the Turkish invasion and occupation. It [the plan] tightens the collective freedom of 700,000 Greeks in a fatal loop.

In this short extract three categories are used to refer to us. At the beginning it is argued that the Cypriot people cannot be slaughtered as in 1960. Evidently in this context the people are Greek-Cypriot and not other communities. In writing about the other, the category Turks of Cyprus is used, which is a term often used from an ethnonationalist perspective to emphasize Turkishness instead of Cypriotness (Papadakis, 2008b). At the end of the paragraph it is argued that the Plan was endangering the collective freedom of Greeks, emphasizing belonging to the Greek nation. The following extract, again by Simerini, used two categories: the Cypriot Greeks and the Greek-Cypriots (G/c). It is in a way reconciling the enthnonationalist/Hellenocentric rhetoric with the Cyprocentric to campaign for the rejection of the Plan. It represents an interesting mixture of rhetoric that goes beyond being merely Greek or merely Cypriot and beyond being a Greek of Cyprus as the following, also by Simerini, did:

1. All Cypriot Greeks [Έλληνες Κύπριοι] want a solution. A fair, neat solution for which they fought for decades.
2. They want a viable and fair solution. If it is not fair, it is not viable. And if it is not viable, it will not be a solution, it will lead to disintegration.
3. G/c and T/c want to live, coexist, and cooperate in peace. Yet, if there is no feeling of security and respect for human rights and democratic principles, coexistence will be a chimera and an illusion. (15 December 2002)

The extract started by the category Cypriot Greeks, which is different from Greek-Cypriots and emphasizes Greekness. Then the category G/c is used, which is usually found in leftist or liberal discourse and carries different symbolism and content and tends to conflict with the category Greeks of Cyprus. Also in referring to the Turkish-Cypriots the editorial used the more Cyprocentric term T/c and not for example Turks of Cyprus. So, we see the use of Hellenocentric modes of address alongside Cyprocentric categories.

The following extract by Haravgi began with a reference to the Cypriot people, seemingly the Greek-Cypriots, and then explicitly referred to Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots:

Thus, the Cypriot people expects the Secretary General of the UN to focus not on placating Angara and Denktas or on legitimizing the results of the Turkish invasion and the 29-year-old occupation of 37% of Cyprus by Attila.

The Cypriot people expects UN representatives to lead to the lifting of the Turkish intransigence and to pave the way for a solution based on the resolutions and decisions of the UN, ensuring a state with a single sovereignty, a single citizenship, and a single international persona and guaranteeing human rights and freedoms for all citizens, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots alike. (Constantinou, 23 February 2003).

In the context of the lead commentary, Cypriot people cannot be but the Greek Cypriot community as it is noted that the Cypriot people expected the Secretary General of the UN to be neutral and leave aside pro-Turkey biases. This clearly cannot be considered as a general demand of all Cypriots. At the end, the demand for one state and a appropriate solution is requested in the name of both communities.
4.3 Cyprocentric and Hellenocentric Codes: History and the State

This section explores the ways in which editorials and lead commentaries referenced history and the state to build arguments in defence of the Plan or to criticize it. By focusing on the uses of state and history, the analysis confirmed shifts between Hellenocentrism and Cyprocentrism, even in the same paragraph of the same editorial, which contribute towards confirming our claim that the confrontation of nation-state was not prominent during the said period. The nation as a community is imagined as having its own history but also a future destiny (Anderson, 2006), or as elsewhere argued the nation as an imagined community is complemented “by a glorious past and by expectations about the future” (Yumul & Özkırımlı, 2000, p. 798). For the case of Cyprus, as thoroughly elaborated in the thesis’s introduction, state and history are used by Cyprocentrists and Hellenocentrists to construct who we are. Identification with the state has historically been attributed to Cypriotists and stressing the Greek nation to Hellenocentrists while both interpret history in different ways to ensure ideological hegemony over the present (Mavratsas, 1997, p. 731).

The history of the state and the history of the nation. Simerini, in one of its editorials (15 February 2004), expressed a profound frustration with the Plan using a logic based on the last 50 years of Cyprus history: “The people, however, and their real life do not go into diplomatic folders. This is what the history of all people says, especially the Cypriot history of the last 50 years....”

The editorial asked Greek-Cypriots to consider Cypriot history over the last 50 years and resist immense pressures and to reject the Plan. An editorial by right-wing Machi, titled “9000 years of history are staring at you” (17 April 2004), called for a rejection of the Plan based on a more prolonged history, going back to the time that the island was first inhabited. In the actual content, Machi’s editorial (see also Table 2) noted the following which is an example of supporting No by emphasizing the history of the Greek nation:
The Greek [man] of Cyprus is not a nomad in this land. He did not come as a conqueror or a predator. He was here since the beginning of time and space. He therefore has a “diachronic historical consciousness.” He can feel 9,000 years of history staring at him!

Evidently, the last 50 years of Cyprus history, in Simerini’s commentary, coincide with the history of the state, whereas reference to a prolonged history and how Greeks have been in Cyprus since “the beginning of time and space” emphasizes the history of the Greek nation. The two examples represent respectively two national historical tales that, as Anderson (2006) would argue, emerge from long-lasting battles for hegemony and which were in opposition during other historical periods: the one builds our national identity mostly around the entity of the state and the other around the nation which has a historic continuity. Yet, they both aimed at the rejection of the Plan.

In the first extract by Simerini, a version of contemporary Cypriot history takes its place in the public sphere in a celebrated manner, though delayed, given that focusing on Cypriotness instead of Greekness was considered anti-national by Greek nationalists in Cyprus. Thus, the rejection of the Plan focuses on a very recent past of just 50 years and undermines elements of the ethnonationalist rhetoric that Cyprus’ history is unworthy in relation to the history of Hellenism. As already noted, the last 50 years, coincide with the history of the RoC: they include the anti-colonial struggles – namely EOKA I (1955-1959) – leading to independence despite that it aimed at enosis and the post-independence years, during which the existence of the state was challenged in many ways. In another editorial, Simerini (28 March 2004) specified these “fifty years of Cypriot history” to include the so-called Turkish mutiny [τουρκοανταρσύα], the July 1974 Greek Junta-instigated coup against the Greek-Cypriot President, and the Turkish invasion and occupation, and it argued that “[t]he Cypriot people cannot be slaughtered again like in 1960.” The year 1960 is the year of Cyprus’s independence, and reference to slaughter is indicative of predominant perceptions among the Greek-Cypriot community that the agreements leading to independence were against Greek-Cypriots and that they carried the seeds of the bicomunal strife which followed. The events that
the editorial referred to are represented as tying together the Greek-Cypriot community after having challenged the existence of the state. According to the editorial, the Plan is their current equivalent. Other events which took place within these 50 years are selectively silenced, such as the bicomunal strife or the Left-Right conflict. The use of the term Turkish mutiny in the same Simerini editorial is indicative of a restrictive form of Cypriotism, as the term is usually used to refer to intercommunal violence as instigated only by Turkey and/or with the Turkish-Cypriots. Nevertheless, the editorial asked the Greek-Cypriot community to associate with the particular history that is strategically limited, primarily concerned with themselves and not the entire Greek nation, and they were asked to reject the Plan.

Overall, the examples provided by Simerini and which refer to history to justify the rejection of the Plan, despite being Cyprocentric, still exclude the Turkish-Cypriot community. In this regard, they are examples of Greek-Cypriot centric approaches, representing them as “victims” but also resisters, and conflate Cypriotness with being Greek-Cypriot, thus implying that Greek-Cypriots are the only victims of Cyprus turbulent history. The negotiations on the Plan are represented as a contemporary analogous event to stimulate a sense of continuity and unity to support anti-Plan positions. The Plan, like the 1960s agreements, gives too much to the other side, yet it is also suggested that it is our duty to resist to such “unlawful” pressures to prevent a new “catastrophe”. The same editorial concluded that the Plan puts the freedom of “700,000 Greeks” at risk (Simerini, 28 March 2004). In other words, it easily switched from Cyprocentric codes to Greek fixity and the imagined national community is represented as bound together by its state and ancestry.

In Machi’s extract, from the editorial titled “9000 years of history are staring at you” (17 April 2004), there is no need to specify or name the others, as what is important is that they came as occupants, contrary to us, who have been here eternally “from the beginning of time and space”. The presence of the other is once more stimulated through absence. It is suggested that what tie us together are our common ancestry and our common Greek history. In addition, the extract suggested
a timeless Greek fixity but did not inappropriate Cypriotness. By contrast the same editorial also used Cyprocentric codes when claiming, for example, that Cypriots resist American plots.

The analysis will look more closely at another of Machi’s editorials (17 November 2002), titled “Such false and big words” [Τα ψεύτικα τα λόγια τα μεγάλα.]. The editorial criticized Greek-Cypriot political elites, namely the then current government of the Right, for using nationalistic repertoires in their public discourses to deceive the people. According to the editorial the government’s readiness to negotiate and accept the Plan revealed political and national deception. This is because, although in public the government used nationalistic catchphrases, in practice they were willing to agree to an “antinational” settlement which, according to Machi, would “Turkify” Cyprus. These nationalistic slogans are called lies and big/false words. Interestingly, the entire sentence is from the lyrics of a well known song from the soundtrack of the Greek movie Rebetiko (Ferris, 1983), which arguably aimed to expose, through the life of a marginalized group, rebettes (part of the Greek sub-culture, with a leftist orientation), nationalistic clichés in the context of Greece (Monos, 1987). However, one could argue that the opinion piece of the newspaper used the phrase particularly to justify the nationalistic repertoires that the movie, the specific song and rebetika music in general questioned. Interestingly Machi once more adopted what was more of a leftist rhetoric to show identification with the lay public, although not to criticize hegemonic nationalist discourses but to underpin them.

*The legality of the state and beyond.* From the presentation of the Plan, Simerini equated the acceptance of the Plan to the dissolution of the state, and in one of its editorials (22 February 2004) it characterised the state that the Plan foresaw as apartheid. Reference to apartheid mirrors anti-Plan arguments that the Plan would lead to a racist new status that would completely segregate

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54 Rebetika is a music genre of the Greek urban working class and 1922 Greek refugees from Turkey (see Monos, 1987).
the two communities mainly because of the bizonality of the proposed settlement. The argument is not that bizonality in principle was conceding two much to the minority but that it would lead to the foundation of an intolerant state, described as a “prison” within which the Greek-Cypriot community would suffer great violations of basic human rights, similar to those of black South Africans under the state of apartheid. Interestingly, relevant arguments by using pro-coexistence positions, questioned the main aim of the Plan to reunite the two communities and are representative of views that the Plan was not providing for a federation (see also Trimikliniotis 2009 on disagreements within the No supporters in relation to whether the Plan provided for a federation or con-federation).

The analysis noted the recurrent use of the argument that the solution should safeguard human rights of both communities alike. The argument on the one hand builds on the universality of basic human rights, that is that the core rights of every individual should be protected. On the other hand, when Greek-Cypriots refer to human rights, they tend to include merely the right to property and the right for those Greek-Cypriots displaced in 1974 to return to their villages and homes. This takes away the potential universality of the arguments used and turns the issue of the protection of human rights into a divisive argument rather than a reconciliatory one.

From a leftist perspective, Haravgi argued that the Plan should not lead to “racial boundaries” or to a “racial wall” (Gkiourof, 29 February 2004): “I don’t know if there is a Leftist or a progressive person who will accept erecting a racial wall which will separate Christians and Muslims into two clearly religious zones as Denktash demands.” The argument is probably related to the disputed issue of bizonality and the extent to which the Plan foresaw a federation or a confederation. In general, the position for confederation or “covered” partition is attributed to the Turkish-Cypriot side and is juxtaposed to the position of the Greek-Cypriot side for federation. As noted in the thesis’ Introduction, whether the Plan provided a federation or a con-federation was an issue of conflict within No supporters, with President Papadopoulos arguing for the second or that it
entrenched partition and AKEL the first (Trimikliniotis, 2009, p. 113). Haravgi’s editor-in-chief, who wrote the lead commentary, criticized the Plan by using arguments that it should not lead to the foundation of a racist regime, which were analogous to those of Simerini that the Plan created a state resembling apartheid and therefore was in line with arguments that the Plan was entrenching partition.

Studying the press’s editions on the opening of the crossing points allowed us to unravel an emphasis on the state and ideas related to it. Evidently, behaviour by Greek-Cypriot crossers that undermined the legality of the state or recognized the state of the other side was heavily criticized (see Chapter 4, section “The Rupture: Opening of the First Crossing Point”).

Table 3 presents two examples of the media’s uses of the state: the first to underpin a position against the Plan and the second in defence of voting Yes for the Plan. In the first example, the argument is that the Plan would lead to the dissolution of the Republic of Cyprus, transforming it to a new state, which would be a protectorate of Turkey (Simerini). It is related to the predominant argument to vote No to preserve the entity of the state. The second example is representative of a predominately Yes argument that the rejection of the Plan would eventually lead to the recognition of the TRNC – a goal of Turkish-Cypriot ethnonationalism and considered unacceptable by the Greek-Cypriot side (Alithia).
Table 3

Examples of Pro-Plan and Anti-Plan Texts’ Contextual Use of the State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Sample Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes= State Dissolution</td>
<td>On the contrary, the Plan dissolves the Republic of Cyprus and establishes in its place an Annan-ish state, a hybrid state, protectorate of Turkey, a vassal to its invasive obstinacies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No= TRNC Recognition</td>
<td>…which [the Presidencial Palace] cannot convince that it can confront the nightmarish situation, which will arise, adding new sufferings to the martyred people of the island by “embedding new fait-accompli and recognizing two states,” as Glafkos Clerides warned during the last historic conference of DISY.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

The position that accepting the Plan would lead to the dissolution of RoC coincides with President Papadopoulos’s famous statement during his televised speech calling for a resounding No, that “I received a state internationally recognized and I will not deliver a community” (Tassos Papadopoulos, April 2004). Simerini’s editorial emphasized that “[t]he state was the only weapon and battlement of [our] international struggle,” implying that its dissolution would lead us into a state of limbo and vulnerability. “The Cyprus Republic, namely, the Greeks and the Turks of Cyprus” noted another Simerini editorial (28 March 2004). It is another example of the argument that RoC belongs to both communities. Explicit references to the Turkish-Cypriot community as part of the state can be addressed taking two analytical perspectives. On the one hand, anti-Plan
arguments built around the need to preserve the entity of the state had to take into consideration the Turkish-Cypriot community, given that the state is in principle a bicomunal one. On the other hand, despite specific reference to the Turkish-Cypriot community, all other codes tended to remain Greek-Cypriot centric and obscured the fact that the state has been functioning almost since its inception without the Turkish-Cypriot community. By contrast, the Turkish-Cypriot community is included in a common Cypriot citizenship to fortify the state’s sovereignty vis-à-vis Turkey’s aggression and mediators’ threats to accept the Plan. Indeed, in principle there can be no Cypriot state without the Turkish-Cypriot community. However in practice, for about 50 years the state functions, internally and externally, without the Turkish-Cypriot community, as a Greek-Cypriot state. Therefore, a common Cypriot citizenship emerging from a common state is the cornerstone of the argument that, at any time, the Turkish-Cypriot community – or at least individual Turkish-Cypriots – may assume their rights and responsibilities within the state. Sincere or not, this argument is informed by how one should recognize the Turkish-Cypriot community’s rights in order to underline our readiness to share the state with them. The argument represents rather a strategic or, perhaps for some, a genuine shift towards Cyprocentrism, incorporating to an extent the rhetoric of multiculturalism in which there is “a national community within which the diverse ethnic communities can flourish” (Brown, 2003, pp. 608-34, as cited in Vural and Peristianis, 2008, p. 42), but also incorporating pro-independence arguments, primarily of leftist origins, which were developed vis-à-vis the nationalist goal of enosis.

*Alithia*, supporting Yes, argued that the rejection of the Plan would lead to the recognition of two states, as the example in Table 3 suggested. In another editorial (15 December 2002) it underlined that the TRNC was an “illegal regime”, while in a different one (22 February 2004) it emphasized that the Turkish-Cypriots could enjoy all rights offered by the state, such as the right to property and/ or civil and political rights, even if the Plan was rejected. Therefore, the legality of the state is reversed to campaign Yes at the referenda. This is the relevant extract by *Alithia*:
THEREFORE, the Turkish-cypriots (who will probably say yes to the referendum) will be able to come to the free areas, to recover their properties, and to demand their political rights as provided in the Constitution of ’60 [1960], which rules our existence as a state. If we deny them [their rights] – something that we will not be able to do – then they will also resort to the European Court of Human Rights too (as Titina Loizidou did) and they will be vindicated. In the meantime, the tens of thousands of refugees will not be able to return to their homes. Their properties will not be recovered. And neither the territories that the Annan Plan foresees will be returned.

The editorial apparently aimed to “sensitize” No supporters by pointing out some of the risks and the negative impact that would be a result of rejecting the Plan and also because of the state’s legal obligations. Turkish-Cypriots, as individuals, would be legally entitled to claim rights, contrary to the Greek-Cypriot refugees, who would arguably not be entitled to claim rights by Turkey or the illegal TRNC.

The anti-Plan argument about rejecting the Plan to preserve the state provides evidence that once more, the Greek-Cypriot community was grasping “the levers which statehood made available” (Attalides, 1979, p. 57) to use them this time to resist “pressures” to accept the Plan. Evidently, the state that was once characterized as a “strange mixture of a protectorate, condominium, and independent statehood” (Constantinou & Papadakis, 2001, p. 127) was during the said period perceived by the opponents of the Plan – and constructed as such in relevant editorials – as more of an independent state than a protectorate even if de facto divided and despite its status of exception based on the doctrine of necessity (see Trimikliniotis, 2009b, p. 2; and p. 392; Trimikliniotis, 2010; Özersay, 2004; Constantinou, 2008). EU membership fortified arguments that the Greek-Cypriot community could resist international pressures without perhaps having to face severe retaliation. In effect, the threat by the “bad” West was proposed to be confronted by

55 RoC functions on the basis of the doctrine of necessity which has been applied in Cyprus since 1964, after the “withdrawal” of Turkish-Cypriots from the government.
membership of the state to a “good” or better “ideal” Western institution, the EU (see Chapter 3 in the section titled “External Actors, Mediators and the Question of Cyprus’s International Position”).

Some editorials used economic arguments against the Plan, raising fears that the implementation of it would weaken the Greek-Cypriot economy which was booming at that time, as opposed to the Turkish-Cypriot economy, which was weak and depended on aid from Turkey. For example *Machi* (28 February 2002) quoted the then Central Bank Governor who warned that the Plan’s implementation would destabilize the entire economy. Another argument against the Plan, is that by dissolving the state the Plan was also going to destroy “everything” that the people created in the post-1974 period. This argument can also be used as evidence that there was a fear that not only was the state, as a legal entity, threatened but so was the status quo from the post-1974 period.

In this regard, our analysis takes two analytical directions in looking at the use of the state to construct *us*: a view from above as relating to the objectives of nationalism for using state power (Breuilly, 1993, p.1), and a view from below regarding how the readership was expected to make sense of such arguments (see also Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 on participants’ perceptions about the state and the Plan). As Barker argued, citizens evaluate the state from a moral perspective, not only or at all – from a legal one (1990, p. 62, cited in Gilley, 2006). Navaro-Yasin, focusing on the Turkish-Cypriot community, argued that “sovereignty is only actually realized through an enactment of agency (back and forth) between people and things in and on a given territory” (2012, p. 43). Our media data provide evidence that the state was used once more as a weapon against international pressure (Attalides, 1979) and against a perceived new “Turkey’s might” (Peristianis, 2006, p. 104). In parallel the press drew arguments from the state recognition discourse (Constantinou & Papadakis, 2001), which is largely embedded in the way the lay person understands the Cyprus issue and which produces “essentialist and totalizing visions of the other” that demonize the other (Constantinou & Papadakis, 2001, p. 133). However, what perhaps made the readership associate with the argument that, even before the 1974 war, statehood was seen in a
“sympathetic light” (Attalides, 1979, p. 59) is that for the larger Greek-Cypriot community, the state perhaps fulfilled the core obligations – despite its postcoloniality – of a “modern” state functioning in an environment of prosperity.

**History and (of) the Left.** In Haravgi’s lead commentaries we noted the use of an emancipatory rhetoric drawing on the universal history of liberation movements. The following title is indicative: “History has recorded brilliant struggles, epics, setbacks and betrayals” (Gkiourof, 29 February 2004). In this context, the reasons for rejecting the Plan relate to the idea that, instead of reuniting the two communities, it was reinforcing division by turning them into “neighbours of two separated states”:

History has recorded brilliant fights, epics, setbacks, but also and treacheries. The Left in Cyprus has sacrificed its best children in the struggle for common coexistence between G/c and t/C [ ... ] But what we struggle to achieve today is to live together with the Turkish-Cypriots and not merely as neighbours of two separate states.

The extract draws attention specifically to the “heroic” history of the Cypriot left and AKEL members, who, at times of interethnic conflicts, opposed the hegemony of nationalism, risking their own lives. The lead commentary underlines this in an effort to justify to a leftist audience a potential No vote on the Plan. The argument is probably that the Left aimed for genuine reunification, to “live together with the Turkish-Cypriots and not merely as neighbours of two separate states” proclaiming Cypriotness and rejecting the Plan on the basis that it entrenched divisio. Prior to the referenda the editor-in-chief emphasized the long-lasting pro-rapprochment positions of the Left noting that “[t]hroughout its 80-year-long history, [AKEL] gave examples of how it is concerned about the entire Cypriot people: GreekCypriots and TurkishCypriots” (18 April 2004) in a clear effort to justify the party’s No response to the Plan.

Left-wing arguments, drawing from local and universal history of oppressed people, aimed to justify their decision on the Plan whatever this decision was going to be. In the data studied,
Despite bringing in universalist and occasionally anti-imperialist arguments (see also Chapter 3 External Actors, Mediators and the Question of Cyprus’s International Position), the Left explicitly avoided emphasizing the supremacy of class vis-à-vis the nation.

The year 1974. The year 1974 is the year during which the Turkish invasion took place, which was an event that the two dominant communities and other Cypriot communities experienced significantly differently. As already analyzed from a reconciliatory perspective, a week before the referenda Politis argued that there can be no complete justice for the two communities in the context of a settlement. To build on the argument, the editorial quoted two historical events of importance to the two communities: the 1974 invasion, which brought severe collective and personal pain to the Greek-Cypriots, and the 1963 intercommunal strife, which caused tremendous pain to the Turkish-Cypriot community. Politis’s editorial aimed at approaching history from the perspective of the other to encourage all to move away from zero-sum positions which had so far characterised the Cyprus issue (Richmond, 1999, p. 43).

For the Left, the year 1974 was marked by two events and was characteristically called in an editorial (17 November, 2002) by the chief-editor of Haravgi as the year of a “double treachery” [διπλή προδοσία]. In this context, invasion and occupation were the disastrous events caused by the pro-enosis coup that happened five days earlier on 15 July 1974. Reference to these two events of 1974 appeared to perform two roles: to ensure unity among the Left by reminding them about the catastrophic role of the Right, but also to justify an alliance with centre-right and centre-left parties that disapproved of the coup for the forthcoming presidential elections. For the Left, nationalists of both sides are responsible for past atrocities committed against people of the other community, but also specifically the nationalist Greek-Cypriot Right is blamed for contributing to the invasion and the subsequent de-facto division of Cyprus because of its role in the coup.

An exception to Greek-Cypriot centric approaches to the invasion was an editorial in Alithia (5 December 2002) that argued that the invasion had pernicious results for both communities. The
editorial adopted the position of a faction within the Turkish-Cypriot opposition (namely Turkish-Cypriot oppositionists belonging to the Left) to underline that the invasion and occupation of the north resulted in the Turkish-Cypriots being impoverished and oppressed by Denktash’s regime. Specifically, it noted that the invasion and occupation was a burden for both communities and had “proved disastrous and painful for each side” (5 December 2002). The argument is used in a pro-Plan context, and was written a month after the Plan was first presented. Alithia viewed the invasion through a form of intercommunal lens, which is noticeable as it took into consideration the other when in fact referring to an event usually seen from a very Greek-Cypriot centric perspective. Still, it did not explicitly cross Greek-Cypriot centric perceptions of the 1974 war or to discuss why (some) of the other experienced and perceived the invasion and occupation as a “peace operation”.

**Traitors and historical continuity.** This part considers arguments about “traitors” and the construction of the internal enemy. Such viewpoints developed particularly from positions against the Plan. One such recurrent argument is that the US bribed influential Yes supporters to promote the Plan, complementing the analysis of Chapter 3. Relevant editorials set such arguments in a historical context and we analyse them from the perspective that their use contributed to projecting a common identity for Greek-Cypriots. More interestingly we noted references in the data studied that it is part of Cyprus’s political culture to call anyone a traitor who disagrees with what some others may perceive as nationally correct.

First we focus on representations of Yes supporters as traitors using examples from *Machi*. In one instance, *Machi* emphasized that there have always been traitors in Cyprus. Its argument, though proclaiming some historicity, in effect reproduced primordial understandings of the “nation”, according to which, the nation has historical continuity as its enemy has: If national traitors are omnipresent, then by extension the nation is as well. This is a relevant extract by *Machi*:

> We live on a small island and we have had diachronic experience with powerful conquerors. Collaborators of the enemy have also been a diachronic reality [for us]: Those who formerly
wore the Latin tiara, replacing it later with the Turkish fez. The eggs of the snake are being brought to hatching again. Can you teach a dolphin how to swim? Our ancient ancestors would caustically ask us. "Once a pepper trader, always a pepper trader," our grandmothers would add, shaking their heads. (21 February 2004)

The extract emphasized how conquerors and traitors are pervasive in the history of Cyprus. It writes about the land [τόπος] that is the island of Cyprus, characterised as a small island, victim of powerful conquerors. The tiara and the fez are types of headwear that symbolise two powerful conquerors of Cyprus, the Venetians followed by the Turks. Both occupiers appear to have conquered a “Greek” island on which they found willing servants among locals. The editorial targeted the so-called internal enemy, accusing it of collaborating with conquerors and implying that these internal enemies abandoned willingly their Hellenic roots and culture to adopt the culture of the external enemy as evidenced by their use of the tiara and fez. Although the target of the editorial is not the external other or the Turkish-Cypriot community, or other communities of Cyprus, the absence of other Cypriots – beyond us – can easily lead to conclusions that others are by extension excluded from being rightfully here, in this country. The contemporary traitors are Greek-Cypriot journalists who supposedly “sold out” to the Americans to promote the Plan. In the same editorial, historical continuity is also suggested in relation to our primary national enemy, the Turks, having remained unchanged in time. The Turks on the one hand are just another conqueror like the Venetians who dominated the island for about four centuries (1191-1571). On the other hand there is no differentiation between Ottomans and neo-Turks and this adds to the construction of Turks as our long-lasting national enemy. This is instigated by reference to the fez as something relevant to the Turks throughout history. The fez is in general used as a symbol in Greek-Cypriot narratives of history when constructing the other as barbarians that “slaughtered the Greeks when they were trying to gain their independence” (Papadakis, 1994, p. 407), and despite that, the fez was banned by Kemal Attaturk, and Turkish Cypriot secularists opposed its use since the 1930s (Xypolia, 2011).
The editorial’s reference to “eggs of a snake” is also interesting. It is a rather common metaphor widely associated with the film “The Serpent’s Egg” (Bergman, 1977) which focuses on the rise of Nazism in Germany and Europe. Here, the metaphor is used to point out the dark origins of so-called Greek-Cypriot traitors. Traitors in this context are well-known journalists who supported the Plan and were allegedly bribed by the US to promote it.

In relation to the use of mediators, particularly the US and the UK, to construct the category of us, the above-cited editorial represented not only a unified America, projecting anti-Americanism, but also a unified American people who tend to uncritically consume the propaganda of the American government, such as regarding the Iraqi invasion. These are set vis-à-vis us who managed to resist such plots, exemplifying perceptions that we are superior compared to them. Specifically, it is argued that the Cypriot people are not as naïve as the “Americanaki” is.

Machi had been promoting a profound form of anti-Americanism based on pre-existing views. It is evidence of anti-Americanism not only because of the role of the US in the said process but because it entailed an idea that “something associated with the United States, something at the core of American life, is deeply wrong and threatening to the rest of the world.” (Ceaser, 2004, p. 48). It projected an American way of doing politics and imposing its will using underground, covered un-democratic means of propaganda. Interestingly anti-Americanism has also been called a Western construction (Ceaser, 2004). Therefore it could be explained as emerging not only from Cyprus postcolonial and colonial experiences – a postcolonial “suspicion” – but perhaps also on pre-existing west-centred views that America is threatening Europeanism (Ceaser, 2004) or is a threat in general to universal and superior Western principles.

Simerini also attacked the “internal enemy”, the Yes supporters, in an editorial written much earlier than the referenda which still indicated the tendency to identify traitors willing to sell out our rights. According to such positions, the Clerides’ government was willing to “sell-out” Cyprus because of its readiness to accept the Plan. The example is not related to historical continuity yet it
builds on arguments about Clerides’s government’s willingness to betray Cyprus by accepting the Plan. What has a historical continuity are the so-called “endemic slayers” of Cypriot rights, which is a reference evidently pointing to international actors, namely US and the UK, which allegedly pressed the government to accept of the Plan:

The People have never gave them such a right. And they [government] cannot now, that they are leaving from the position of Power, to DISSOLVE the State and the country, in order to receive…congratulations for prudence! By the endemic slayers of the Cypriot rights. (*Simerini*, 17 November, 2002)

*Endimikos* [ἐνδημικός] is usually used to describe an infection which appears regularly and attacks a specific number of people. The endimikoi slaughterers of Cypriot rights (right=justice) is a reference to how external actors were an “infection” that threatened all of *us* in the past as they do in the present.

One of *Simerini*’s editorials (13 April 2004) criticized AKEL for collaborating with foreigners to achieve a postponement of the referenda. *Simerini* accused the Left of being a “sold out” to “foreign embassies”. They do not name the embassies but in the context of the negotiations they could be those of the US and the UK, or Russia, given the historically good relationships of the Cyprus’s Left with Russia. Nevertheless the juxtaposition of AKEL’s international links with Russia, the US, or the EU also shows suspicions among the Papadopoulos-led governing alliance: right-wing rejection of the Plan appears not to have considered AKEL as an “authentic”, “patriotic” opponent of the Plan the way they were. In this context the enemy within are the leftists.

*Phileleftheros* criticized the catastrophic tendency emerging from the “dark side” of Cyprus’s history to accuse those of being traitors who disagree with what some may consider being nationally correct. The RoC is at the core of this argument and is represented as a victim of polarization. It was a criticism of a faction of political elites for having a democratic deficit and for being intolerant to oppositional viewpoints. This is a part of the editorial:
UNFORTUNATELY, outbreaks of other periods have not disappeared, outbreaks that led to undesirable situations and irreparably hurt Cyprus. For the sake of petty-party reasons, some of the political actors cannot be characterized as traitors because they believe that the Cyprus problem can be solved on the basis of the Annan plan. The reactionists [αντιδρούντες] shall put forward other arguments to assert their ‘No’. (22 February 2004)

The analogy, though not clearly drawn, is more probably between how in the past non-supporters of enosis were treated as national traitors and how in the present day Yes supporters are called sell-outs. In a way, the editorial reversed Machi’s argument by claiming that traitors are not as omnipresent as so-called patriots, who are intolerant of opposing points of view and tend to use patriotic rhetoric to divide the people between patriots and traitors.

Relevant references on internal enemies remind the historical antecedents of suspicion indicative of right-wing hysteria over so-called traitors who did not comply with the national aim of enosis in the past. The other tradition of “naming and shaming” traitors is that in the aftermath of the 1974 war in which the extreme right wing and by extension the entire Right were accused of being accomplices to the invasion because of the coup. In the analysis we noted both innuendos depending on who was talking.

Constructing fears and threats. Editorials supporting a No response invoked fears, threats and risks which, evidently, contributed to the demonization of the Plan. Some editorials warned about the consequences that would come from rejecting the Plan, in some instances presenting them as catastrophic. Yet fears and threats were more noticeable in the No positions which contributed to the Plan’s demonization. Building on these findings, we seek to explore what kind of fears, threats or risks the press used, following theories that what we fear is also a part of who we believe we are (Furedi, 2007; Alteide, 1997). In this regard, we build on an understanding that fears or threats are not free-floating concepts or natural or “purely psychological” but socially constructed and manipulated “by those who seek to benefit” (Altheide, cited in Furedi, 2007, p. 2). As Alteide has noted that “Every society teaches its members many things, including what to worry about” (1997,
These arguments coincide with insights from nationalism studies that the external threat or the threat by the other is important for the construction of national identities and the mobilization of nationalist feelings (Yumul & Özkırımlı, 2000; Schlesinger, 2000; Billig, 1995) and that national identities “are continually reconstituted through strategies of exclusion and inclusion in the face of perceived threats from without and within” (Schlesinger, 1991, pp. 299-300, cited in Brookes, 1999, p. 249).

Simerini titled its editorial in the aftermath of the presentation of the Plan as “The sauce of nibbling...” meaning that the Plan was the sauce with which we would be eaten (17 November 2002). The editorial described vividly how the Plan was to “surrender Cyprus to Turkey”, “dissolve the state” and impose a “trisectioned” one [τριχοτόμηση] and an illegitimate (bastard) confederation with three sovereignties and three citizenships. The sexual language (i.e. bastard) used to express opposition to the Plan is indicative of efforts to demonize the Plan. It is suggested that the Plan would lead to an almost unprecedented period of vulnerability for the Greek-Cypriot community.

The following is an extract by the same editorial:

Once our State is dissolved, and is delivered effectively to the Turks, since a trisection [τριχοτόμηση] and illegitimate Confederation is imposed by an ultimatum, since three sovereignties and three nationalities are imposed, since the Refugee and the Territorial [issues] are regulated in a monstrous way, since Turkey maintains a right to intervene unilaterally, given that SAFETY does not exist even theoretically, what is there to negotiate? (17 November 2002)

The editorial asked rhetorically what the purpose was to negotiate a Plan that was already completed (meaning that it could not be improved) and it answered with another rhetorical question “To give more to Attila’s monster?” The Turkish operation was initially coded as Operation Attila and the editorial’s reference to “Attila’s monster” is obviously drawing analogies between the Turkish invasion and the Plan. Specifically it claimed that the Plan would render the entire Cyprus under “Turkocracy”, that is under Turkish authority. Evidently it draws on traumas that the Turkish
invasion caused to the Greek-Cypriots, yet, as elsewhere highlighted, fearing Turkey or the so-called fear of Turkification is simultaneously a fear “of being taken over by the ‘barbarian’ Other.” (Argyrou, 2010, p. 43). Evidently fears and threats were related to the safety of the Greek-Cypriot community but also they intersected with ideas that the Plan was giving too much to Turkey – as a barbarian other – including a right to intervene in Cyprus’s affairs by political or military means.

Simerini used phrases such as that the Plan had “head(s)”, and it could kill or restrain one’s freedom. The newspaper was consistent in presenting the Plan in an essentialist manner in that it was a dangerous creature, such as a “three-headed” freak [έκτρωμα], a monster, “completely vile” [πανάθλιο], or an “Annan-ish hybrid-state” [‘Αναν-ικό κράτος-υβριδίο] (22 February 2004), that could harm us. The perceived complexity of the Plan, characterised as an “undigested legal text”, contributed further to its demonization by its opponents.

In a Phileleftheros editorial, the acceptance of the Plan was characterised as national suicide. This is the relevant extract:

NO reasonable Greek would wish not to have a functional plan and not to have a solution emerge from it. Even with painful sacrifice of rights of land and life. But also, without any consideration, no one will consent to commit suicide by relinquishing his rights for a solution approximately equivalent to national euthanasia. (23 February 2003)

The editorial used a nationalist narrative which anthropomorphizes nations (Papadakis, 1998) and according to which, rights to land and life appear inferior to the nation. This recalls Billig’s argument that “All societies that maintain armies maintain the belief that some things are more valuable than life itself” (1995, p. 1) and that the “death of a nation is the ultimate tragedy, beyond the death of flesh and blood” (Billig, 1995, p. 4).

Another “fear” constructed by the press was that the implementation of the Plan would create conditions for a return to interethnic violence. In this argument, both communities were constructed as being under threat. For example, Simerini wrote: “The imposition of a settlement,
which will collapse before its implementation and will bring new sufferings and conflicts between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots” (23 February 2003).

The following lead commentary by Haravgi called on the Greek-Cypriot people to defend their “country, state, people and rights”. The threat is anti-Cypriot plots and the initiators are “powerful states”. The use of deictic words, “our” in particular, contributes to constructing threats from a powerful “other” simultaneously constructing “us”:

But international politics are exercised on the basis of the interests and especially the geostrategic interests of powerful states. With this in mind we are called to constant alert, unity and fighting to defend our country, our state, our people, their [people’s] rights. (Constantinou, 23 February, 2003)

The commentary sent a warning, aiming to unify within, that we still live in a world defined by international inequalities and shaped by the interests of the dominant international powers.

AKEL requested the postponement of the referenda based primarily on concerns about safety, and subsequently safety was a significant reason in its official justification for the party rejecting the Plan. In a lead commentary, Haravgi’s editor-in-chief explained the rationale of the party’s decision (18 April 2004) pointing to the importance of safety and international guarantees to the solution.56

On the side of those supporting the Plan, Alithia had the most dramatic references in relation to what the impact would be if the Plan was rejected. Prior to the referenda (18 April, 2004), it anticipated that there would be a catastrophe if the Greek-Cypriot community rejected the Plan, consolidating the effects of the invasion. This is an extract from the said editorial:

56 Closer to the referenda, Phileleftheros supported AKEL’s proposal for a postponement of the referenda, emphasizing a negative impact on the Greek-Cypriot community by a possible rejection of the Plan. An underlined concern was about the impact on bicommmunal relations if the Greek-Cypriot community rejected the Plan, suggesting that the Turkish-Cypriots would interpret it as a rejection of coexistence.
The tricks of the Presidency led to decades of stagnation and to the prolongation of the refugees and the entire population being victimized. It is not convincing that it can deal the nightmarish situation, that will occur by forcing the martyred people of the island new sufferings with the "consolidation of new faits accomplis and recognition of two states," as Mr. Clerides warned at the last historical DISY conference. (18 April 2004)

As discussed in the previous part, warnings about dangers that would result if the Plan was rejected were also promoted, such as the danger that TRNC would be recognized by other states besides Turkey. To promote Yes, editorials also promoted the position that there may not be any other realistic alternative to division than the Annan Plan. Politis characteristically warned that either we say Yes now or we “wait for years and time” for “full” justice which evidently was not achievable in a world driven by interests and not justice (17 April 2004)

**The Turkish-Cypriot community: Present through its absense and absent through its presence.** Thus far the analysis presented examples which had inclusive arguments in relation to the Turkish-Cypriot community, emphasizing, on the one hand, that the state belonged to both communities and, on the other hand, that any potential solution would need to safeguard the rights of members of both communities. In this part we look through critical lenses at such instances of inclusiveness to uncover their more tacit meanings. First we concentrate on common expectations for a solution which would protect the interests and the human rights of all Cypriots. Then, the analysis completes the puzzle of the Turkish-Cypriots’ representations, as it takes two analytical paths: it explores groups referenced within the community and it depicts representations of their long-lasting leader Rauf Denktash.

**A solution for all of us (?)**. Overall, the analysis did not note direct instances of media representing the Turkish-Cypriot as the “enemy”. One exception is an editorial in Phileleftheros which argued that the Greek-Cypriots were concerned that, in case of a solution, the Turkish-Cypriots would receive more international aid than the Greek-Cypriots, who would incur new taxes:
THE CITIZENS are worried that foreign aid will be channeled to the Turkish Cypriot-controlled area. That the majority of the funds from the European Union will end in the turkishcypriot community and that the Greek-Cypriots will incur new taxes. (22 February 2004)

Still, even this editorial did not demonize the Turkish-Cypriot community although it did highlight community antagonisms. In contrast, the general tendency was to underline an expectation for a solution which would protect the interests and the human rights of all Cypriots alike. For example, Haravgi said that protection of the basic human rights of both communities should be treated as a “red” line for the Greek-Cypriot community (28 March 2004), meaning that any Plan restricting core human rights should be rejected. Therefore, it justified a possible rejection of the Plan in the name of both communities. Simerini (23 February 2003) used analogous arguments to emphasize that a solution should respect the human rights of the entire Cypriot people who would together face negative or positive consequences of a solution. Machi and Haravgi claimed that the Turkish-Cypriot community should benefit from EU accession, yet the first used a negative tone for the Plan and the second’s was rather positive. Another inclusive instance was noted in an editorial of Simerini after the 2002 EU Summit in which it underlined the willingness of both communities for peaceful coexistence. This is interesting specifically when compared to a predominant homogenizing account that we want a solution whereas they do not want, and which takes the maxims of nationalist positions within the Turkish-Cypriot community as representative of all Turkish-Cypriots. Simerini’s example refers to the Turkish-Cypriots’ wish for peaceful coexistence, leaving aside the leadership (Simerini, 15 December 2002). Politi also emphasized that the EU could contribute in the protection of human rights and guarantee the safety for all the “residents” of Cyprus (16 November 2002). In one editorial, Phileleftheros, after the opening of the crossing points, argued that Turkish-Cypriots should be allowed to vote at elections organised by the RoC

57 “They” in this context is ambiguous and sometimes stands for Turkey only or for Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot leadership, namely Rauf Denktash, but it is not explicitly clarified if it refers to the Turkish-Cypriots as a whole.
regardless of a settlement (21 December 2003). The editorial questioned the political will of the Papadopoulos government to ensure voting rights to Turkish-Cypriots. Yet it defended the rights of Turkish-Cypriots as individuals rather than as a community. In defence of its proposal, the editorial emphasized the consequences of depriving Turkish-Cypriots of such rights given that, despite the de facto division, the state was obliged to honour Turkish-Cypriots’ political, human and civic rights.

Evidently, the press routinely flagged support for a “viable” [βιώσιμη], “functionable” [λειτουργική] solution which would lead to reunification and protect the interests of both communities. The analysis suggests that the recurring concepts such as a “fair” and “viable” solution which will protect the rights of Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots are “confused, [and] made of yielding, shapeless associations like a ‘myth’” (Barthes, 1972, p. 118). This is because, such ideas tend to be interpreted differently by the two communities. Therefore, the more the press referenced the Turkish-Cypriots using these ideas as having bicommunal appeal, the more the Turkish-Cypriots, as a distinct community with its own interests and needs, became invisible: in effect they became absent through their presence, an extension of Greek-Cypriot own ideas and interests. Overall, an abstract acknowledgment of Turkish-Cypriots’ rights, as Barthes (1972) would perhaps argue, is not an alibi of Greek-Cypriots’ past and present attitudes towards the Turkish-Cypriot community, but the “very presence” of such attitudes. This is because, once more, the needs, the fears and the aims of the other are interpreted in ways supporting our aims and interests. To clarify, in Mythenologies, Barthes (1972) comments on the depiction of “a young Negro in a French uniform is saluting, with his eyes uplifted, probably fixed on a fold of the tricolour...”, (p. 115) on the front-cover of a French magazine. If one could convert Greek-Cypriot media references to Turkish-Cypriots’ rights into an image, it would probably depict a Turkish-Cypriot saluting the Cypriot flag – the one with image of Cyprus in the middle. The message convened would be that RoC is the common “house” of both communities. In the same way that supportive references to Turkish-Cypriot individual and community rights fortify the legitimacy and moral
authority of the state and give the appearance that of a genuinely good will on the part of the Greek-Cypriot community for coexistence.

**Between and beyond Rauf Denktash: The Turkish-Cypriot opposition.** Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash dominated the editorials and lead commentaries as almost the only referenced Turkish-Cypriot politician and actor. The only other Turkish-Cypriot politicians mentioned were in *Alithia*’s editorial and concerned Mehmet Ali Talat, the leader of left-wing Republican Turkish Party (RTD) who became Prime Minister (13 January 2004 – 24 April 2005), and Mustafa Akinci, the former mayor of north Nicosia (1976-1990), leader of the Communal Liberation Party (TKP) (1987-2001), and recently elected leader of the community (May 2015). In general the newspapers depicted Denktash in grey colours and often called him occupation leader instead of Turkish-Cypriot leader, reinforcing his unquestioned support of the occupation.

On the one hand, media criticism of Denktash led them to represent Turkish-Cypriot leadership, but not the individual people, as evil. On the other hand the media tended to portray the Turkish-Cypriots as lacking agency to subvert Denktash’s dominance, which often appeared as untranscended. This removed any sense of complexity that other references found in that there was opposition to Denktash within the Turkish-Cypriot community. Notably, between 2000 and 2004, the Turkish-Cypriot community organized massive anti-regime and pro-solution demonstrations characterized as an “uprising” (Pericleous, 2007, p. 339; Navaro-Yashin, 2012) and representing a rift with Denktash’s policy of partition.58

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58 At the beginning of 2000, the prospect of Cyprus’s EU accession, coupled with an economic crisis in the north, acted as a catalyst for the emergence of massive anti-regime protests by Turkish-Cypriots, who posed a significant challenge to Denktash’s authority and specifically his nationalistic politics of permanent partition. These, along with collisions with the newly elected Turkish government of Erdogan, contributed to Denktash’s eventual replacement as the long-standing negotiator of the Turkish Cypriot community by Mehmet Ali Talat and Serdar Denktash (Pericleous, 2007, p. 159).
A common claim in the newspapers was that partition and recognition of TRNC remained Denktash’s ambition, despite him appearing willing, in some instances, to negotiate on the Plan. The data studied used him as a symbol of Turkish intransigence. The following extract, by Simerini, is an example of how Denktash set roadblocks to reunification:

Is there even a slight possibility to bridge the great gap between the positions of the Greek and the Turkish side? No! [...] Therefore, this is what is going to happen: Denktash will demand and require things that the Greek side will refuse to grant, and rightly so. (29 February 2004)

The editorial attributed the impossibility of finding a mutually accepted agreement with Denktash, who set maximalistic demands, and who the Greek side, “our” side, could not accept. It is also an example of their position that Denktash’s political domination would eventually remain unchallenged by the Turkish-Cypriot community throughout the negotiation process. Therefore, it was believed that Denktash’s stance ensured that this negotiation effort would lead to a new dead-end.

The analysis noted references to groups within the Turkish-Cypriot community, namely the Turkish-Cypriot opposition, which were juxtaposed to Denktash’s authority and occasionally to Turkey. For example we noted arguments that Denktash’s dominance was questioned from without and from within, namely by Erdogan-led Turkey, which aimed for a settlement as a means of achieving Turkey’s EU accession goals, and by the Turkish-Cypriot opposition. This is a characteristic example by Alithia:

And Yes, on the one hand, Denktash’s intransigence has peaked, but the new political leadership of Ankara and the insurgent Turkish-Cypriots create other positive impressions. While Denktash is marginalized. (23 February 2003)

The argument is that Denktash was progressively being marginalized because of the Turkish government’s willingness to settle and because of political pressure within the Turkish-Cypriot
community for a solution and accession to the EU. About a year later, Alithia called on the anti-
Denktash groups to put pressure for a solution based on the Plan:

Meanwhile, forces of anti-Denktash Turkish Cypriot opposition, which so openly were
supported by the US and European actors, will need to rediscover the voice of the magnificent
rallies, organized for a solution based on the Annan Plan.
They must be supported to assume their historical role with a key role for a solution instead
of being left in the background of Denktash’s management. (29 February 2004)

Phileleftheros (18 April 2004) shared concerns that the Turkish-Cypriot opposition would
interpret Greek-Cypriots’ eventual rejection of the Plan as intransigent. Evidently, before the
referenda it had become apparent that the majority of Turkish-Cypriots would vote Yes and the
Greek Cypriots would vote No.

Haravgi’s editor-in-chief (28 March 2004) referred to her discussion with a Turkish-
Cypriot, who she called “comrade”, the characteristic way that communists sometimes use to
address each other. Her interlocutor allegedly urged her to ask the Greek-Cypriot leadership to
request the withdrawal of the Turkish army, the expulsion of Turkish settlers and for non-permanent
derogations of the EU acquis after the solution. All demands coincided with Greek-Cypriot official
demands, yet they were put forward by a Turkish-Cypriot who perhaps made the demands appear
more universal and less Greek-Cypriot centric. Such demands usually come from a numerically
small group of radical anti-occupation Turkish-Cypriots and in general by those Turkish-Cypriots
who consider that Turkey illegally invaded and occupied Cyprus in 1974 and who often maintain
that RoC is the common state for the two communities. The exchange that the lead commentary
shared with the readership was an example that some Turkish-Cypriots (in this case those on the
Left) have common aims with the Greek-Cypriot community.

It is interesting to note that the commentary started with a description of how the editor-in-
chief answered her phone to hear the familiar voice, as she described it, of a Turkish-Cypriot
comrade. The description points to a long-standing relationship which is not only political but also
deeply personal and reflects the ties among the Cypriot Left, despite conflict and division. The editor vividly described the agony and concerns of the specific Turkish-Cypriot, whom she characterised as “a genuine patriot”, as mutual concerns and agonies among all Cypriot “patriots”, Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots. By underlining the concerns of the particular Turkish-Cypriot as representative of genuine patriotism, it perhaps implies that those disagreeing are not patriots or not as genuine as him. Underlining that he called from “Occupied Cyprus” (both words in capital letters) reinforced an anti-occupation rhetoric. Furthermore, the Turkish-Cypriot was quoted referring to settlers as *kouvalitoi*, a term often used in Greek-Cypriot discourses meaning those Turks who were brought *here* to Cyprus, but who evidently do not have the right to be here. In this way settlers are constructed as an *other* vis-à-vis both the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot community.

The commentary, written near the time of the referenda, argued that similar demands by the Turkish-Cypriot community were silenced by Denktash, the occupation and an arguably small minority of Greek-Cypriots who were willing to accept the Annan Plan as it was. The commentary, voicing Turkish-Cypriots’ concerns, illuminated significant political cleavages within the Turkish-Cypriot community, namely between the Turkish-Cypriot ethnonationalist leadership, represented by Denktash, and the Left. Yet by that time, it became rather obvious that Denktash’s dominance was breaking down. As noted in the previous part, an effective way to justify the positions of the Greek-Cypriot community was to imply that they were supported by Turkish-Cypriots. Meanwhile, by giving voice to a dissident Turkish-Cypriot, the commentary silences other dissident voices, including “comrades” who supported the Plan.

The commentary is also an example of how editorials mixed different rhetorics in the period under examination: It drew arguments from the peaceful co-existence discourse, but also used an anti-occupation rhetoric which may not be understood as very compatible with ideas of compromising. It informed the readers of how a dissident Turkish-Cypriot made sense of the
proposed solution and reunification and challenged the positions of the Turkish-Cypriot ethnonationalist leadership. At the end, the commentary referred to a statement by the AKEL Secretary-General that there should be limits to the concessions on offer during the negotiations. It is an example of how editorials took the language of the public and returned it “inflected with dominant and consensual connotations” (Hall et al., 1978, p. 62).

Notably, regarding AKEL’s decision to reject the Plan, Haravgi’s editor-in-chief resorted only to those Turkish-Cypriots who “trust the party” and asked for their understanding. It employed the historical narratives of the Greek-Cypriot Left to underline that the Left truly aimed at reunification as opposed to other No supporters – and perhaps Yes supporters. The commentary was preparing the audience for a Left No to the Plan. It employed arguments which could appeal to its leftist readership such as its support for coexistence or arguments which criticised ethnonationalism.59 This is a relevant extract:

With this decision, AKEL calls on our T/c compatriots who trust the Party to demonstrate understanding of the concerns and the worries of the G/cs and that the struggle for reunifying our common country is continued with the same fervor. (18 April 2004)

Despite explicit references to the Turkish-Cypriot community and how the party still had a will for reunification, the target was mainly its leftist Greek-Cypriot readership. The extract used a defensive tone as it acknowledged that a significant portion, evidently the majority of the Turkish-Cypriot Left, supported the Plan and subsequently considered AKEL’s rejection as inexplicable.

Another finding of the analysis is how editorials referred to Denktash to build arguments against their Greek-Cypriot opponents. Namely, they demonized any direct or indirect agreement made by Greek Cypriots with Denktash. Simerini (13 April 2004) criticized AKEL’s proposal for a postponement of the referenda by noting how Denktash also wanted the referenda to be postponed.

59 AKEL rejected the Plan but also rejected arguments that it dissolved the Cyprus Republic or that it institutionalized division (Christophias, 2004).
It was criticism of the party’s decision for a so-called soft No, which also illustrates perhaps the disunity of the No camp. On the opposite side and from a pro-Plan perspective, *Alithia* compared Denktash to so-called Greek-Cypriot rejectionists and underlined that they had identical aims as both fiercely opposed the Plan (*Alithia* 15 December 2002).

### 4.4 Representations of Ordinary or Simple Greek-Cypriots

Editorials and lead commentaries referred to the ordinary or simple people, mainly in order to claim a public consensus for their positions on the Plan. Through its public idiom, the media command “the passage between those who are ‘in the know’ and the structured ignorance of the general public” (Hall et al., 1978, p. 64). Overall, the negotiations on the Plan and the solution appeared in the press to be the elites’ responsibility. In this regard they either ignored the Cyprus people (see also Trimikliniotis, 2010) or suggested that the people agreed with the interpretations and positions of the press. In this way the people were portrayed as the real holders of the “nation” contra the political elites. Thus the press drew power, at a discursive and symbolic level, by invoking the people. But when the media campaigned for the people’s right to be informed, it was mainly a result from the fact that the referenda were imminent and each daily, apparently, wanted the people to vote in line with its own position.

An example of the press’s efforts to represent a wide consensus on its own positions is how *Alithia* used the argument that numerically more people supported the Plan than rejected it. Specifically, it argued that the biggest political parties, which represented the majority of the people, supported negotiations on the Plan. This extract is from its editorial that was published closely after the Plan’s presentation: “The position of the parties, which represent the vast majority of the people in support of an initial acceptance of the plan, to be negotiated, represents a positive development […]”. (17 November 2002)
The parties, to which the editorial referred and which represent the majority of the people, are evidently left-wing AKEL and right-wing DISY, which, when their electoral percentages are added together, are bigger than the electoral percentage of the rest of the political parties. The editorial aimed at showing a wide consensus on the Plan, but it took the people for granted by assuming they and their parties had identical viewpoints.

In contrast, when the Plan was presented in 2002, Machi and Simerini argued that the people disagreed with the leadership’s viewpoints and specifically with the right-wing government’s readiness to even discuss the Plan. They referred to the will of the people to illustrate that their own position against the Plan shared the people’s consensus. Yet Alithia’s editorial quoted above spoke of the people’s majority, perhaps recognizing alternative views. A Machi editorial asserted that there was a “consensual arrangement” between the people and the political leadership, according to which the political leadership was responsible to implement a specific national policy in relation to the solution. This is a relevant extract:

The people, heartened and encouraged, rolled up their sleeves and devoted themselves to the peaceful work of creation. It [the people] left to the leadership the accountability and the responsibilities to materialize its promises and proclamations. (17 November 2002)

According to the editorial, in the aftermath of 1974, the Greek-Cypriot leadership worked towards a solution, whereas simple or ordinary Greek-Cypriots took care of rebuilding the country. The editorial maintained that this status of social relations and responsibilities was a decision of the people: the people legitimized the political leadership to negotiate within a specific mandate but not to accept the Plan. It is noticeable that this assigning of responsibilities to elites according to which they must negotiate while “the people create” appeared as an ideal prototype of social relations. The consensus only broke down because the leadership breached its promises. Referring to “people that create” is probably a subtle comment that people should deal with everyday issues and leave the leadership with the responsibility to deal with the solution. The editorial, as a “national” watchdog,
criticized the readiness of the current Greek-Cypriot political leadership to negotiate the Plan and presented people as victims of deception and as the genuine holders of the beliefs and the principles of the nation. This is another relevant extract by the same editorial:

Throughout the preceding three decades, there has been, with minor exceptions and deviations, a harmonization of the leadership and people's aspirations and visions in relation to the solution of the Cyprus problem [Κυπριακό]. Now this identification seems to disappear as if by magic. It was sufficient to submit the Annan plan to show this incongruity. The people heard its ‘advocates’ and with its intuition and its political sense they realize that all this time they fell victims to fine words and slogans.

If the leadership of the country [τόπος] listened to the people’s feelings and emotions, it would be placed before a people-ruin and about to fall apart psychologically. Maybe in this way it is easier to impose a lawless solution. Some will triumph about it. (17 November 2002)

The editorial, and by extension the newspaper, again appeared not only to be the spokesperson for the people but also to be their “national” counsellor who knows their deep psychological conditions and declares them on the brink of psychological break-down. Interestingly, while the newspaper represented the leadership as being disconnected from the people and off “national” limits, the newspaper appeared to stand beside to the people. It did not explicitly extend its criticism to the entire leadership but to those leaders of the Right who the newspaper had expected to conform to its nationalist repertoire. A slogan that President Clerides used in public, points clearly towards this conclusion: “I will not deliver my country” [Την πατρίδα ουκ ελάττω παραδώσω]. Apparently the editorial put forward that the President was now willing to deliver his country to the enemy by discussing and showing a willingness to accept the Plan. The editorial criticized the use of nationalist rhetoric saying that it is manipulative and is used as a means to deceive the public. But it agreed with the substance of the nationalist ideals.
Our analysis noted in *Simerini* \(^{60}\) analogous arguments that the people fiercely disagreed with the Plan and they had been victims of political deception. Evidently, the opponents of the Plan aimed at showing wide public disagreement to it vis-à-vis those political elites who appeared willing to discuss and agree on it. Again the target was the then Clerides-led right-wing government who negotiated the Plan in 2002. The following is an indicative extract by *Simerini*:

A leader may be playing with many issues for a long time. To succeed or fail by mocking or flattering or looting the naiveté, the ignorance, the trust and the patriotism of the People. It cannot, forever and for all issues to extinguish the intelligence of the People. To lash it. To humiliate it. And especially to play with the surrender of his country. (17 November 2002)

The leader to whom the editorial made reference was probably former President Clerides. The editorial used strong language and almost directly accused him of betraying the nation and of playing with his country’s surrender. The last sentence gives the impression that the president was more of a gambler than a negotiator and was betting on – obviously at the negotiation table – his own country. The editorial reproduced fears that if the Plan was accepted it would lead to Cyprus’ Turkification. The president was also fiercely criticized for routinely deceiving the public either openly or through other means of manipulation, such as “flattery” or exploiting the people’s naivety or their trust. On behalf of the people and perhaps on behalf of the President’s supporters at the moment, the editorial sent a warning that his political deception and manipulation were to be uncovered. In this regard, punishment would come through electoral defeat, as the people, enlightened by the presentation of the Plan, would vote for a more “patriotic” president. The editorial represented the general public as being enlightened and thus empowered by the

\(^{60}\) These positions in *Machi* and *Simerini* provide evidence of significant divisions within the Right, as both editorials unleashed a fierce attack against President Clerides, a long-time leader of the Right – though moderate – and who was now working towards a settlement based on the Plan.
presentation of the Plan which revealed the unpatriotic content of the negotiations. Both editorials appeared to speak for a silent crowd so that it could be heard by its detached leadership.

In 2002, Haravgi, being the main newspaper for the opposition, criticized the outgoing government for treating the people as supernumerary, and warned it on behalf of the people, that the people had the “last word”. Specifically, the editor-in-chief warned that “[t]he people of Cyprus will not stay in the background as observers or supernumerary to what is happening, but they will claim the role of the protagonist and the final word belongs to them.” People’s power was associated with forthcoming presidential elections at which the editorial expected them to punish the outgoing government by electing the left-supported candidate, Papadopoulos. Another criticism was how the Clerides’ government had made huge concessions “behind closed doors” leaving the rest of the political leadership and the people in the dark about what was happening at the negotiations. As in Simerini’s editorial, Haravgi’s claimed that the people can suspect when they are being deceived by the politicians and subsequently they will punish that government by voting for another candidate and eventually they will subvert the secretive intention to impose the Plan.

A week before the referenda, the editor-in-chief of Haravgi (18 April 2004) interpreted the will of the people as giving wider support for AKEL’s proposal to postpone the referenda. In particular it suggested that the vast majority of the people (within this context, the people equals the Greek-Cypriots see Chapter 4, section “Forms of Identities: Mixing Modes of Address”) agreed with AKEL’s idea to postpone the referenda. It further suggested that the people supported a bi-communal, federated state and were resistant to “rejectionism”, that is to anti-federal ideas and positions. The editorial used the will of the majority of the people to justify and defend the party’s position to reject the Plan and ask for a postponement of the referenda.

Phileleftheros invoked the people’s will in its own efforts to build a consensus (see also Chapter 3, section “Tight Deadlines, Ultimatums and Constructed Consensus”). One of its editorials asked the people to support President Papadopoulos, and noted that: “Finally, in this place all
political leadership and people must show the necessary seriousness and responsibility. [...] And the people must support the President in his effort to improve the Plan” (22 February 2002). The editorial almost ordered people to support the President and took for granted that he was negotiating in good faith to improve the Plan.

*Alithia* (15 February 2004) used a similar argument, although it also expressed a frustration with the President. It underlined as a given that:

THE PEOPLE, who sense the importance of the times, will not deny to the President of the Republic the unity that he asks for and the universal support that he needs to have in order for all that he agreed on in New York to materialize.

The examples provided thus far support the argument that the public is invoked to underpin the positions of each editorial and lead commentary and to show that there was a wider consensus on claims made. Therefore, the press appeared as the peoples’ spokesperson and not for the political elites who were often criticized. In some instances the editorials drew analogous expectations of the mediators, such as the UN Secretary-General. The following example is from *Haravgi*:

Thus, the Cypriot people expects the Secretary General of the UN to focus not on placating Angara and Denktas or on legitimizing the results of the Turkish invasion and the 29-year-old occupation of 37% of Cyprus by Attila. (Constantinou, 23 February 2003)

The leading commentary outlined how the Cypriot people expected the UN Secretary-General to be neutral and fair and to leave aside pro-Turkey biases. It is similar to the other examples presented as this was also interpreting the will of the people in a homogenous and fixed manner.

In relation to mediators, *Machi* described the Cypriot people as resisters vis-à-vis so-called American plots to impose the Plan. It particularly used this argument in an editorial published just before the day of the referenda and when it was already clear that the majority of Greek-Cypriots were inclined towards No. This is the relevant extract:
Beyond the pimp (of politics, business and journalism), there is the people. Over the Cypriot
citizen the American propaganda broke its face. As much as the experts tried they failed to draw
people into a "virtual reality." The Cypriot was not led astray and did not buy the tall tales, like
any naive amerikanaki. (17 April 2004)

The main argument here is that the people resisted immense local and US-led pro-Plan
propaganda, contrary to some elites who were bribed to promote the Plan.

Finally, the referenda prompted arguments on the need for an informed populace. In general
a consensus emerged that the people had to make an informed decision.61 One can however not
wonder whether such concerns about reading the Plan would have been raised had it not been for
the referenda.

One of Phileleftheros editorials pointed out prior to the referenda, “[T]he people are now
called to say the big ‘Yes’ or the big ‘No’” (13 April 2004.). The following extract by Politis again
illuminates the need of the public to be informed and understand the Plan:

The Annan Plan is not an exclusivity of the politicians and the citizen today should not be left
with the interpretations that are foisted upon them. It is a text for which the citizen will be called
to vote and to decide on his future and the future of next generations. It is for this reason that we
believe that each one should take into his hands this specific text and read it, study it and try to
understand it as best as possible. (Politis, 28 February 2004)

The editorial argued that the solution should not be treated merely as a concern of
politicians. By contrast, given that the people were asked to vote at the referenda, then it was
required that they understand it. The following two extracts are indicative of the argument that
developed:

61 This consensus also illustrates an understanding that people had not been adequately informed and inevitably it raises
the issue of the media’s own role as they are allegedly the most significant information providers in a society. It is a
perception that participants shared during our discussion that the Plan was not understood by many Greek-Cypriots and
which are explored in Chapter 8.
Therefore the people should be prepared to confront every possibility as long as it first compares the pros and cons. Without any misleading impressions. And without any wishful claims. The ‘Yes’ to the referendum is a historical imperative. (Alithia 22 February 2004)

An unprecedented joke is observed. A nation is only sovereign when its people are adequately informed. That is correctly, responsibly, and objectively. This is why, NOW, and not tomorrow, not on the 16th of April (after the cunning conference of alleged donors…) that informing the people needs to take place. To be prepared from today for a sounding “no” and to bury a Plan that demands to bury Cyprus. (Simerini 29 February 2004)

Both extracts subtly implied that the wider Greek-Cypriot community may have not been informed of the Plan and the implications of a solution. From the perspective of the Plan’s supporters, since the president had rejected the Plan, their hopes were now on the people to say Yes. For the Plan’s opponents, a No at the referenda would epitomize a “national” or a “resounding” No. The examples provided thus far show that opponents of the Plan believed an informed public would reject the Plan, whereas its supporters believed the public would accept it, had it received more adequate information.

Some of the editorials criticized politicians for polarizing society and causing confusion. Again from the side of the Plan’s supporters, Politis noted that:

Citizens do not need anyone’s pompous words. Only with seriousness and responsibility, only with democratic pluralism, only with comprehensive and consistent information will they be equipped to take the most historic decision in their lives. Those who are pompous do not have a place in such a period of reflection. (21 February 2004)

Impressions about the negotiation’s process were identified as restricting the public’s ability to make an informed decision. There was reportedly a concern that the people would make a decision based more on the impressions of the Plan and the process than on the content of the Plan itself:
That is, if they see that at least at this stage there will not be an agreement between the leaders, they should invest in the approval of the Plan by the people.

Since this is so, they should ensure positive messages from Lucerne to Cyprus and not those that negatively influence the people. (*Politis* 27 March 2004)

In general, media’s calls for the need of an informed public are peculiar given that their expected main role, at least in principle, in a democratic society is to provide accurate and objective information (*Curran*, 2011), particularly at that time when social or community media barely existed or were still in an embryonic status. Therefore, a lack of information among the public could be evidence that the media themselves failed to perform their core role as information providers.
4.5 The Rupture: Opening of the First Crossing Point

The focus of this section is on editorials and lead commentaries on the opening of the Ledra Palace crossing points in April 2003\(^{62}\). The event is called a rupture\(^{63}\) because it was an instant and sudden break from the status quo of almost complete division while a return to it appeared impossible. To an extent, it also represented a “rupture” to media constructions of us/other. Both communities were surprised by the opening of the crossing points (Demetriou, 2007; Navaro-Yashin, 2012) apart from the Turkish-Cypriot leadership which made the decision and subsequently implemented it. The following paragraphs analyze how the press represented the reactions of the two communities. The analysis of this took two directions: it focused on national identities and representations of power relations. We illuminate diverse “national” reactions to the event and its aftermath which can be positioned along an axis from welcoming the reunification of people to fierce concerns and warnings of potential negative consequences.

Notably, prior to the opening of the crossing points, the nationalists of both communities were considerably hostile towards bicommmunal meetings after 1974 and more so when they implied a direct or indirect recognition of either regime (Constantinou & Papadakis, 2001, p. 126). The mass media were particularly vocal in their opposition to bicommmunal meetings after 1974 (Constantinou & Papadakis, 2001). However, during the 2003 April opening of the crossing points, they appeared at some instances to celebrate intercommunal contacts but only for as long as Greek-Cypriots played by the state’s rules.

Reunification from below. Initially, the analysis provides examples of the press’s welcoming of how people of both communities warmly embraced one another after decades of

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\(^{62}\) According to Demetriou within the first three days 45,000 people crossed from one side to the other and vice versa (2007, p. 987).

\(^{63}\) For a conceptualization of the event as a “rupture” see also Psaltis (2011, p. 97) who builds on Zittoun et al (2003).
complete division. In this context, the press interpreted the events as a bottom-up development which challenged the status quo of interethnic hatred, the impossibility of peaceful coexistence and ultimately the post-1974 status of complete partition. For example, Alithia claimed that the events proved that reunification would start from “below”. The following are indicative extracts by Alithia:

Above all it [the events] proves that the reunification of people and of places will take place from below. Because no one will be able to question or counteract this common wish. The wall of the occupation partition fell. The myth of the "impossibility of coexistence" is extinguished. (29 April 2003)

The myth that coexistence is impossible, to which the editorial referred, evidently came from nationalist propaganda, particularly from Turkish-Cypriots to underpin their aim for ethnic partition, but also from Greek-Cypriots in their nationalist and racist discourses. Alithia remained consistently pro-American and emphasized how the US Secretary of State had publicly welcomed the events. Simerini wrote about the “simple Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots, who unpretentiously sent the message that we can live together and not only side by side.” This is the relevant extract by Simerini:

A unique life jacket to the bafflement of our spineless leadership who are searching and trying to recover from the first shock, it was the behaviour of the ordinary Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots who unpretentiously sent the message that we can live together and not side by side. (29 April 2003)

Machi (29 April 2003) emphasized that “The people sometimes decide to take its fate in its own hands” and “leave behind the leaders”, and noted that “A new period in the relationship between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots was launched” and that rapprochement was generalized and went beyond the small groups which participated at US-funded initiatives. Machi remained consistent herein with its anti-Americanism. About a year later it charged US-funded bicommunal meetings with “recruiting supporters of compromise”.

142
Simerini recognized that it was rather impossible to predict where the events would lead to, and spoke of a positive “subversion” and expected the government to build on the events and exploit them accordingly:

We know it is not easy to predict where the new status will lead. The subversion brought about by the impressive numbers and shocking influences that happened when Greek and Turkish Cypriots came together created new evidence. We hope that the government and our political leadership will direct their actions correctly and they will build on the climate that exists. (Simerini 29 April 2003)

Simerini’s extract is an example of criticism some news outlets had against the Greek-Cypriot government and the political leadership during the first few days the crossings opened. Machi used analogous arguments underlining that the state, as usual, was “caught sleeping” and was almost “absent”: “On the other hand the government of the Cypriot Republic, which as usual was caught sleeping, now runs spluttering behind the events and is unable to design a specific and coherent policy. It is virtually absent”. (29 April 2003).

Furthermore, Simerini claimed that the leadership failed to perform its primary role of guiding public opinion and had become a follower of Turkish policies. However, the press did not admit that they themselves were caught asleep even though it had not seen the event coming despite publishing information the previous month that there would potentially be a relaxation of movement restrictions (Demetriou, 2007, p. 994).

Regaining “national” control. Simerini emphasized that the opening of the checkpoints was part of Denktash’s long-held position for partition; however, it also emphasized that ordinary Turkish-Cypriots opposed him. Notably, the title of the said editorial read: “If Denktash is not subverted”. It was a warning to people but above all to the leadership not to be fooled by Denktash. By referring to Denktash’s motives for opening crossing-points, the editorial warned (those) Greek-Cypriots who went across that they may unconsciously be complying or reinforcing Denktash’s ultimate plan for partition: they might visit the occupied areas to see their homeland as “pilgrims”
(Dikomitis, 2005), but at the same time they could be contributing to the reinforcement of division. Simerini’s editorial called on the political leadership to accommodate the “free will of the Greek-Cypriots and the Turkish-Cypriots of this island,” but then it inserted its own requirements for a solution, underlining that it should not lead to restrictions and concessions of human rights. In addition the same editorial interpreted the reaction of the people as evidence of their will for a solution which would subvert the realities of the invasion and would implement the EU acquis in the entire Cyprus. It also asserted that it was the time to find a settlement which would abolish the “Turkish consciousness”. This is an example of how the press tailored the expectations of the people to match their own viewpoints in relation to the solution (see also Chapter 4, section “Representations of Ordinary or Simple Greek-Cypriots”). The message sent is that the events should not create any disillusionment about who had the “upper” hand or the control regarding the Cyprus issue, meaning it was not the people but the leadership.

Interestingly, all editorials save Alithia’s editorial criticised crossings for tourism, but Haravgi and Phileleftheros were clearer on this position which dominated Haravgi’s commentary and Phileleftheros’ editorials, while Politis was also profoundly critical of Greek-Cypriots shopping in the north. Haravgi’s lead commentary (29 April 2003) adopted a critical stance towards the events and explicitly said what others only subtly implied, “the people needed guidance”. Additionally, the lead commentary expressed a profound frustration that crossings to the north would resemble touristic visits and did not abide by the collective aims of the Greek-Cypriot community. Haravgi’s commentary projected dissatisfaction with Greek-Cypriots who chose to cross to the other side and presented official identification and behaved as tourists. The author was personally sorry that Greek-Cypriots used their state identity cards to go across but also showed some empathy with crossers noting that for the majority of them it was not a comfortable process. As the relevant commentary noted: “It is sad to watch thousands of our compatriots waiting in the
queue for hours and accepting – at least the majority with a heavy heart to present their passport to cross […] in our own country.”

Overall Haravgi’s lead commentary was policing the people, underlining that they should not behave as tourists in their own country and highlighted also that “The trust between the two sides will not be achieved by touristic visits of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots”. It represented the position that this kind of interaction among the ordinary people of both communities did not lead to rebuilding trust, but political decisions at a higher level were needed. It sent also a warning that movement relaxation did not amount to the long-awaited solution that the Greek-Cypriot community wished to achieve and therefore it emphasized a concern that people would settle for much less than the national aims aimed for. The commentary used elements of various dominant discourses: the peaceful coexistence discourse that the two communities want to live together, that the conflict should be approached ultimately as an international one rather than an ethnic one or a problem of bicommmunal relations, the discourse of return necessitating that any solution should give the right to all Greek-Cypriot refugees to choose whether to return or not and provide for the recess of the entire Turkish army. More so it reinforced arguments that the Cyprus issue is a responsibility of the political elites and that people are not knowledgeable enough to deal with its complexities, but on the contrary their actions could derail it from its correct track. The lead commentary, by repeating dominant discourses that for more than 30 years were articulated around the Cyprus issue, aims at regaining discursive control over dominant significations of the Cyprus issue which the events apparently questioned and because people were seen as possibly compromising national aims.

Phileleftheros claimed in an explicit manner that “THESE developments are not the solution” (30 April 2003) and that the basis of the Cypriot problem was occupation. It warned that movement relaxation did not really correspond to the Greek-Cypriot national goal, as articulated in
official discourses. Like Haravgi’s commentary, this editorial also reflected a recurrent position that the events threatened to derail the Cyprus issue out of the correct track.

*Politis’* editorial titled “Kontrambatzides”, a name referring to sea pirates of the beginning of the 19th century, also expressed significant dissatisfaction but more regarding shoppers. Evidently some Greek-Cypriots crossing were buying cheap goods from the north, such as cigarettes or alcohol. According to the editorial shopping in the north violated the laws and the institutions of RoC. In addition it underlined that crossing was acceptable as it did not amount to direct or indirect recognition of the TRNC, the “psevdokratos”.

The argument about touristic visits is related to predominant ideas on state recognition, as individuals are not expected to carry or present official identifications to travel within their own country. In addition shopping in the north was considered as an indirect support of the TRNC and thus it was found as a predominantly anti-national act. According to Dikomitis (2005), one of the justifications that Greek-Cypriots who refused to cross used was that crossing under the circumstances turned them into tourists. The media’s reproduction of this reasoning demonstrates a concern that people were crossing not only their internal “border” but also the borderline of “nationally” correct behaviour. Therefore, presenting an identity card or a passport to cross to the north was like recognizing the legality of the regime in the north. In contrast it is tourists who use identifications when crossing borders. Evidently, the press wanted to emphasize that the Green Line was neither an internal nor an external “border” but crossing under these requirements made it seem like one: Greek-Cypriots crossing was justified but not when they behaved as tourists or shoppers. These calls for nationally correct behaviour are more than an invitation to conformity, as Adorno (1954) would perhaps argue but they are reminders to these resisters that their dissident actions “amount to little more than temporary relief from larger, more overwhelming operations of power” (Agathangelou & Ling, 1997).
In terms of national identities, as already noted, *Alithia, Haravgi* and *Politis* consistently avoided using Greek-centric terms before and after the event. Another interesting finding is how *Machi* and *Simerini* used the categories Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot, moving more clearly towards Cypriotism. *Machi*, in fact, explicitly referred to Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots three times and also used the category People to mean both Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots in the same editorial. Yet in the same one it still also used more Greek-centric terms like Cypriot Hellenism and Greeks of Cyprus and demanded at the end that the Greeks of Cyprus should behave in a nationally correct manner:

From the Greeks of Cyprus we expect a responsible behaviour. We call them to show self-respect. The justified desire to visit their villages and their cities, their houses and their properties, should not lead to self-humiliation. The national and self dignity necessitates a relevant behaviour. Movement to the occupied areas should not become an excursion to our stolen restaurants, playing at the casinos or shopping. (29 April 2003)

We already noted that, thus far, contacts between the two communities were legitimized only if they would not imply any kind of recognition of the regime in the north. In some ways exclusionary identifications were undermined and the category of ordinary or simple people emerged claiming a protagonistic role in the Cyprus issue.

The developments that followed the opening of the crossing points, in particular, the reaction of the ordinary people of both communities combined with the absent state, had obviously challenged the order of things regarding the politics of the solution. This is because the Cyprus issue stopped, even if just for a while, from being a monopoly of the political elites; now attention was on ordinary people who demonstrated a “will for peaceful coexistence”, as Simerini’s editorial argued. We approach such media representations having in mind Spivak’s famous question: “Can the subaltern speak?” Spivak was concerned with marginalized social strata or the “muted subject” (Spivak, 1987, p. 271), that is, as Navarro Tejero clarified, “men and women among the illiterate peasantry, the tribals, the lower strata of the urban subproletariat on the other side of the
international division of labor from socialized capital” (Navarro Tejero, 2004, p. 91). Yet, as
suggested by Coronil (cited in Navarro Tejero, 2004, p. 94), “subalternity is a relational and a
relative concept”:

[T]here are times and places where subjects appear on the social stage as subaltern actors, just
as there are times or places in which they play dominant roles. Moreover, at any given time or
place, an actor may be subaltern in relation to another, yet dominant in relation to a third.
Dominance and subalternity are not inherent, but relational characterizations.

Building on this background, we approach Cypriots in a flexible manner and look at them as
ordinaries and, as holding “variously subordinated positions” (Navarro Tejero, 2004, p. 94) in
relation to the political establishment, including the mainstream media. In this regard, perhaps
people who crossed did set, to an extent, the media agenda during the said period, yet, the press
tried to ensure that they did not jeopardize, in parallel, the “national” agenda and thus that the
“subalterns” agency had limits.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated how editorials and lead commentaries constructed Greek-
Cypriot identities, and has explored how and in what ways constructions were exclusive or
inclusive of others, namely the Turkish-Cypriot community. In addition, the analysis confirmed
findings from Chapter 3, that external actors, namely the US and the UK, were often used in the
construction of us.

The use of the national syntax which ran throughout the newspapers in our sample
contributed to the enhancement of the existing binary oppositions of us and the other and worked to
achieve representational unity among us. In some cases it contributed to the reproduction of a zero-
sum approach to the settlement and fixed divisions between us and the others, by implying that they
could not be transcended; in certain examples the national we was vague and the ethnic other was
more so. However, the use of the national syntax in a reconciliatory context disrupted such divisive
constructions, opening up the boundaries of we to include the other community and occasionally even to acknowledge their own suffering in the processes of Cyprus’s divisions. The use of the first person plural to criticize representatives of the Greek-Cypriot community or their respective positions, illustrated significant internal political cleavages in relation to the Plan and the settlement in general.

Through the examination of the use of the categories such as People, Greek-Cypriot, Cypriot and Greek, this chapter illustrated a general media preference for Cyprocentric categories during the period studied. Hellenocentric terms were used but always in combination with Cyprocentric ones. In particular, newspapers which were more negative towards the Plan, that is Simerini, Phileleftheros and Machi, used Hellenocentric terms, whereas Politis and Alithia, which supported the Plan, and left-wing Haravgi explicitly avoided Greek-centric categories. The analysis has therefore demonstrated that the confrontation between the nation and the state during the said period was not prominent.

The selected press drew links between certain historical events or periods with the period under investigation evidently, to create a sense of duty in the community to conform with a nationally correct behaviour and to argue that collective, national, interests should be prioritized. In this context, the state was represented as a legitimate institution regardless of the stance each newspaper or editorial adopted in relation to the Plan. Yet, the state was exemplified as a code constructing a common we in the anti-Plan arguments about voting No to preserve the state. The analysis explored why a state-centric discourse could successfully connect to the layperson beyond the obvious facts that a state exists because of its international recognition, or that it serves as a means for Greek-Cypriot political elites to obtain and reproduce power.

The analysis also noted the kind of fears and threats that the press constructed in relation to acceptance or rejection of the Plan. Fear was used primarily to build anti-Plan arguments which claimed that a national catastrophe would occur had the Plan been implemented. Warnings used as
arguments in pro-Plan editorials did not generally amount to a “national catastrophe”. Overall arguments based on fears functioned in two ways: to promote unity vis-à-vis collective enemies and to project that dissent is unpatriotic.

The press, through its editorials and lead commentaries, referred to the public using its public idiom: either to speak on behalf of the public or give its own views on public matters. By shedding light on how newspapers represented the general population of Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots, we unpacked their role not only in the construction of partition identities but also the reproduction of simple Cypriots as subjects or as Kyriakides and Torres argued (2012), in other contexts as non-humans outside history.

After the April 2003 opening of the Ledra Palace checkpoint, the master dichotomies of us and the other broke down to reveal the transformative potential of a different identity that included – with relative ease in all of the newspapers – both communities. Evidently, in the state’s absence, the general public became intensely present as increasing numbers of Cypriots queued to cross the partition line for the first time after 30 years of complete division thereby claiming the “agency” to do so. The press welcomed the event and the reaction of the “ordinaries”, but at the same time the press appeared anxious for a quick return to order. The “inferiority” of ordinary people is represented as mainly due to their perceived lack of knowledge and political naivety which is deemed to leave them in a vulnerable position and in need of guidance from a higher authority. Despite criticism of political elites for being caught sleeping, the press in its own right also struggled to make sense of the events, but retained its role as a national “watchdog” of ordinary people, and warned of dangers which it considered that the laypublic could not anticipate. Even Machi and Simerini employed terms such as “simple Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot” or a “civil society” that transcended the leadership. This is evidence that the media differentiated between the leadership and groups, such as the Turkish-Cypriot opposition, which in some examples it appeared able to claim agency. Relevant references contributed to representations of a
more fragmented yet empowered Turkish-Cypriot community. On the other hand the press made fervent calls to those Greek-Cypriots crossing to the north to behave responsibly and not act like tourists or irresponsible shoppers.

Ultimately, the press resembled the English captain in Spivak’s *The Rani of Sirmur* who travelled on horseback to let the natives know who their masters were. Therefore, with this background we set ourselves up to “listen” to Cypriots’ own accounts which form the focus of the remaining empirical chapters.
5 Charting the Terrain: Divergence and Convergence of Perceptions Between and Across Yes and No Supporters

This chapter introduces the analysis of the qualitative interviews and charts the terrain of how participants self-rationalized their respective referendum votes and how they perceived that others voted at the referenda. Participants tried in a way to turn the attention to other ideas beside “national” ideas, such as economic criteria, which, as they recurrently noted, played a significant role in how some Greek-Cypriots voted in the referenda. The chapter initially presents characteristic examples across the spectrum of arguments used by No and Yes participants to explain their own votes. Then we lay out a core rift between the Yes and the No voters: The latter perceived a much higher degree of risk in relation to the Plan’s proposed implementation of a solution.

The chapter begins with the analysis of No participants and specifically the construction of the majoritarian No vote as “Great”. It is called Great No for the purpose of this analysis because some participants underlined its numerical (quantitative criterion) and moral supremacy because it was patriotic (qualitative criterion). The analysis uncovers further No vote justifications, some of which fall within and others contradict the Great No. Consequently, we provide evidence for the fragmentation of the No group.

The chapter then explores perceptions among Yes participants. The Yes group of the study formed a more coherent group than the No group in relation to the rationale underpinning their respective votes. In particular, Plan supporters recurrently underlined their expectation that the Plan would end an unstable status quo and create conditions for a long-lasting peace in Cyprus while most appeared frustrated by the Greek-Cypriot’ rejection of the Plan. The chapter also examines how Yes voters reacted to criticism that they were “traitors” and how No participants commented on the division between patriotic No and unpatriotic Yes.
The second part of the chapter provides an exploration of perceptions which represent a counter-narrative to the argument that voting in the 2004 referendum was ultimately a national or collective matter. In practice participants perceived that the Plan divided the displaced and dispossessed Greek-Cypriost into two main groups: those with properties in areas which according to the Plan were subject to territorial adjustment and those with properties in the Turkish-Cypriot administered zone. In this regard, a recurrent perception was that it was likely that the displaced and the dispossessed from areas subject to territorial adjustment voted Yes and the non-displaced voted No, like those from the city and district of Paphos. Some participants also gave officers of the National Guard as an example of a group which voted taking into consideration its own interests. This is because the Plan foresaw Cyprus’s demilitarization and subsequent dissolution of the National Guard. Therefore many respondents argued that members of the National Guard were more likely to have voted No in order to keep their jobs. Focus on such perceptions illuminates an alternative approach to the one adopted by the press, which took a predominantly “national” or collective view on the Plan.

Overall the analysis presented in this chapter reveals that the supporters and the opponents of the Plan in 2004 should not be approached in the present day apriori as two antagonistic sides or as ideologically coherent groups. Rather, the analysis exemplifies fragmentation, especially of the No group. The examples provided in the chapter to build the analysis should not be taken as representative of homogenous accounts but as evidence of recurrent perceptions of why participants supported No or Yes respectively. The reflections shared by participants of both groups provide a context to reconstruct the political and social environment during the period under examination.

64 According to media reports the Cyprus Army Officers Association (CAOM) has recently conducted a survey which maps the concerns of army officers about their job security in the event of a solution which is expected to abolish the National Guard (Andreou, 2015, Aug. 21).
5.1 Voting No: Between and Beyond the Great No

This part analyzes perceptions that were representative of the Great No, and is followed by an analysis of the following No patterns: voting No to preserve the state, voting No because the Plan was unfair for the Greek-Cypriot community, voting No to preserve the status quo followed by arguments that voting No was about following the majority, being between No and Yes and finally voting No as a result of a combination of personal and collective criteria.

Great No. Stelios, a fierce opponent of the Plan and a high ranked police-officer in the district of Paphos, gives an example of how some No participants constructed the Greek-Cypriot No vote as Great in the sense that it was numerically significant (quantitative) as well as ethically superior, that is patriotic (qualitative criterion). He provided a rich and very descriptive account, and the following is only a small sample of it:

Moreover, in combination with the disclosure and publishing of all those accumulated retreats, which all [Greek-Cypriot negotiators] did from time to time and led us to the Annan Plan, when the Cypriot man [Κυπριακός] found all of those in front of him, he said: “Man, what are we about to do?!? What were they signing all those years?! What are we about to do now?! We are about to give them everything they have over there [north] and loose everything we have here [south] as well! And on top of this, we will feed them too! Apologize as well! That is, they fucked us and we are going to apologize to them as well? And pay the bill too”. Excuse my language. Did you understand what I am telling you?!!! So the Cypriot [man] got this and we reached 76%. Well, I am telling you that if better work had been done, it would not be 76%. It would have been 86%.

Stelios used a sexual and very masculine language in general to describe how Cypriots (meaning the Greek-Cypriot community) perceived the Plan. The above quote represents the presentation of the Plan as an event which awoke Greek-Cypriots from a long-lasting political and national “sleep”. The No vote in this context exemplified the end of a period of political and national naïveté: With the Plan, he argued, the public learned about so-called concessions that the political leadership had made in the previous years of negotiations, which the public could not
legitimize by accepting the Plan. His perceptions echo arguments of Simerini and Machi that the presentation of the Plan led to a political and national enlightenment of the Greek-Cypriots who sought agency against subjugation by international and local elites (see Chapter 3 and 4).

In Stelios’s account, the connotations of the word *fuck* clearly show a sense that an attempt was made through the Plan to humiliate Greek-Cypriots. Interestingly, Stelios also used economic arguments against the Plan. He emphasized that the Greek-Cypriot community was asked not only to make significant national concessions but also to assume full responsibility for the –expected-enormous economic burden the Plan required for its implementation as at that time the Turkish-Cypriot community was significantly less wealthy. So, Stelios shared a perception that the Greek-Cypriots would need to financially support the impoverished Turkish-Cypriot community and the underdeveloped north. Similar arguments that one community would take on the economic cost of the other are often found in right-wing discourses against migration (Fangen, 1998). In this case Stelios used them to underline the extent of the concessions that Greek-Cypriots were asked to make and their subsequent unwillingness to pay for the *other* as the ultimate act of national humiliation.

Nicolas, another No participant from the district of Paphos, attributed the magnitude of the No vote to the “national” instincts of the people and emphasized, “At difficult times, the Greek man [ο Έλληνας] comes to his senses!” He added, “I strongly believe in the preservation instinct.” Then, when asked to clarify he said: “The simple people [laos] instinctively finds the right solution in difficult times and you can tell him anything you want to [to no avail]!”

Nicolas suggested that a common characteristic of all Greeks is to react nationally and sensibly at difficult moments, implying perhaps that in the interim they may not. In this context, instincts stand for national rather than natural instincts but he used them in a similar way. He argued that people anticipated the threats that the Plan carried and almost instinctively, as any Greek person would do, voted No. That the people instinctively react despite possible pressures to do otherwise
indicates also an understanding that voting No was a collective act of resistance to pressures to vote Yes. Such metaphors about national instincts as being comparable to natural instincts represent national identities and the nation as naturally occurring within people themselves. In this quote, Nicolas emphasized belonging to the Greek nation but overall he emphasized both the state and the nation as constituent parts of who we are. In his account, the Plan threatened both the state and the nation, which is evidence that perhaps he spoke of the state as a nation state (such perceptions are analysed in more depth in Chapter 7).

Nicolas’s assertion is interesting in that he did not want such a solution to “bear” his signature, which is a statement made by other Plan opponents. His remark that the status quo is negative but it is not his responsibility is also noteworthy. In effect, participants, like Nicolas, raised the issue of collective responsibility, claiming that the Plan should not be implemented “in their name” (see Runciman, 2007 on political representation) bearing their signature. The argument most probably shows two perceptions. One viewpoint is that division was merely an outcome of Turkish aggression, but the Plan would be approved by the Greek-Cypriots, so they preferred to vote No and avoid taking responsibility. On the other hand, it could more probably be that, whereas other solutions, such as the 1960s Zurich Agreements, were imposed on them, this time international mediators tried to “trick” them into approving a settlement and taking responsibility for a potential failure.

**State dissolution and the divisive Plan.** Focusing on Sotiris’s account, a retired public servant from Paphos, allows us to present two recurring No arguments that maintained that the Plan was divisive and that it would dissolve the state, leading ultimately to Cyprus’s Turkification. The following quotes are examples of his main criticism of the Plan:

It [the Plan] has so many divisive elements for which it would not have worked![…] And us, we would not have been a state any more! We would have become a community! And they [Turkish-Cypriots] would find a pretext and never return back [to the common state]. We would
Sotiris argued that the Plan reinforced ethnic cleavages to such an extent that the new state would inevitably collapse. His concerns that the Plan foresaw an enhanced bizonality and that it replaced the single state with a confederation is probably related to the disputed issue of bizonality and the continuity of the legal entity of the state echoing anti-Plan arguments in the Press (see Chapter 4, section “Cyprocentric and Hellenocentric Codes: History and the State”). The cornerstone of Sotiris’s account was that the Plan would end the existence of the RoC and transform it into a confederation. He frequently emphasized that the Turkish-Cypriots could opt for secession by using a pretext and they would “never return” to the common state. In this case, Greek-Cypriots would not be represented by a recognized state, as the RoC would have ceased to be a legal entity because of the Plan. The perception shared by Sotiris and other participants that the Plan would lead to Cyprus’s Turkification, which is assumed to be Turkey’s ultimate expansionist goal for Cyprus, perhaps also relates to the Plan’s provisions that Turkey would retain guarantor rights that it had from the 1960 Zurich Agreements (see also Chapter 7). Finally, Sotiris suggested that the Greek-Cypriot side should seriously consider withdrawing from any negotiations, as under the circumstances it was impossible to consolidate differences between the two sides.

An unfair Plan. There were perceptions that some No voters – and to an extent Yes voters – shared that the Plan was biased against Greek-Cypriots. Loukia in her early 30s and daughter of a Greek-Cypriot refugee, provided a justification for voting No which is characteristic of such perceptions. The following extract is why she rejected the Plan, based on arguments related to the debated issue of majority vs. minority rights, the right to return, and property issues. She said:

I was with No and I was fanatically [supporting] No. I cannot remember exactly what the Plan foresaw, but the most important thing was …[pause], to give you a description, it was as if you have a house and somebody comes and steals half of your house and then returns just one room and you are expected to be OK with this [arrangement] and never again raise the incident. So I
was not willing to sign with our own signature and agree that everything is OK and to have Turkey as a co-sovereign state and to have a Turkish-Cypriot President….In practice it made the meaning of majority and minority obsolete – Turkish-Cypriots were less than 20%, but they would have equal rights to decide!

Loukia’s comparison of the arrangements that the Plan entailed to a house theft is indicative of a very Greek-Cypriot centred approach for many reasons. First she began by referencing the Turkish invasion, which she compared to a burglary, and more importantly to an unprompted one, without referencing prior events. Then she underlined that the Plan gave equal rights to the minority, referring to Turkish-Cypriots as a minority and not a community, perhaps illustrating a disagreement with any solution that would treat them as a community because that entailed allowing them to have elevated representational rights. Like Stelios, above, she saw the No vote as an act of resistance, with an added emphasis on how the Plan gave too much to the other. Similar to Nicolas above, she raised the issue of responsibility underlining that she was not willing “with our own signature” to legitimize what she considered an unfair Plan.

The No-voting respondents’ perceptions that the Plan was unfair to the Greek-Cypriot community and by extension that it was positively biased towards Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot community were supported by how many of them considered that Turkey had a geopolitical advantage. This advantage related to its powerful allies, the US and the UK, who arguably also used the Plan as an opportunity to enhance their own interests.

**The collective and the subjective.** Eleni’s account will be treated as an example of how participants took into consideration personal and collective criteria to make sense of the Plan and to vote at the referendum. Eleni in her late fifties is a displaced from a Kyrenia village, and she said: “Given that it [the Plan] would not allow me to go to my village [return/resettle] and I would not have my state, then I think that I acted emotionally [and voted No].”

The personal or the subjective in Eleni’s case related to her having been displaced from a village in the north, which, according to the Plan, would remain in the Turkish-Cypriot controlled
territorial zone. Her criterion which represented a collective concern was that the RoC would not exist any longer and that would jeopardize the entire community. Eleni said with bitterness that there was no Plan that could return the life she lost when she was forced to abandon her village in 1974. She explained that returning to her village was not possible under any Plan because no Plan could reverse time and undo 1974. The dissolution of the state exacerbated her fears of Turkification. Her clarification that she acted emotionally was made perhaps in order to show that her No vote was also a result of her feelings of bitterness and injustice rather than being a rational decision.

**Pro-division.** Leon said that he voted No because he wanted to preserve the status quo of division, and he gave a rich and detailed account to this end. He explained that he preferred division to reunification, and, more importantly perhaps, he suggested the institutionalization of division but with some territorial adjustment that would represent the population ratio of the two communities: a Greek-Cypriot controlled state in the south and a Turkish-Cypriot controlled state in the north. Leon, in his mid-thirties originates from Nicosia and neither of his parents were refugees. He supported this solution because, as he said, the status quo proved sustainable for both sides and ensured peace for about 30 years, since the imposition of de facto division in 1974. He emphasized that, should the populations reconnect, new conflict could occur, given that the two communities share antagonistic nationalist views regarding Cyprus as a territory and the two nationalisms would inevitably collide, as the one considers that Cyprus is Greek and the other Turkish. This shows that Leon sees an ongoing and indefinite antagonism of nationalisms in Cyprus which can threaten peace, so he believes it would be best if each takes a “piece” of the land they claim to be theirs.

Leon’s account contradicted at least two main arguments of other No supporters and deviated dramatically from the Great No. The first argument he contradicted is that the rejection of the Plan was not a rejection of a solution in general but of the particular Plan, and the second, that the two communities can coexist peacefully without external interventions. Leon clearly stated that
he voted No to any solution which would reunify the two populations and that he supports division. A comparison of this with Stelios’ account, the high ranked police officer in Paphos, illustrates how extensive the opposition was between the two perspectives leading to a No vote:

The problem, dear [mana mou], is not the internal aspects of the Cyprus issue. That is not the problem. We can solve this with the Turkish-Cypriots. We can sit down, talk, and have it solved. Don’t you get it that the problem is invasion, occupation, guarantees, the army, the borders, citizenship, the legal entity of the state?

Leon approached the Cyprus issue as primarily an ethnic conflict and Stelios approached it as an international conflict instigated by Turkey. Thus, on the one hand Stelios undermined the internal factors related to the Cyprus issue, such as intercommunal relationships, and Leon undermined the role played by external actors in its birth and reproduction. Therefore while for some the problem was that the Plan was divisive, for Leon the problem was that it abolished division and would reunite the two communities.

Marios explained that he voted No to preserve the current status quo because he perceived it as safe. Marios, in his late thirties residing Paphos but also son of a refugee from a village in occupied Nicosia, was not adamant like Leon that the Plan would definitely lead to interethnic violence, nor did he adopt Stelios’s line of argumentation that the Plan was predominantly anti-Greek-Cypriot, or Sotiris’s view about Turkey’s long-lasting plan to Turkify the entire country. For Marios, the Plan encompassed a risk, because it would lead to an unknown new status and he was unwilling to accept that status, particularly given that the long-lasting division had proved stable.

Notably, accounts similar to Leon’s and Mario’s provide evidence that some were reluctant to coexist with the other in a single federated state, not because they felt animosity for the other, but out of fear about the power of nationalism and perceptions that the status quo is a better alternative (see also Chapter 6). Relevant accounts resemble a tendency found in other studies among Turkish-
Cypriots, the so-called ethnic competitors and separatists, “who support complete territorial isolation of the two communities from each other” (Vural & Peristianis, 2008, p. 54).

Gone with the wind. Some participants explicitly argued that they did not hold strong convictions about the Plan, but voted No to follow the majority’s position. Nasos is one who characteristically said: “I just followed.” Katerina also argued that she followed the majority as well as her party, AKEL. She said, “We went with the flow; we went with the party” [πήμεν με το κόμμα-πήμεν με το κόμμα]. Both Nasos and Katerina in their mid-thirties, claimed that they were disengaged from developments on the Plan in 2004, but finally they were convinced by the main arguments of No supporters that the Plan carried risks. Nevertheless, Katerina shared serious doubts about whether a solution was feasible, and Nasos defended the status quo, emphasizing that it is viable and functional through the rhetorical question, “Why change it if it works?”

Katerina’s account is an example of a No voter who adopted only some of the official Greek-Cypriot positions on the solution, but who rejected their ultimate goal of return and reunification. She said:

Now, imagine that some come and kick us out of our house – us, now. If you think of this….then it is important [the solution]. But at this point, what kind of a solution could support the refugees? Will they go there [north]? […] Who is going to return their houses? Most of them died…only the young are still alive. How will things be if it is solved? But even if it is solved, I don’t think that they will give anything back.

Katerina obviously reconsidered the need for a solution. On the one hand she understood that a solution was the only way to rectify injustice done to the Greek-Cypriot community and particularly the refugees, but on the other hand she seriously questioned whether this is feasible. In contrast, she was unable to imagine a solution or to imagine reunification. The rhetorical questions she posed, such as “Who is going to return?”, referring to the Greek-Cypriots displaced in 1974 from the north, are indicative of perceptions that many of the displaced would not resettle in their villages in the north and that those who might have considered returning have died. The examples
she gave show an understanding that the issues of property and the rights to return are complex and that they make a solution impossible. Perhaps such accounts also relate to how many Greek-Cypriots admittedly did not understand the provisions of the Plan and subsequently they could not conceptualize a solution in practical terms.

In between No and Yes (then and now). Niki said that she had been faced with a very painful dilemma during the referenda period and described herself as being in-between Yes and No. Finally, she voted No after being persuaded that the Plan carried dangers for the Greek-Cypriot community. Niki, a non-refugee from Paphos in her late fifties, to emphasize her dilemma, she said, “At certain moments we wondered, why not vote Yes, if this was a real chance for a solution!” Niki’s account is representative of No voters who did not have strong convictions about the No vote and who could have voted Yes, rejecting arguments that the Plan was “evil” and approaching it as an opportunity for a solution.

Some No participants noted unprompted that their main perceptions of the Plan changed significantly after the referenda, and some said that they are now willing to vote Yes in a similar referendum. Those participants claimed that their No was influenced – although to different degrees – by their reluctance to accept coexisting with the Turkish-Cypriot community, because they considered the Turkish-Cypriots as a national enemy, along with the Turkish. Notably, those who felt this way were all from the youngest age group. The following quote is by Louiza, raised in Paphos but a child of refugee from Famagusta, today in her late 20s:

Now I wonder whether there would be something better. Or if we are trying to remain as we are now because this suits everyone and we are not looking for a solution. So, maybe if I voted now I would vote Yes.

Louiza now rejects the rationale of her once so-called patriotic No. She explained that she voted No because the Plan was unfair to us and because, if agreed, it would force us to live with the enemy. Today she considers that the Plan was a rather good compromise, particularly given that a
similar opportunity for a solution had yet to arrive. In effect, she herself questions the No justification, juxtaposing it to “realities”, and she also questions the will of her community for a solution, like most Yes participants did. Other No participants claimed that they had hopes that Cyprus’s EU accession would create conditions for a fairer solution; however, 10 years have elapsed since Cyprus became an EU member state and the fact that there is no solution has made them reconsider their 2004 stance.

5.2 Voting Yes: Peace, Stability, Progress and Return

Most if not all participants who supported the Plan expected that a solution based on the Plan would end an unstable status quo and would create more promising conditions for peace and stability, particularly for the young generations. Most appeared extremely disappointed by the outcome of the referenda and considered that the Greek-Cypriot No vote reinforced the status quo of division.

Panayiotis voted Yes because, “[W]e were tired. Above all we wanted our children to live in a quiet Cyprus from now on. It is with these thoughts in mind that most of us voted Yes.” Panayiotis used the first person plural to refer to all the Yes supporters. His statement, “We are tired”, demonstrates that people have become fatigued with the neverending Cyprus issue which has created a constant sense of instability. Panayiotis implied that for as long as there is no official solution, one cannot say that Cyprus is truly “peaceful”. The use of the first person plural we to speak of all Yes voters also indicates that there is a sense of unity among Yes supporters and his understanding that they had common perceptions for voting Yes. Panayiotis is from a village in the north and works at the public education sector in Nicosia.

Electra in her early thirties and a teacher at a private school in Nicosia argued that a solution based on the Plan would mark a shift from a nationalist paradigm to a new paradigm of coexistence, and in her opinion this meant progress. She said:
It’s just we considered this as an important…a decisive step to change the way we make sense of our place [τόπος]. The way we make sense of history. That we would be more comfortable to discuss topics which remained untouched by then. […] Because issues like education, migration, policing, economic issues, everything…can be stuck on the Cyprus issue.

Electra believed a solution would initiate a process of reforms at the level of the everyday and at the level of institutions, for example, enabling new ways of approaching the teaching of history. She described the continual existence of the conflict as a reason for an unofficial censorship that prevented reforms or even dialogue on sensitive social and political issues. Another Yes voter, Yiannis, in his mid-forties from Paphos said: “Above all, reunification means political maturity.” He also said, “We could never understand the other.” Yiannis suggested that a reunification agreement was primarily about accepting the other, and thus far Greek-Cypriots have proven unable to do this.

Yes participants who expressed being uncertain, in the present day, about their Yes vote explained that this was because they perceived nationalism to be strong within the Greek-Cypriot community. For example, Dinos, in his mid-forties, a civil-servarnt from Paphos wondered whether it is for the best that the Plan did not get the majority of the votes, as many Greek-Cypriots are prejudiced against the Turks. Dinos echoed other Yes informants who claimed that a significant number of Greek-Cypriots were instigated by nationalism to vote No.

Most Yes voters agreed that it was in the interest of the Greek-Cypriot community to reach an agreement the soonest. They noted that this is because the more time passed without a settlement, the more the status quo was enhanced and the fewer possibilities there were for a settlement. Harris’s account is characteristic of the argument:

Every day that goes by makes it harder for the Cyprus issue to be solved. The settlers multiply…in the occupied areas there is more and more development, this complicates the situation [pause]. And after a while I believe that foreigners will get bored of us, and if their interests change and they recognize the pseudo state…this would be a significant blow. Because I don’t think that Cyprus can take two states. Even solely from an economic perspective, it will
be a great disadvantage to have across another state which will be considered an enemy [state]. Already you can see that most – many tourists go there now, using the Tympos airport which – as far as I know – is almost a normal airport.

Harris, in his late twenties from a Nicosian village but a Paphos’ resident, argued that all of the time going by without a solution was more catastrophic for the Greek-Cypriot community than for the Turkish-Cypriot. He mentioned the increasing number of settlers, meaning that more Turkish people are arriving and settling in the north without a solution and that only a solution could end this process. He noted another dominant argument of Yes supporters, that since there has been no settlement there is so much more construction activity in the north, further complicating the property issue and the issue of return. He was concerned that mediators will eventual get “tired” of the unending Cyprus issue and they will quit efforts to get the two sides to come to an agreement, and they will recognize the TRNC. Therefore, recognition of the TRNC would lead to a situation of two antagonistic states in Cyprus, and he gave the example of antagonisms in relation to the tourist industry. Harris emphasized mostly the negative consequences a non-solution would have, while Electra and Yiannis, quoted above, emphasized the benefits of a solution.

Some Yes voters also discussed how their personal situations influenced the way they voted. Angeliki, a retired civil-servant residing in Paphos, said that she voted Yes because her husband desires to resettle in his village in the north, which is in territories that would have been subjected to territorial readjustment. She said:

I voted Yes basically for emotional reasons, because of my husband who was displaced is eager to return. Also the entire family wants to return. I will follow my family though it is not my place. So I voted Yes and did not listen to [obey] any politician.

Angeliki said that she and her family voted Yes for “emotional” reasons, echoing Eleni who said something very similar about her No vote. Angeliki spoke of her husband’s wish to move back to his village as the fulfilment of a personal dream. She admitted that they were troubled about what
to vote, yet in the end she stated that their desire to “return” was more powerful and played the decisive role in their voting Yes. It is also interesting that she emphasized that she was not influenced by politicians, which is similar to other participants who also underlined that their referendum votes were more an individual decision than obedience to a party. In this case, voting Yes appeared to be a family decision.

Angeliki, when prompted to discuss what risks might there be if the Plan was implemented, she said that neither she nor her family considered war or conflict to be probable if the Plan was realised, except perhaps for some minor nationalistic incidents. She said, “It did not cross my mind that there could be a conflict.” She added, “Some reactions, Yes, but a war and things like that, No.” Angeliki’s perception that the Plan did not carry severe risks, was not shared by No voters. The two perceptions on the risks that the Plan carried are contrasted in the following part as they represent the most divisive perception between the two groups.

5.3 The Rift between Yes and No: Turkey’s Role and the Risks the Plan Carried

The analysis noted a rift between Yes and No voters which concerned their perceptions of what Turkey’s role would be in the event of a solution. Angeliki, who is quoted above and who is also a Yes voter, said that she did not expect significant incidents of violence in case the Plan was put into effect, whereas some No participants also quoted in this chapter expected a disaster, such as Turkification and interethnic conflict (see also Chapter 7). Dwelling on the perceptions of Fotini and Yiannis, both from Paphos on the issue will allow further illustrate this divisive aspect between No and Yes voters.

Fotini argued that Turkey is not a credible counterpart and that it would have found a pretext to intervene if there was a solution based on the Plan. This is a characteristic example of her ideas:

Of course we were troubled but this view about our enemies, the Turks, was more powerful (small laugh) that the Turks never keep agreements. In their history they never kept an
agreement. And they always find a window to say that the agreement was violated and to intervene. So while Turkey committed to the Plan, at the end they would find a pretext and would not give us what they signed for.

Fotini did not trust that Turkey would abide by the Plan, so she voted No. She based her argument on Turkey’s historical reputation, that it “never kept an agreement”. She said that Turkey is our national enemy and that there could be no meaningful compromise, as Turkey’s ultimate goal is to capture all of Cyprus.

Yiannis was adamant when he said that it was not the Turkish side but the Greek-Cypriot side which historically violates agreements, and therefore it should not be trusted. To back his claim, Yiannis referred to the enosis politics of the Greek-Cypriot side despite that it agreed in independence. The following extract is indicative of his position:

They [Greek-Cypriots] destroyed the Turkish-Cypriots. They destroyed them. They terrorized them! Then the 1974 coup came. And then they accuse Turkey for violating agreements! Who! The first who did this was them [Οι πρώτοι διδάξαντες]. Didn’t they do the coup?! Didn’t they violate the constitution?

Yiannis referred to how the Greek-Cypriots treated the Turkish-Cypriots; he spoke of terrorism and violent attacks. He also talked about the coup as an example of how the Greek side used force to violate Cyprus’s 1960s independence agreement to achieve enosis and in effect to dissolve the state. He aimed to contradict No arguments that Turkey is not to be trusted by claiming that it is our side which should not be trusted.

The two examples, provide evidence that perceptions of whether it is us or the other who violates agreements depend on which point of view the respondents had on the history of Greco-Turkish relations and on the history of intercommunal relations. Yiannis and Fotini took two antithetical perspectives. One said that Turkey could not be trusted, using historical arguments that, throughout history, Turkey violated all agreements it had made. The other negated the argument and said that the Turkish-Cypriot community was more justified to feel insecure with an agreement
given how in the past it was targeted by Greek-Cypriots who also did not abide by the agreement for independence.

5.4 Ideas on Group Homogeneity

Maria, a No supporter in her mid-thirties from Nicosia but a child of refugees from the Kyrenia district, argued that Yes voters were unfairly categorized as traitors. She said, “It [referendum] created labels – once more.” She also emphasized that she had come to believe that “the people who voted Yes were wronged,” and asked in a rhetorical manner, “Why would a person who voted Yes, who believed for example certain things, be a traitor?” Despite her querying why Yes supporters were categorized as traitors, Maria confirms that indeed they had been categorized as such.

Interestingly, another No voter, Stelios, referred to patriots and traitors without being prompted, but he anticipated that I might ask him to elaborate, although I did not. He acknowledged that No and Yes supporters were labelled as patriots and traitors respectively, yet he rejected that this categorization reflected reality with the exception of AKEL. He considered the core of AKEL leadership to be traitors, even though AKEL came out against the Plan, because of their internationalism, which he perceived as antithetical to being a patriot. He said that they [AKEL leadership] “are not interested if Cyprus is run by a Turk or by a Greek as long as their own ideological goals are served.”

The supporters of the Plan were aware that they were categorized as traitors. It is noticeable that Phoebos, at the end of our discussion, asked me with bitterness: “You do understand the Yes supporters, don’t you?” It is evidence of resentment that the motives of Yes voters were misrepresented and evidence that perhaps a “researcher” would be able to be more “objective” transeniting this established paradigm.
Some Yes supporters reacted to their being categorized as traitors by questioning the patriotism of No voters. For example, Harris accused President Papadopoulos, who led the No camp, of treason. Harris argued that the President did not want a solution in general, not just the Annan Plan, and he emphasized that he did not negotiate to improve the Plan, in order to ensure that the Greek-Cypriot community would reject it. Harris proposed that there should be a referendum in the Greek-Cypriot community to ask whether Greek-Cypriots want a solution or not, and he argued that a significant proportion would vote No. He expected that this would prove his perception that Greek-Cypriots, and not only the leadership, do not want a solution at all.

Some Yes participants described how the division between “patriotic” No and “unpatriotic” Yes votes was part of their everyday life at that time. Dinos said that he still has nightmares about the referendum period. He vividly described how difficult it was to discuss the Plan, as merely to suggest that it might have had some positive elements prompted others to criticize him and accuse him of being a traitor. Gregoris, who was also a Yes supporter from a village of the Paphos district and in his early forties, described similar experiences of censorship on a daily basis. He said, “You could not open your mouth….They would all attack you and ask if you are a traitor!”

Other Yes voters specifically wanted to deny that a No vote had been patriotic and they argued in effect that it had not been that Great. For example Renos, a retired displaced from the north and residing in a village in the district of Paphos, speaking as a representative from the marginalised Yes group, emphasized that the rejection of the Plan was not because of so called patriotism that dominant discourses suggested, but because of economic interests and because, as he emphasized, Greek-Cypriots do not want reunification any more. He wanted to ensure that I understood his argument and asked “Do you get this?” Probably he thought I would not be able to follow his argument which refuted the popular reasoning for voting No. He, like other Yes voters, felt that they had been accused of being traitors, and such perceptions reflect the general polarized political climate that characterised that period.
Another Yes voter, Orestis, emphasized that voting Yes necessitated optimism to counter pessimistic views that Turkey would put up obstacles to peace and stability. Orestis, a refugee from the city of Famagusta in his mid-thirties, interpreted No voters’ negative perceptions of the role of Turkey as evidence of their lack of will for peaceful coexistence and their preference for the status quo of division. It was a recurrent perception among Yes voters to criticize No voters, for focusing only on the risks and not on the prospects of the Plan, using this as evidence that they actually prefer the status quo, and that they are unwilling to make any sacrifices for reunification.

**Challenging homogenizations.** Dinos voted Yes and Emilios voted No, but both argued that the No vote cannot be taken as representative of a particular ideological stance. Elektra voted Yes and argued that a Yes vote also should not be taken as representative of a particular ideological position or as representative of beliefs on national identity. All three voters developed their arguments in reply to what they perceived as a constructed homogenization of the No and Yes votes.

Dinos said with an added emphasis that he did not believe that all No voters shared the same views. In contrast, he underlined that No voters had significant ideological differences, and there could be more views in common between a Yes and a No voter than there might be between two No voters or between two Yes voters. He added: “This is because within that No it was also the No of some of AKEL [supporters], it was also the No of…Golden Dawn. And this is what many tried to exploit at the end, including Lillikas.”

Dinos argued that No voters came from different and often opposite ideological camps. He mentioned supporters of AKEL and the extreme right-wing ethnonationalists who both supported No. He named Golden Dawn, but he obviously referred to their Cypriot counterpart, ELAM.

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65 Yiorgos Lillikas is a Greek-Cypriot politician and former AKEL MP, who served as Minister of Commerce and Minister of Foreign Affairs during Papadopoulos’s government, and he is currently leading the Citizens’ Alliance party that proclaims anti-federation positions.
Emilios, who confirmed Dinos’s point, in his early thirties from Nicosia and currently living and working in Paphos presented himself as an example of a No voter who did not adopt the main arguments of most No supporters, and voted No because he was not well informed on the Plan. He said, “I would never vote for something I am not ‘clear’ about”. He added that:

Why 75% said No? Did they all say No for the same reason? Or did 30% within that 75% say No because this is what the party told him [to vote]? Or did another 20% say No because, like Emilios [himself], they would never vote Yes for something which was not clear [to them]. And another 10% said No because this is what the father of Costis said and Yiannis. So they kept repeating, that the 75% said No or that the entire/sissomos the Cypriot people decided No. Give us the reasons (emphasis). Why did they say No?

Both participants criticized politicians in particular for their efforts to capitalize on the high percentage of No voters in the referenda and frame it as indicative of a specific ideological stance, while the participants thought it was obvious that it had not been.

5.5 Beyond the National: Intraethnic Conflicts of Interest?

A Yes supporter, Yiannis said that during the Annan period two forms of nationalism backed the No vote: a genuine one and a “bastard” one. The word bastard is used in the colloquial sense to refer to something which is impure and to point to a pretentious and fake nationalism hiding other, more individualized concerns. He meant that some No voters were genuine nationalists in the sense that they prioritized the nation – however they conceptualized it – and voted No, but others only used a nationalist discourse to justify No but in reality they voted based on pure economic criteria. Yiannis believed that although some No voters thought about ideas other than the nation when deciding to vote No they did not admit it in public.

Stelios, a No supporter, used a similar argument mostly in relation to Yes voters, saying that some voted Yes to get their properties (in the north) back and to improve their economic status. Stelios characteristically said that the Greek-Cypriots “studied the map of the Plan” before deciding
what to vote. He meant that what they were interested in knowing was whether they benefited personally from the Plan’s provisions on territorial adjustments. Such perceptions concerned mainly the displaced and how the Plan regulated their rights to property and return. According to the Plan, the Turkish-Cypriot administrative zone would be 29 per cent of the country, and this meant that some 7 per cent of territories in the north would be “returned” to the Greek-Cypriots (Gürel & Özersay, 2006). Participants called these areas “returnable” territories as Greek-Cypriots would be allowed to return to their properties if they wished to “while in other areas the property rights were to be exercised partly by way of reinstatement and partly through compensation” (Gürel & Özersay, 2006, p. 364-365).

Costis, also a No voter and a displaced from a village in the district of Kyrenia, made the same claims equally for both groups, highlighting that the Greek-Cypriot community has conflicting interests of an economic nature in relation to the solution and that these played a significant role in referenda votes. He also mentioned the members of the National Guard as a particular group which voted No out of fears of losing their jobs. The Plan foresaw Cyprus’s gradual demilitarization, save for 950 Greek troops and 650 Turkish troops which would remain indefinitely. In practice this meant the abolition of the National Guard. According to some participants, this provision of the Plan created rumours and concerns that the members of the National Guard and staff of the Ministry of Defence would be left in an unemployment limbo. Evidently many participants associated members of the National Guard as a group who were interested in maintaining the status quo. Participants who worked for the National Guard confirmed these perceptions.

In this regard, a recurrent and general dissatisfaction with individualism was recorded in the field. This dissatisfaction is evident in quotes such as, “We Cypriots we are interest-based [συμφεροντολογοί]” (Costis, displaced from Kyrenia and No voter), or, “We Cypriots we can sell patriotism but when money is involved we become kittens” (Yiannis, Paphos and Yes voter).
The following parts explore specifically perceptions which held that the displaced who came from areas that would have returned if the Plan was approved were more likely to vote Yes, as opposed to non-refugees who voted No and those in the military who voted No out of fear of losing their jobs because the Plan foresaw the dissolution of the National Guard. These perceptions provide evidence of how some people assumed that others used subjective, in particular economic criteria to make sense of the Plan and to decide how to vote in the referenda.

**Displaced vs. non-displaced.** Orestis, a Yes voter from a returnable area, said that it was unfair that both the displaced and the non-displaced, voted “whether a refugee could ‘go home’ or not”. He considered the rejection of the Plan as unfair to the displaced from returnable territories, as they lost an opportunity to return and exploit their properties. He added:

> OK we may be returning to the economic factor now, but still I consider it unfair. [...] I am a refugee and I have property in the occupied areas which I cannot exploit and I have to buy land in the free areas of Cyprus. And the value of the land – we need economists and statisticians to explain the reasons for this – has been set at a fourth of its value. Given that Cyprus was divided and the entire population came to this side, then the prices went up by four times. This is how I think of this issue. So why does one who has all this land (in the south) reject all this profit [out of the rise of the prices]? Because I cannot stop thinking that economic factors also played a role in deciding [what to vote].

Orestis was frustrated as he interpreted the Greek-Cypriot community’s No vote restricting his right to claim his property in the north. He did acknowledge that the solution concerned all of Cyprus and not just the displaced, yet his feelings of injustice were exacerbated by how he perceived that some voted No to protect their own economic interests such as land-owners in the south.

Constantina, also a Yes voter from a “returnable” area who resides in the district of Paphos–questioned the will of the displaced to return. She said:

> We can already conclude that it is not in the interests of any locals here (emphasis) who have their properties here that the refugees leave from here.[…]
And to tell you the truth, neither do refugees want to leave [from the south]. And I will tell you why: not only because of property issues but because for example there is a family which has three or four children who they got married to people from Paphos, they built houses in Paphos or Geroskipou, others here, others there. Who wants to return? Will an old person move with his wife and leave their children on this side?

Constantina believed that not only the non-displaced but also some displaced do not want to return to their villages in the occupied north. She described how for most displaced “return” would feel like if they were being uprooted as the south had now become their “home”. It is noticeable that she suggested that some displaced do not feel nostalgic, in contrast to post-1974 official cultivation of nostalgia among the displaced for their lost homes and villages (Papadakis, 2006, p. 11). However, Constantina and her husband wanted to resettle in their village in the north. She said:

I was not embarrassed at all to say that I was a Yes [supporter]. Because we believed that we wanted to go! My husband had a lot of property. I have four children. How do you educate four children? We believed that by returning, things would be very different for us. You sell one plot, you support your children. We visit them [the properties in the north]. I went three times in a month. We go, we see them and we return.

According to Constantia, to vote Yes to ameliorate her family’s economic situation was natural and normal. The fact that she pointed out that she was not embarrassed to vote Yes perhaps shows her awareness that others had criticized this position.

On the other side, Eleni who is displaced from a Kyrenia village, said: “[I would] return…if my neighbours returned, if my children returned [then I would return].” Eleni disliked the idea of returning under the circumstances. It is clear that she herself understands that the requirements she sets to return to her village could not be met, as her neighbours, most of whom had already died – would not return and neither would her children who had left all their lives in the south. The Plan did not foresee that her village would be under Greek-Cypriot administration and perhaps this is another reason that returning to her village seemed such a distant possibility.
Stelios, a No voter, also with roots from a Kyrenia village, said that he did not consider resettling but that it was for “national reasons” that he considered return of properties significant. When prompted to clarify what he meant, he said: “I want the return of our territories for national, personal reasons. It is mine and I want it!”

Stelios, perhaps anticipating arguments that most of Greek-Cypriots would not return, emphasised that returning to his property is to him a national issue and not just a personal one. He clarified that although he personally did not plan to resettle in his mother’s village in the north, the return of lost Greek-Cypriot properties in the north is a national matter and should not be conflated with one’s individual choice to return or not. As he fiercely argued, the occupied village and in particular his family’s properties constitute “Greek” land which should be returned to its rightful owners.

**Paphos’ No vote.** Among participants who supported or rejected the Plan, there were some who argued that people from the Paphos area (Paphites as they named them) had prioritized economic criteria over common interests when deciding to vote No. A recurrent justification of this perception was that Paphites feared that if there was a solution they would lose tourists who would prefer to go to coastal areas in the north. Others argued that the invasion benefited Paphos as the arrival of Greek-Cypriot refugees boosted its economy and that they feared that a solution would take this away. This is perhaps because the district was perceived as less developed compared to other cities in the pre-1974 period but also due to the high percentage of No votes there.

Constantina, quoted above, resettled in Paphos after 1974. She said that the arrival of refugees in the south and specifically in Paphos contributed significantly to the district’s development. To help me conceptualize the change that Paphos underwent after the invasion, she described her impressions from her first visits to Paphos saying it resembled more of a fishing village than a city. “The refugees opened their [Paphites’] eyes, she told me, and added: “When you
visited Paphos, it was like a dead place, you would not even see two cars driving by, not even one shop open.”

Paphos, as described by Constantina, lacked shops, cars and hotels, which evidently she considers as marks of development. The expression she used that the refugees “opened their eyes” illustrates perceptions that Paphites were backward compared to the displaced. In effect she argued that the 1974 war and the influx of refugees to Paphos acted as a catalyst in the district’s development and its modernization. Interestingly, she said that Turkish-Cypriots are clean [Οι Τουρκοκύπριοι εν καθαροί] to point to similarities between the Greek-Cypriots and the Turkish-Cypriots. In contrast she thought the settlers were dirty and were thus underdeveloped, not only economically but also culturally. Her impressions of settlers resemble her impressions of Paphos being backward in 1974. Constantina spoke with bitterness about Paphos because she considered that although refugees contributed to Paphos’s development, Paphites ruined the refugees’ chance to return home by voting No.

Phoebos, who came from Paphos and is a retired civil servant, agreed that the invasion benefited that area. He said that it was probable that some Paphites unconsciously or consciously voted No out of fear of losing the “goose laying the golden eggs.” He said:

So the invasion, regardless if this sounds out of place, benefited Paphos economically. At least some Paphites may consciously or unconsciously think that they would loose the goose laying the golden eggs. The goose will leave. We would pay for others to be comfortable etc.

By saying that “we would pay for others to be comfortable [να σαστούν]”, Phoebos pointed to ideas that people from Paphos disliked the idea of taking the economic burden of the solution and that such economic arguments promoting No were influential among some Paphites.

Other participants from Paphos who were aware that some refugees considered them underdeveloped reacted differently. For example Nicolas, a No voter from Paphos in his early fifties, said, “The refugees constantly repeat that when they came to Paphos they made us human.”
In other words, the Paphites, under the influence of the displaced, became “civilized” and “modern”. When prompted to discuss his reaction to such criticism, he said, “I tell them that when their food from Nicosia is interrupted they will die of hunger.” Nicolas was alluding to how the displaced were on state benefits. Furthermore, he said such economic arguments were irrational because, for example, the ghost city of Famagusta, a potential tourist destination, needed decades to be restored before again becoming a tourist attraction. Dora, also from Paphos and who voted No, argued that refugees receive state funds whereas other poor groups within the Greek-Cypriot community are not equally supported. So refugees had no motivation to vote Yes as they received sufficient state aid. These accounts are evidence of perceptions than non-refugees were treated unfairly by the state compared to refugees.

Fotini, a No voter from Paphos and a high ranked civil officer, refuted arguments that the displaced who had a chance to return to their areas voted Yes and others No. She gave the example of her brother-in-law, who came from a place that he would be allowed to return to, still voted No. She said, “Although he had properties which would be given back, he was not influenced by this to vote Yes.” She also said, “I consider this ridiculous that the people of Paphos supported No for this reason, because in a non-functional solution the properties of everyone would be lost.”

**National Guard’s No Vote.** Costis, a No supporter, was adamant that all the members of the National Guard voted No at the referendum out of fear that a solution would render them unemployed. He said:

> All the military personell without any exceptions, voted No, because the army was [going to be] abolished, the National Guard. So these [members of the Guard] used to take promotions every four years. They became brigadiers. Like if we have brigadiers in Cyprus for thousands of soldiers to fight! […]Eh, so…it was about the salary!

Costis described the military as a privileged group in terms of employment benefits, such as salaries and promotions. He also criticized how the National Guard works, in general. He thought
the officers were fearful about losing their jobs which were not just any job. Therefore, the prospect of a solution threatened not only their employment status, but also their social status by extension. Costis supported his argument by sharing a discussion he had with an army officer who admitted voting No out of concern about his job. When Costis challenged him to leave aside his personal situation and take into consideration the common good, the officer immediately presented other reasons for voting No which evidently sounded more “nationally” correct. Costis’s example echoes Yiannis’s argument that some did not share their real reasons for how they voted in the referendum.

Interviewees who were in the military confirmed that fears about employment insecurity after a solution dominated the National Guard at that time. Harris, a Yes voter and former military officer, said his colleagues in the National Guard basically voted No in 2004 to keep their jobs. He described an environment of confusion and fear within the National Guard. Evangelos, who voted No and who originates from Paphos, agreed that job insecurity was a key concern for members of the National Guard during the referendum period. This is an extract from our discussion:

Participant: The government did not say to us…and perhaps this is a reason for which even the more moderate officers voted No was because I believe it was job insecurity! Everything was in the air! Meaning that there was no plan! Would you be fired? Compensated? Pensions? There was nothing!!!

Researcher: Did you ask for information?

Participant: Nobody knew what to answer!!! They didn’t know! And the issue is that after the referendum the next government would not have a responsibility. Who would hire you?!! And this is something that we should take notice this time. At the next solution, they should explain these issues.

Evangelos said that most people employed in the military voted No because they did not know if they would lose their jobs, and they had no official information about how they would be compensated and how their rights to pensions would be managed after the solution. He emphatically stated that in a future Plan these issues should be clarified. It seemed to him very probable that there would be another Plan. Although he voted No, Evangelos considered this
environment of confusion in the National Guard was a mistake which should be avoided in the future.

Kyriaki, who is also in the military and a Yes voter, said people’s confusion and concerns were instigated by the government on purpose to ensure that they would vote No. She asked rhetorically: “If the line [aim] is for No, then why bother to inform people?” She said she voted Yes because she had in mind that the entire country would benefit from a solution. She admitted that working for the National Guard is a privileged position and this made it easy for the government to intentionally spread controversy amongst the military personnel to ensure more No votes. Kyriaki is a displaced from a Nicosian village in her mid-forties.

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter presented the findings from the interviews of how participants who were either supporters or opponents of the Plan explained their referendum votes. It also looked at the way they perceived that ideas other than the “nation”, such as the economy, the territories that would have become accessible, and job security, were taken into consideration by some Greek-Cypriots to make sense of the Plan and to decide how to vote in the referendum. This entailed exploring how participants perceived that there is a conflict of interests within the Greek-Cypriot community in relation to the solution.

Initially the chapter argued that although some No participants adhered to the Great No, other No voters contradicted this account. Therefore the moral superiority of No as a patriotic duty was questioned from within the group. In addition, other reasons which contradicted the Great No were also provided to justify No votes. For example, some participants said that they voted No to maintain division, others said that they followed the majority or their party, and others took into consideration their personal conditions beyond the collective. A common point of reference among most No voters related to the risks that they perceived the Plan carried. This constitutes also a point
of disagreement, a rift as it has been called for the purpose of this analysis, with Yes voters who refuted such arguments and suggested that the risks were not as grave as the opponents of the Plan imagined or claimed they would be. It was seen in the research that Yes supporters shared more similarities in justifying their stance on the Plan compared to No voters. Some supporters of the Plan emphasized the negative consequences of a non-solution and others focused on the benefits of a solution. In general, however, they all were aware that they were accused of being traitors, but they reacted to it mainly by questioning the patriotism of No voters or questioning Greek-Cypriots’ desire for a solution.

The second part of the chapter explored perceptions among participants about subjective economic criteria and group interests which also played a role in referenda votes. We looked at the viewpoints of those who were accused of voting for their own personal or group interests and at the perspectives of those making the accusations. Participants recurrently said that it was more likely that those who were hoping to be able to return to their properties after the if the Plan was agreed would have voted Yes, whereas the non-displaced persons (emphasis was on people from the Paphos area) would have voted No because they would not have any direct economic benefit from a solution, and some thought Paphos would lose out on the tourist market if there is a solution.

Next, the chapter covered perceptions about employees of the National Guard, as participants pointed out they were more likely to have voted No to maintain their privileged jobs, as the Plan provided for the dissolution of the National Guard. The paradox is that army officers are the main group officially entrusted with national security and one would expect them to prioritize the patria and the nation in principle, but the study reveals that they were recurrently pointed out as a group which put its group interests over national interests. This idea was shared by officers themselves who participated at the study.

Ultimately, the chapter has shown that there are strong perceptions among the participants that different groups within the Greek-Cypriot community may have conflicting interests in relation
to the solution. This contradicts constructions that the Greek-Cypriot community is homogenous and shares identical “national” interests in relation to the solution. Other than a few exceptions who admitted that a return to their village would ameliorate their financial situation, most interviewees refuted that they personally voted using economic criteria. However, many recurrently noted that they knew people who admitted voting based on such economic criteria. Most importantly perhaps is the general criticism of individualism and of making decisions based on personal interests rather than the common good. It is a criticism of core capitalist values in which Greek-Cypriots had been indoctrinated since the colonial period. Evidently, the 2004 referendum exarcebated such criticism as many perceived that most Greek-Cypriots voted based on individualistic criteria rather than for the collective.

The next chapter builds on the conclusions of this chapter to explore in more depth perceptions that the Plan would be the end of the RoC and that it would lead to Cyprus’s Turkification.
6 Perceptions of the Nation, Identities, Nationalism and the “Other”

This chapter initially explores perceptions among some No participants who defended the fortification of division as an alternative to a peace settlement in Cyprus. This entails a critical reading of perceptions that some Greek-Cypriots would prefer a “wall” separating the two sides rather than reunification and argues that perhaps there is a normalization of walled borders at the grass-roots level which are seen as protecting one population from another. Then, the chapter argues that perhaps such ideas are reactions to understandings that the separation of the two communities could no longer be maintained. Therefore, some people confronted with the surprising possibility that reunification might happen with or without a solution, proposed the building of a wall which would protect them from what could disturb the status quo from either the everyday practice of coexistence or an agreed settlement.

In particular, the chapter discusses recurrent fears that Turkification would occur if the Plan was implemented, either as a result of Turkish military action, or through cultural and political imposition, or both. Notably, editorials taking an anti-Plan position recurrently used the argument that Turkification would ensue (see Chapter 3), and this chapter shows how the threat of turkification is understood at the level of individuals. The chapter also brings to the surface a fear of coexistence with the other, which was absent from the editorials’ projections of the Plan. Nevertheless, for some participants it was a wall or division of “peace”, as they perceived that a wall would protect them from new conflicts, such as atrocities committed by the other, but also those committed by us. To build on this argument, the chapter explores beliefs among Yes and No participants that there is an omnipresent minority of ethnonationalists among both communities which threatens peace.
The chapter concludes with a discussion about people’s perceptions that the implementation of the Plan would make them more vulnerable and that these perceptions are evidence that division as a safe or safer status quo to some has become a normalized concept.

6.1 Fenced Walls and Interethnic Relations

During a discussion with Sotiris, a retired civil servant and No voter from Paphos shared his older son’s suggestion about constructing a wall across Cyprus to divide the two communities if the Cyprus issue cannot be solved the way Greek-Cypriots would like. According to this perception, a wall was the second best alternative if a solution would not meet Greek-Cypriots’ expectations. I will argue that his son probably formed the idea when he realized from the Plan that a solution would probably not be something Greek-Cypriots would want. Sotiris shared his son’s perceptions with me to emphasize the extent of hostility some Greek-Cypriots, like his son, had for the Plan. At the same time, Sotiris distanced himself from such beliefs by noting that although he personally disagreed fiercely with the Plan, he still wanted a solution and reunification.

Other participants in the study also said that many Greek-Cypriots would rather have a wall separating the two sides than a solution. It is a perception also analysed in Chapter 5 as a recurrent perception of Yes participants who in some cases argued that the No vote was not only against the Plan but against any solution in general. But the study unravels that such ideas are also common among No voters.

Orestis, a Yes voter from Famagusta, said that during the Annan period many Greek-Cypriots told him that it is best if they (the Turkish-Cypriots) stay there and we stay here [τζηείνοι ποζηεί εμείς ποδά]. I prompted him to interpret such accounts and he said:

[What Greek-Cypriots did not like was] That the element of Turkish-Cypriots would join again the political, social, economic life. So when they say “us here and them there” they consider [the preservation] of the current conditions from which the Turkish-Cypriots are excluded, [for example] from the public service…OK after 2003 they [Turkish-Cypriots] became part of the
economic life of Cyprus. But they did not integrate much in the society. So they [Greek-Cypriots] prefer the status that we have now.

Orestis concluded based on his experiences during the Annan period that a number of Greek-Cypriots wanted to preserve and even deepen ethnic division in order to keep the other as far away as possible. Orestis, like other participants, suggested that some Greek-Cypriots preferred an impermeable, closed border, prefereably with infrastructure which would ideally protect the Greek-Cypriot side from the other and solve the long-standing Cyprus issue for good. Perceptions that a wall can solve problems contrast sharply with the negative perception of contemporary state-initiated walls that they are “obvious symbols of conflict infrastructures” (Till et al., 2013) vis-à-vis the way populations celebrate the demolition of walls, like the Berlin Wall, which was enthusiastically dismantled in 1989 to reunite East and West Germany. One could give examples of contemporary walls that are severely criticized, such as the wall the Israelis erected under the guise of security but which has lead to serious human rights violations, or the US-Mexican border wall, which has been criticized for leading to a “walling up democracy” (Till, et al., 2013). Notably, participants reflected on the possibility of having their own ethnic wall erected or official division just as there seemed to be real chance to reunite – that is after the opening of the crossing points and when for the first time there was a settlement Plan. The analysis will argue that wishing to build a separation wall was a reaction to the potential of reunification, as they could sense that the complete separation of the two communities could no longer be sustained. This way, a wall would ensure the reproduction of the status quo while cementing permanently the boundaries of who we are and who the other is. It is not only protecting us from the other, but, as Gourgouris (1996) noted in relation to China’s Great Wall, the wall would be an act of “self-defence” (p. 13), protecting against our own people who lean towards reunification.

The following part focuses on perceived fears and threats from which some No voters expected a wall or permanent division to protect them. Chapter 5 presented the No argument that
the Plan would dissolve the state, leading ultimately to Cyprus’s Turkification. In the next part we explore in more depth these perceptions showing that those who adopted this rationale argued that Turkification would be achieved either through military means (similar to the 1974 events) or through cultural and political means.

**Turkification through militarism.** When Lambros, a non-displaced police officer in his forties was prompted to discuss what, if any, changes in the Plan could encourage him to vote Yes, he replied, “to satisfy our ego”. The connotations of “our ego” relate to a sense of collective, national pride and dignity, which a solution should not insult. It is a perception which goes beyond concerns over specific provisions of the Plan to what it symbolized in general. In this regard he emphasised that to agree to a Plan, Greek-Cypriots needed proof that Turkey would not once more violate an agreement and become aggressive. The central question, which he raised, is, “How can we avoid a new 1974?” This was a main concern of a number of No participants who worried that the Plan created the conditions for a return to violence and a new disaster. Such perceptions, which were recurrent among No voters, highlight a concern that Turkey could become aggressive without any provocation by us.

Fotini, the high-ranked civil servant from Paphos characterized the Plan as another piece of the greater puzzle of an omnipresent Greco-Turkish struggle for dominance. The Plan, she said, would lead to Cyprus’s Turkification, which is Turkey’s long-lasting aim for Cyprus. Similar to some other No voters, she thought that Turkish aggression did not need any real provocation but just a pretext. She said:

> I believe had we voted Yes, the new Plan would give a pretext for Turkey’s intervention. This scared me a lot. The right of intervention [provided by the Plan] to Turks to come and interfere again in our country and capture us again, or capture the south Cyprus.

The “right to intervene” refers to how the Plan retained Turkey’s guarantor rights to unilaterally be involved in Cyprus’s affairs in the event of constitutional disorder. What admittedly
underlined her fear of Turkification was her belief that “we” are Greek and the “others”, the Turks, are our enemies who are agressive. A belief which, evidently, again goes beyond the Plan’s provisions on guarantees to ideas about a barbarian, aggressive “other”.

Louis, a No voter from a village in Paphos which used to be bicomunal until 1974, argued that disbanding the National Guard would exacerbate the vulnerability of the Greek-Cypriot community vis-à-vis Turkey’s aggression. He said that without a National Guard, “they [Turks] could easily capture us one night and we wouldn’t even realize!” Louis, as well as other participants, perceived the National Guard to be protecting Greek-Cypriots, despite the National Guard being responsible in 1974 for carrying out the coup in an attempt to achieve exactly what they feared the Annan Plan would do: to dissolve the state of Cyprus and achieve enosis with another state. These participants also perceived that the army can at least defend them, contrary to 1974, when there was practically no meaningful defence against Turkey’s invasion. Participants supporting the retainment of the army, even a bicomunal one, contradicted the official Greek-Cypriot position that Cyprus should be completely demilitarized (Sözen & Özersay, 2007).

**Turkification through cultural and political means.** Loukia expressed her deep frustration that the Plan would abolish the Greek flag and the national anthem. Indeed the Plan’s initiators designed a new flag for federated Cyprus and an anthem to replace the current ones. Greek-Cypriots tend to use both the Cypriot and the Greek flags at official events, but they use Greece’s anthem. Loukia felt that the rejection of the Plan ensured the preservation of national symbols, which she considered as state symbols. She said:

> We were brought up based on a logic that the Turks will come and destroy what we have and [and this time they would do it] with our signature. When you are told that you will no longer have your national anthem and your flag, you cannot expect a person whom you cultivated for 30 years with the logic that s/he should give his or her life for that flag regardless of the consequences and suddenly to tell him that these symbols are abolished.
Loukia, in her early thirties, understood the Plan as inspiring a process of de-Hellenization, starting with the abolishment of “our” symbols. Loukia perceived the idea of compromising with the other as unpatriotic and surrendering to the enemy, which again is evidence of a sense of national humiliation related to the acceptance of the Plan, which is an argument underpinning the Great No (Chapter 5). Loukia was adamant that her perceptions were based on a cultivated logic that one should sacrifice his/her own life for the sake of the flag. In addition, her reference to how suddenly people were asked to betray their national ideals is also evidence that the Plan surprised many participants (see below, “The Power of Extreme Nationalists” in Chapter 6) and their No vote was an instinctive, national reaction.

Another No voter, Louiza in her late twenties said she was frustrated with the introduction of Turkish language instruction at schools as a result of the Plan. She said:

We were younger you know [during the referenda]…we would not accept that they only give us half, [we would not accept] to speak Turkish at schools. I remember that this was a very important issue, the issue of the Turkish language…but now it is taught and everyone is OK with it…So we were kind of more patriots in our youth.

Louiza said that during the referenda the Plan represented a national compromise that she and others (as she speaks using the first person plural) were not ready to consent to. The example she gave about Greek-Cypriots learning Turkish at schools illustrates a reluctance to accept the other but also the idea that Turkish is the “enemy’s” language, and it is probably understood to be a part of the Turkification process initiated and institutionalised by the Plan. Today, Louiza questions her once patriotic No. Referring to her young age is perhaps to imply that voting No was not that sensible or mature, as young people tend to be spontaneous and lack reason and that is why they tend to be nationalistic, as nationalism is also irrational.

Another No participant, Eleni from a village in the north and in her late fifties expressed fears that the implementation of the Plan would lead to Islamization and Turkification. She said that
Greek-Cypriots would not be allowed to speak their own language, like the Kurds in Turkey. As others did, she expressed fears of becoming “extinct” which evidently relates to ideas that Turkey is an intolerant state, a barbarian other, or, in more moderate accounts, a nation-state which recognizes only the Turkish language and restricts the use of other ethnic languages (Serdar, 2014, p. 71). In this regard, the analysis shows that some participants who voted No were reacting to their understanding that the Plan would expose Cyprus, and by extension us, to the influence of a barbarian other. Another example is Marios who said that the entire Cyprus would end up being a “small” Turkey that is undemocratic and oppressive, in which Greek-Cypriots would become a minority. Marios in his late thirties said:

I like my freedom and democracy and I cannot imagine myself living in a country such as Turkey where big brother is watching. Everywhere you go you see red. Turkey’s flag is everywhere. There is fear, for the state, for the police…I don’t like this militarism.

Mario’s account is representative of ideas in which we are attributed with positive values and culture such as democracy and freedom whereas the other is characterised as backward. In addition, Marios provided examples of other states that consisted of Muslim and Christian populations and which were constantly plagued by interethnic conflicts to suggest that it was possible reunification could lead to a similar troubled future for Cyprus. Furthermore, he employed the discourse of extinction of the Turkish-Cypriot community, extending it to the Greek-Cypriots. That idea is related to perceptions of the numerous Turkish settlers in the north, who are culturally different to – or even inferior to – Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots. Many argued that this change in the north’s demographics pushed Turkish-Cypriots to emigrate and it would also lead Greek-Cypriots to emigrate. Marios characteristically said that settlers, like all Turks, tend to have numerous children, and he believed that if the Plan was implemented and the communities lived together again, Greek-Cypriots would be a minority, too. Therefore, Marios felt that division would
protect us from Turkification and extinction by keeping the Turkish population and, in effect, Turkey away. Evidently the other was constructed as culturally different and backward.

During our discussions, people spoke about settlers in the north to underpin fears of ethnic extinction and to show similarities between Cypriots of both communities, that is, “the people of the land [topos]”, as another No participant, Christiana in her mid-thirties, said. Often, in Greek-Cypriot discourses Turkish settlers are called *Kouvalitoi* (see also Chapter 4), a word emphasizing that they are people who have been brought to Cyprus but do not belong here. In this regard, most participants’ perception of settlers was similar to how the Turkish-Cypriots see them, which is as a homogenous group, and using “terms that signify cultural difference and social class” and that indicate “differences in lifestyle, veiling, gender issues etc.” (Navaro-Yashin, 2012, p. 58).

In the pre-2003 period, settlers were an imagined “other” for Greek-Cypriots. After 2003, when Greek-Cypriots visited the north, interviewees’ accounts show there is evidence that their perceptions of settlers were reinforced as they came across images of poverty and of distinct cultural appearances compared not only to themselves but also to Turkish-Cypriots. These images are often taken as representative of all the Turks living in the north and perhaps beyond the north. In this regard, most participants perceived settlers as the authentic representatives of Turkey and Turkishness in the island, personifying Turkey’s plan to change the character of Cyprus in non-militaristic ways. It was common for participants to argue that Turkish-Cypriots also oppose the presence of Turkish settlers in the north. Notably, in this case participants took into consideration Turkish-Cypriots’ perceptions to support their own viewpoints. Yet, it is also evidence of processes of imagining a common Cypriotness which entails sharing common values and culture with the Turkish-Cypriots.

**Saving the state.** Chapter 5 presented the argument that voting No saved the state because under the Plan the RoC would no longer be a legal entity. Herein, the focus is on how participants understood the practical implications of the said argument and how it relates to ideas and
imaginings of the “nation”. For example, Lambros emphasized, during our discussion, that he voted No because he concurred with the President Papadopoulos’s argument that the Plan would dissolve the state:

My friend, if you like come to find a solution under the Republic of Cyprus, not in nationalist terms or anything. Did he [Papadopoulos] misguide us?! Perhaps’. […] We are not losing our Cypriot identity [by preserving the state]! This is the most important! Is this selfish? Yes. But everybody, all states have their own identity. On the other hand, we can move together towards development. You cannot abolish the Republic of Cyprus, which is something that denotes stability to me, even if this is at the level of “trash”. […] My safety is here. My Greek identity is here. As a state, can you protect my identity as a Greek? And yours as a Turkish-Cypriot. Well… I respect you! As an Armenian. But you should not underestimate me either.

Lambros associated the preservation of the state with the preservation of national identity, as well as security and stability. The two are interconnected in the sense that in conditions of instability Greek-Cypriots, as a distinct community, would not prosper and eventually they could loose their distinct identity. In this regard, Lambros, as other No voters did, proposed that Turkish-Cypriots could return to the RoC. He emphasized that suggesting that Turkish-Cypriots should return to the single state was not nationalistic or at least overtly nationalistic. Like other participants, while he acknowledged the driving force of Hellenocentrism, he rejected that state-centred arguments were nationalistic. Nevertheless, he asked rhetorically if he is selfish, which shows he recognized that he was not considering the needs or concerns of the Turkish-Cypriot community.

Another noticeable element is that Lambros at first argued that the state protected Cypriot identity and then that it protected Greek identity. Evidently, whether it is Greek or Cypriot, or a dual identity, he felt that the RoC protected it. To justify his expectation of a state which protects national identity he resorted to arguments about the universality of the nation state, or that we live in a world of nation states (Billig, 1995). “All states have an identity,” he said, implying that it is only fair that ours has one as well. Finally, he recognized that the Turkish-Cypriot community and
other Cypriot communities should be taken into consideration but not at our expense. There is an effort to include the other, however, Lambros and other participants did not really acknowledge the fears the Turkish-Cypriot community might have had about a return to the single state.

Overall, Lambros’ perceptions that the RoC preserves Cypriot and Greek identity (used interchangeably) indicate that he probably has in mind a nation-state rather than a bicomunal one, and they exemplify how some people saw no distinction between the state and the nation in 2004 as preserving the state entailed preserving their distinct identity. Nevertheless, the existence of other communities disproves this argument and made the issue of state-identity nexus more complicated.

Lambros’s perception that the state provided “safety” even if it is in a status of trash concerned RoC’s recession and that it is heavily indebted to international lenders. Even if Cyprus is economically bankrupt, Lambros said people had a sense of safety and stability, but other participants questioned the state’s legitimacy given its weak economy.

When Maria, a high-school teacher and No voter now in her late thirties was prompted to explain how she understood the argument that accepting the Plan would dissolve the state she said:

The way I understood this is that everything would be abolished: institutions, the constitution and then a chaos would emerge. On top of this, at that time there was a community (Turkish-Cypriot) whom we didn’t know!

Maria did not mention the legal entity of the state being discontinued or its transformation into a federation. The way she made sense of the argument was that the Plan would result in chaos and disorder because of the institutional transformations that it entailed. Such perceptions that adopting the Plan would mark a shift from a status of order to one of disorder point to a normalization of the status quo (see Chapter 7). They also support the argument that voting No or defending division was not only about being protected from the other, but also about preserving order. In addition Maria’s account shows that the long-lasting division of Cyprus and Greek-Cypriots’ lack of interaction with Turkish-Cypriots exacerbated some people’s fears, as she said
that by then the Turkish-Cypriot community was unknown. The following paragraphs detail the results of the analysis on how some No respondents felt about coexistence with the Turkish-Cypriot community.

**Fear of coexistence.** Some participants’ ideas to build a separation wall between north and south Cyprus, which we explored at the beginning of the chapter, contradict ideas related to the discourse of peaceful coexistence that the two communities can peacefully coexist as they did in the past (Papadakis & Constantinou, 2001). Angelos, in his mid-thirties from Nicosia, explained that he rejected the Plan because he did not want reunification. He said:

So I think that supporting No did not necessarily relate to whether the Plan was good or bad or if it was to our interests or no. [Supporting No was the result of] The combination of the Plan with how I felt [my emotions] that I did not want a solution. Or better, that I did not want coexistence.

Angelos emphasized that his main reason for supporting No was because he did not want Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots to live together. Then he clarified that his perceptions about the Turkish-Cypriot community progressively improved.

Lambros, the police officer, directly questioned the peaceful coexistence discourse: “Regardless if we all say that the Turkish Cypriots are our brothers and that we used to live together for many years! OK yes, if we coexisted for so many years then why this thing happened?” He perceived a dominant claim of the peaceful coexistence discourse that Turkish-Cypriots are our brothers. This claim is from a left-wing pro-rapprochment slogan which Lambros thought was used by others beside the Left. His rhetorical question implied that in reality the past had not been that peaceful.

Nasos, in his mid-thirties from Paphos argued that mixing the communities again could lead to a return to violence, and he based his perception on the intercommunal conflicts in the pre-division period. He said:
Listening to how things were when Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots used to live together…There were conflicts, etc. There were problems and us, living in the post-1974 period during which we were here and they were there and everything is OK. I considered that it was a big risk to go back to the old times when there was coexistence.

Nasos said coexistence means “strife”, whereas division after 1974 means “peace”. Loukia, who described herself as being fanatically against the Plan, argued that Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots are doomed to clash given the appropriate conditions, although she admitted that not all individuals of the same nation are the same “not all fingers are the same”. For her the Turkish-Cypriots are Turks and Greek-Cypriots are Greeks so it was inevitable there would be conflict.

Evidently, these participants challenged the idea that Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots could peacefully coexist on the grounds that in the past there had been interethnic violence and on the basis that Turks and Greeks naturally collide.

On the other hand, some questioned the authenticity of the discourse of peaceful coexistence given that Greek-Cypriots had constructed the Turkish-Cypriot community as the enemy along with Turks. Marios said: “From day one at school, they say to us that ‘a good Turk is a dead Turk,’ and things like that, including the Turkish-Cypriots”. Marios’ quote is characteristic of beliefs that the peaceful coexistence discourse is superficial and that in reality the Turkish-Cypriot community was subtly constructed as the enemy.

6.2 The Normalization of Division

This part focuses on No voters’ perceptions of the risks that the Plan carried and which made them reconsider the need for a solution in general. In effect, the analysis will argue that catalysing them to reconsider were their perceptions that the current status quo of division was safe
and permanent. In particular, this part examines such perceptions to show that to an extent the status quo has been normalized, as individuals appear to understand and have experienced it for most of their lives as “safe”. It is argued that division – whether it is physical or psychological – is an extremely difficult emotion that spawns hatred, grief, denial, depression and forgiveness. (Bollens, 2012, p. 5). Yet, some participants appeared detached from these feelings. By contrast many shared views, such as “why change division since it works?”, or arguments like “the Cypriot [Issue] was solved in 1974”, and even statements that “official division is the best solution”, all show that some experienced the post-1974 status quo as mostly stable and permanent. Evidently, some participants did not perceive division as an atrocity but as an invisible, often a taken for granted fenced wall protecting both communities from conflict.

Fotini, from Paphos, who feared that the Plan would instigate a new intervention by Turkey, said, “Perhaps, after all a solution may not be an end in itself for me.” She also said:

If there will be a solution which will trouble us more and create more problems then I don’t want such a solution! We can stay as we are…perhaps the solution is to stay as we are now that we feel a form of freedom. And perhaps in the future the appropriate conditions maybe created in order to unite and become one state, which would be one.

Fotini’s account is evidence that some may find the current status quo an acceptable alternative to a solution similar to the one provided by the Annan Plan. Specifically, Fotini rejected any solution which would not retain the single state and would propose a federation. Realizing perhaps that she proposed an unfeasible alternative, she then questioned the need for a solution considering the current status quo of division is a form of solution – a win-win situation. Her comment that “perhaps the solution is to stay as we are now that we feel a form of freedom” indicates a sense of safety that division provides, in contrast to a solution. What she opted for was

Navaro-Yashin argues that lack of international recognition for the north created “a unique, territorially and politically referenced feeling of stunted temporality” (2012, p. 7).
not any kind of division, but the post-1974 status characterized by lack of conflict. This is an example of perceptions of division as a “peace wall”.

Like Fotini, many other No voters shared similar perceptions. Marios, born in the post-1974 period in Paphos, said this about Cyprus division: “This is what I know since the day I was born, this to us means security, so we live with it and we are OK.” Division represented normalcy to him because it is experienced as a secure status which had thus far provided a sense of protection from unwanted conflicts. More importantly, division is the only status Marios and other Greek-Cypriots of his age have experienced. At another point in our discussion he noted that the Cyprus issue is “solved” [λυμένο], meaning that the current status is not a transitional one but permanent, and explained that he voted No, to contribute to its preservation.

Nasos, of the same age group as Marios used analogous arguments and set forward a rhetorical question referring to the division: “Why change division if it works? All I know is how we live now. We are here and the Turkish-Cypriots are there.”

Nasos described the post-1974 period as one of complete ethnic division, peaceful and safe. Despite the 2003 opening of the crossing points, he said that being from Paphos, he does not experience processes of reunification as perhaps Nicosians do. Leon, although from Nicosia and in his mid-thirties, also said that he voted No so as to maintain the ethnic division, and he emphasized that the long-lasting partition turned the two communities into perfect strangers. Specifically, he said that he has as much in common with the Turkish-Cypriot community as he has with Eskimos. His comparison of Turkish-Cypriots and Eskimos emphasized that the solution would be with a foreign population and not a reunification of a “single people”. He referred to Eskimos probably to make his opinion as clear as possible that he thought the Turkish-Cypriots were so completely different to, or poles apart from, the Greek-Cypriots.

Angelos, from Nicosia and in the same age group as Marios and Nasos, could not give a straight-forward answer to the question of whether a solution is needed. He understood that
Cyprus’s division was the result of strife which caused collective and personal pain to the Greek-Cypriot community, but he could not personally associate with what had happened although he felt some compassion. He also noted in referring to division that “we grew up with this thing,” which suggests that he is comfortable with the status quo, which he did not see as an atrocity but a way of life. Finally he emphasized that he is neither a fierce opponent nor a fierce supporter of a solution, revealing a disconnection from politics in general. Angelos’ account is indicative of the existence of fragmented political approaches to the solution, further suggesting that homogenizing the Yes and No voters and saying they hold coherent ideological perspectives does not work: On the one hand he adopted a strictly Greek-Cypriot viewpoint to the conflict and on the other hand he rejected its core arguments that division is an atrocity. That he considered the relaxation of movement controls along the Green Line to be positive is also evidence that he was comfortable with the post-2003 status, described as one of “lived reunification” in which division and reunification coexist (Demetriou, 2006, p. 65).

Many No participants described the presentation of the Plan and the prospect of a solution as a “surprise”. This is indicative by how they used expressions such as “it was like a bomb” or that it all happened “suddenly” to show their astonishment. For example, Maria, a No supporter in her mid-thirties, said, “It is unacceptable all of a sudden to tell you ‘you know you will not go to Kyrenia’ while in the previous years they said that our borders are in Kyrenia.”

There are two things which Maria considered unacceptable: first that suddenly people were asked to decide on a Plan and second, the content of the Plan which did not correspond to collective expectations about the solution as she made sense of them. Anna in her mid-thirties as well also expressed being surprised by the Plan and concluded that it is best to remain divided. She said, “At the beginning I was embarrassed even for considering division as an option but in the long-term I demystified division as something more clear.”
In general, this sense that the Plan was unexpected demonstrates that division may have become part of peoples’ everyday, and division went almost unnoticed until the Plan came to disrupt this normalcy. Furthermore, the feelings of embarrassment and guilt which Anna claimed she experienced point to an understanding that she crossed politically and nationally correct lines. Meanwhile, Anna explained that she favoured intercommunal contacts – mainly cultural exchanges – but not reunification, because, as she said, it carried a risk that the communities would return to interethnic conflict. On the other hand, Maria, who said that in 2004 she vehemently disagreed with the Plan, emphasized that now she was more open to the settlement it foresaw. She said the referenda inspired a substantial dialogue on the Cyprus issue, while, in the pre-Annan period, debates had been predominantly superficial. One could see a paradox here that if an issue is so dominant in a society, as the Cyprus issue has been, then why does one welcome a re-opening of a dialogue on it? This is perhaps more evidence of how banal the Cyprus issue had become among some Greek-Cypriots: it was remembered, but at the same time it was forgotten.

6.3 The Power of Extreme Nationalists

In the part The Normalization of Division, the focus was on No accounts to illustrate their perceived threats in relation to the Plan and the solution in general. In this part emphasis is on participants’s views, from either group, that the existence of influential nationalist groups in both communities made more possible the risk of reviving the conditions that led to interethnic and intracommunal conflicts. Kyriaki, a Yes voter and leftist displaced from a Nicosia village, noted that “they did it before” and therefore “they” can do it again. She was referring to what she described as a small group of right-wing ethnonationalists and in particular EOKA II who used

67 Psaltis (2011) survey has also shown that a significant portion of Greek-Cypriots, specifically those who self-identify more with Cypriotism or who lean towards centre and left wing ideologies, are critical to ethnonationalism considering it as responsible for the Cyprus Conflict particularly in relation to its role in the 1974 coup.
violence in 1974 to overthrow the government, resulting in the invasion. She argued that it is possible for groups with the same ideology to resort again to violence. She said the contemporary organization which is analogous to EOKA II in the Greek-Cypriot community is ELAM.

The cornerstone of such concerns is that nationalist extremists disagree with a federated solution, and in the event it happens they could cause trouble, as this is what the supporters of enosis did when they disagreed with independence and participated in the coup. Doros, a Yes voter with right-wing affiliations from Paphos, argued that extreme right-wing nationalist organizations flourish during an economic recession and increased migration and combine anti-Turkish rhetoric with anti-migration rhetoric. He said, “Those fanatics, even if they are 5-6% will create problems! So, if unemployment rises, that 6% will become 26%. In Paphos for example it will become 76%! And everything will become a mess [upside/down].” The point he was making is that although in the present day such groups are marginalized and small, if they are given the appropriate conditions, they may again become powerful and create significant problems or even cause a new conflict.

In addition, perceptions that the Greek-Cypriot community and Cypriots in general tend to tolerate extremism formed participants’ views on the power of nationalism. Leon, a No voter from Nicosia, said that the vast majority of the Greek-Cypriot community may criticize extreme nationalists at a discursive level, but still they tolerate them. This is related to how these extreme nationalist groups flee responsibility for their actions and to ideas that passivity is a feature of Cypriotness. Lambros, No voter, argued that “we are all sheep” to indicate that Greek-Cypriots uncritically accept or tolerate nationalistic propaganda. His metaphor illustrates a recurrent perception that I recorded in that Greek-Cypriots tend to be passive and uncritically follow the elites like a lamb follows its shepherd. Lampros described how he was socialised at school and in the army to hate Turks. Not only did he share his negative perceptions of the other but he recognized they came from his experiences and were a result of institutional processes (see also Chapter 7).
Notably, by rejecting coexistence and reunification out of fear that mixing the populations could lead to complications and conflict, participants reproduced a common assumption among extreme nationalists that it is necessary to avoid contacts with people of different ethnic and cultural backgrounds if one wants to ensure peace. Leon, for example, voted No to ensure that Cyprus would remain divided and protected from a return to interethnic violence, which could be instigated by extremists on both side. His remark that “the reason which created the clashes is still there and if we get back together again all this violence will return” typify a fear held by many that there would be a return to interethnic conflict in the event of a solution. Several participants noted “it only takes a few from each community to start a [new] conflict.”

Therefore, we have shown that people who did not self-identify as nationalists adopt similar rhetoric of nationalists that coexistence is impossible (Fangen, 1998) because of the nationalists’ intolerance to it. Evidently, many participants of both groups acknowledged the role of ethnonationalism in the conflict as most Yes and No participants considered that it is instigated by a small minority of extremists within both communities, and despite their small numbers and political marginalization (Katsourides, 2013), they can be extremely dangerous. This is because the interviewees associated extremists with the violence that led to the conflict and believed that they could easily retreat to violence again.

Many respondents did not consider other forms of identity or nationalism as exclusive or disastrous beyond the specific form of ethnonationalism. For example Costas, a retired teacher from a Kyrenia village, argued that generations of Greek-Cypriots, including himself, were cultivated to be “Greeks” mainly through education and the Church. He described nationalist aspirations as a cultivated pothos, a desire. Specifically he noted:

It was an unexplained pothos which…when they put into your brains this thing it does not go away easily. Since the first grade of elementary school: Greece! Greece! But if they had put into your brains that Cyprus is an independent state –it belongs to its inhabitants. That we can live together. That we can find a way.
Costas described the power of nationalism as *pothos*, meaning an irresistible, almost erotic, desire. In effect he presented a process of brainwashing by the powerful institutions of education and the Church which turned people into “fanatic” Greeks. Things, he argued, could have been different if, instead of convincing people that they are Greeks, they had “planted” Cypriotness. Evidently his account demonstrates the perception that national identities are constructed rather than fundamental and natural (see also Chapter 7).

As a teacher, Costas was part of the education establishment that promoted Cyprus Greekness (Loizos, 1974), but he has moved on from ethnonationalism and now supports Cypriotism and in particular an independent Cypriot state. However, he assumed that everyone adhered to Greekness in the pre-1974 period, not recognizing that alternative identities to Greekness existed despite ethnonationalism’s hegemony at certain historical periods. More so, Costas used a blame discourse against ethnonationalism, considering it responsible for the failure of the bicomunal state and ultimately for Cyprus’s division. Drawing from his and others’ accounts, it appears that the negative impact of ethnonationalism is normalized and criticized albeit to different degrees. In particular, participants across the two groups tended to approach ethnonationalism as *evil* and *catastrophic*. Such perceptions, coupled with perceptions that the state legitimized ethnonationalism, provide evidence that other forms of nationalism are not always seen as “bad” nationalism (Billig, 1995). By contrast, supporting the state and underlining Cypriotness instead of Greekness, as Costas did, is taken for granted as antinationalistic. I would argue that focusing on the politics of ethnonationalism perhaps blurs the role that other exclusionary forms of identity may play in the reproduction of interethnic hatred. The dividing force of ethnonationalism in the past and at present is recognized, but certain forms of Cypriotism is not, which perhaps can be equally exclusionary of the other.

Fotini, a No supporter from Paphos, said, “I do not have an issue with the Turkish-Cypriots. I mean, they are our compatriots!” She added:
They have the same rights as we do! And I could live at work and in the society and within the state with the Turkish-Cypriots for as long as we are all equal. […] I am not a nationalist to say that I can only live [coexist] with Greek-Cypriots.

Again, emphasis on a willingness to coexist with the other community is treated as evidence of non-nationalistic perceptions and as evidence that, by voting No, she rejected the Plan and not the Turkish-Cypriots.

Sotiris, also No voter and retired civil servant from Paphos said:

I can say that I am Greek-Cypriot because I come from that generation for which it is a bit difficult to get it [Greekness] out of ours souls! We lived the 1955-59 [EOKA struggle]. We are part of that. On the other hand, as a person I am open and I would not mind being ‘Cypriot’. Yes! Considering in the present day what motherlands have done to us…and our adherence/obssession to Greece. And the adherence of the Turks to Turkey. Yes, Cypriot!

Sotiris’s quote is a result of being prompted to reflect on his national identity. Evidently, to say that he is Cypriot is associated with being open-minded, tolerant and progressive, and in a way it necessitated him distancing himself from the politics of ethnonationalism which has proved disastrous in the past, although he did not completely reject it. He initially said that he is Greek-Cypriot, whereas at the end he said that he felt comfortable saying he is Cypriot, and therefore leaving out identification with Greece.

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter initially investigated perceptions in favour of a fenced wall or an impermeable division as a solution to the Cyprus conflict. The analysis showed that such ideas about the possibility of building a wall to separate the two sides or formalizing division represented a form of defence against the new phase that Cyprus was entering – with or without agreeing on the Plan – which entailed a process of the general population, if not of the political institutions, reunifying with the “other”.
Then the chapter explored the risks which No voters expected a wall or division and ultimately the rejection of the Plan to protect them from. The analysis showed how some No participants expected Turkish aggression to unfold had the Plan been implemented. It highlighted perceptions that Turkification could be achieved through military means as well as through cultural and political means, and that Turkification would take place when both communities live together, particularly due to the influence of Turkish settlers. Those participants arguing that a Turkish military intervention would be possible described it as similar to the 1974 invasion. Those who emphasized cultural or political means of Turkification perceived that the Plan would initiate a political, institutional and cultural process of assimilation and then restrict the basic human rights of the Greek-Cypriot community. Evidently, both perceived the “other” as barbarian that would initiate these attacks without being prompted by us.

The analysis also unpacked that support of division (either official, unofficial or walled) was in some instances related to perceptions of the power of nationalism and in specific of ethnonationalism in both communities. Many participants said that it is possible to return to interethnic violence if there is a solution, therefore, although they personally were not against the other in principle, they defended the status quo of division in that it protects both sides from atrocities. Finally, the exploration of ideas about the power of nationalism among both the supporters and the opponents of the Plan illustrated that there was a concern that extreme nationalists could pose a threat to peace and coexistence and lead to a new intercommunal strife.

The next chapter takes another path to show that there was an understanding of nationalism and national identities as social constructs. In this regard it builds on participants’ perceptions on the role of social institutions and political elites in the conflict, but also it analyses how they perceived that they themselves are personally involved in its reproduction or how they managed to resist it.
7 Demystifying Identities

In this chapter we focus on how participants make sense of the antagonism between Hellenocentrism and Cyprocentrism while negotiating how the “other” affects or even subverts ideas of who “we” are. The analysis discusses evidence that the politics of nationalism at the level of the elites are questioned by individuals regardless of whether or not these individuals adhere to ideas which reinforce a specific national identity.

Interviewees’ perceptions of nationalism and national identities draw on the understanding that nation-building is institutionally grounded, particularly in respect of the role played by schooling and education. Lastly, the chapter documents how participants of both the Yes and the No groups challenged the Cyprus issue as being a trump card relied on by political elites so as to maintain their power in society. Some participants of both the Yes and the No groups stated, for the purpose of this research, that the status quo of division is sustained not only because of the other’s intransigence but also because of us. The chapter dwells on perceptions that the reproduction of conflict draws on a set of power relations within the Greek-Cypriot community to illustrate that most participants are aware of how they themselves are involved in the reproduction of nationalism or how they may or have questioned it.

7.1 Perceptions on Voting Yes and No and National Identities

One of the participants in this research was Stelios, a high ranking police officer and fierce opponent of the Annan Plan. During our discussion, he elaborated in a didactic manner on identity politics in the Greek-Cypriot community and how they intersect with the politics of the solution. To clarify his argument, Stelios drew a long vertical line on paper and wrote “Cypriot” on one side, “Greek” on the other, and in between, he drew grey zones. He said grey zones represented more fluid perceptions of one’s national identity than the two usual ones. In his opinion some or perhaps
the majority of Greek-Cypriots do not see themselves as either one or the other category, but they have a rather ambiguous sense of self. Because of this ambivalence, they also do not hold strong convictions on how a solution should or should not be. In a way, he looked down at the majority of Greek-Cypriots and constructed them as simple-minded and do not know who they are. The following quote is from his account, and it is indicative of his position that there are two main but contrasting national identities in the Greek-Cypriot community:

The nationalist position begins from a liberation war, a struggle. This is one tendency. And on the other hand, there is the other tendency, the disposition for rapprochement and the willingness to give everything [to the other] before being asked to! You get what I mean?

According to Stelios, nationalists identify with Greekness in its extreme form and support a national liberation struggle, whereas supporters of extreme forms of Cypriotism tend to consent to any pro-Turkey settlement. In a nutshell, those supporting a “liberation” struggle reject negotiations and a federal solution. On the opposite side, the pro-rapprochement faction is willing to make significant national concessions even without being asked to.

Stelios’s language had sexual and masculine overtones, and in this example he called the pro-rapprochement leftists yiousoufakia, an oriental term that referred to Greek pre-adolescent boys who worked for high-rank Ottomans officials and also offered sexual services. By employing this homophobic insult, Stelios reveals that he thought the leftists who were in favour of rapprochement were treacherous and were willing to offer too much to the Turkish side, and in effect they had no respect for themselves or their nation. Beyond this however, what is noticeable in his account and highlighted by his drawing is an understanding that there are two main and competing forms of identity in Cyprus that intersect politics in general and the politics of the solution in particular. Stelios used the hegemonic trope to explain identity antagonisms in Cyprus between Hellenocentrism and Cyprocentrism.
Elektra, a Yes supporter in her early thirties, also drew connections between identity perceptions and referenda votes to challenge the idea that individuals from the two groups are homogeneous in their actions. She argued that a person identifying with either Cypriotness or Greekness did not necessarily lead that person to a particular stance towards the Plan, which is to vote Yes or No. Specifically, she said the following:

So, there were Greeks of Cyprus who voted Yes to preserve Cyprus Hellenism. [For example] DISY, right? There were Cypriots who voted Yes to provide an opportunity for a reunited Cyprus, anyhow. This was…AKEL’s Yes, kind of, and of some, leftists, besides AKEL. But there was also the more internationalist Yes.

Elektra divided the Plan’s supporters into the following groups: Greeks of Cyprus who believe that Cyprus is Greek and who belong mainly to the Right and who voted Yes to preserve a Hellenic Cyprus, and the leftists who may or may not be AKEL members and who saw an opportunity to reunite Cyprus based on more internationalist/universalist perceptions. In her opinion, Yes voters not only had no common ideologies but they basically belonged on opposite ends of the political spectrum and had different reasons for the way they voted. Interestingly, she also claimed that, although identity is important, it was not the only criterion people used to make sense of the Plan and vote at the referenda.

Both Stelios and Elektra tried to present the link or glue which connects national identity and referendum vote. Their accounts are evidence of their understandings that identities are politicized, albeit to different degrees, and that in 2004, some were guided by such perceptions when they voted. They also talked about their personal stances. Elektra said that her Yes vote fell beyond Hellenocentric and Cyprocentric perceptions, and she called it an “internationalist” Yes. Stelios said that he “tries” to be Greek, in the sense that Greekness is characterised by certain features which he has yet to accomplish but he did not identify with the extreme nationalists.
7.2 Between and Beyond Hellenocentrism and Cyprocentrism

This part focuses on how participants reacted to identity groupings of being either Greek or Cypriot or Greek-Cypriot as they perceived that there was a pressure from above to choose one of them.

The moment the interview with Marios, a No voter in his late thirties, moved to the topic of identities, Marios expected that I would ask him to choose between being Cypriot or Greek. He refuted the dilemma even before it could be posed to him. He emphasized that he is Greek-Cypriot and added “that is all”. He said:

And if your question is “if you had to choose what would you choose?” I don’t have to choose! Why do politicians need to make up this thing for us? To explain: While there is no difference of opinion; they create differences in order to exist!

Marios presented the identity question in Cyprus as being imposed on the population by political elites, who expect people to choose between being Greek and being Cypriot to win their own struggles for power. His frustration with identity questions illustrates an identity fatigue as he explicitly rejects the question of being either Cypriot or Greek as a banal and manipulative practice instigated from establishment.

Louiza, in her late 20s and a No voter from Paphos, was prompted to discuss similar issues, and she described how she personally dealt with the identity question. Initially she felt uncomfortable, which is similar to the frustration shown by Marios. The question, “Do you feel Cypriot or Greek?”, was for her as familiar as it was for Marios. Specifically, she said:

I went through many stages in relation to this question…that’s why I don’t know. And it is also kind of connected with your political fraction….I would say that I am Greek-Cypriot. Or Cypriot with Greek descent. Something like that. Meaning that I recognize my Greek descent but I don’t feel part of Greece! I mean, I feel that we are an independent country, we are our own country…OK. I would never say that I am Greek and things like that. But OK, I don’t like saying that I am Cypriot and I don’t recognize…No…., Greek-Cypriot.
Louiza’s response is indicative that a feeling of being Cypriot or Greek did not always come naturally, but it was experienced as an omnipresent pressure to choose one or the other. She described how she moved from one identification to the other before ending somewhere in the middle, accepting a sort of dual identity. Her efforts to resolve her identity in Cyprus resembled a journey: She moved between different identities, which intersected with political identities, so she was not only switching national identities but also political ones and moving between the Left and the Right. She said that while she was engaged with the leftist student union (Proodeftiki, affiliated with AKEL) she went through her Cypriot phase which included being open to the Turkish-Cypriots – whom she called “brothers”. Her reference to her identity phases suggests that it is a question that she tried to answer through most of her youth and that she answered the question differently depending on the time. Her experience resembles how people usually go through different political and cultural phases in their youth, such as being rock fans, punks or anarchists, in their search for an identity and belonging. In 2004 she voted a “patriotic” No, but today she wonders if it only succeeded to reinforce division.

For a young Cypriot like Louiza, who was brought up in an environment of politicized national identities, it felt like an obligation to choose one and to be able to clearly state who she is, but it had not been easy to give a straightforward answer. Finally she rejected both poles and she said that for her the most appropriate identification is that she is a Greek-Cypriot. Adherence to both Greekness and Cypriotness has given her an identity she is comfortable with. Perhaps in the present day she does not associate her identity so closely with political beliefs which contributes to her feeling of comfort with it.

Maria, also a No voter in her late thirties, initially made an effort to define her national identity by resorting to examples/prototypes of what she considered “established” nations, to use Billig’s term (1995). “If the French are a nation then why can’t we be one?” she wondered. To define Turkish-Cypriots in national terms, she began by saying that they are “Islamized” Cypriots
(Cypriots = Greek-Cypriots). By this she wanted to fortify the claim that they are rightfully in Cyprus because they used to be one of us; however, she used a rationale according to which the Turkish-Cypriots are at the end of the day Greeks by descent, and that is why they have as much right to be here as Greek-Cypriots have. While developing this argument, she began considering the implications that it treated the Turkish-Cypriots as inferior to the Greek-Cypriots. She said: “If you see this historically, the Turkish-Cypriots were Islamized Cypriots. Now one could ask: ‘are we more Greek or are we more Cypriot [than them]’? I may be falling into a trap here…."

Evidently when attempting to identify the Turkish-Cypriot community, she started questioning the criteria she used to identify herself and her community in national terms. Her reflections present evidence of how taking the other into consideration can lead to reconsidering who we are. In this regard the Turkish-Cypriot community became a mirror through which she reflected on her identity and belongingness to the Greek nation: a mirror which cracked and now reflects fractured images of “our” national identity. As Özkırımlı (2005, p. 175) argued, building on Edensor (2002, p.89):

> We only become aware of the process of reproduction when we are torn apart from our habitual environment. Reflexive awareness, in other words, results from disruption.

Maria’s perception that one should belong to a nation seems at first glance to confirm the idea that nations are perceived as natural (Billig, 1995). However, this notion becomes complicated in cases like Cyprus where conventional or naturalized criteria of what a nation is do not seem to apply, and if used, they simultaneously exclude the other. The end of complete division in 2003 and the Annan period, in general, had subverted the habitual environment of the previous 30 years into which Maria had been born and raised. So, confrontation with the other led her to question her perceptions about her own national identity. Maria did not want to use either exclusionary criteria, and this is what further complicated the idea of a nation and that there is a need or it is natural to belong to a nation as a fixed and homogenous entity. Finally, she rejected the “obligation” to have a
national identity at a personal level and at a collective. Certainly, the 2002/2004 changes that happened in Cyprus illuminated to some more vividly that Cyprus is a multiethnic space. Specifically, after the crossing points opened in 2003, Maria’s perceptions of Turkish-Cypriots shifted, although she never met one, either before or after. She said:

Now I see them [Turkish-Cypriots] more positively than in the past. But I don’t consider my or other people’s negative perceptions about the Turkish-Cypriots as our mistake. When for 30 years, until 2004, they are telling you that our borders are in Kyrenia [emphasis] and that there will be a struggle [more emphasis] and we will…whatever [small laugh]. Then, yes, to a certain extent you [have to] consider them as enemies.

Maria presented her negative opinion of Turkish-Cypriots as a result of how Greek-Cypriots had demonized them from after the invasion until the opening of the crossing points. In her account, anti-Turkishness appeared almost an imposition – the result of being brainwashed. Yet her convictions changed even without ever meeting in person a Turkish-Cypriot after the opening of the check-points. Evidently, the end of complete partition in 2003 made the other more visible and not merely a distanced, imagined and silenced community, and it allowed a reconceptualization about who the other is, and inevitably to question who we are.

Panayiotis, a Yes voter displaced from a Famagusta village and in his late forties, argued that he is not a patridofilos, meaning that he does not love his country. He emphasized that he is not willing to fight and die for Cyprus. Interestingly he had served and worked for several years in the National Guard. His statement is an example of a counteraction to the politics of nationalism, according to which the “patria” is something that people are willing to kill and die for (Anderson, 2006; Billig, 1995). Specifically he said with an added emphasis:

I want to go to my house. As said I want a solution. If I loose my job, I lost it. First you will think your “place”/topos and then…Your place, not because I am a patridofilos, but because in this country I will raise my children and I want peace. I am not a patridophile, and I am not going to fight for Cyprus. Note this down! I will not fight for Cyprus!
Except for Panayiotis’ declaration that he is not willing to fight for Cyprus, his account is perhaps indicative that a number of people voted Yes to secure peace for future generations. He also said that he wanted to return to the village in the occupied north where he was from. More importantly, however, he wanted his conviction that he is not willing to fight for Cyprus to be taken seriously. He knew that he was crossing a “line” by declaring his unwillingness to die for his country and he wanted me to acknowledge that he had been conscious about doing so. Interestingly, he rejected individualism and argued that when he voted Yes, he had in mind the interests of the entire Cyprus. His reference to losing his job was related to how his wife was employed by the Ministry of Defence, and that there were rumours that everyone who had voted in favour of the Plan would lose their jobs (see Chapter 5, section “Beyond the National: Intraethnic Conflicts of Interest?”).

Renos, who was an ethnonationalist in his youth and had become a Yes supporter, based his Yes vote on the following three factors: that the nationalist goal of “freeing” Cyprus was maximalistic, that Turkey would not be a threat to a reunited Cyprus, and his personal desire to return to the village from where he came:

“Look, seeing that… in time the marbled King will get up and with his knife…we would get back a lot of territories, I don’t know exactly what it [the Plan] said but my village would be returned. We are refugees. I considered my decision correct.

Evidently, he reached a decision based on his general perceptions of the Cyprus issue but also based on his personal situation. He expected that the Plan’s implementation would be smooth and that he would finally get the opportunity to resettle in his former village. He did not reject his Greek identity, but he downplayed it, as he did not fear it was threatened with or without a solution. He also rejected nationalist aspirations regarding the solution as fruitless and unrealistic, revealing the utopian pronouncements that called for a long struggle to “free” Cyprus. Renos alluded to a Greek national myth that one day Emperor Constantine will return to give Hellenism back to the lost city of Constantinople and recover the Byzantine Empire. According to the myth, Emperor
Constantine survived the fall of Constantinople and was transformed into a marble statue (popularly called in Greek, marmaromenos Vasilias). Renos compares this legend to nationalist rhetoric for an ideal solution: More than 400 years have elapsed since the Byzantine Empire fell to the Ottomans, and of course the prediction has not come true. He suggested that instead of waiting for an unrealistic ideal solution, it would be best to compromise within the framework of a solution like the Plan.

Interestingly, Istanbul as a “lost” Greek city was often brought up by Yes voters in the discussions to show the utopianism of some of the No arguments, specifically of those emerging from Hellenocentric perceptions of Cyprus being a Greek land. In effect some Yes voters blamed nationalism in Cyprus for causing the Turkish occupation in the north and argued that Greek-Cypriot nationalists will also be responsible if north Cyprus becomes another “lost homeland” because of their unwillingness to compromise. Such comments criticized nationalist rhetoric which present “the northern part of the island as lost to the ‘Turkish occupier’” (Demetriou, 2014, p. 48) and blame our nationalism for the continuation of the occupation.

### 7.3 Nationalism as a Result of Institutional Processes

For many participants, political elites and institutions encouraged and cultivated nationalism and interethnic hatred. Most underlined the role of education in cultivating nationalism and demonizing the other. Yiannis, a Yes voter in his mid-forties from Paphos, described public schools as mechanisms aiming to produce Greek nationalists. He gave the example of his young son who, despite being raised in a pro-peace family, considers “Turks” as an enemy:

[Nationalism is] first [taught] by the teachers! The teachers begin this by holding flags and then parents continue at home. My son is 7 years old and he feels when holding a gun that he has to kill a Turk! In my house we never had such discussions. On the opposite! I try to raise my children to be tolerant and to learn the possibility to coexist with the other, with another culture, with other people! […]
Because, all these…little teachers [daskalouthkia] who are at schools, and POED\textsuperscript{68} are their children! They are children of Synargermos. [Children] of the nationalist fraction of Synargermos,\textsuperscript{69} which watered them, tended them and now they have become trees. And they give a nationalist shadow. Don’t think that these are coincidences.

Interestingly, Yiannis used the tree metaphor to criticize nationalism by arguing that nationalists and Greek nationalism are neither circumstantial nor superficial. By contrast, Yiannis describes national ideas as cultivated and as the product of specific institutional processes. He presented nationalism as a tree rooted in the “garden” of a right-wing nationalist establishment, such as education. The tree of nationalism grew and became strong, casting a nationalist shadow over everything. Plant metaphors have been used in Western discourses as well as in postcolonial contexts to normalize national belonging and to represent it as “a moral and spiritual need” (Malkki, 1992, p. 30) of individuals; however, Yiannis used it here for the exact opposite purpose: to challenge its usual depiction and to refute that people have a natural or spiritual need. His metaphor clearly represents national identity and nationalism as the result of specific social and cultural practices. As he emphasised at the end of his account, the spread of nationalism is not a coincidence!

Loukia, a No supporter in her early thirties, tried to explain why in her opinion a federation is not compatible with our history, but immediately corrected herself by saying that it is according to the history “they taught [it to] us”. She quickly corrected herself twice:

The history, anyway the way they taught us history, speaks of heroes who either tried to win their freedom or to defend what they had or to take back what they lost. We were never taught for someone who accepted occupation and compromise. In general our history does not speak of compromises…it speaks of…the way that we were taught history …it says that we were

\textsuperscript{68} POED (Pancyprian Organization of Greek Teachers) is the Greek-Cypriot teachers’ union.

\textsuperscript{69} Synagermos is another word for DISY.
conquered and we stayed like this for a certain period and then you would rebel and somehow gain your freedom.

Loukia emphasized the dichotomy between “us”, the Greeks, and the “other”, the Turks, adhering to the Good Greek vs. Bad Turk binary. Nevertheless, she recognized a possibility that her knowledge about her “nation’s” history may be constructed. Despite having such doubts, she accepted this knowledge as truth to make sense of the Plan. Her understanding of “our” history as a glorious past is drawn from nationalist narratives which influence her perceptions of the Plan and which required a glorious future and a compromise based on the Plan fell short of this expectation.

Angelos, in his mid-thirties and also No supporter, blamed the education system for systematically demonizing the Turks, including the Turkish-Cypriots. He particularly referred to elementary school exercise books which had a photo on the cover of an occupied village in the north with the caption: “I do not Forget and I Struggle [Δεν Ξεχνώ και Αγωνίζομαι]”. He also recalled nationalist ceremonial performances at schools which always included anti-Turkish content, “I think that any national ceremony was characterized by anti-Turkishness. Either if it concerned songs or a poem or something, either directly or indirectly.” He understood that his perceptions of the Turkish-Cypriot community could be traced back to his past childhood experiences, therefore showing how one individual could see how he was involved in the reproduction of nationalism. Notably, despite these critical perceptions on the role of education in spreading nationalism, a high school teacher, Yes voter, claimed that afterall nationalism instigated by education is superficial.

Many participants shared the perception that nationalism dominates the Greek-Cypriot community. For example, Maria emphasized, “We were told that the Turkish-Cypriots are enemies and that our borders are in Kerynia.” She then laughed at the pointlessness of the slogans in the present day but which slogans in the past – and during the Annan period – represented the sense of righteousness of the Greek-Cypriot community vis-à-vis Turkish aggression. Maria became
progressively more critical of Greek-Cypriot centric approaches to the solution, and about ten years after the referenda, she ridiculed them as unrealistic and manipulative. With the easing of movement restrictions in 2003 and the introduction of the Plan in its own right, it was revealed that the “struggle”, in which the Greek-Cypriot collectively demanded a return of all refugees to their homes and villages in the north, was utopian, but perhaps more importantly it was used for political manipulation. Maria argued further that the controversy about the Plan initiated a substantial dialogue about the solution, which went beyond the populism of previous nationalist discourses. Her account shows how she went through shock when she realized what the solution would be like and she became fortified by the rejection of the Plan behind familiar national slogans still ten years after, she questions them.

Christina, who voted No, said that if the Plan was implemented, the two communities would have happily coexisted and implied that people may peacefully coexist despite if some may be cultivating interethnic hatred and are able to resist nationalism:

I wouldn’t mind if the Plan was implemented, I believe that we would be happy. And the TurkishCypriots I believe that this is what they wanted. Despite the situation what they sometimes make to us and change our brains

Perceptions that political elites instigated nationalism, which then spread through society with little resistance, cut across generations. Renos, a refugee in his late 50s who voted Yes, described how ethnonationalism was cultivated and promoted during certain periods by political elites and how it was almost impossible for individuals to resist to it. He said that “Makarios nurtured us [with the ideals of nationalism] and kept on telling us ‘enosis, enosis and enosis’.” And he also used a metaphor of a plant growing to describe his point of view that nationalism did not happen on its own, but was constructed:
It is not easy to change this discourse and then argue that enosis after all is not in our interest – from the moment the seed was planted, it sprouted and not as something which emerged from within the people.

In the present day he has rejected the politics of enosis and supports federation although he has not rejected his Greek heritage.

One could argue, in line with Bryant (2001) that these accounts are representative of a blame discourse and particularly that participants blamed the political elites for interethnic hatred to absolve themselves from responsibility. Yet, what is more important is that they all have come to recognize how power works and realize that one is not born to hate the other but learns to do so.

7.4 Challenging the Patriotic “Card”

Participants in both groups emphasized that a number of the political elites are responsible for the continuation of the Cyprus conflict, having set roadblocks to a settlement. They spoke of the Cyprus issue as the patriotic card which many Greek-Cypriot politicians play to stay in power. In relation to the Plan, some participants of both groups pointed out that some political elites promoted anti-Plan positions to protect their political and financial interests which are deeply associated with the status quo of division. The Annan period fortified such perceptions among both Yes and No voters.

Marios, a No voter in his late thirties, said that, in 2004, the establishment resisted the solution to protect its own interests. He asked a rhetorical question: “When you own and control half of Cyprus, making lots of money [why] is a solution in your interest?! So the establishment resists a solution.” He clarified that a few families “own and control half of Cyprus.” He suggested

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70 In specific, Bryant (2001, p. 892) argued that Greek-Cypriots tend to blame local politicians and international powers for Cyprus’s division.
that the interests of this group would be jeopardized if Cyprus was reunited, as they would probably have to share power with the other and did not want to take such a risk.

Renos, a Yes voter, characteristically said that Greek-Cypriot politicians “build their careers on ‘ruins.’” He meant that politicians exploit the pain and the disasters of the conflict to advance their political careers. As the Cyprus issue is a politician’s ultimate patriotic card to secure power, a solution would have burned it. Renos also asked: “Who would be shouting patriotic slogans in the streets if the Cyprus issue is solved?” So a solution would mark the end of nationalist politics upon which many politicians have built their careers and which were also the basis of their legitimization within the community. Dimitris, another Yes voter retired high school teacher and displaced from a Nicosia village, said that a number of committees and groups exist because of the Cyprus issue and mentioned organizations of the missing people, refugees’ rights groups, and others. He said that a solution would abolish them, so they naturally resisted one. Dimitris in effect questioned the role of these groups as instead of campaigning for the reasons they were formed, they became part of the post-1974 establishment and a solution would take away their raison d’être and in effect their power.

Stelios, an opponent of the Plan, used similar arguments, emphasizing that the Cyprus issue is the raison d’être of political elites. He said: “They will not have any other reason to exist if they stop speaking about the Cyprus issue!” He felt the main role Greek-Cypriot politicians perform is to speak about the Cyprus issue, reiterate their rhetoric, and give political speeches on and off the media. “The Cyprus issue is like a candy,” said Anna, ‘No’ voter, and added that:

They [politicians] are feeding us the Cyprus issue. And the solution and the solution! But at the end some are comfortable with the existence of the Issue. I can feel it. It’s a hard candy. If we want to solve it, we do it. But how much do we really want to solve it?’

Anna described the Cyprus issue as banal and the epicentre of power games among the Greek-Cypriot political elites. Her metaphor that the Cyprus issue turned into a “candy” [karamela]
is indicative of perceptions that the issue is cliché-ridden, as she presented it as something that politicians *suck* on to build their rhetoric without really meaning what they say. It is understood that constant preoccupation with the Cyprus issue is not a genuine will for a solution but rather as evidence that the political elites are not interested in really finding a solution, but they are merely pretending. Dinos, who voted Yes, said that it was about time for those who supported division to come out of the closet and declare it clearly. His comment is indicative of a wider frustration among most participants about how politicians used the Cyprus issue to manipulate the society while in fact some did not even want a solution.

It is interesting that participants did not appear to perceive nationalist politics as a characteristic of an extremist faction but as an idiom of mainstream politics. Some participants named specific politicians as examples: Yiannis, Yes voter from Paphos, spoke of a faction within DISY and others criticized smaller parties of the centre or pointed a finger at some of their representatives. In general, the criticism covered the political spectrum, including the Left because it promoted a No vote at the end arguably to preserve the unity of the party. Interestingly, participants who made such claims came from diverse political and ideological backgrounds. In this regard, it would be interesting for a future study to focus more on political identities and perceptions of the solution, again with an emphasis on divergence and convergence of opinions across the political spectrum.

### 7.5 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed that some participants’ positions on the Plan were related to ideas of who we are. Stelios’ and Elektras’ accounts, who voted a resounding No and a resounding Yes respectively, are examples of such perceptions. Then the chapter went on to look at how some individuals feel that they are expected to choose to be either Greek or Cypriot, but the choice is heavy with political meaning. This conundrum has led some to experience internal conflict and
identity fatigue. In addition the chapter explored the accounts of two Yes voters, in which one adhered to his Greekness whereas the other rejected both the nation and the patria. The analysis shows that whether participants question or adhere to a national identity, they still question how political elites treat national identities and their politicization. Then, the chapter focused on perceptions that nationalism is a result of institutional processes which support the chapter’s argument that individuals understand that national identities are social constructions and not something one is born with.

The chapter treated examples from participants’ accounts as evidence that there is awareness among the general public of the Hellenocentric-Cyprocentric antagonism and how favouring one over the other could lead one to have a political label, as identification with Cypriotness is associated with the Left and Hellenism with the Right. Participants’ perceptions blurred these lines and these divisions and tended to focus on how political elites fuel this antagonism to hold onto power in the community which in effect prolongs the interethnic conflict.

It is claimed that Cypriots of both communities often blame politicians and international powers for Cyprus’s division. This chapter took another analytical path to argue that by blaming local or international political elites for Cyprus’s division, participants implicate nationalism as the result of institutional processes. Subsequently, some participants reject claims that the nation is natural, and they refute arguments that the conflict is merely an ethnic one, while recognizing interethnic hatred as founded on social and cultural pillars. Participants recognize that one is not born to hate the Turks but is “made” to hate them. In addition the chapter argues that recurrent perceptions which see nationalism and national identity as social constructions rather than natural phenomena are evidence of a meta-analysis of nationalism which contradicts arguments that ideas of nation and national identity are uncritically naturalized in the everyday. Some participants, when reflecting on the Plan, supported this approach, noting that the post-1974 status quo is upheld by a
specific set of power relations within the Greek-Cypriot society which the Plan would perhaps disrupt.

The following chapter extends the argument to the ideological role of the media during the Annan period. Participants often stated that the mainstream media are part of the political establishment, and they played a negative role during the Annan period by serving political interests rather than informing people about the Plan. These perceptions form the focus of the final chapter.
Chapter 8

Perceptions of the Media’s Role during the Referenda: “It Was a War.”

This chapter looks at how participants understood the ideological role of mainstream media in the Greek-Cypriot community during the Annan period and explores the consensus among Yes and No participants that the Annan period was characterised by confusion and a lack of information. Central to the chapter are common references that the Greek-Cypriot media played a negative role, in the sense that they did not adequately inform the public about the Plan and that they were biased and often acted as political instruments rather than free agents. Participants’ accounts often extended – without being prompted – to the role of the media within society in general.\(^\text{71}\)

From the onset of the field research, one idea preoccupying participants was that the Annan period was a confusing period and that the Plan was not adequately explained. Most participants described how they resorted to the mainstream media, print and broadcast\(^\text{72}\) to receive information regarding the Plan. As Lambros, in his mid-forties and No voter said as soon as our discussion started: “The Annan Plan is a Plan which nobody explained!” Others elaborated on certain media events such as President Papadopoulos’ televised speech (7 April 2004) either to criticize it or to defend the President’s stance on the Plan. Since independence, presidential broadcast speeches have become a common form of addressing the people and are broadly treated as media events (Karayianni, 2011; Avraamidou & Kyriakides, 2015). This study explores recurrent comments by participants on the president’s televised speech, as examples which illustrate how certain media

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\(^{71}\) As already noted, although discussions focused on the Plan, participants consistently extended their views of the media’s role beyond that period. Evidently, the 20012/13 economic disaster appeared as a catalyst in crystallizing negative perceptions on the media.

\(^{72}\) Only rarely participants referenced online media, mainly websites of newspapers.
events may be interpreted differently by the public, yet, they can still be considered powerful regardless of how one interprets them. In general participants’ accounts are evidence that knowledge of the Plan was primarily disseminated by the media and was not received first-hand. In addition, at a time when there was no social media, like Facebook and Twitter, perceptions that there was a lack of information and confusion are inevitably suggesting that the media perhaps failed to fulfil their primary role as information providers. Finally, given that the Cyprus issue normally dominates public debate, at first glance it appears paradoxical that so many participants claimed not to understand the issues of concern.

8.1 Negative Role of the Media

To quantify findings, no participant said that the media played a positive role during the Annan period, even for No supporters. To some extent, negative accounts and the perceptions they reflected were related to the media’s power to influence or manipulate the general public by distorting the truth in order to serve specific interests.

Memories of Televised Events. Constantina, a Yes voter, made a very revealing comment, which is characteristic of perceptions that the media coverage of the Plan was superficial and that Greek-Cypriots made a decision about the Plan in an environment of confusion and without being fully aware of its content. She said:

You know, at the beginning they did not say many things about the Annan Plan. Hmm…they said it is the Annan Plan, it has this number of pages,…there will be a referendum…hmm…they did not say many things. Papadopoulos then went on TV and he cried a bit [laughs]. The people felt sorry for him; he said the No; the people followed [laughs].

Some participants said that they discussed the Plan with politicians they had personal relations with or at party informative events. Participants from villages and from Paphos mentioned more frequently personal interactions with politicians whereas, for the majority of participants, politicians were primarily media figures.
Constantina’s account is representative of recurrent perceptions that the information in relation to the Plan was not adequate. It follows from her account that for the general public the Plan was unclear if not “mysterious”. Furthermore, her emphasis on the Plan’s number of pages indicates a subtle dissatisfaction that information on it emphasised detail rather than substance. Notably, the number of the Plan’s pages was an issue of debate on its own prompting questions of how people could read, understand and vote on such a lengthy legal document (see for example Emilianides, 2009). Constantina, when prompted to say what she expected to find in the media on the Plan, said, “What we wanted was to understand exactly what was inside the Plan.”. “[W]hat was inside the Plan” relates to the content of the Plan and it is a demand for “factual” information rather than opinion. In effect, many participants, like Constantina, confirmed Hallin and Maccini’s argument that in Mediterranean media systems “political communication takes place outside the open public sphere, or enters it only tangentially or in coded, cryptic form” (2004, p. 132).

In parallel, Constantina, described the president’s tears, during a televised speech calling for a resounding No, in an ironic tone, showing her personal disapproval. However she perceived the televised speech as a powerful media event because it achieved in influencing most people to vote No: as she said the people felt sorry for the crying president and “obeyed” him. For Constantina, like other Yes interviewees, the president’s speech acted like a catalyst within an environment of misinformation and confusion. Constantina did not ever read Althusser or Adorno, but she argued that the people “obeyed” the leader after watching him on screen. She added that she was “disobedient” because she wanted to return to her occupied village in the north. The fact that the president cried instigated her disobedience further as she emphatically said. For Constantina as for others, the presidential speech had been manipulative because it used emotionalism to drive the people towards a specific direction. Additionally, it is interesting how convinced she was that people were taken in by the president’s crying and voted No.

Lampros, a No voter, described the televised speech as “extremely emotional”. He said:
It [the speech] also had truths. And a huge fear. At the same time agitation, determination. He [President Papadopoulos] gave me the impression that was conscious of the difficult times and that he felt how enormous pressure was put on him. I felt that a terrible pressure was over that man at that time. I felt that before me I had a person who felt he held the destiny of his people in his hands. And he was aware that he was holding the destinies of his people in his hands at that time.

Lampros referred to the televised speech passionately, even though almost a decade had elapsed since he watched it. He described it as emotional but truthful. “Truth” appears as antithetical to emotionalism, yet in this case the speech is deemed successful exactly because it combined both. Evidently the President had won his empathy, as a human and as a leader. Loukia, a fierce opponent of the Plan, defended the president’s tears during the speech and said that his tears proved his sincerity. She defended the president as she was aware that some criticized him for crying in order to manipulate people towards voting No.

Dimitris, an enthusiastic supporter of the Plan, heavily criticized the televised speech to the extent that he argued that many people ridiculed the president for choosing to cry during the debate. He said:

And the late Tassos Papadopoulos went on television and cried and begged people not to vote [for the Plan], so this was a mistake. The entire people laughed at him. A lot of people. Because you suggest something to me, right? I have the right as a citizen of this place to choose democratically: The one or the other. So I chose, only one could pass as it is forbidden to implement both. This is the right thing to do. I will respect the one which will win but I want you to respect me as well for having an opinion. And you move forward. So as soon as his position for No won, he called us names.

Dimitris, described himself as nenekkis, explaining that this was how the former president used to refer to Yes voters which is another indication that the President encouraged the division between patriots who voted No and traitors who voted Yes. His account is also evidence of perceptions for a democratic deficit during the said period given that Yes voters were called “names”.
To provide further evidence of the media biases against the Plan, a number of participants, particularly leftist Yes supporters, recalled what they described as a media ban of an AKEL representative and constitutional expert, Toumazos Tsielepis. Participants discussed Tsielepis’ appearance on a CYBC debate on the Plan as successful, meaning that it influenced some of the audience towards Yes, consequently he was not invited again. One respondent who had this perception is Yiota, an AKEL supporter and Yes voter, who argued with excitement and bitterness that after this televised discussion more people leaned towards Yes. “The YES was increasing!” she said. She emphasised that despite CYBC announcing the televised discussion would be repeated, evidently due to its warm reception by the audience, this never happened.

Tsielepis’ perceived media ban, mentioned by Yes voters who were not only of the Left, is interesting evidence of two perceptions: The media had biases for a No vote and the No positions were not balanced with other positions, and perhaps more importantly the referenda results could have been different if media acted otherwise. Yiota said that the percentage of Yes supporters increased after this media event. Perhaps she had in mind other leftists, because Tsielepis’ rhetoric was expected to primarily impact left-wing voters, as he used a discourse with which they could identify.

Information gap. It is interesting to investigate further a recurrent perception about the significant information gap regarding the Plan, given that thus far, they all agreed that the Plan had dominated the media. Yiota, a Yes supporter in her late fifties, said that she had her “ears on the news” the period before the referenda, but “they [the media] weren’t really saying anything.” On the one hand, Yiota’s account shows how accessible the media were, as she could constantly follow the news, and how the audience experiences a network of various media in everyday life (Cardoso,

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74 This appeared as another important media event during the period, and it is worth exploring it in-depth. For the purpose of this thesis I examine it as an example provided by participants to support their perception that media were biased in favour of No.
On the other hand, it shows dissatisfaction with the information received, and criticism about the media content being superficial and inadequate. Yiannis, a Yes voter, used comparable arguments and said:

Well, they were all preoccupied with slogans, cues, and they found something [a detail]…about our territorial waters… about this and that. But in reality nobody went into depth about anything.

Yiannis described mediatized political discussions as superficial and, in a sense, polarizing, given that to him they sounded like an exchange of slogans. Slogans are short, catchy political manifestos which usually are not used to promote substantial dialogue but to advance one’s own position as the ultimate belief. Describing media-run political discussions as an exchange of slogans points to how the debate on the Plan was perhaps characterised by populism. In addition, Yiannis attributed the media’s failure to inform to the lack of professionalism of the journalists and their nationalist perceptions. He said: “They are superficial and uneducated! Most of them are uneducated! Leave aside that they are inflicted by the nationalist vaccine! I don’t watch television now. I also stopped newspapers and television.” Yiannis appeared very frustrated with the media and the journalists and for this reason he said that he stopped relying on them for information.

Emilios said that he voted No because he did not understand the Plan. This is an extract from his account:

I was watching the TV channels, trying to find out something about the Plan. I expected that it would be clear. That it [the Plan] provides for this and that; and that later, our politicians (short laugh), who supposedly understand [better], would say that this is positive, this is positive, this is negative, the pros are more than the cons, etc – and that then all of them [the politicians] would say vote for it or don’t vote for it. That is, not to tell you [what to do], but to tell you the pros and cons and then let you [decide on your own]…

See also Madianou (2002, pp. 128–164) on mediated everyday lives.
But they did the exact opposite. Some said it was positive; some said it was negative, and they were fighting each other [emphasis] as they always do.

It is evident that Emilios, who did not have a predetermined position on the Plan, expected the media and the political elites to assist him to form an opinion. Emilios made a claim similar to Constantina’s that information on the Plan should have been fact-oriented. Notably, he described mediated discussions on the Plan more as political “battlegrounds” than as information providers. His following quote is also indicative of perceptions that during the referenda, the media and the politicians aimed at polarization instead of information:

Our channels and our politicians, or the newspapers did not help. By contrast they were trying to send the people to the two edges and the edge that would attract the more, even 5 or 10 people more than the other, to claim that it had the majority.

Emilios’ account provides evidence that television channels and newspapers are understood primarily to be political actors. Again, broadcasted debates on the Plan are remembered more as battles for winning votes than debates on the positive and negative aspects of the Plan. As Emilios argued, what the politicians cared for was to attract even a small numerical majority to their positions, which would legitimize them to speak in the future in the name of the people: to claim that they had the majority of people with them. Thus, the media are not just political instruments, but part of the political establishment, as they – as well as politicians – aim to polarize the populace.

Lambros, a No voter, attributed the poor quality of information presented to the politicians’ own confusion. In his own words, “They didn’t know what was going on.” Evidently, what frustrated him was not necessarily that the politicians receive media attention but how they used it. Therefore, he claimed that people were confused about the Plan because politicians failed to understand it and then explain it to the people.
Niki, who also voted No and is a retired civil servant from Paphos, vividly described her agony to extract information from different media in order to reach an informed decision. She concluded that the more she listened to the media the more confused she became:

I remember that at that time we were all struggling. We read a lot from within the newspapers, the different newspapers that came to our hands, or those entering our house, newspapers, radios, we listened to discussions. And the more we listened the more we were becoming confused.

Her description is indicative of the perception that this was an inherently confusing period for a number of Greek-Cypriots and that the media exacerbated confusion instead of clarifying things. Niki also expressed her frustration with left-wing Haravgi:

[S]ometimes I was becoming angry because they would not enlighten us enough. It seems like, if they themselves were struggling or that they had different opinions, the different journalists who used to write and I could not trust let’s say completely the one over the other.

Nikoleta decoded the content of Haravgi as evidence that the newspaper staff – and by extension, perhaps the party – did not have a clear position on the Plan or had internal disagreements.

The examples provided by both Yes and No participants indicate that although they considered media content to be plentiful and accessible, they felt it was of poor quality, contradictory and partial. Participants’ accounts illustrate they would have preferred more informative media coverage of the Plan. In parallel, these accounts show that people perceived that the media kept important issues outside the public sphere, confirming Hallin & Mancini (2004) concept about how Mediterranean media systems work. By contrast, participants complained that the media emphasised populist slogans or procedural details throughout.

**Media instrumentalization: Mechanisms of political/ ideological expressions.** Renos, a Plan supporter and displaced who lived in a Paphos village, said that each newspaper had its own
agenda aiming at persuading people to vote Yes or No accordingly. He said that “every newspaper was publishing what suit it,” and added that “each had its own agenda: how to persuade the people to vote or not to vote for it [the Plan].” Renos, like other participants tried in a way to assist me to understand how the news media functions in Cyprus, advising me that there was really nothing beyond this “reality to study”. To make sure that I was able to make sense of this reality, he asked, “Do you get this?”

Renos’ account reflects an underlying perception among many participants that it was normal for the media to align with political circles, rejecting ideas that they are “free agents”. Panayiotis, who supported the Plan and also displaced but a Nicosia resident, said that it was natural for the media to be biased against the Plan because the media are subjective, as they want to “lure” you. He added that if people want accurate information, then they should find more credible sources than the media. Still, he underlined that he was significantly influenced to vote Yes after watching an AKEL representative on TV who was specialised in constitutional law.

Perceptions that it is normal for Cypriot media to be biased can be interpreted as evidence of an understanding at the level of individuals that the media serve interests instead of being watchdogs of power. In effect, media are seen as part of the society and as they function within societal structures they serve specific, political or economic interests. In the words of Gregoris from Paphos who voted Yes, the media are in general “guided” in order to manipulate people.

Koullis, also based in a Paphos village and who voted No, said that it is natural for the media to be biased and serve the interests of those who finance them as they are all controlled and ultimately paid by centres of power, not only in Cyprus but worldwide. Stelios, also a No voter, reproduced the accusation that media professionals, like journalists, were bribed by the US to support and promote the Plan. Whether or not the media were controlled by anyone, the general sense I recorded was that the media were intentionally infused with biases, aiming to manipulate people towards voting Yes or No rather than informing.
A general perception among the participants is that the news media are in alliance with political elites and they are a powerful out-group (them) compared to the general public who is less powerful or even powerless. In this regard, participants criticised how politicians are constantly on TV. Some described them as television’s “parrots” meaning that they are always in the media repeating the same words. These accounts point to how the media and particularly the electronic media are perceived as a theatrical stage for politicians to perform in front of their electorate.

Stelios said:

Their [the politicians] job is to be there! To be there! To parade every night on TV and to watch the same [people] to fight and then after a while to sit at a tavern, to eat and drink.

His account is characteristic of a popular view that politicians’ raison-d’être is to be on TV performing “media events” which did not correspond to the truth, like disagreeing with political opponents, while they remained friends behind the scenes. The paradox is that despite all these negative accounts of media and politicians, several participants expected at that time politicians to advise them on the Plan through the media.

A No voter justified the media biases against the Plan as an action to protect themselves and their organization from political fallout and as having being succumbed to commercial pressures. He said: “Probably they were thinking of…the political cost, audience costs.” Therefore, it is assumed that had media employees been more supportive of the Plan, or even neutral, they would probably have paid a political cost as most of the political establishment and the government were against the Plan. It is also assumed that audience share would decline if any media were pro-Plan, as again it was understood that most people were anti-Plan. In a way, journalists had “gone with the wind”.

As already noted, although our discussions were related to the Annan Plan, participants consistently extended their views on the media’s role in society beyond that period. “There is a gang [κλίκκα],” said Marios, a No voter, explaining that five privileged people “rule” Cyprus and
each owns a newspaper. He added: “It is them who influence the masses! Presidents are elected by those who own the [TV] channels.”

Participants expected media professionals to be neutral but recognized that they could not be because of how the media industry works: They aim to make a profit, financial or political, and to attract big audiences. People are evidently not part of the gang, to use Marios’ words, a No voter from Paphos, but they are not really challenging the status quo either. Instead some practice a form of passive resistance and refrain from watching TV or reading newspapers.

**Media biases against the Plan.** Yes participants recurrently criticized media biases against the Plan. Yiannis, a Yes voter, said with bitterness that “it was an unfair fight,” meaning that the two positions were not given equal opportunities to be heard in the public sphere. Dimitris, another Yes voter, similarly suggested that the dominance of the anti-Plan position was so complete that alternative voices could not be heard. But also No voters expressed frustration that the media inclined towards rejecting the Plan. This is an interesting finding given that studies suggest that “supporters of an issue or a group tend to believe the media favor their opponents” (Lee, 2005, p. 44), and that media distrust is largely underpinned by political and ideological positions (Tien-Tsung Lee, 2005). Participants’ accounts demonstrate widespread distrust of the media which cuts across the Yes and No groups.

Another issue that participants of both groups underlined was related to the way the media framed No as patriotic and Yes as unpatriotic. Orestis, a Yes voter, said that Yes supporters were characterized in the media as traitors. Similarly Elektra, a Yes supporter, argued that a dominant rhetoric in the media during the referenda was the division between traitors and patriots. Nicolas is an example of a No voter who said that during the said period the media were obviously in favour of No. He said: “Maybe I did not see this clearly at that time! But when the dust settled, I definitely saw this! First, I consider that a journalist should do his job and not take [support] the position of anyone.” Nicolas said that during the referenda he did not fully realize that the media were
promoting a rejectionist point of view, but he acknowledged it later on. By emphasizing that journalists should always be objective and neutral, he showed his dissatisfaction with media biases for a No vote. Regardless of their personal beliefs, journalists must adhere to the journalistic norms of objectivity and neutrality. Similarly, Maria, a No voter said: “I don’t remember if there was a television station which was supporting Yes, the bombardment was for No.” Maria’s reference to a “bombardment” shows the extent to which she perceived media biases for No. Furthermore, she quashed media practice to appear “objective” by inviting representatives in favour of the Plan to appear on TV panels, and she pointed out that even then the Yes position was underrepresented. Finally, she questioned her own impressions suggesting that perhaps she did not notice Yes positions because she was not willing to.

Dinos, a Yes voter, said that no television channel supported Yes, although some newspapers supported the Plan as did the left-wing radio station. On the other hand, a No participant disagreed. He said that TV coverage was more pluralistic because it had representatives of both camps, while each newspaper represented only one view.

**Media power: Weak vs. Strong.** In relation to the media’s role in influencing voting No or Yes in the referenda, the analysis noted two opposed, main perceptions: those claiming a strong media-weak people nexus and those claiming a weak media-strong people nexus. Focus is on both perceptions, but in parallel we show how although participants agreed that there was lack of information or misinformation regarding the Plan, they interpreted the results of the referenda differently. For some, despite lacking information on the Plan, Greek-Cypriots demystified the Plan and voted No in a collective act of resistance. Similar accounts were primarily instigated by primordial understandings of the nation considering that the No vote resulted out of national enlightenment (see Chapter 5 and 6). As Andreas, a retired teacher who voted No said: “The people acted with intuition and said No to such a big degree.” For others, the lack of information and media
manipulation prompted the resounding rejection of the Plan. Yiota, a Yes voter, is one such an example, and she said:

I believe it is because no information was provided to the people and those voting No; it is because they were persuaded by the media. Because there was nothing, they did not explain to the people what is the Annan plan. Nothing, nothing, in the dark. The people were in the dark!

Maria, a No supporter, gave a statement which is also an example of the strong media–weak people nexus. She said that:

Their [media] role was decisive. How many read it (the Plan) on their own? I didn’t read it either. Most [of the people] formed their opinions by the media and through their friends and family. So (pause) so they [media] played the most decisive role. The media forms views and perceptions without telling the absolute truth.

In contrast, Fotini, also a No voter, rejected the strong-media vs. weak-public perception. Though she admitted that, perhaps, some media had been biased (however, she did not clarify how they were biased), she was adamant that people still could make a free choice. She said, “Some channels may had been giving/passing one view more, others not. But we also had our own judgement. We read newspapers. We read the plan on our own. We had this opportunity.”

Phoebos, a Yes voter, used an analogous argument that he forms an opinion of his own and does not uncritically follow media positions. But, contrary to Fotini, he said that there was an organized effort by multiple centres of power and within the media to demonize the Plan. Phedonas’s account is an example of how resistance to media is possible at an individual level but perhaps not at a collective level. The Plan’s supporters, but also some opponents, said that perhaps media biases for No drove neutral people towards No, which agrees with studies that media has a stronger influence on people who hold neutral convictions (Perloff, 1993).

Evidently, these positions emphasised the effect that the media may have had on others. Similar accounts substantiated the third person effect seen in media reception studies, which is the perception that “others are more easily influenced than oneself” (Davison, 1983, p. 5). However,
some respondents argued that the media had or could have a direct influence on their own views, particularly on how they internalized hegemonic patterns. For example, Harris, a Yes voter, said that the Plan was vastly anti-Greek-Cypriot only to add that he does not know if this is an objective view or if this is an impression he had because of media representations of the Plan. Similarly, Phoebos, Yes supporter, said that at first he considered saying a “resounding No” (using President Papadopoulos’s famous phrase) due to the Plan’s negative media coverage.

It is noticeable that some participants associated media influence with the level of citizens’ engagement with politics. Specifically, Yes-supporter Gregoris from a village in the district of Paphos said that media achieve to manipulate people because of “the people’s own ignorance.” It follows that if people become more political and informed then the balance of power between the media and the general public can change. Therefore, in his view media power is not static or a given, but it depends on whether people are engaged with issues of common concern or not.

Some participants regarded that specific social groups, such as villagers, older people and the “uneducated”, were more vulnerable to media manipulation. In this regard, Yiota, a Yes supporter, noted:

In particular let’s say the village people. Did they take the plan to read what was there? Whatever they listened to and whatever they were told.

Other Yes and No voters repeated Yiota’s argument and perceptions, yet, among the participants, those of a younger age and holding university degrees – in some cases from prestigious universities – were those who said that they did not even consider reading the Plan because they expected it to be complicated. In fact, none of the young participants had read it, although they were the most educated.76

76 A more in-depth study across age groups could be useful and further the analysis of this study.
Interestingly, some participants said media power and influence was mostly down to a cycle of misinformation rather than to a direct cause and effect relationship. Emilios’ account is an example of this understanding. For Emilios, the cycle of misinformation on the Plan was instigated by the media, but then it ran through “everyday” interpersonal communication:

Because the Plan was not clear, whatever Tsouroulis [TV journalist/presenter] said, Costis shared it at the coffee shop with Yiannis, but in the way he personally made sense of it, while they played cards. Then Yiannis went home and he told it to his wife and his children. By the end this was completely distorted!

Emilios said that the media presented politically instigated and inaccurate information. Then the people interpreted it in a particular way and discussed it with their wider social circle, resulting in a complete manipulation of the truth. Thus, the subjective media product, though expected or desired to be objective, was turning also into subjective knowledge among the public. The two are not perceived as separate units of knowledge and information but that they intersect. In addition, it follows that relatives and friends were also a source of influence, sometimes stronger than the media.

“There is no reality,” claimed Marios, a No voter in his late thirties from Paphos, and his account is indicative of how people perceive the media as having power over others but not over themselves. In a way, Marios was justifying peoples’ passivity and uncritical adoption of the medias’ constructed reality, by claiming that the people think the way they do because of how the media construct reality. He implied that there is no diversity of opinion in Cyprus and that the media are constructing a single reality and this makes it impossible for the people to come up with other ideas. Thus, it is normal for people to adopt hegemonic patterns and perceptions. To him, it follows that it is impossible to try to convince them otherwise, as people’s views are the result of powerful media. Therefore, Marios is not only justifying others for being trapped within hegemonic media produced realities but him as well for not being more political and taking action to affect
change. In his understanding, the cycle of reality construction cannot come to an end, as the structures of the system within which media work cannot be transcended.

On the other hand, there was some optimism for the new generation who reportedly have more opportunities to receive unbiased information because of the use of the internet and social media. Nikolas, a No supporter from Paphos, said:

I believe that they [the younger generation] are even more open-minded and you have the potential of the new media…facebook, internet etc. To have access to real knowledge of events and not to remain exclusive to the knowledge that those above will plant in them.

Again here, there is the strong link between the media and the “above” [άνω]. The social media appear as an alternative means of communication for the younger generation to reclaim freedom of information and thus free will.

In relation to the Plan, participants’ accounts showed not only that the news media exacerbated their sense of confusion but it also created a sense of political vulnerability as they felt unable to decide what to vote. Such quotes show that this lack of knowledge and misinformation prompted some critical accounts as regards the usefulness of the referenda for making decisions on complex issues.

8.2 Media and the Cyprus Conflict: “Hot” or “Banal”?

A number of participants shared perceptions that the media have always been against the other and they criticized them for contributing to demonizing the other and cultivating interethnic hatred. Angelos, a No supporter, recalled the media coverage of the assassination of two Greek-Cypriot men by Turks or Turkish-Cypriot officials when they entered the buffer zone during a protest of the Turkish occupation, while he was a teenager in the 1990s. He said that:

It was the summer before I went to the third class of Lyceum that the assassination of Isaak took place. Who was the other one? [...] Solomou. So, this was presented in the media…in…the news: the television and the newspapers, etc. the magazines. The way that this was presented I
think it played a crucial role in my creating a negative…image [for the Turkish-Cypriot community].

Although his account is not directly related to the media’s role during the referenda, it is still interesting that, to make sense of the Plan and to explain specifically his hostility to the idea of reunification which the Plan proclaimed, he recalled media events. He argued that media representations of the said events enhanced his negative images for Turks and Turkish-Cypriots. However he also sympathized with the Turkish-Cypriots by watching the media coverage of the April 2003 opening of the checkpoints. He said that a Turkish-Cypriot he saw on television at that time reminded him of his uncle and this softened his negative perceptions of the entire community. Thus, for this one person, the power of the media appears important, but in two opposite directions: that of reconciliation and that of interethnic hatred.

Marios, also a No voter in his late thirties, contrasted the coverage by left-wing ASTRA to that done by the rest of the media, and he said that it was courageous of ASTRA to give voice to Turkish-Cypriots and to broadcast in the Turkish language. When asked to explain why this showed “courage”, he replied:

The Turkish-Cypriots are presented by err.. the third quarter of the political scene in Cyprus, as Turks. [Often] without saying this directly, because they do not want to. So since we go to school, we are being told that “a good Turk, is a dead Turk,” etc. And they are also implying the Turkish-Cypriots [as Turks]. They always speak of the ‘Greek element’ like if it’s the only one [here]

Marios echoed Yiota’s views, a Yes voter based in Nicosia, that the media were not only turning the people against the Plan but also against the Turkish-Cypriots. Yiota said:

If through information we said that we should accept them [the Turkish-Cypriots], then I believe that the people would be persuaded.

They [news media] speak to you constantly in a negative manner…There is nothing positive about the other side.
Yiota’s account exemplifies perceptions that the media routinely demonize the Turkish-Cypriots or the other side.

On the other hand, Doros, also a Yes voter, argued that the Cyprus issue had become predictable and boring and that this related to its routinization by the media. He said:

Who is bothered with the Cypriot issue [kypriako]? One starts to….get bored. That is, from a very young age when they talked about the kypriako I switched station [broadcast] until it came to the next news. They don’t say anything. Do they say anything!?!?

The idea is that, although the media routinely cover the Cyprus issue, they cover it superficially. Subsequently, the media’s long-lasting preoccupation with the Cyprus issue perhaps had the opposite results for some: Instead of maintaining it as a “hot” national issue, it has become routine.

8.3 Conclusion

This chapter explored the ways in which participants evaluated media coverage of the information on the Annan Plan and their perceptions of the ideological role of the media during the said period and particularly their perceptions that the media played a negative role. Participants learned about the Plan from secondary sources and mostly, as they all claimed, from the media on which they also watched political debates. Plan supporters expressed greater dissatisfaction with and bitterness over media bias for rejecting the Plan, namely for reproducing the discourse of patriots voting No and traitors voting Yes. Some participants who had voted No also noted media bias for No, while both groups provided multiple accounts – often unprompted – regarding the lack of information, the misinformation and conflicting information about the Plan. And for this they blamed mainly the media but also political elites.

In this regard, most participants perceived that the media and the political elites are linked and often work as a “gang”. The connotations of the word “gang” are evidently negative as they point to a group of people who work together, in illegal or unethical ways, in order to make
personal or group gains. It is also evidence that many interviewees’ perceived the media as an inherent part of the overall political and economic establishment, an outside, powerful other. This reflected an understanding that media are associated with centres of power in terms of ownership (they own the media) and in terms of interpersonal associations/links they have with them (involved interests).

Politicians were criticized for performing media events revolving around the Cyprus issue and the media were criticized for providing a stage for them to do so. The paradox is expressive of two antithetical positions: the expectation to be informed or guided by politicians, and dissatisfaction or fatigue with overexposure to politicians. Evidently, for participants, the Annan period exemplified the failure by both the political leadership and the media to respond to their perceived primary role, to guide and to inform the public. Another argument of the chapter is that this sense of a lack of information led to disorientation and vulnerability, which rendered some participants open to third person interpretations of the Plan.

Participants also expected more from the media because they perceived the referenda as constitutive of a significant period and that the Plan was, in its own right, complicated. Specifically, some participants argued that the Plan was extremely long, legally and politically complicated, and therefore they did not read it. Not reading the Plan was independent of each participant’s level of education or social status, and many relied on the media and family or friends to form an opinion. Nevertheless, participants expected more facts and less value-judgment. Their expressed interest in receiving facts about the Plan is evidence that they rejected media constructions of the Plan as either good or evil.

The analysis clearly indicates that participants view the Cypriot media as highly politicized. Moreover, participants tried to explain why the media function this way and they mentioned various entry points of the media power cycle. They discussed media ownership, issues of cultural production, the journalists’ role, and cultural consumption; that is, the audience’s stance and
reaction to media products. Notably, participants’ approach to the media displayed a convergence between a political economy approach and cultural studies approach, and, to a certain extent, as noted, they considered media to be an integral part of the political establishment, expressing ideologies aimed at political mobilization rather than direct economic profit. These characteristics of the Greek-Cypriot media system are perceived as weakening the ability of the media to objectively inform.

To break away and escape from powerful circles, some respondents claimed that they had switched off their television sets and had stopped buying newspapers. They perceived media as agents of manipulation, leading to disempowerment, and some participants preferred more fragmented spheres involving friends and families rather than the larger public sphere created and dominated by the mainstream media.

Having showed a convergence of perceptions among the supporters and the opponents of the Plan regarding the ideological role of the media during the Annan period, the chapter has also supported the argument that the two groups’ should not be approached as completely antithetical groups.
9 Conclusion

This thesis set out to explore the intersections between nationalism, national identities, and Cyprus’s peace negotiations, and referred to the Annan Plan from two perspectives: How the media constructed national identities during the Annan Period and how individuals perhaps perceive that they used (or not) ideas of the nation during the April 2004 referenda to make sense of the Plan. Specifically, this conclusion synthesizes each chapter’s central arguments to show how they answer the two research questions which guided the thesis and which correspond to the study’s two perspectives: a) How and in what ways did the mainstream Greek-Cypriot media construct Greek-Cypriot identity during the Annan Plan negotiations? and, whether these identities refer to the Turkish-Cypriot community in an inclusive or exclusive manner and b) How and in what ways do individual Greek-Cypriots currently use ideas about the nation or national identities to make sense of the Cyprus conflict and a potential solution, and how do they perceive that they used them during the April 2004 referenda? Additionally, the thesis includes an analysis of what participants thought about the media’s ideological role during the Annan period corresponding to the Research Question about how participants think about the media’s ideological role during the Annan period. Finally the Chapter discusses future work in view of the study’s limitations.

This study did not approach Yes and No supporters’ apriori as two antagonistic groups. This approach contributed to unpack divergences of perceptions within and across the Plan’s supporters and opponents. In this regard, although the thesis focused on the Annan Plan and the 2004 referenda, it offers a theoretical and empirical step beyond that period. Taken together, the two parts of the study illustrate the significance of the said period in reformulating and perhaps questioning commonly held beliefs in relation to Cyprus’s reunification and issues of national identity, nationalism and their exclusionary and inclusionary tendencies. The Annan Plan may or may not be “dead” as a constitutional text however, this study shows that the Annan period is a significant point
of reference to contextualise present (and perhaps future) configuration of positions towards a solution. Furthermore, this study indicates that although some people celebrated and others were despondent in the immediate aftermath of the majority Greek-Cypriot No vote, there is complexity and antagonism within the Yes and No groups.

**Media Analysis.** Based on a qualitative analysis and drawing on literature in nationalism and media studies, the thesis has uncovered the use of the national *we* and unpacks complex ways that it was used during the period studied. The analysis has shown that during the Annan period, media-projected norms of national conformity either closed or shifted the boundaries of the national *we*. Although all media studied during that time participated in the construction of national identities, they differed where boundaries of *us* and the *other* existed, therefore mirroring struggles for power within Greek-Cypriot society. This study reveals efforts to put a distance between us and the other as well as more complex ways that the national *we* was used, as selected media used the first person plural to criticize political opponents within the Greek-Cypriot community, thus pointing to sharp internal political divisions. In addition, the use of the national *we* homogenized opponents but also ourselves: Perceived differences were often represented in the press as non-transcendable. In some instances the boundaries of *we* opened up to include both Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot communities.

The thesis highlights how the master dichotomy of *us* vs. *other* was dislocated in media representations during the events which followed the relaxation of bizonal movement restrictions in April 2003. Such representations revealed the transformative potential of a different identity and specifically of a concept of an open and inclusive Cypriotness. In this regard the analysis noted a paradox. On the one hand the press welcomed the reaction of the people but on the other hand appeared anxious for a quick return to order even though they recognized that a complete return to the previous order was impossible. Editorials and lead commentaries promoted the idea that individuals needed guidance from the state; the absence of such guidance led to press attempts to
fill the gap. The press issued warnings to Greek-Cypriots who crossed into the occupied territory that they still had to behave in a nationally correct manner, and reminded them that they are not free agents. Nevertheless, regardless of whether the use of the binary *us* and *other* distanced the two communities or reflected differences of opinion within the Greek-Cypriot community, the media discourses assumed speaker-listener unanimity, calling the readership to imagine membership in a national collectivity.

This study confirms that neither Cyprocentrism nor Hellenocentrism, which have been the hegemonic tropes used to give meaning to Greek-Cypriot identity, are static boundary formations of *us* and the *other*. Media discursive shifts between Hellenocentrism and Cyprocentrism, even in the same paragraph of the same editorial, revealed that the confrontation between nation and state, as two antagonistic nationalistic codes, was not prominent in the campaigns for No and Yes. Across the political spectrum, the press rarely used the Greek categorization, but preferred terms like Cypriots or Greek-Cypriots, which is evidence of a Cypriot-centric approach. Appeals to Cypriotness blurred the lines between “what is Cypriot” and “what is Greek-Cypriot” in a way that excluded other Cypriot communities. The analysis of the different newspapers shows examples of the use of the term “Cypriot” used in an inclusive or an exclusive way. When “Cypriot” was used to mean merely the Greek-Cypriot community, it was unclear about what being Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot meant, implying that Cyprus includes only Greek-Cypriots, although it emphasizes Cypriotness rather than Greekness.

By exploring the uses of “state” and “history”, the thesis furthers the argument that media frequently shifted between Hellenocentrism and Cyprocentrism. The traditionally right-wing press was also seen to shift towards an exclusionary Cyprocentric attitude when campaigning for people’s rejection of the Plan. This shift was exemplified in recurring editorial arguments to vote No as a means of preserving the state. In this context the analysis notes historical references to the state’s independence, such as the anti-colonial group EOKA, and references which challenged the
existence of the state, such as intercommunal strife, the coup and finally the Turkish invasion. On the other hand, editorials in support of the Plan used the legality of the state to campaign for Yes at the referenda, for example by drawing attention to the possibility that the TRNC would be recognised if the Greek-Cypriots voted No on the Plan, or that individual Turkish-Cypriots could claim state benefits regardless of a settlement. Evidently, the state appeared as a legitimate institution in both Yes and No positions.

The analysis reveals that the way the press referred to the Turkish-Cypriot community as the “other” was mainly premised on the construction of them as an “absent/present” community. Specifically, the Turkish-Cypriot community was often mentioned in an inclusive manner. However, the analysis suggests that recurring concepts, such as editorials’ proclamations for a fair and viable solution, which will protect the rights of Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots alike, still portrayed the Turkish-Cypriots as an “other” and as a distinct community. This is because Turkish-Cypriots’ own interests and needs were made invisible this way: In effect, Turkish-Cypriots became absent through their presence, as their interests and needs were tailored to project Greek-Cypriots’ own wishes.

This media analysis shows that, during the Annan period, the Greek-Cypriot community – at least on the level of the elites as their ideas are represented in the mainstream press – primarily distrusted the US, the UK, and the UN. Specifically, the media constructed distrust for the UN in editorials that perceived it functioned under US hegemony. In parallel, the study shows that media depictions of “external mediators” cohered with a debate among them on Cyprus’s international position. The analysis provides evidence that in the Annan period the press generally believed that Cyprus belongs to the West despite at times providing examples of its affiliation with countries beyond the West and at other times displaying anti-imperialist rhetoric. However and perhaps more importantly the research shows that this consensus about Cyprus belonging to the West unravelled in different constructions of the West, with the “good” West being represented by the EU and the
“bad” West being represented by the US/UK. In this regard, the analysis brings to the fore that media tended to portray the EU as a morally superior, regional Western bloc. Such positions back up arguments that the idea of Europe “ruled” the said period and also reaffirm that there was a perceived need for the Greek-Cypriot community’s “Europeanness” to be acknowledged. All newspapers supported EU membership, and all but one newspaper, Alithia, represented Anglo-Americans as the main external malevolent actor, setting roadblocks to Cyprus’s EU accession, and who aimed to impose the Plan on Cyprus to protect Turkey’s and, by extension, their own geopolitical interests.

**Interview Analysis.** By exploring participants’ accounts the study reveals that there is an understanding on the part of individuals that national identities are the result of social processes and that there are conflicts within each community which go beyond the ethnic cleavage. In addition, by focusing on people’s agency, we were able to move beyond the Hellenocentrism-Cyprocentrism antagonism thesis, which, while analytically useful, can lead to homogenized biases which fail to see the dynamics of identification at specific times and under specific circumstances. A specific facet of the thesis approach was to question conceptualisations of individuals as structurally induced non-agents. By contrast, the individuals in our study were reflective and had been interested participants in the processes either by adopting in the end dominant national(istic) doctrines or by questioning them. Consequently, we uncovered a meta-analysis of nationalism at the level of individuals which contradicts arguments that people naturally acquire ideas of nation and national identity. This is evident in their perceptions of how education and media function as mechanisms of identity construction and cement nationalistic perceptions which exclude the “other”. The metaphors of “planted” national identities exemplified this understanding. Many participants understood national identities were constructed or were “false consciousness” and they even recognized how they themselves adopted specific national identity perceptions.
From the analysis in the empirical chapters we note a recurrent conceptualization among participants that elite identity politics are above all interest-based and that nationalism is, to an extent, a construction. Participants’ accounts evoke identity fatigue, because not only is identity perceived to be ambiguous and disputed, but also as imposed. This is particularly relevant to the antagonism between Hellenocentrists and Cyprocentrists, which many participants understood was part of political elites’ own struggles for power and distanced themselves from it. This indicates that a meta-reading of nationalism and identity operates at the individual level, which other studies have so far tended to subsume in their analytic frameworks.

National imaginings tend to be a political prison for the other as Appadurai (2001) argued. This study shows national imaginings may become a political prison also for the community “imagining”. Participants’ accounts exemplified how individuals perceived that they themselves, or others, could not help but hate the other given that they were in a way “programmed” to do so. The paradox is that while making these claims interviewees simultaneously noted the weakening of such perceptions and an understanding they may be constructed. In this regard, although some interviewees challenged the naturalness of national identity and belonging to a nation when discussing the Plan, they still resorted to commonly held ideas of how a nation is or should be. For example, to understand if they belong to a nation, interviewees referred to what they considered as established nation-states, like the French nation/state. However, such nation-state prototypes did not always provide adequate answers and some participants challenged not only their own national identities but also whether a homogenized nation may exist at all in the world.

Some No participants experienced the Plan and the prospect of a solution as a great surprise that disrupted their routines. Their inability to accommodate such sudden change subsequently led them to support building a wall or other physical division as an acceptable alternative. Such perceptions provide evidence that division had become a relatively normalized situation in the pre-2004 period. The presentation of the Plan and the potential of reunification prompted them to
consciously consider, which some admitted doing for the very first time, whether or not they wanted to change. In this regard, some No participants perceived that the particular Plan would lead to a new period of danger and vulnerability for the Greek-Cypriot community, which some of the editorials studied also claimed. Others perceived that any Plan could be catastrophic and declared that they preferred the current status quo. Probably this normalization relates to how even though there was complete partition from 1974 until 2003 it was also a period of economic prosperity and peace despite certain sporadic acts of bicommmunal violence which never escalated. Many participants stated that division actually worked out well for them because it provided a sense of safety. The opening of the crossing points in 2003 prompted two reactions. Some have quietly accepted that the communities are coexisting again, which is also somewhat normalized regardless of the lack of an official settlement, and others have ideas about wall-building, which also surfaced as a result of the Plan’s proposed solution.

Yes and No voters appeared to share a consensus that the Annan period was a confusing time and that many did not understand the Plan. In this regard, they considered the media and politicians responsible for creating the polarization of the 2004 referenda. Most participants considered the media to be part of the political and economic establishment, and therefore, they were not surprised that media were biased in 2004. Those perceptions confirmed their belief that the mainstream media in Cyprus are not free agents in general, but that they are the spokespersons of the political and economic establishment. Few respondents said that they expected the media to act as a “watchdog” to challenge the status quo or to hold those in power to account, and some participants rejected the option of being informed by mainstream media: radio, television and newspapers. This can be interpreted more as an act of resistance rather than withdrawal. Although they perceived knowledge as empowering, they deemed media content to be disempowering because they believed that it is infused with propaganda and biases: Media manipulate rather than
inform, particularly in conflict-ridden contexts characterized by polarization and calls for national unity.

**Synthesis: Media and Interview Analysis.** The two parts of the study contribute to an understanding of the uses of the state as a nationalist symbol during the Annan period. Specifically, we see in the thesis how the state assumed the role of a symbolic wall; the state was imagined to simultaneously safeguard order and to cement the boundaries of we. Subsequently, the press as well as participants often used the idea of the state to create enemies of anyone who supported the Plan. The way the media wrote or spoke about Turkish-Cypriots contributed to erecting this wall as, on the one hand, the Turkish and the Turkish-Cypriot side were criticized for suggesting ideas to dissolve the RoC and therefore to demolish the state’s institutions and international legitimacy, which protected the Greek-Cypriots from Turkish aggression. On the other hand, editorials and other opinion pieces said that RoC gave Turkish-Cypriots the “privilege” to be citizens as proof of Cyprus’s bicommunal status not because the “law” says so, but because they and we are Cypriots, which shows that some commentators recognized a shared Cypriotness.

The state was not conceptualised in this thesis along legalistic lines or as an aid to hold back community antagonisms, but also as a symbol, for postcolonial Greek-Cypriots, of statehood that brought prosperity without dependence on a “motherland”. Focusing on newspapers across the political spectrum and across Yes and No positions we see the reproduction of elite-oriented beliefs embedded in the state recognition discourse and that the media have come to present these interests and beliefs as those of the “nation”. The fear that the Plan would dissolve the state and that it would be catastrophic had salience. Participants confirmed that state legitimization did not emerge only because it is internationally recognized but also because it appeared to fulfil its main obligations to the citizenry and because it operated in conditions of stability and lack of conflict.

Newspaper editorials analysed provide evidence of a struggle to win the “Annan Plan battle” often by taking a “national” view. Editorials and opinion pieces also used ideas about the “nation”
to construct arguments to signify that the Plan was either “evil” or unpatriotic or it was an opportunity to end Cyprus’s long-lasting division. While the different newspapers competed to win the communication “battle” over the Plan in 2002 to 2004, about 10 years later, the study’s participants reflected of the Plan and the overall Annan period as another conflict for power among political elites, which once more used ideas of national belonging as a pretext to gain or hold on to power. Therefore, we see that although the press tried to construct a national consensus on the Plan, participants insisted that different and often very conflicting perceptions existed and still do within the Greek-Cypriot community regarding the solution. Many participants said that the Annan period revealed that part of the Greek-Cypriot political establishment and perhaps individuals do not want a solution. Such perceptions support the argument that the said period made people question the value of reunification, which in the press studied in 2002/2004 it had been a taken for granted collective aspiration of Greek-Cypriots. The interview analysis has shown recurrent perceptions among participants about subjective economic criteria and group interests which also played a significant role in referenda votes but also expressed ideas that a part of the Greek-Cypriot establishment may not want a solution.

Nevertheless, the diversity of views expressed by participants indicates that attempts to homogenize the supporters and the opponents of the Plan as two distinct ideological and opposed camps were an oversimplification. In particular, the media analysis shows the opponents of the Plan were a fragmented group in 2004, and analysis of the interviews also indicates conflictual perceptions within a across the Yes and No participants in the present day. We can make this conclusion specifically when considering that the Plan’s supporters shared more reasons for voting Yes.

The two empirical studies drew on insights from nationalism studies and media studies that claim external threats or when the “other” makes threats is important for the construction of national identities and the mobilization of nationalist feelings. Our results confirm this in that the
press constructed national identities vis-à-vis perceived threats from external “others” but also from within the Greek-Cypriot community. In effect, the two studies show that choosing one fear over other(s) in relation to the Plan is associated with perceptions of who we are and who the other is. During the Annan period, Cypriots had to either vote Yes or No on the Plan – a decision associated with certain risks, fears and threats. Newspapers and participants who had been opposed to the Plan argued that the Plan would leave Greek-Cypriots in a dangerous and vulnerable position, thus indicating their understanding that they were more protected during the period of division.

Beyond the Annan Plan: Limitations and future work. The thesis in answering the two central research questions guiding the study, puts forward a claim and an assumption for further investigation. The claim manifested in the analytical chapters is that Cyprocentrism and Hellenocentrism were not antithetical during the Annan Period. The assumption is that perhaps this is evidence that in the future, exclusionary and inclusionary tendencies within Cypriotism are more likely to become antagonistic. The exclusionary form tends to focus on civic identity to exclude other communities, not necessarily the Turkish-Cypriots who are in a way often included in this imagining as their presence fortifies the sovereignty of the state. On the other hand, inclusionary Cypriotism, despite emphasizing Cypriotness, remains tolerant towards others. Nevertheless, emphasis on the state should be addressed in other contexts as not merely related to a “civic” identity but also a cultural one. This could form the focus of future research on nationalism, national identities and identifications in Cyprus.

Based on the two studies the dissertation has provided evidence allowing to built a general argument which goes beyond the specific research questions to claim that referenda votes cannot be taken as representative of a particular ideological or “national” perspective. Instead, the post-facto analysis reveals individual and conflicting approaches. More importantly perhaps, both empirical studies provide evidence that one cannot claim the Greek-Cypriot community is in agreement on a solution. By contrast, the study has revealed that the officially accepted idea of a solution which
was by then perhaps taken for granted to be what the nation wanted fell apart and resulted in different forms and alliances.

In this regard, the study has shown that in-depth exploration of smaller samples, despite inherent limitations related to the potential for generalizations, contributes to unravelling the ambiguity, the multipolarity and dissent from otherwise presumed consensus, particularly on so-called national issues. A key strength of this study is that it focused on the Greek-Cypriot community and reveals complexity within this community on a predominantly “national” issue. Yet, being limited to one community, the study has prompted questions about how the media of other communities may have constructed national identities during the said period. These questions can be addressed particularly in relation to the Turkish-Cypriot community.

A major drawback in media research in Cyprus, acknowledged by other researchers, is that it remains divided along ethnic lines as scholars tend to focus on one community or the other and only rarely do studies shed light on the situation in both. For example, it would be interesting if further research focused on media constructions of national identity in both communities for periods which either precede the 2004 referenda or which followed. It would also be useful to compare the findings of this thesis with studies focusing on other periods as this would allow to determine whether and how national identity constructions in the press evolve over time. In addition, future studies could focus on other Cypriot communities, the “expandable” as Constantinou (2009, p. 36) called them and which are marginalized by the dominant communities. This would be interesting in relation to both empirical studies: the media and qualitative interviews.

The study has justified its focus on newspapers espousing different political opinions. Specifically, we claim that this approach allows for a rich data sample. Still, the data corpus was richer in relation to positions within the Right, as the majority of the daily newspapers of that period are politically Right-leaning. Consequently, the analysis focused more on the right-wing’s national identity constructions and the complexity and divisions therein, breaking down homogenized
approaches on the national identity-political identity nexus. However, the thesis has not done the same concerning the Left. In this regard a future study could include data from other Leftist media, for example, the AKEL-affiliated ASTRA Radio station which reportedly adopted a positive stance towards the Plan and arguably was differentiated from Haravgi. In general, by focusing on the press the study left untouched other media forms, such as electronic media which would provide a wider spectrum of positions. In the current context, a study on national identity constructions and the Cyprus settlement must consider the expansion of social media like Facebook and Twitter.

Finally, it would also be interesting to address the 2004 referenda within the research tradition of political participation. While conducting interviews in the field, relevant questions arose about how and in what ways participation at the referendum in its own right interrelates or has an effect on Cypriot political culture in general. The analysis only touched the surface of such questions and it would be significant for a future study to focus exclusively on them.
Annex I

Information on Participants

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<th>Gender M/F</th>
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Note: All names have been changed.
### Annex II

**Titles and Dates of Publication of Editorials and Lead Commentaries**

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<th>Title</th>
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<td>1: Doesn’t this bother you Mr. Christophia? [Αυτό δεν σας ενοχλεί κ. Χριστόφια;]</td>
<td>17 November 2002</td>
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<td>2: The hope that lights our path [Η ευχή που φωτίζει το δρόμο μας]</td>
<td>15 December 2002</td>
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<td>3: Unacceptable suspicions and accusations [Ανεπίτρεπτες καχυποψίες και κατηγορίες]</td>
<td>23 February 2003</td>
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<td>4: Utilisation, not exploitation [Αξιοποίηση και όχι εκμετάλλευση]</td>
<td>29 April 2003</td>
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<td>6: Bilateral Obligation [Αμφίπλευρη Υποχρέωση]</td>
<td>15 February 2004</td>
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<td>7: The historic one-way [Ο ιστορικός μονόδρομος]</td>
<td>22 February 2004</td>
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<td>8: The new international interference [Η νέα διεθνής παρεμβολή]</td>
<td>29 February 2004</td>
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<td>9: The rampant rejectionist distortion [Η ανεξέλεγκτη απορριπτική διαστρέβλωση]</td>
<td>28 March 2004</td>
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<td>10: A huge question [Ένα πελώριο ερώτημα]</td>
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<td>11: The new warning by Powell and the tricks of the Presidential (Palace) [Η νέα προειδοποίηση Πάουελ και τα κόλπα του Προεδρικού]</td>
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<td>12: The day after [Η επόμενη μέρα]</td>
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<td>13: The last word has not been said [Η τελευταία λέξη δεν ειπώθηκε]</td>
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<td>14: Awaiting for the UN Secretary General [Αναμένοντας τον Γ.Γ. των Ηνωμένων Εθνών]</td>
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<td>15: Free movement and CSE77 [Ελεύθερη διακίνηση και ΧΑΚ!]</td>
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<td>16: Hostages of a velvety… terrorism [Ομηροί μας βελούδινης … τρομοκρατίας.]</td>
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<td>17: Confronting history [Αντιμέτωποι με την ιστορία]</td>
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77 Cyprus Stock Exchange
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<td>Read the Annan plan [Διαβάστε το σχέδιο Ανάν]</td>
<td>28 February 2004</td>
<td>Politis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Impressions [Οι εντυπώσεις]</td>
<td>27 March 2004</td>
<td>Politis</td>
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<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Vindicated today and tomorrow [Δικαιωμένοι στο σήμερα και στο αύριο]</td>
<td>17 April 2004</td>
<td>Politis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>[We say] NO to postponement! [ΟΧΙ στην αναβολή!]</td>
<td>13 April 2004</td>
<td>Simerini</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>The sauce of nibbling… [Η σάλτσα του φαγώματος...</td>
<td>17 November 2002</td>
<td>Simerini</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>By the rules of Europe [Με τους κανόνες της Ευρώπης]</td>
<td>15 December 2002</td>
<td>Simerini</td>
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<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Ottoman bazaar… [Οθωμανικό παζάρι…]</td>
<td>23 February 2003</td>
<td>Simerini</td>
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<td>41</td>
<td>If Denktash is not outflanked… [Αν δεν υπερφαλαγγιστεί ο]</td>
<td>29 April 2003</td>
<td>Simerini</td>
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<td>42</td>
<td>Open Fronts [Ανοικτά μέτωπα...]</td>
<td>21 December 2003</td>
<td>Simerini</td>
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<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Tragic Irony [Τραγική Ειρωνεία]</td>
<td>15 February 2004</td>
<td>Simerini</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Apartheid state [Κράτος απαρτχάιντ]</td>
<td>22 February 2004</td>
<td>Simerini</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Before the referendum [Πριν από το δημοψήφισμα]</td>
<td>29 February 2004</td>
<td>Simerini</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>[We say] No to blackmail [Όχι στους εκβιασμούς]</td>
<td>28 March 2004</td>
<td>Simerini</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Mitsotakis strikes again!... [Ο Μητσοτάκης ξανακτυπά!...]</td>
<td>18 April 2004</td>
<td>Simerini</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>We have to find the required convergences [Πρέπει να βρούμε αναγκαίες συγκλίσεις]</td>
<td>17 November 2002</td>
<td>Phileleftheros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Part of the European scene [Ως μέρος πλέον του Ευρωπαϊκού γίγνεσθαι.]</td>
<td>15 December 2002</td>
<td>Phileleftheros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>If compelled to say 'no' [Εάν αναγκασθούμε να πούμε και «όχι»]</td>
<td>23 February 2003</td>
<td>Phileleftheros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Being aware of the high risks [Με συνείδηση των μεγάλων κινδύνων]</td>
<td>30 April 2003</td>
<td>Phileleftheros</td>
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<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Now it is the time for decisions [Τώρα είναι η ώρα των αποφάσεων]</td>
<td>21 December 2003</td>
<td>Phileleftheros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Being on the side of the President with prudence and wisdom [Με σύνεση και σωφροσύνη στο πλευρό του Προέδρου.]</td>
<td>15 February 2004</td>
<td>Phileleftheros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>A solution to the thorny issue of the economy [Λύση στο ακανθώδες ζήτημα της οικονομίας.]</td>
<td>22 February 2004</td>
<td>Phileleftheros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Campaigning the EU to safeguard accession [Εκστρατεία στην Ε.Ε. για προάσπιση της ένταξης]</td>
<td>29 February 2004</td>
<td>Phileleftheros</td>
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<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>The United Nations should give peace a chance [Τα Ην. Έθνη να δώσουν ευκαιρία στην ειρήνη.]</td>
<td>13 April 2004</td>
<td>Phileleftheros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>A guarantee of solution and safety [Εγγύηση της λύσης και της ασφάλειας]</td>
<td>18 April 2004</td>
<td>Phileleftheros</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex III

Nvivo Initial Coding – Conceptual Map: Referendum Stance and National Identifications

Nvivo Initial Coding – Conceptual Map: Perceptions on the Ideological Role of the Media
Annex IV

Interview Guide

Each interview had as a starting point the Annan Plan and began with a general introductory question, such as What was your stance on the Plan? or Do you remember what or if you voted at the referendum? The questions which followed this general question depended on the answer provided by each participant. Therefore each interview took different paths without losing sight of the general themes that it aimed to explore and which are referenced in this guide. For example for the National Guard officers a set of additional questions/areas of interest was prepared which concerned the following: memories of discussions at workspace and information received [or not] regarding their employment status in the event of a solution.

Additionally, during the interview the aim was to collect basic demographic information on each participant (age, place of origin, education, displaced/ non-displaced status, political affiliation [Left/Right/Center etc]-see Anne I Table 4).

Theme 1: Personal stance in 2004 and Self-Justification (starting event)

Introductory Question: What did you vote at the referendum? Why? Try to asses using open-ended questions the following points:

- If s/he considers 2004 an important period of his/her life.
- If s/he held the same stance from the beginning [i.e. when the first plan was presented] or did you decide during the referendum period. Why?]
- Ideas whether the Plan was “unfair”

Theme 2: Self/ identification and Intercommunal Relations

If this question was not answered unprompted the participant would be prompted to discuss the following:
- What do you usually say when you are asked to identify yourself in this way-Greek/Cypriot etc? Do you like this question?

- Did you cross the checkpoints when they were first opened? Why? Do you cross now?
  For what reasons?

- Who is a Cypriot?

- Experiences with the Turkish-Cypriot community: Context/ Negative/ Positive

- Did you ever personally meet a TC/GC? Under which circumstances? Before/ After 1974? How often? What kind of relationship did you develop? What are/ were your impressions?

**Theme 3: Media Role/ Power**

- Did you read newspapers during that period? A particular one? Do you still read the same newspaper? Did you read the same newspaper before the referendums and after?

- What did you think of the coverage provided to the plan at that time? [balanced-useful-one-sided]

- Do you have any further comments on the press and the media in general?
  - Do you remember what you were doing during President Papadopoulos’ televised speech?
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280


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Αν δεν υπερφαλαγγιστεί ο Ντεκτάς... [If Denktash is not outflanked...]. (2003, April 29). *Simerini*, p.1.


Εάν αναγκασθούμε να πούμε και «όχι». [If compelled to say 'no']. (2003, February 23). *

*Phileleftheros*, p. 3.


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*Alithia*, p. 1.
Με συνείδηση των μεγάλων κινδύνων [Being aware of the high risks]. (2003, April 30).
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Πρέπει να βρούμε αναγκαίες συγκλίσεις [We have to find the required convergences]. (17 November 2002). Phileleftheros, p. 3.


Σε κοιτούν 9000 χρόνια Ιστορίας [9000 years of History are staring at you]. (2004, April 17).

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